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Aim and Scope

The Journal of Defence and Security is a publication of the Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security (MiDAS). The journal publishes original papers and reviews covering all aspects of defence and security. It is a platform to promote awareness on the capabilities and requirements of modern defence & security technologies and policies, covering topics in the areas of, but not limited to, Evolution of Military Information & Communication Systems, Smart Weapons, Military Engineering, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance, Biological & Chemical Terrorism Countermeasures, Personnel Protection & Performance, Military Medicine, Emergent Naval Technology, Defence & Security and Strategic Management.

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DIVIDING THE KOREAN PENINSULA: THE RHETORIC OF THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the prospects of inter-Korean reconciliation during the George W. Bush administration and argues that in its rhetoric and discourse, the US framed South Korea as an ally and partner against North Korea, while imagining the North as part of the “axis of evil” and a threat to international security. This framing of North and South Korea as unalterable opposites made possible a situation where warming inter-Korean relations were disrupted. The paper will use rhetoric from two events to illustrate its argument – the 2001 US-South Korea summit and the 2004 US Presidential Elections campaign. In both case studies, three themes were evident in the Bush administration’s rhetoric: the construction of an US-and-allies Self against a North Korean Other, the emphasis on the US’ necessary presence in Northeast Asia, and the expression of scepticism over North Korea’s intentions.

Keywords: *US, North Korea, South Korea, George W. Bush, Sunshine policy*

INTRODUCTION

Along with cross-Taiwan Strait relations and interstate territorial disputes, the divided Korean peninsula is one of the potential flashpoints in Northeast Asia. Given that the peninsula is where the interests of global and regional powers intersect, the process of Korean reunification is likely to shape regional and global dynamics. There are four ways which reunification can occur: by military force, by absorption when one side collapses, by trusteeship, or by reaching a consensus between the two Koreas [1]. South Koreans have rejected reunification by absorption or by force in light of the potentially high costs [2], and reunification by trusteeship is not a popular option since it harks back to the “bad memories” of US and USSR occupation of a divided Korea after World War II [3]. This leaves reunification by consensus, which involves inter-Korean reconciliation.

Inter-Korean relations made significant progress under South Korea’s policy of engagement, also known as the Sunshine policy [4], from 1998 to 2008. Notably, two inter-Korean summits were held, in 2000 and 2007, involving the leaders of both sides. However, progress in inter-Korean relations were disrupted on at least two specific occasions – in 2001 and 2004 – after remarks made by officials of the President George W. Bush administration on the situation in the Korean peninsula. Traditional International Relations (IR) theory, such as neorealism, seems unable to fully account for these

developments. According to neorealist tenets, the relationship between North and South Korea should take the form of hostility and military competition. While such sentiments were occasionally present during the Sunshine policy years, North and South Korea were at the same time moving significantly toward reconciliation. Meanwhile, the US was an important external actor that was always in close consultation with South Korea on the North, thus playing an influential role in inter-Korean relations. This paper does not aim to assert the irrelevance of neorealism. Instead, it suggests that an analysis of US rhetoric can supplement neorealism to account for the state of inter-Korean relations during the Bush era. The issue with traditional IR theory is its reliance on structure, making the concepts of national interests and security threats “indeterminate” [5]. As Jutta Weldes writes, realism “cannot help us to explain the adoption by a state of particular policies over alternative means for achieving security” [6]. What is lacking is “the centrality of processes of interpretation” [7] in which actor agency plays a key role. The interpretation process depends largely on the prevailing discourse and beliefs of policy-makers.

This paper offers the argument that in the Bush administration’s inter-Korean discourse, the US framed South Korea as an ally and partner against North Korea, while imagining the North as part of the “axis of evil” and a threat to international security. This framing indicates that the US, an important actor in inter-Korean issues, saw North and South Korea as unalterable opposites, and this subsequently affected the reconciliation process. The paper will examine the rhetoric of Bush administration officials in two case studies – the 2001 US-South Korea summit and the 2004 US Presidential Elections campaign – and show how the rhetoric made possible a situation where warming inter-Korean relations were disrupted. The next section of the paper establishes the importance of the US in inter-Korean affairs, followed by a discussion of how the understanding of US interests in the Korean peninsula can be supplemented by discourse analysis. Subsequently, US rhetoric in the abovementioned case studies will be examined. The conclusion offers implications arising from the findings of this paper.

US INFLUENCE IN INTER-KOREAN AFFAIRS

Most scholars generally agree that the US is the most influential external actor in inter-Korean relations. On the other hand, China did not have as much influence as the US over inter-Korean affairs during the Bush era. Scholars also note that China’s preference for positive relationships with both North and South Korea means that Beijing avoids taking sides in inter-Korean issues [8]. Compared to the US under the Bush administration, China thus occupied a less central role in inter-Korean relations.

US involvement on the Korean peninsula stems from its military presence in South Korea, its impact on South Korea’s identity, and its role in the Six Party Talks (SPT). First, the US-South Korea security alliance binds each side to defend each other in cases of external aggression and sees US troops installed on the peninsula. Provocative acts from North Korea are often met with a US-South Korea joint response. Even during the era of the Sunshine policy, the speed of progress with regard to inter-Korean

reconciliation “depend[ed] in large part on whether the US [was] prepared to modify its role on the peninsula, especially the size and character of its military presence there” [9]. US military presence on the Korean peninsula thus exhibits a great deal of influence over the conduct of North-South relations.

Second, the security alliance with the US has shaped South Korea’s collective identity. In the patron-client relationship, the US (patron) “functions as a ‘significant other’ in forming [South Korea’s (client)] national identity” [10]. US influence on South Korean identity, as well as their shared norms, will shape how “democratic” South Korea views itself in relation to “communist” North Korea – a state which constantly proclaims anti-US sentiments. Observers note that US policy in the Korean peninsula has the ability to influence North Korea’s actions toward South Korea and affect inter-Korean ties [11].

Third, the critical role of the US in the SPT is evidenced by how negotiations had been disrupted several times when the US displayed hostility toward the North. Both South Korean presidents leading the Sunshine policy, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, had said on separate occasions that the US held a central role in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue [12]. Thus, even though the SPT is a multilateral forum, the US plays a leading part in the negotiations.

The US’ impact on South Korea’s self-perception, its military presence on the Korean peninsula, and its critical role in the SPT privilege it as an “outside insider” [13], and probably the only one, in inter-Korean issues. The prominent role of the US on the peninsula ensures that Washington remains an important variable in inter-Korean reconciliation. Indeed, scholars have identified the US, under the Bush administration, as a potential obstacle to inter-Korean reconciliation [14]. The divergence between US and South Korean attitudes toward the North was thus likely to have affected progress in inter-Korean relations.

CONSTRUCTING “REALITY” THROUGH DISCOURSE

This section will first look at how an examination of US discourse and rhetoric can supplement traditional neorealist explanations of US policy towards North and South Korea. Following that, US construction of its identity and interests on the Korean peninsula will be discussed. This paper does not aim to assert the irrelevance of neorealism. Indeed, US policy toward North Korea has seen the superpower installing troops on the Korean peninsula and expressing wariness at the actions of the Kim regime – all in line with neorealist tenets. However, a wholly material account cannot fully explain why a state chooses a particular policy over other options. The prevailing discourse surrounding the decision-making process must also be considered.

The dominance of neorealism in international politics is linked to the preoccupation with structure, which predicts recurrent patterns of state behaviour and outcomes [15]. According to Alexander Wendt, structure in neorealist theory is “made only of a

distribution of material capabilities”, which neglects the input from “social relationships” [16]. A purely material view of “global politics does not consider the role of agency, which can also account substantially for the actions of states. Foreign policies are not merely a function of material capabilities and structure, but how these capabilities are perceived and understood within a particular framework. The process of interpretation is influenced by the prevailing discourse, which helps to identify who a state’s “enemies” and “friends” are. For example, even though North Korea is not considered a major power in the conventional sense, its “proximity to the strategic field of play ... its relative asymmetrical military capabilities, and its coercive leverage strategy” have allowed it to “exercise bargaining power disproportionate to its aggregate structural power in the US-DPRK asymmetric conflict and negotiations” [17]. The concept of a “threat” depends on the intersubjective understanding among policy-makers. The construction of national interests and threats is hence worth studying as a variable in foreign policy-making, as it supplements neorealist theory with the explanation of how developments or events were made possible. It is through looking at the discourse and rhetoric of the Bush administration that one can understand the US worldview in relation to the Korean peninsula.

Discourse analysis involves examining the “structure and function” of language or texts [18]. Discourse is never independent of its reality; rather, it is mutually constitutive with the factors that shape it [19]. Through this interaction, a text (re)shapes and (re)constructs itself into a seemingly natural, coherent and logical narrative that is taken as reflective of the current situation. This paper offers two reasons for the adoption of discourse analysis, focusing on rhetoric, in this paper.

First, language is rooted in cultural and social contexts, and makes up reality as we know it. Language provides interpretive structures and attaches connotations to what are essentially arbitrary and abstract terms. The meanings of words are formed and understood through the interaction of societal customs and texts. Ideology, as a “coherent set of ideas and beliefs adhered to by a group of people that provides an organised and systematic representation of the world about which they can agree” [20], plays an essential role in language. Since language occupies a performative role, it not only reflects meaning, but also produces meaning. The production of meaning indicates the Foucauldian power relations inherent in the discourse – which narrative emerges as dominant depends on who is at the top of the hierarchy [21]. This self-legitimising technique assigns labels built on binary oppositions to actors, where the Other is typically placed in an inferior position to the Self.

Second, an examination of policy-makers’ rhetoric allows analysts to account for the choosing of one policy option over others. Weldes and David Campbell argue that national interests and dangers to national security are concepts that emerge from a process of social construction and interpretation, premised on common beliefs among policy-makers and a state’s self-perception of its identity [22]. Such an approach focuses on how the “discursive spaces”, such as “concepts, categories, metaphors, models, and analogies”, make it possible for a particular situation to arise [23]. It is through such a

process that certain knowledge about the world comes to be taken as given and logical by a particular group of people. Accordingly, the idea of a “North Korean threat” to international stability cannot be sustained outside the discourse. Danger is not constituted purely through material factors; ideational variables are equally important in forming policies toward “enemies” and “allies”.

In assuming a self-identity that portrays it as the leader of the free world, it is already in the US’ interest to assist other states in their transition to democracy, and hence freedom. A democratic South Korea is an “ally” of the US; a communist North Korea is a “threat” which must be subverted. By constructing security on such binary terms, North Korea has become the “rogue *par excellence* ... the one that lies outside the sphere of good and is to be watched, contained and controlled” [24]. The responsibility of policing North Korea would, naturally, fall to the US and its allies, the ones inside the “sphere of good”. However, this Manichean perspective of the Korean peninsula pits the South against its Northern neighbour. The US constructs the North and South as unalterable opposites – an “enemy” and “ally” respectively. The US-South Korea alliance is reinforced by the presence of the “threatening” North Korea, which in turn feeds back into deepening the division on the Korean peninsula. Given that the US is an influential actor in inter-Korean affairs, reconciliation between the two Koreas can be affected by US rhetoric.

In examining the rhetoric and discourse of the Bush administration on both Koreas, this paper will apply the concepts of presupposition, predication and subject positioning. Presupposition is a “textual mechanism that creates background knowledge and in doing so constructs a particular kind of world in which certain things are recognised as true” [25]. For example, a statement such as “South Korea is working towards the goal of a reunified Korean peninsula” presupposes that ‘South Korea’ and the divided “Korean peninsula” exist, and “South Korea” wants “reunification”. Predication is the act of “attaching various labels to subjects” [26], such as a “democratic” US being seen as a “responsible” state, while “communist” North Korea is “threatening”. Subject positioning refers to the establishment of relationships among subjects [27], in which the Other is perceived to be inferior to the Self. Using these three techniques, this paper will show that the Bush administration’s rhetoric has affected inter-Korean reconciliation.

This paper will focus on US rhetoric about the Korean peninsula arising from two events: the US-South Korea summit in March 2001 and the US Presidential Elections campaign in 2004. Prior to the events in the two case studies, relations between North Korea, South Korea and the US had been relatively smooth. Reflective of the buoyant mood characterising North-South relations, a study by South Korea’s Youth Development Institute in 2000 found that 61.3 percent of those surveyed predicted that reunification would occur within ten years, while another 26.5 percent predicted reunification within 20 years [28]. Another survey conducted in September 2002 by the same institute found that 63.7 percent of the respondents wanted a “peaceful and gradual unification”, as compared to reunification by absorption of the North or by force [29]. During the early 2000s, inter-Korean reconciliation was progressing, and South Korea’s policy

of engagement had been relatively well received by North Korea. The thaw in North-South relations under Kim Dae-jung and Roh raised the prospects for inter-Korean reconciliation, but this progress was affected by rhetoric from the Bush administration. The two case studies will be discussed in the next section.

BUSH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS' RHETORIC ON NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA

Both case studies will first describe the warming inter-Korean relations before US officials passed uncomplimentary remarks on North Korea. Each case study will focus on several speeches which highlight US discourse involving the Korean peninsula, and show that US rhetoric created an environment which disrupted progressive inter-Korean ties.

Case Study 1: 2001 US-South Korea Summit

Ahead of the Bush-Kim summit, relations among South Korea, North Korea and the US had undergone some positive shifts. The North-South Joint Declaration emerging from an inter-Korean summit in June 2000 between Kim Jong-il and Kim Dae-jung in Pyongyang stated that both sides would “promote reunification” and “consolidate mutual trust” [30]. Key ministerial talks were subsequently scheduled for mid-March 2001 to discuss a potential visit by Kim Jong-il to Seoul [31]. Meanwhile, in what was seen as the “clearest sign yet” that the Bush administration wanted to engage with North Korea, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said on 6 March that the US wanted “to pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off” [32]. In response to the new Bush administration, a North Korean Foreign Ministry spokesman said that North Korea was “fully ready to cope with whatever stand” the US would adopt, adding that North Korea “appreciate[d] the progress so far made in the bilateral ties through negotiations with [the] US” [33]. Separately, attempts to smooth over US-South Korea relations were quickly made following Kim Dae-jung’s joint communiqué with Russian President Vladimir Putin endorsing the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in February 2001. Both the US and South Korea downplayed the significance of the communiqué, with South Korean officials reiterating their support of the US [34]. Thus, by the time Kim Dae-jung met with Bush on 7 March 2001, US-South Korea relations were on the mend.

At the Bush-Kim meeting, Bush publicly declared support for Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine policy, and both presidents affirmed that inter-Korean reconciliation was important for regional peace and stability [35]. This section will focus on remarks made by Bush during a joint press conference with Kim Dae-jung after their meeting, and Powell’s comments to the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee on 8 March. Sentiments from the statements can be categorised under three themes: the Self consisting of the US and its allies against a North Korean Other, the necessity of the US presence in Northeast Asia, and scepticism over North Korea.

First, US rhetoric drew a clear line separating itself and South Korea from the North. In particular, Bush expressed hope that the Sunshine policy would “convince the North Koreans that we are peaceful people and that they need not be fearful about the intentions of America and of the Republic of Korea, that we want the peace” [36]. Here, Bush presupposed that North Korea was “fearful” of the US and South Korea, creating the image of the US and its allies as a global force “fear[ed]” and respected by other states. The statement further predicated that “we”, which encompassed the US and South Korea, were “peaceful” states. If the US and South Korea wanted peace, then “they”, the North, would be seen as disrupting the peace with its actions. Bush also appeared to have firm ideas about what would help the Korean peninsula achieve peace – specifically “the idea of trade, flows of capital ... open dialogue [and] reunification of families” [37]. Bush privileged liberal market ideals over other types of economic systems, in effect acknowledging that the free trade system should be the only type of economy that states should adopt to achieve peace. In this context that Bush constructed, North Korea, with its rejection of the Western market ideals, was inherently a threat to stability. In this sense, North Korea remained inferior to South Korea and the US because it had failed to attain a perceived higher stage of political and economic development. Bush’s discourse on North Korea ran parallel to Powell’s comments to the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee on 8 March. Powell labelled North Korea as a “failed society that has to somehow begin opening if it is not to collapse ... once it’s open, it may well collapse anyway” [38]. Here, Powell made several assumptions about what constituted a successful or failed state. To the US and its allies, North Korea had “failed” against their measures; however, to the North Korean leadership bent on regime survival, the state had actually managed to achieve its top political objective. Such remarks might have had the effect of further isolating the Kim Jong-il regime since the latter clearly lay outside of what the US believed a responsible state should be.

Second, Bush’s statements stressed the importance of the US on the Korean peninsula: “with the right alliance and right formulation of policy, hopefully, it will achieve the peace that we all want” [39]. Clearly, Bush was referring to the US-South Korea alliance as the one to uphold, and the measures adopted by US and South Korean policy-makers as the ones to follow. Bush had positioned the US and South Korea higher on the moral scale compared to North Korea. Such remarks affirmed the necessity of the US-South Korea alliance, and denied South Korea agency in working toward inter-Korean reconciliation on its own. Implicitly, the US was recognised in that statement as an integral actor exerting a positive influence on the Korean peninsula to counter the “threatening” North Korea.

Third, Bush displayed cynicism over the intentions of North Korea. Noting that there was “not very much transparency” in the Kim Jong-il regime, Bush expressed “scepticism about whether or not we can verify an agreement in a country that doesn’t enjoy the freedom that our two countries [the US and South Korea] understand – [they] don’t have the free press like we have here in America” [40]. Here, North Korea was constructed as an unknowable entity, in opposition to the “free” US and South Korea. The assumption was that a closed state could not possess good intentions. Bush additionally

expressed unease over “the fact that the North Koreans are shipping weapons around the world” [41]. What Bush did not explicitly say, but was embedded in his message, was that a “rogue state” like North Korea would naturally have offensive intentions. Similarly, Powell called Kim Jong-il a “despot” [42] in his Senate address, constructing a hierarchical relationship in which the US was morally superior to the “despotic, broken” [43] North Korea. The boundaries differentiating a good/bad leader and successful/failed state thus reinforced the US’ image of North Korea as a “threat” to international stability. It is in this context that the Bush administration’s harsh policy toward North Korea can be understood. Since the North did not appear to reciprocate the US and South Korea’s “peaceful” intentions and its behaviour lay outside the norms of the international community, there was no point in accommodating the Kim regime. In constructing North Korea, the Bush administration in turn constructed the US and South Korea in opposition to the North, reinforcing the latter’s isolation and impeding inter-Korean reconciliation.

Despite the relatively hostile rhetoric emanating from the US, Kim Dae-jung said a day after meeting with Bush that North Korea, which seemed to be gradually engaging with other states, was going through a change which was “wondrous and full of meaning” [44]. He added that “the ice has begun to melt in the last remaining Cold War on Earth” [45]. Kim also played down the differing views held by the US and South Korea on North Korea [46]. Regardless, North Korea reacted strongly to the Bush administration’s rhetoric during the summit, and following the US-South Korea meeting, displayed “indifference toward improving inter-Korean relations” [47]. Six days after the Bush-Kim meeting on 13 March, North Korea announced that it would postpone the fifth round of high-level talks with South Korea scheduled to plan for Kim Jong-il’s potential visit to Seoul [48]. Although no reason was given for the postponement, observers speculated that North Korea was unhappy with Bush’s hardline stance and scepticism of the regime [49]. The postponement of the talks meant that the progress of inter-Korean reconciliation was halted. Meanwhile, the North Korean Workers’ Party newspaper, *Rodong Sinmun*, published an editorial on 15 March criticising the Bush administration for its “aggressive hostile policy” [50]. It acknowledged that “a sign of détente” had emerged in the Korean peninsula, but said that the US was “a stumbling block in the way of peace and reunification” [51]. To North Korea, the Bush administration’s hostility only served to intensify the tensions between the North and South. In this instance, US rhetoric created an environment which challenged warming inter-Korean relations. A similar trajectory of events occurred during the 2004 US Presidential Elections campaign, leading to a ten-month delay in convening the fourth round of the SPT.

Case Study 2: 2004 US Presidential Elections Campaign

Since Roh took over the presidency in 2003, inter-Korean relations had been improving. Roh continued Kim Dae-jung’s policy of engagement with North Korea, and inter-Korean economic relations flourished with cooperation on projects such as the Kaesong Industrial Complex and the Mount Kumgang Tourism Zone [52]. During a seminar commemorating the fourth anniversary of the 2000 inter-Korean summit, North Korea’s chief delegate to the seminar delivered a “personal message” to Roh from Kim

Jong-il, who said that “South and North Korea need to continue the current favourable atmosphere between them to greatly develop inter-Korean relations” [53]. The outcome of the third round of the SPT in June 2004 had received mixed reactions from the media and observers. Some felt that there had been no progress in the discussions, especially in light of news that North Korea had tested a short-range missile just before the talks begun [54]. However, others noted that both the US and North Korea had “assumed more sincere and compromising attitudes” during the talks; notably, the US offered to provide North Korea with “energy aid and a security guarantee in exchange for ending its nuclear programme”, a shift from its previous insistence on a “complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantling” of the North’s nuclear programmes before making concessions [55]. The parties involved also agreed to hold the fourth round of talks by September 2004 [56]. Meanwhile, the US in June 2004 announced plans to downsize its military presence in South Korea, but it also declared a US\$11 billion upgrade of South Korea’s defence capabilities [57]. The US additionally dismissed concern about South Korea’s past secret nuclear experiments [58]. North Korea was unhappy with both the US’ “double standards” [59] in handling the South’s nuclear issue and the US\$11 billion “arms buildup plan” [60] on the Korean peninsula. These events set the context for the hostility that emerged when Bush officials’ passed uncomplimentary remarks about North Korea in their campaign speeches.

This section will focus on three speeches – two by Bush addressing voters in Wisconsin on 18 August 2004, and in Michigan on 13 September as well as US Secretary of State-Designate Condoleezza Rice’s speech to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 18 January 2005. The themes arising from these speeches can be grouped in a way similar to the first case study: the Self consisting of the US and its allies against a North Korean Other, the necessity of US alliances with states such as South Korea and Japan, and scepticism over North Korea’s intentions.

First, Bush and Rice made clear that North Korea did not belong to the same international community as the US and its allies. In an expression reminiscent of Bush’s “axis of evil” statement in his 2002 State of the Union address [61], Rice identified North Korea as one of the “outposts of tyranny” in the world [62]. In doing so, Rice presupposed that such a thing as “tyrann[ical]” behaviour exists, and such behaviour had been exhibited by North Korea. Rice’s statement had the effect of dividing the world into “good” and “bad” states, which categorised states’ intentions into either “peaceful” or “threatening”. It was a black-or-white simplification of the world, and North Korea was clearly on the “wrong” side. Likewise in his campaign speeches, Bush referred to Kim Jong-il as a “tyrant” [63]. Specifically in one address, Bush said that the SPT was important as there were “now five countries saying to the tyrant in North Korea, disarm, disarm” [64]. The predicate had become the actual signifier; “tyrant” was now a synonym for “Kim Jong-il”. Effectively, Bush had depersonalised his subject and removed from Kim his human agency. In his speeches, the other person whom Bush had referred to as a “tyrant” was Saddam Hussein. This indicated that Bush placed Kim in the same category as Saddam Hussein, which perhaps suggested that the US would not rule out invading North Korea and deposing Kim, like it had done with the former Iraqi president. The US

and its allies were thus pitted against the inferior and morally corrupt regime of “tyranny” in North Korea.

Second, Bush and Rice stressed the importance of US alliances with its partners, such as Japan and South Korea. Bush expressed gratitude for the contributions by South Korea and other allies to the coalitions for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan [65], while Rice noted that South Korea was one of the US’ “key partners in our efforts to deter common threats” [66]. By highlighting the strong ties between US and its allies, the rhetoric of Bush and Rice served to further isolate the North, effectively portraying it as the antithesis of the US and South Korea. Freedom was a recurrent theme in the speeches. Bush asserted that “freedom is the Almighty God’s gift to each man and woman in this world” [67] – reinforcing the notion that it was only natural for a state to be free. Rice declared US support for “oppressed people on every continent” [68] including the people of North Korea. This defined the US (and its allies) as a beacon for liberty – in opposition to North Korea. As the leader of the free world, the US was obligated to help the “inferior” North Korea achieve freedom for its people, returning it to its “natural” and “right” condition. Such discourse emphasised the difference between North and South Korea, and additionally implied that the South was on the “right” path, while the North was clearly on the “wrong” one.

Third, the US displayed scepticism over North Korea’s motivations. Rice called for “unit[y] in insisting that Iran and North Korea abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions, and choose instead the path of peace” [69]. As with Bush’s concern about North Korea “shipping weapons around the world” [70] in the 2001 US-South Korea summit, Rice also appeared to assume that North Korea had aggressive intentions because it was not a democratic state. Hence, the “reality” of the situation was that North Korea harboured offensive intentions and should be prevented from continuing down the path of “evil”. In its discourse, the US had constructed North and South Korea as opposites to each other. With the reiteration of themes such as freedom and morality, it was implied that North Korea had to undergo regime change before it could be included into the US-led international community – perceived by the US as a desirable outcome.

South Korea’s response to the US’ harsh rhetoric on North Korea had been relatively muted. At the end of August 2004, Seoul appeared hopeful for the resumption of the SPT, but the event did not occur in September as scheduled [71]. Regarding Rice’s “outpost of tyranny” reference, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon commented that her comments were not as hostile as Bush’s “axis of evil” speech in 2002 and expressed hope that her remarks would not undermine the progress of the SPT [72]. However, North Korea withdrew from the SPT, blaming its actions on the US’ “hostile policy” [73]. Responding to Rice’s “outpost of tyranny” remark, North Korea on 10 February 2005 announced publicly for the first time that it had nuclear weapons and reiterated its opposition to the SPT [74]. As a result, the fourth-round of the SPT only resumed in July 2005, ten months later than scheduled. Since Seoul was committed to a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue [75], US rhetoric and North Korea’s response threw a spanner into the works, derailing the progress made in inter-Korean reconciliation.

Both case studies show that the Bush administration's rhetoric generated a situation which made possible the disruption in inter-Korean relations during the Sunshine policy. North Korea's cancellation of inter-Korean talks in 2001 and the postponement of the SPT in 2004 were responses to US rhetoric that attempted to impose a certain image on it. Such an image involved the exclusion of North Korea from the US-led international community, the perception that the North had dubious intentions, and the necessity of US presence in Northeast Asia to counter North Korea. In that process, US framing of both Koreas as opposites helped to impede the reconciliation process on the Korean peninsula.

CONCLUSION

This paper has examined the rhetoric of Bush administration officials during the 2001 US-South Korea summit and the 2004 US Presidential Elections campaign. In both case studies, the Bush administration constructed the image of "North Korea" as a failed state under an irrational leadership and the Other of the US and South Korea. At the same time, it constructed "South Korea" as a democratic ally, and emphasised the necessity of the US-South Korea alliance. Since the US occupied an essential role in inter-Korean affairs, hostile rhetoric against North Korea led to a situation which challenged the inter-Korean reconciliation process. In this regard, while neorealist theory has some explanatory power over the progress of inter-Korean reconciliation, the importance of rhetoric and discourse should not be discounted. The findings of the paper offer two implications for foreign policy-making and interstate relations.

First, the process of policy-making occurs within a language framework. For the Bush administration, its policy toward the Korean peninsula was limited by its critical rhetoric on North Korea and friendly rhetoric on South Korea. The "axis of evil" and "rogue state" discourse about the Kim regime essentially narrowed the policy options available to the US – as Samuel S. Kim notes, "'evil' is something to be destroyed, not something to negotiate with" [76]. Choosing one policy option over another is largely a function of a state's existing beliefs and perceptions. Policy-making is a response not only to physical action, but also sentiments embodied in the discourse of states. It is through an examination of such discourse that intentions may be discerned. Second, a state's national interests and threats to its security are formed through a process of social construction. The concepts of national interests and security threats should not be viewed in isolation – they arise out of a complex web of negotiations, ideologies and beliefs. This accounts for why states which are not considered major powers globally may also occupy significant roles in international affairs. The Other-ing of North Korea in US discourse identifies it as a threat to US national interests, and thus justifies the necessity of its troops on the Korean peninsula. Policy-makers should be aware of how national interests and security threats have been constructed. With this understanding, they can then effectively design their strategies to achieve their policy goals.

Moving beyond the Bush administration and South Korea's Sunshine policy, the

leadership transitions in both Koreas in the recent past, as well as the second half of US President Barack Obama's term, does not seem to have had a significant impact so far on the relationship among North Korea, South Korea and the US. The success of current South Korean President Park Geun-hye's trust-building strategy with North Korea is as yet difficult to measure, as inter-Korean relations continue to fluctuate. Meanwhile, the influence of China in North Korea indicates the importance for the US to tread carefully where the Korean peninsula is concerned – should North Korea close off all communication with the US and turn completely to China, the latter could potentially supplant US dominance on the peninsula. This would adversely affect US leverage over inter-Korean affairs. It is therefore essential to be aware of the US discursive framework that surrounds the Korean peninsula, as it is through this lens that the motivations behind US policies and rhetoric towards North and South Korea can be better understood.

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SECURITY MEASURES FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL LABORATORIES

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ABSTRACT

The protection and defence of individuals, society and the community can be achieved if we consider, at the same time, both the safety and security. In fact, they are the two fundamental elements to identifying the methods and models for the prevention, management and mitigation of risks, and also to define the individual, organizational and contextual variables that can cause dangerous situations. Over the past decade, increasing risk scenarios have exposed the world to a much wider and complex vision of security and safety. For this reason, chemical and biological laboratories should be handled with special care. In fact, in these structures, many materials, products, systems and equipment are handled/stored. These can be targets for theft and sabotage, as well as information, sensitive data and dual-use capabilities. The loss or intentional release of substances and/or data can cause severe damage to the community. Hence, recently, the attention of labs has focused on those materials and agents that may have dual use; in scientific research, and in criminal or terrorist activities. Chemicals commonly present in laboratories, such as acetone and hydrogen peroxide, can be converted to highly explosive or dangerous products, while biological agents may also have dual-use, such as anthrax. In this regards, in many accredited websites, it is possible read that some terrorist groups, posing as students, access university laboratories to withdraw dangerous chemicals and harmful biological agents. Although many laboratories have already installed the minimum safety requirements, there are still many facilities that do not have adequate security and safety tools. Therefore, the integrated domains to consider for safety and security are mainly architectural, physical and operational. In addition, it must be considered that the domain of data and information that is the most vulnerable and exposed. In order to achieve an efficient and effective protection of infrastructure and staff, national and international security policies that considers, at same time, safety and security should be adopted.

Keywords: Chemical and biological laboratories; safety and security; dual-use hazard; security vulnerability assessment risk management.

INTRODUCTION

Carrying out terrorist attacks require specific skills and expertise. These competencies are available in university laboratories, public and private research laboratories, or

industries. In Britain, in 2008, the intelligence services have found that more than 100 suspected terrorists, posing as graduate and PhD students, attempted to infiltrate some chemical and nuclear labs to obtain cognitive, technological, methodological and instrumental means. Their purpose was to create weapons of mass destruction. Since 2001, bioterrorism and the use of biological agents in attacks against the population have seen a sharp rise. In fact, in this year, in the US, there was a deliberate release of spores of *Bacillus anthracis*, where 7 people died and many others were contaminated. The strain of anthrax used was Ames, one of the deadliest currently known. Experts and specialists who have been instructed to determine out the source of the event have not found an unambiguous conclusion. Some of them argued that the agent could be produced from any microbiologist with good experience and skills, and that he does not need a room with special equipment (such as a basement or garage). However, others said that the material could be produced only with highly advanced technological capabilities. What the truth is not very important, what matters is that to produce biological or chemical agents for terrorist use, engineers, chemists, microbiologists and scientists are needed and in addition, they must have adequate labs and instrumental support. [1]

Today, for all these reasons, the prevention of a chemical or biological terrorist attack is premised also on the protection of labs. However, for the safe handling and use of materials, systems and tools, it is necessary to adopt specific regulations and guidelines that aim to achieve a shared and high safety and security standards. They must take into account all the threats and risks that may cause damage to things and people. Hence, a key challenge is to improve the security of these chemicals and biological agents while ensuring they remain available for their legitimate use by researchers and industries, and also reduce the likelihood that they will be diverted for misuse for terrorist or criminal activities.

To promote effective chemical and biological security management practices throughout the supply and use chain, is important to:

- Protect against the diversion of chemicals and biological agents for terrorist or criminal purposes
- Encourage cooperation between businesses and organizations that handle these materials and law enforcement agencies on chemical and biological security matters
- Educate and train staff to be alert to warning signs and report suspicious behaviors.

The world has become more security conscious, and that awareness extends to laboratories. New guidelines and approaches, driven by legislation and regulation—to say nothing of common sense—are promulgated every year. A laboratory security system is put in place to mitigate a number of risks and is complementary to existing laboratory security policies. In very broad terms, laboratory safety keeps people safe from chemicals, and laboratory security keeps chemicals safe from people. This paper is intended to provide an overview of laboratory security concerns and to raise awareness of

the issue because a good laboratory security system should, among other things, increase overall safety for laboratory personnel and the public, improve emergency preparedness by assisting with preplanning, and lower the organization's liability [2].

OBJECTIVES OF SECURITY POLICY

The main objectives that a laboratory should reach is an effective chemical and biological security management practices, and in particular to encourage sharing of knowledge and best practices, and educate and train to have a greater understanding and awareness of the risks. In this way, it is possible to develop a real system to prevent, protect and reduce chemical and biological hazards. In fact, the Security Policy has the following objectives:

- Identify plausible and credible threats and risks
- Assess the consequences of harmful events
- Recognize the system's vulnerabilities and criticality
- Identify possible solutions (methodologies, technologies and tools) to monitor, supervise and control the structure
- Define the management of information and communication flow.

Overall, these tasks can help to increase both security and safety levels. Security is the tool that should help us to protect ourselves from any malicious or negligent event and/or actions that may damage human and material resources. Therefore, we can define a security risk as the combination of threat and vulnerability, and represents the possibility that a specific target can be hit and cause damage to people, property and the environment. In order to properly evaluate the security risk, it is important to understand the substantial difference between vulnerability and threat:

- Vulnerability: The weak points of the system in relation to a dangerous event that has a specific intensity, location, frequency and duration
- Threat: Danger of a future harm that may be due to circumstances or events.

In addition, it is fundamental to take into account that the vulnerability has different aspects:

- Direct vulnerability: Transition from punctual crisis to system crisis
- Induct vulnerability: Collapse of a single element generates the crisis of the entire system
- Temporary vulnerability: Loss of efficiency in crisis
- Dynamic vulnerability: Loss of efficiency in the recovery time
- Deferred vulnerability: The ensemble of social and economic effects that occur in post-emergency.

Similarly, if we must consider all aspects of vulnerability, we should evaluate both the internal and external threats:

- External threats: They are mainly related to political, ideological or criminal movements, and aim to achieve striking and demonstrative damages

- Internal threats: They are located in the internal context and aim to cause economic damage or stopping activities.

Furthermore, vulnerabilities and threats analysis must be carried out periodically because they change with the local context. In fact, in order to increase the resilience of the system, it is important that it is flexible and always updated so we must have a rational approach to risk that is based on the identification of priority.

Table 1: Matrix for Impact-Probability

Impact Probability	Extreme	Very High	Moderate	Low	Negligible
Almost Certain	Severe	Severe	High	Major	Moderate
Likely	Severe	High	Major	Significant	Moderate
Moderate	High	Major	Significant	Moderate	Low
Unlikely	Major	Significant	Moderate	Low	Very low
Rare	Significant	Moderate	Low	Very low	Very low

LABORATORY SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

A laboratory security system must aim to mitigate a number of risks and is complementary to laboratory security policies. Laboratories are exposed to many risks:

- Theft or diversion of chemicals, biological and radioactive, or proprietary materials
- Theft or diversion of mission-critical or high-value equipment
- Intentional release of, or exposure to, hazardous materials
- Sabotage or vandalism of high-value equipment
- Loss or release of sensitive information;
- Rogue work or unauthorized laboratory experimentation
- Threats from activist groups.

The security system depends on several factors, such as known and recognized threats gleaned from experience, history of theft, sabotage, vandalism, and presence of valuable or desirable materials, equipment, technology and information. A good laboratory security system should enhance the overall safety for laboratory personnel and the public, develop emergency preparedness by assisting with preplanning, and lower the organization's liability. For example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lists 322 chemicals as "chemicals of interest" and the facilities that use these materials must meet regulatory security requirements, based on the degree of risk posed by each facility. The DHS considers each chemical in three types of threats: release, theft or diversion and

sabotage, and contamination. According to this document the chemicals facilities that have large quantities of potentially dangerous chemicals must submit information to DHS and therefore, it can determine the facility's risk status. [3]

Generally, laboratories do not possess large quantities of dangerous products. However, it would be important to assess the risk and provide containment measures for intentional or unintentional security breaches in the laboratory, either by personnel or by outside agents. In fact, there are many occasions in which personnel do not follow laboratory safety and security procedures, either intentionally or unintentionally and so it is fundamental that the institutions be aware of and address these barriers when designing safety and security policies and procedures. Among barriers that we can include are:

- Rapid turnover of students and staff who must be trained in safety and security procedures
- Variable levels of laboratory experience among students, staff and even supervisors
- A shortage of instructors or others who can train new students and staff
- The time burden of adequate training and record keeping
- The cost or limited availability of safety and security equipment
- Cultural principles that minimize the importance of individual health and safety.

Obviously, it is possible to assign high-risk facilities into risk-based levels, founded on both the quantity and type of materials, and so facilities in higher risk must meet more stringent performance-based requirements.

DUAL-USE HAZARDS OF LABORATORY MATERIALS

Most of the chemicals and biological materials produced and used today are beneficial, but some also have the potential to damage human health, the environment and public. Hence is important must be aware of the potential for the accidental misuse of these substances, as well as their intentional misuse because laboratories face a number of threats, including dual-use chemicals that may be employed for weapons or illicit drug production.

Much of the recent focus on security in research and teaching laboratories relates to dual-use materials. Dual-use or multi-use materials are substances that have both a beneficial use in scientific research and education, but also can be utilized for criminal or terroristic activity. For example, common chemical substances that are easily removed from the laboratory without notice or readily purchased, such as acetone and hydrogen peroxide, can be converted into highly explosive or otherwise hazardous products. At present, there is no comprehensive list of dual-use biological materials, but for chemicals, this can be referred to the list of "Chemicals of Interest" (COI) that was prepared by the DHS. [4]

In addition to well-known warfare agents, such as nitrogen mustard and sarin (which are difficult to acquire or synthesize in makeshift laboratories), more widespread laboratory reagents, such as ammonia, phosgene, chlorine, sodium cyanide, cyanogen chloride and sodium azide are considered as dual-use compounds. These substances can cause human injury and therefore, could be required by terrorists gaining access to laboratory facilities. Alternatively, a research laboratory could be used for the illicit synthesis of terror substances.

An objective assessment of the usefulness of a given hazardous materials for terrorists might underestimate the true risk posed by malicious target. For example, osmium tetroxide, which is highly toxic in pure solid form and in solution, has been judged to be inadequate for terrorists to use, because of its high cost and rapid evaporation, and the fact that an explosion would convert it into harmless products. However, osmium tetroxide poisoning was suspected to be the proposed means of a foiled terrorist attack in the vicinity of London, England [5] Therefore, it cannot be assumed that terrorists will follow the same logical path or practical considerations as an individual who is trained in laboratory sciences.

Dual-Use Security

When assessing security needs, it is important to determine whether laboratories possess materials, equipment or technologies that have the potential for dual -use, such as select agents or COIs. Whether or not the security regulations apply, prudent steps should be taken to reduce the risk of theft or use for terrorist activities:

- Maintain inventory records of dual-use materials
- Limit the number of laboratory personnel who have access to dual-use agents
- Provide easy access to a means of emergency communication, in case of a security breach or a threat from within or outside. Consider adding repeaters or bidirectional signal amplifiers, so that someone with a cell phone can make an emergency phone call from within the secure area
- Periodically and carefully review laboratory access controls to areas where dual-use agents are used or stored
- Maintain a log of who has gained access to areas where dual-use materials are used or stored
- Develop a formal policy prohibiting use of laboratory facilities or materials without the consent of the principal investigator or laboratory supervisor
- Monitor and authorize specific use of these materials
- Remain alert and aware of the possibility of removal of any chemicals for illicit purposes. Report such activities to the head of security
- Train all laboratory personnel who have access to these substances, including a discussion of the security risks of dual-use materials.

Certain biological agents, including viruses, bacteria, fungi and their genetic elements, are considered as dual-use materials because of their potential for use by

terrorists to harm human health. Biological materials pose a unique problem because these materials can replicate and thus, theft of even small amounts is significant.

Chemical security is getting more and more attention from regulators. Most regulations that require specific security measures are intended for structures with large stores of materials, such as production facilities, rather than laboratory-scale quantities. However, nations, states, and local regulatory agencies are increasingly applying standards to chemical laboratories.

There are no many agencies and organizations that deal with chemical security and therefore, the most important regulation to which can be referred is *6 CFR Part 27 Appendix to Chemical Facility Anti – Terrorism Standards* promulgated by DHS [6]. This regulation applies to chemical facilities, including laboratories, with the aim of keeping dual-use chemicals out of the possession and control of terrorists. In addition, the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) are concerned with the following types of chemicals:

- Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Risk Management Plan chemicals
- Highly toxic gases
- Chemical weapons convention chemicals
- Explosives
- Precursors of the above chemicals.

According to DHS, all laboratory facilities must monitor their entire facility (including non-laboratory areas) for the presence of COIs and compare their inventory to the threshold screening amount established in the standard. If the facility meets or exceeds the threshold quantity for any COI, the facility must report the inventory through the completion of an assessment report called “Top-Screen.” Upon receiving a completed Top-Screen, the facility is required to conduct a security vulnerability assessment. Based on the results of the assessment and the risk tier, the facility is expected to develop and implement a standard security plan. [7][8]

SECURITY VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

Security vulnerability assessment is very important and has two key objectives:

- To determine or confirm the placement of the facility in a risk-based tier
- To evaluate the security level of the site to identify any gaps.

The treatment measures should be developed by the government (in consultation with private sector) to address vulnerabilities identified through the risk assessment process. In particular, the treatment measures are designed to enhance the capability to contribute to the security of chemicals and biological substances. A security vulnerability assessment

is used to identify potential security risks to the laboratory and the magnitude of possible threats and it must take into account all the facilities, including:

- Laboratories
- Departments
- Buildings and their perimeters
- Staff interviews about materials, procedures, and sensible data and information

There are two security threats; the first can come from internal factors and the other from external adversaries. Internal threats include dissatisfied employees and/or contractors, and employees forced into cooperation by threat of extortion or violence; while external sources include criminals, extremists and terrorists. [9]

A security vulnerability assessment is basically a review of a facility's assets for handling, storing and processing hazardous materials from the perspective of an individual or group intent on causing a catastrophic event with large-scale injuries/fatalities or supply disruption impacts. This process must consider possible scenarios by looking at inventories or production steps involving hazardous materials, potential pathways of attack, and existing security countermeasures or ring of protection.

There are a number of ways to conduct a security vulnerability assessment. DHS, for example, has developed an assessment protocol for higher risk facilities, which may include laboratories if threshold amounts of COIs are present. Therefore, it is important adopt an evaluation protocol for all critical infrastructure, which often includes colleges, universities and other facilities with research or pilot laboratories. [10]

Around the world, several professional organizations have also developed security vulnerability assessment checklists, such as the following [11]:

- Existing threats, based on the history of the institution (e.g., theft of laboratory materials, sabotage, data security breaches, protests)
- The attractiveness of the institution as a target and the potential impact of an incident
- Chemicals, biological agents, radioactive materials, or other laboratory equipment or materials with dual-use potential
- Sensitive data or computerized systems
- Animal care facilities
- Infrastructure vulnerabilities (e.g., accessible power lines, poor lighting)
- Security systems in place (e.g., access control, cameras, intrusion detection)
- Access controls for laboratory personnel (e.g., background checks, authorization procedures, badges, key controls, escorted access)
- Institutional procedures and culture (e.g., tailgating, open laboratories, no questioning of visitors)
- Security plans in place
- Training and awareness of laboratory personnel.

RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk management can be defined as all those activities, procedures, methods and tools that are necessary to estimate and evaluate a risk, and to identify the management strategy most suitable to prevent and limit the effect of the risk and its effects. Among the tasks of a good risk management is the protection and increase the security level by supporting the objectives stated through the setting of a methodological and resource framework, which allows to maintain coherent and controlled future activities in order to ensure the laboratory and to its staff.

Risk management is a continuous process that is gradual and proactive. It provides the introduction of a logical and systemic methodology that is able, step by step, to identify, evaluate, communicate, eliminate and/or contain and monitor natural risks or those risks which are associated to men's activities. For this reason, it is important to promote a "risk culture" which has to involve in a transversal way every society; from the government's structures to private enterprises, from the public and private centers of research to the law and military enforcement, and all the citizens. Risk management cannot be and must not be considered a process of exclusive competence of this sector's technicians, but, at different levels, it must involve every part which can be directly or indirectly affected by events which can degenerate first of all in a crisis and then, if not adequately and immediately faced, in an emergency.

Treating the Risk

The treatment of security threats is specific to a business and may include a combination of measures. It should:

- Identify the security gaps – find out where chemicals and biological materials could be lost or diverted from activities and find their way into the wrong hands
- Treat the risks – apply the relevant control measures to protect against loss and diversion of materials
- Develop and manage reporting systems
- Assist in raising employee security awareness
- Include security in employee and contractor training
- Arrange for training and exercises of security plans, including participating in government and / or police exercises relating to chemical and biological security
- Ensure that suspicious incidents and security breaches are investigated and reported
- Coordinate emergency response activities
- Periodically assess and review the security program

Crisis Unit Organization

An efficient security plan should include a management system for any type of event, based on the following classification:

- > Emergency:
 - Level 1: Can handle locally by the security manager with the laboratory's resources
 - Level 2: Can be handled locally by the security manager but with the support of public and/or private authorities and organizations
 - Level 3: Can be handled locally by the security manager but with the support of the national authorities and organizations
- > Crisis: These events must activate the Crisis Committee, which has extraordinary powers to carry out all activities to overcome the crisis

The crisis unit is the instrument that, credit to its strategic organization, must deal with emergencies and crises by implementing a series of activities, such as information collection, activation of the emergency management system, situations analysis, response strategy, priorities evaluation, emergency overcoming and finally, recovery.

In peacetime the Crisis Unit must prepare action plans to be implemented during the emergency/crisis because it is necessary to minimize improvisation and response times, and in fact, immediately after the event there are many activities to do:

1. Situation analysis
 - verify the actual conditions of the event
 - testing the effectiveness of the measures taken
 - identify the factors that can modify the event
2. Risk assessment
 - Environmental risk
 - Social and political risks
 - Financial and economic risks
 - etc
3. Information sharing
 - share information with national/local authorities, institutions and organizations
 - properly inform the population
4. Response strategy
 - Define the objectives
 - Identify the priorities
 - Name the head of emergency
 - Assist victims
5. Activation of the response plan
 - counteract the incident
 - activate the internal/external communications
 - avoid the domino effect
6. Overcome event
 - monitor the evolution of events
 - identify the culprits
 - estimate the time required to overcome the emergency

After the event, it is important that the security staff analyze the incident to find out where it is possible take action to prevent the event from occurring again. In fact, know-how is a key element to act on the safety plan and modification in the light of the emergency/crisis. The new risk assessment will be useful in identifying future mitigation measures.

Policy for Ordering Dual-Use Materials

When placing orders, be aware of the potential for intentional misuse of dual-use laboratory chemicals. Appropriate policies should be adopted to prohibit unauthorized purchases of chemicals and other hazardous materials. Such requirements could include: review of all hazardous materials purchased by an appropriate authority, such as a chemical hygiene officer; demonstration by laboratories that appropriate safety controls are in place prior to the purchase of hazardous chemicals; review and authorization of requests to purchase dual-use or multiple-use chemicals or any purchases above a given volume; and receipt of all chemical shipments by trained personnel in a central receiving area or prep room. Missing shipments or lost inventory should be reported in a timely manner. All free shipments of chemicals or hazardous materials to researchers by chemical companies should be reported to the chemical hygiene officer and added to the chemical inventory for that laboratory

INFORMATION SECURITY

Information and data security can be as critical as the security of equipment and materials. Loss of data and computer systems from sabotage, viruses or other means can be devastating for a laboratory. Information risk analysis is a key requirement through which information security management is defined. In this area, the risk is the probability that an information is under threat in one or more of the following parameters; confidentiality, integrity and availability.

The issue of dual-use applies to information as well as laboratory materials. Most institutions and firms have information security policies and procedures, and information technology support staffs who can help implement security systems. Therefore, risk analysis must consider both data and assets; hardware, software, buildings, networks, individual skills and competences, documents, instruments, and human rights. In fact, it is possible define an asset as anything that will allow to achieve a certain target.

All cyber threats aim to codify files for commercial purposes, to create harm, for illegal use of chemical and biological materials, to acquire strategic knowledge to build weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In order to protect the information, it is necessary to identify the vulnerabilities including; processes' weaknesses, control procedures, management of applications and software, and communications and information flow.

There are some measures to protect the information:

- Avoid unwanted accesses
- User authentication
- Multilevel protection
- Flow control
- Control of inferences
- Cryptography
- Access management according to the vulnerability levels

Confidential and Sensitive Information

Assessing the type of data produced by the laboratory, department or group is very important because there is much information that if used by the wrong people can damage human health, and the country's safety and security. The information can be divided into the following categories:

- Public: Shared freely with anyone
- Internal: Shared freely within the institution
- Department: Shared only within the department
- Laboratory: Shared only in the laboratory
- Confidential

First of all, it is necessary to understand if the laboratory produces confidential, sensitive or classified data, and some procedures should be taken to ensure the security of information flow. Each laboratory should identify the most suitable protection measures for its own needs, but in any case, the main actions should be taken:

- Supply training and courses to those with access to this information, emphasizing the importance of discretion
- Take into account a written and signed confidentiality agreement for those with access to such information
- Keep passwords confidential; do not store or write them in an obvious place
- Protect keys, access cards, or other physical security tools
- Destroy documents that contain sensitive information before discarding
- Report any known or suspected breaches in security immediately
- Set up policies and procedures for the storage of confidential information.

SECURITY PLANS

The site security plans must address the vulnerability assessment by describing how activities in the plan correspond to securing facility vulnerabilities. Additionally, the site security plan must address preparations for and deterrents against specific modes of potential terrorist attacks. The site security plans must also describe how the activities taken by the facility meet the risk-based performance standards.

Although the security vulnerability assessment aims to provide a list of risks, requirements and options for development, there is no model that can apply to every laboratory security plan, because several aspects make each organization unique, including building architecture, building use (offices, classrooms, meeting rooms, storage, etc.), organizational culture, and so on.

In regards to this, the Department of Homeland Security supplies principles on the planning process in its Risk-Based Performance Standard for chemical security. They were prepared for dual-use materials that set high or unusual risks, recognizing that facilities need *“the flexibility to choose the most cost-effective method for achieving a satisfactory level of security based on their risk profile”* [3]. In addition, this guideline presents some elements that should be taken into account for any laboratory security plan:

- Identify the leadership structure for security issues
- Secure the assets identified in the vulnerability assessment so that prevents access by unauthorized individuals
- Discourage cyber sabotage (unauthorized on-site or remote access to critical process controls)
- Prevent diversion using secure shipping, receiving and storage of target materials
- Identify theft or diversion of target materials through inventory controls
- Set up a process for personnel security, such as background checks, of laboratory personnel, visitors, and others with access to the laboratory
- Monitor and control access to the facility using identification badges, electronic access controls and security personnel. Check individuals to ensure that they do not carry hazardous materials into the lab
- Detect the security of assets, such that a security breach would be noticed; while for high-risk materials, it would advance an instant response by laboratory or security personnel
- Deter and prevent a security breach through the use of multiple security layers and physical security measures
- Develop and implement response plans for security breaches and exercise those plans
- Maintain monitoring, communication and warning systems
- Investigate and track reports of security-related incidents including findings and mitigation
- Report significant incidents involving chemical and biological security to local law enforcement
- Maintain records of compliance with the security plan
- Set up information and communication networks with associations and government agencies that regularly assess and classify threats
- Develop a multilevel security plan that identifies appropriate security processes, procedures and systems for normal security operations and increasing levels of security for periods of higher risk

- Train laboratory personnel on the security measures and responses, and the importance of observance of the security procedures.

Obviously, it would be recommended that the security plans address the security of the site perimeter. When developing a security plan, it is important to establish levels of security that correspond to the security requirements of a particular laboratory or portion of a laboratory. These requirements will also be influenced by the mission of the organization; for example, in many universities, research laboratories are located in the same structure as educational classrooms, so strong access controls are not functional. Fixing security levels makes it easy to review the security needs for a laboratory, guarantees consistency in the application of security principles and integrating the specific countermeasures. Table 2 shows certain security measures for the three laboratory levels. [12]

Table 2: Security measures for the three laboratory levels

Laboratory level	Physical Features	Operational Features	Electronic features
Level I	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lockable doors and windows 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lock doors when not occupied • Ensure all laboratory personnel receive security awareness training • Control access to keys, use judgment in providing keys to visitors. 	
Level II	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lockable doors, windows, and other passageways • Door locks with high-security cores • Separate from public areas • Hardened doors, frames, and locks • Perimeter walls extending from the floor to the ceiling (prevent access from one area to the other over a drop ceiling) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secure doors, windows, and passageways when not occupied • Ensure all laboratory personnel receive security awareness training • Escort visitors and contractors, consider an entry log 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access control system recommended • Intrusion alarm recommended where sabotage, theft, or diversion is a concern

Laboratory level	Physical Features	Operational Features	Electronic features
Level III	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lockable doors, windows, and other passageways • Door locks with high-security cores • Separate from public areas • Hardened doors, frames, and locks • Perimeter walls extending from the floor to the ceiling (prevent access from one area to the other over a drop ceiling) • Double-door vestibule entry 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secure doors, windows, and passageways when not occupied • Ensure all laboratory personnel receive security awareness training • Escort and log in visitors and contractors • Lock doors, windows, and passageways at all times • Inspect items carried into or removed from the laboratory • Have an inventory system in place for materials of concern. • Perform background checks on individuals with direct access to the materials of concern or within the control zone. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access control system that records the transaction history of all authorized individuals • Biometric personal verification technology recommended • Intrusion alarm system • Closed-circuit television cameras for entrance and exit points, materials storage, and special equipment

CONCLUSION

In recent years, in the world, there has been a growing attention to the management and use of hazardous substances, from their production to disposal. With industrial development, and scientific and technological innovations, the effort of governments, industries and research institutes has increased in trying to achieve two main objectives: the protection of operators and rational management of hazardous materials. In this context, it is understood that the management of these substances needs to be regulated to minimize the risks to employees, the structure, the population and the environment, especially for activities that take place within the chemical and biological laboratories.

In laboratories, where hazardous substances are handled badly, it could lead to a risk of the safety of the structure, the researchers and also the surrounding environment. Therefore, it is the duty of every government to define clearly and exhaustively what are the rules to be followed to minimize the risk of accidents. It is important to highlight that this activity must necessarily take place with the support and close collaboration of experts and researchers because they have the appropriate scientific knowledge.

The definition of a correct strategy of safety and security requires collaboration between national private and public organizations, and institutions and international scientific communities. In fact, in a globalized world it is important to know the best

practices adopted by our “neighbours” and especially try to acquire the know-how to other contexts. This is very important because often, biological and chemical emergencies have devastating effects on the environment and we cannot wait to put in place only the lessons learned personally. In fact, our duty is to reduce as much as possible the risk. For this reason, we should try to establish a network in which each offers his experiences, skills and information to achieve a high standard of safety and security. Creating a network can help quickly discern actions to be put in place to ensure the safety and security of research facilities. After identifying what are the best practices, another crucial step is necessary; creating a culture of safety in everyone.

Lately, the security strategies in the world are based on two main pillars: the physical protection of facilities and of the safety of the laboratory operators. In fact, the first step is to take physical mitigation measures to make it as difficult as possible for theft, unwanted loss, sabotage or any other illicit activities. Although it may not be enough to avoid harmful acts against workers, laboratories or environmental safety, physical protection is the minimum requirement to fulfill legal obligations because each security officer is responsible for what happens in his laboratory.

Identifying and enhancing the physical security of laboratories may not be helpful if the staff employed are not fully aware of the importance of their work, the exposure hazards of substances handling, and the possible effects of a negligence or an accident on the environment. It must be clear that the effort of everyone is a key element in achieving adequate levels of safety and security.

It is necessary that each employee knows the risks, procedures that can reduce the risk and what can be done to mitigate the effects. They must have their own clear roles, responsibilities and tasks both in emergency and in peacetime. This is important because everyone has to contribute concretely to make the lab safer for them, for other workers and the environment as a whole. For this reason, not only is appropriate that everyone knows what he can do, but also to determine who can access a sensitive area and why, because to handle some types of materials, it is necessary to have any special skills. Therefore, the security officer should know what his staff is able to do and, in some cases, even those who are employees to ensure that information, and very dangerous substances and capabilities do not get into the wrong hands.

In order to ensure that the staffs acquire a real safety culture, it is necessary to train employees, to update them on the latest technologies and procedures to work safely. The training must cover both best practices of hazardous substances management, and the information that can be disclosed and how they can be shared. The management of classified and disclosed information is a key element of safety and security for the laboratory, to the surrounding environment and for the country as the right information in the wrong hands can be a serious risk to the safety of all.

Though it is desirable that the scientific communities share their achievements, it should pay attention to what is being spread outwards. For this reason, one of the biggest

challenges that each country should undertake is to establish a network to share the skills, capabilities and objectives to increase of safety and security levels.

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RESOLVING THE CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN THAILAND: MOVING FORWARD OR STEPPING BACKWARD?

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ABSTRACT

The Southern Thailand conflict has caused a long series of high and low tides of antagonism struggle between the separatist movement groups in one hand, and the government of Thailand on the other. The conflict has started in a traditional period by the end of 18th century due to sovereignty and suzerainty issues over the Southern Thailand territories and northern states of Peninsular Malaysia. It escalated and become more eminent after the Anglo-Siamese Treaty 1909 with the establishment of several armed and political separatist organisations, particularly; Gabungan Melayu Pattani Raya (GAMPAR), Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO), Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), etc. by the end of 1950s and 1960s. A multi-different ideology brought by and adopted in by those groups but with the similar aim and goal to liberate and to gain independent of the region. The most critical period was in 1960s to early 1980s which marked the hardest struggle by all separatist movement organisations in the Southern Thailand due to political changes in Malaya, situation in the Middle East, Indonesia's influence, and Afghanistan War. The end of 1980s up to 2000s could be considered as a low intensity period. Some efforts of negotiation took place which resulted with the signing of a peace agreement in 1987 between the Thai government and separatist movement. Only several small hardcore friction groups were still active during this long period due to a successful soft strategy carried out by two premierships, General Prem Tinsulanonda, and Chuan Leekpai. But the so-called peace time period has been embroiled by a series of armed conflicts and major incidents in early period of 2000s, under the Thaksin Sinawatra administration with his hard strategy to combat drug and criminal activities in the southern region. This period has re-emerged and dragged the conflict into a high intensity situation, whereby involving Malaysia and the international communities particularly on human rights issues. The most important thing that this period was marked as a turning point for a triangular relationship between the Thai government-Malaysian government-separatist movement groups in seeking for a peaceful solution to the conflict albiet the ambiguity of its result in determining the status of autonomous or full-independence; and issue of Siamese sovereignty or Malays suzerainty over the Southern Thailand region.

Keywords: *traditional period, real-politik, separatist organisations, soft strategy, hard strategy, mandala, ethnic separation, tributary system, thesapiban policy, ratthaniyom, international community, peace initiative, sovereignty, suzerainty*

INTRODUCTION

The Southern Thailand conflict is not new. Before a series of major incidents took place in 2004, the conflict in Southern Thailand may have been neglected and not so important to the international community as compared to the Independence Movement of Aceh (GAM), the Moro Independence Movement in Southern Philippines, and the Timor Leste separatist struggle. Ironically, all these separatist movements took part in the Southeast Asian region, which involved the founding nations of ASEAN i.e. Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines. The two conflicts and crises in Aceh and Timor Leste are by now showing some positive developments, whereby the Acehnese regained their autonomous legitimacy due to series of comprehensive negotiation between the Indonesian government, the Acehnese and some European countries. In certain extent, the Southern Thailand conflict caused a serious tension between Malaysia and Thailand particularly between the period of 2004 until 2013, and many of the tensions have had sense of historical background, combined with the humanitarian factors due to aggressive actions over the Southern Thailand people during the major incidents in 2004. On different scenario, the Timorese regained its independence due to the interest responded by the Australian government and the United Nations to resolve the issue. In the case of Southern Thailand, the progress is still ambiguous due to many factors such as; the involvement of parties, and the level of commitment of the Thai government and the international bodies.

SCENARIO OF CONFLICT

Historical Background

Back in 1785-1786 [1], it was the turning point of the change in politics and security scenario of the Southern Thailand, or the former Pattani state. A tributary system was practiced by the Siamese rulers over the states (including several North Malay States, i.e. Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu) from the period and on as part of expansion vision by the Siamese Kingdom (Ayutthaya). It caused a long-standing period of struggle to liberate the region from Ayutthaya conqueror during the traditional era. Climax of the Siamese expansion was the annexation of Pattani state into the political system and unity of Siamese Kingdom in 1902 through *Thesapiban* political system [2] (centralised control by Bangkok) and at the same time overthrown local administrative position. Seven years later, British and the Siamese kingdom make a major change by signing the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty [3], which put the region under the control of the Kingdom. In short, colonisation process to annex Pattani region into the Siamese kingdom took place over hundred years.

According to Tom Pires, prior to 1785-1786, in 14th century, the pattern of relationship between Pattani (known as Langkasuka) and Siamese Kingdom (Sukothai) were in a harmonial-dictum since they were sharing the same culture and religion. This took place prior to the Islamic period in Pattani, and both kingdom annexed and

practiced the Buddhism-Mahayana as a spiritual strength against any external aggressors [4]. However, according to different analysis, there were so many problems and challenges faced by the Siamese. The hushing and rushing expansion of the Sukothai Empire under the first Chakri Dynasty by posturing the military strength through the *Mandala* [5] approach had caused unstable political relations between Siamese and Khmer (Indochina), Siamese and Mon (Myanmar) and, Siamese and Malay States. Zamri A. Malek postulated that the antagonism relationships had took place in the 13th century, just after the fall of Srivijaya Empire which lost control over the territories in Malay Peninsula. The antagonism pattern had taking place in between 1230 to 1295 [6].

After the fall of Malacca Empire to Portuguese in 1511, the rest of the Malay States in the Malay Peninsula were facing internal political turmoil and segregations under the influence of local sultans and lords without appearance of a strong-centric empire whom could control and unites them. According to *Hikayat Pattani* [7], prior to the Portuguese invasion onto Malacca, there were two strong-holds of Malay empires, Malacca and Pattani. Both empires were strategically controlling the respective territories; Pattani had controlled the northern Malay peninsula, and Malacca controlled a big portion of Malay peninsula, Sumatra and the Straits of Malacca. At that particular time the Malay peninsula also known as Peninsula of Malacca [8].

Throughout the history of relationship between Siamese and Pattani Kingdoms, there were a low and high tide periods. The unrest of power contest and alliances was a phenomenon realism thought amongst traditional states or empires in the region to ensure their survivability. Part of the phenomenon variation had caused the win-lose situation between the rivalry power of the Siamese and the Pattani Kingdoms, which took place in continuum spectrum to postulate the scenario of Southern Thailand conflicts until today. As mentioned earlier on, 1785-86 [9] was a turning point which changed totally the pattern of relationship between the two rival entities. Nik Anwar was depicting the invasion of the Ayuthia (Siamese) army towards Pattani Kingdoms due to Sultan Muhammad's unwillingness in giving auxiliary assistance to the Siamese Kingdom as the main determinant factor. Prior to 1785, the Siamese Kingdom was once been invaded by the Burmese. Considering Pattani as one of the Siamese tributary territories, Phraya Chakri had requested the auxiliary assistance from the Pattani Kingdom, but was turned down.

Periods between 1785 to 1909 could be considered as a transitional period to strengthen Siamese sovereignty over its territory by colonialisation process and political system. The worth part was the intervention policy by the British expansion mission towards the Malay States in the Malay Peninsula particularly in northern part, which collided with the expansion and integration of Ayuthia political vision downward to the southern territory. In a long periods, the competition and 'silent' rivalry between British Malaya and Ayuthia had caused a serial of negotiations and treaties. Among of the negotiations and treaties were Burney Treaty 20 Jun 1826 (over the status of Perak and Selangor states) [10], Bowring Treaty 1855 [11],

Anglo-Siamese Secret Convention 1897 (over the status of Kedah, Kelantan and Terengganu), Anglo-Siamese Boundary Agreement 1899 (over the status of Reman, Yala), Anglo-Siamese Declaration 1902 and end-up with Bangkok Treaty 1909 as an ultimatum point [12]. All those treaties and negotiations had been conducted in *real-politik* interests of both parties either overtly or covertly without the involvement and agreement of the Malay entity. Apart, according to a research by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Bangkok Treaty 1909 has marked the history of Pattani after 1909 which was regarded as the history of the Malay-Muslim minority in Thailand until today. The political history of Pattani may be summed up as the history of struggle for political autonomy and sovereignty of the Malay-Muslims [13]. This is due to the cause of unfair treaties that were taking place between 1826 until 1909.

Separatist Movement and Background of the Conflict

Unfortunately, the borderline that was determined and drawn by the 1909 treaty was not stopping the Malay Muslim of Southern Thailand to liberate their motherland. The 'clash of civilisation' and ethnic separation movement were clearly taking place throughout the history of the Siamese/Thai-Buddhist versus Malays-Muslim. In short, throughout the history of these two struggle parties, there were three main factors contribute to the clash or conflict; first, due to the territorial expansion, second, ethnic diversity, and third, because of the distinctive religious practices.

In the modern and contemporary periods, the struggle for independence or autonomy by separatist movement could be divided into four periods. It depends on the reciprocal relations between these two entities, namely Thai government and Pattani action and reaction of antagonism reciprocal relations:

1. 1909 to 1950s.
2. 1960s to 1980s.
3. 1990s to 2000s.
4. 2000s to the present.

Periods of 1909 to 1950s

In fact, before 1909 Pattani Sultanate had protested the several treaties that divide the territory of Pattani Kingdom into two parts; British Malaya and Siamese Kingdom. In 1901 Tengku Abdul Kadir Kamaruddeen reluctant to accept a direct political administrative ruling from Bangkok, the so-called *Thesapiban*. At early stage, he sent a memorandum of protest to Chulalongkorn [14] by expressing that the Siamese government had tried to abolish all aspects of Malay-Muslims of Pattani culture, particularly which related to the syariah law and practices, criminal law, wealth and etc. He also stressed the Siamese government had tried to adopt and spread the teaching of Buddhism and its elements among the Malay-Muslims of Pattani. The

second stage was when the first protest was ignored, he planned an arm struggle by acquiring weapons from Singapore in October 1901. However the plan to raise the arm struggle was cancelled following to the advice of R.W. Duff [15]. Further step was taken by sending an appeal letter to the Governor of Straits Settlement, Sir Frank Swettenham Singapore on 13th August 1901. The letter explained the internal affairs of Pattani under the *Thesapiban* administrative system. He also threatened that he would interfere if other western colonial powers fail to support the British endeavor [16]. In short, the resistance movement just before 1909 was low in its intensity without a mass raise up, however it was lingering among the royal groups.

1909 was the period of resistance movement. This period could be considered as a trigger point of separatist struggle which was founded by two dominant groups in the southern region, i.e. religious group, and royal/local aristocrat group. The most dominant was the aristocrat group [17] which gained support from the majority of the Malay Muslim of Southern Thailand. The first resistant came in 1910 and 1911, soon after the 1909 Treaty toward *Thesapiban* policy. The policy could be described as follows:

“The process of assimilation occurred over several decades beginning with the reign of King Chulalongkorn. Chulalongkorn wanted his ‘foreign’ government officials to acquire Thai hearts and manners. This was to be accomplished in several different ways. Prominent Malay-Muslims officials were forced to ‘transfer’ to provinces in the North. Sons of Malay nobility were offered on-the-job training with the Thai governor-general. Islamic law (shari’a and adat) was replaced with Thai law, except in cases dealing with family matters and inheritance rights. Qadi (Muslim judges) were appointed under the close supervision of the sitting Thai judges who were also given the right to override the decisions of the Qadi.” [18]

The aftermath of this policy had been continued by the Chulalongkorn successor, King Vajiravud (Rama IV) in 1910. In a research by Pojar, he had stated that the policy ignored and neglected a major part of sensitivities of the Malay Muslims in Pattani territories, particularly the religion sects and culture. He emphasised that:

“A final lesson to be drawn from this time period is that from the outset of Siamese attempts to rule Pattani with Siamese administrators, no attempt was made to understand the culture and society of those being ruled. A government that does not understand the people it is ruling will likely fail. The Thai government continued throughout the twentieth century to send administrators from Bangkok to Pattani who had no understanding of the local culture. This is one of the many historical reasons for resentment, which the Malay-Muslims still harbor towards the Thai government.” [19]

The new administrative policy had been supported strongly by the new nationalism wisdom which stipulated the unity of Thai identity and integration

process. Furthermore, the Thai nationalism was strongly upholding Buddhism culture and practice it as a way of life. It received strong resistant from the Malay Muslims of Pattani which led by Tengku Abdul Kadir, the exile Pattani sultan which based in Kelantan and caused ethnic clashes. The resistance wide spread into the local community in 1920s. The main reason of the struggle was to regain the glorious period of Malay Pattani sultanate, rejecting the introduction of a new educational act 1921 [20] imposed by the Thai government, and also to seek help from the British Malaya administrative to be part of the federation. The second stage of conflict after 1909, the issue involved obviously due to the differences of ethnics, religions, cultural, language and double-standard policy toward the Malay Muslim of Southern Thailand. According to Harris, the new educational act 1921 received bad reaction from the Malay Muslims of Southern Thai:

“Soon after the introduction of the 1921 Primary Education Act which necessitated Malay children to attend Thai primary schools, there was a major rebellion in 1922. This revolt was orchestrated by Tengku Abdul Kadir from Kelantan, to where he had moved in 1915.” [21]

This new educational act of 1921 had been supported strongly by a ‘new Thai’ nationalism which caused the ‘clash of civilisations’ between the Malays and Thai ethnics. The peak of the conflict took place in 1922-23 when the Malay children were forced to attend Thai primary schools. This rebellion was led by Tengku Abdul Kadir from Kelantan [22]. The second uprising also failed when the Thai security forces easily managed to counter back the rebellion at Kampung Belukar Semak (or Baan Namsai in Thai language [23] in Mayor District). Even though the uprising had failed, there were some positive action taken by the southern region to improve the situation after the first *coup* in 1932 i.e. by letting the Southern Thailand people to practice their religion and culture, reduce taxes, and demand the Thai official who serve in the region to respect and behave according to the local customs. Bangkok also adjusted its policy towards the southern region due to response of international community such as Penang Gazette. The rectification of the administrative policy was also to avoid policy intervention of British Malaya or other European powers toward Thai territory [24]. But, this policy also has a few weaknesses particularly on the implementation or execution part. Some researchers in the Southern Thailand conflict in codifying the period between 1923 to 1938 as a ‘peace time’ following the policy changes by King Vajiravudh [25].

In contrast afterwards, *Thai Ratthaniyom* (Thai Customs Decree) had been introduced in 1939 which gave priority to realize Thai nationalism agenda, creating a homogenous ethnic which based on *Siamese-centric*, Thai language as an official and daily used practice, and renamed the nation known as ‘Thailand’. The policy was such a repetition of the administrative policy before 1923, but involved a bigger scope which was not compound to educational policy *per se*. It was not in line with the spirit of *coup d’état* 1932 by removing the absolute monarchy system and replaced it with constitutional monarchy. The manifesto of the constituent also stated obviously the

motto of popular sovereignty [26]. The early stage of the revolutionary movement, the Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand had given a strong support hoping that the new political system would give a special autonomy concession to them pertaining to the religion, culture and language [27]. Nik Anuar postulated that:

“The emphasis on freedom and equal opportunity to participate in the process of self government and, as final result, the enjoyment of the fruits of national modernization were promised to all people. The change was welcomed by the Malays of Pattani region.” [28]

But this positive indication did not long last due to emerging of ultra nationalist movement among aristocrat faction particularly among the military leaders. The slogan Asia for Asian which mooted by the Japanese Imperial Government had deeply influenced a new movement to overthrow the popular sovereignty political system. In 1938, in responding to the emerging of Japanese power General Phibun Songkhram had launched another series of coup. This coup impacted so many fields i.e. education, language, dress, and religious practices in a way of so-called cultural revolution. Modernisation was a prime agenda of this new military government which assaulted the Malay Muslim of Southern Thailand at all angles whereas they were not prepared for the change [29]. The hard, harsh and drastic changes of political system to realise a homogenous state got a strong resistance from the majority of the Malay Muslim of Southern Thailand. It caused the Malay struggle become dominant by establishing proper political organisations such as *Gabungan Melayu Pattani Raya* (GAMPAR) [30], led by Tunku Mahmud Mahyuddin and Tunku Abdul Jalal (representing the people of Pattani and aristocrat groups), and Pattani People’s Movement (PPM) [31], led by Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad Al-Fatani (representing the people and religious groups) after World War II. The third organisation was the establishment of *Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Pattani* (BNPP) [32], led by Tengku Jalal Nasir (known as Adul Na Saiburi - Teluban) which established in 1959, which became the nucleus or founder of the formation of militant groups movement in 1960s, i.e. People United Liberation Organisation (PULO), and *Barisan Revolusi Nasional* (BRN). In addition, Dusun Nyior Incident 1948 and the independence of Malaya/Malaysia in 1957 were the two events that strongly influenced the emerging of armed struggle of separatist movement.

Among of those three political organisations, PPM performed the most dominant organization in the Southern Thailand region. The Thai government, particularly the security forces had put a strong effort to crush the movement. In the international arena, GAMPAR also played an important role in establishing a networking particularly in the Middle East countries. Trigger point was in January 1948, the detention of Haji Sulong by Thai security forces. About 250,000 Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand had forwarded petition to the United Nations (UN) to consider the region Pattani, Narathiwat and Yala affiliate into the Federation of Malaya 1948 [33]. The climax came on 26 – 28 of April 1948 with the broke out of Dusun Nyior Incident. The incident was led by another religious leader Haji Abdul Rahman which caused

400 deaths [34] of Malay Muslims, and many of rebellions escaped to Malaysia, particularly to Kelantan state [35]. Approximately there were 2,000 up to 6,000 Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand fled away into British Malaya immediately after the incident [36]. Issues that had been forwarded to the Thai government by the Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand were:

1. First, appointing a local influential leader assigned with full authority to administer the four respective regions of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun. Election system and process should be implemented to appoint the leader.
2. Second, 80 percent of government officials in the four regions should be Muslim.
3. Third, both of Malay and Thai languages to be official languages in the respective four regions.
4. Fourth, Malay language to be a medium language in teaching process at primary school level.
5. Fifth, Islamic Law to be recognised and implemented through an isolation court procedure off a standard practiced of other civil courts.
6. Sixth, all of wealths and incomes from the four respective regions to be re-allocated to circumstances of local authority and people.
7. Seventh, establishment of a Muslim Committee assigned with full authority to administer Muslims' government official under jurisdiction of respective leaders as in line with the first condition above-mentioned. [37]

In short, the uprising movement during the period of 1909 to 1950s were to liberate and separate the four respective regions with a high intention to establish an independent state or at least full autonomy entity, away from the Thai-Buddhism political system. In the minds of separatists and Southern Thailand people in those periods, the struggle was to preserve the two main ultimatum principles; first, Islam as an official religion, and second, Malay identity for their then generations, should be combined together in a what so-called an Islamic-Malay state suzerainty and sovereignty which cover the whole aspect of life covering politics, economy, and social pillars.

Periods of 1960s to 1980s

The period between 1960s and 1980s had shown a different *modus operandi* of separatism and independence movements. The establishment of two militant groups,

Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) in 1960, led by religious teacher Ustaz Haji Abdul Karim Hassan, which based in Ruso district, Narathiwat province, (with their sub-groups namely BRN-Coordinate, BRN-Kongres and BRN-Ulama). On the other hand, Pattani United Liberation Organisation (PULO) was established in 1968 [38] led by Tengku Bira Kutanila [39] in India [40] have marked a drastic change due to response to the political changes in Malaya which gained independence from the British in 1957. Same issues and agenda carried out by the militant movements, and with an additional issue to join the new Federation of Malaya. Within this period, the involvement of Southern Thailand students movement from secular stream also took place, later on joined by the mainstream of national students movement which based in Bangkok. The main agenda was to bring about democracy whereby political power is to be given to the people's majority.

During this period, BNPP after the Incident of Dusun Nyior had strengthened their movement by consolidating other organizations; GAMPAR and PPM. Through this consolidation effort, their struggle and movement have two-prong strategy which aimed at; taking an active part in political activities, and, guerilla movement [41]. In other words, those movements were representing the unity of aristocrat class as well as the Islamic conservative group [42]. Their mission and strategy were to gain independence of Pattani, to establish an Islamic state [43], and at the same time to return the political power to Malay aristocrat. The ideology of BRN movement on the other hand was more radical than BNPP. This organisation responded to the 1957 coup led by General Sarit Thanarat. His strategy in enforcing close control and monitoring approaches over Islamic learning institutions and religious schools (pondok agama) in Southern Thailand had caused the Islamic religious leaders and followers turned up with armed struggle confronting the Thai government [44]. It was become obvious why their struggle, movement and motives are bias toward gaining an independent for establishing a radical Islamic republic [45]. In 1960s the BRN movement gained moral and ideological support from Sukarno regime in Indonesia. Its struggle fades away by the end of 1970s due to the fall of Sukarno regime, but reemerged with a new spirit in early 1980s [46].

PULO on the other hand, slightly different compared to BNPP and BRN. Its political ideology is to create and establish a wider spectrum of an Islamic secular nationalism [47] awareness or uprising. Their ideology covers a bigger component such as political, social and economic aims for the sake of the Malay Muslims of Southern Thailand. In short it is also known as UBANGTAPEKEMA or *Ugama, Bangsa, Tanah, Air, dan Perikemanusiaan* [48]. It is also different from BNPP and BRN, it has two main strategies; short term and long term missions. Short term strategy was similar to BRN and BNPP, to liberate Pattani and other Southern Thailand provinces by adopting and conducting arms struggle through guerilla strategy and tactics. In order to realise and strengthen this short term strategy, PULO had established a militant wing so-called Pattani United Liberation Army (PULA). About PULA, according to Jones:

“The majority of PULA members have received their military and political training abroad. Thai intelligence believes PULA has training facilities in Syria and Palestine. In 1995 Thai police claimed to have found evidence that “PULO were co-ordinating their operations with radical Shi’ite Muslims trained in the Middle East”. [49]

In short, the period of 1960s to 1980s marked the hardest struggle by all organisations in Southern Thailand to gain an independent from the Thai government, not only due to the political change in Malaya, but also response to the situation in the Middle East, Indonesia’s influence, and Afghanistan war. Armed struggle was the most dominant choice among the people of Southern Thailand rather than through negotiation means. It was become prominent after 1976 when the military launched another series of *coup* to overthrow the civilian government.

By the end of 1980s, the conflict had shown a slightly positive progress with less of armed incident, sabotage etc. The progress also involved the Malaysian government which at the same time had a problem with the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) along the shared borderline. The 1987 peace agreement between Thai government and PULO, and the peace treaty between the Malaysian government and CPM 1989 indicated that all parties involved have their own agendas and interests. The Thai government in particular, put a strong effort to reduce the conflict in Southern Thailand by establishing Civil-Police-Military (CPM 43) and the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC) earlier on. Both peace agreements could be considered as the first step of peace initiative that had been taken by all parties involved, including the Malaysian government.

Periods of 1990s to 2000s

However, the initiative in late 1980s cannot eliminate the separatist movement in totality. The separatist groups who signed the peace agreement in 1987 mostly were the old generation members and leaderships of PULO organisation. It was not representing the majority of the Southern Thailand people and other separatist organisations. The conflict was beginning to de-escalate in 1990s and early 2000s due to many factors; first, the leadership factor played by the Prime Minister, General Prem Tinsulanonda, and Chuan Leek-pai, whom recognise the political and equal legal rights of the Southern Thailand people as part of the national commitment through the New Hope Programme (*Kwan Wam Mai*) [50]. Second, allowing the religious school (*pondok agama*) operating as per normal in many areas of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat regions [51]. Third, the new separatist movements were re-aligning their structure and organisations by establishing a new network which not only compound to the traditional support from the Middle East and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries, but also open to a new door-link with several European countries.

The establishment of the new link is to get international attention particularly the United Nations (UN). Recruitments among the young generation were also taking place during this period. In short, the period of 1990s – 2000s was considered as an uncertain period even though less of armed incidents between the separatist movement and the Thai security forces. It was like a time-bomb waiting to explode. It was proven by the end of 2003 and throughout 2004. The peace process initiative and negotiation hardly took place between these periods from the first agreement in 1987. The fundamental issues of the conflict i.e. the status of annexation of the region into the Thai unification or unity (sovereignty), self-determination, and the issue of socio-economy (cultural, education, religion, language, and level of economic development) re-emerged by the end of 2003, which were ignored by the Thai government, royal institution and security forces for the past decades.

Periods of 2000s up to the Present (Re-emerging of the Conflict)

Due to the factors above, some elements of clash of civilisation as mooted by Huntington had been proven and become prominent to describe the true phenomenon; *real-politik*, and conspiracies behind the screen of the Southern Thailand conflict. Malay Muslim of Southern Thailand never admitted themselves as Thai people due to the differences of fundamental issues i.e. territory, religion, culture and language. A series of armed incidents throughout 2004 including the Incident on 4 January 2004 [52] (militant attacks on Pilling Camp, Cho Airong, Narathiwat), Krue Se Mosque Incident on 28 April 2004 [53] (security forces cordon operations), and Tak Bai Incident on 25-26 October 2004 [54] were depicting the unresolved conflict of fundamental issues between the Thai government and the three most southern regions. At regional and international spectrum, the issues become a humanitarian intervention issue which involved the people and Non-Governmental Organisation (NGOs) as well as the Malaysian government through bilateral approach with the Thai government. These major incidences had drawn wide attention of international community such as OIC, Human Rights Watch of Asia, and International Crisis Group (ICG) which based in Europe, and other international research and humanitarian institutions.

During the peak period of the conflict in 2004, many parties were pointing fingers at Thaksin Sinawatra as a failed Prime Minister in managing the southern provinces's issues. His strategy in combating drug activities had turned him in a difficult situation. So many parties and interest groups involved with this luxurious business ranging from the local people of the Southern Thailand provinces, criminals and separatist groups as well as politicians and security forces personnel, mainly from the Thai Army. Their activities were threatened by Thaksin's strategy. The conspiracy theory also played an important factor which keep the unresolved conflict continue to persist. In short, Thaksin administration and leadership was not the sole factor of causing the series of major incidences that involved the public in the particular peak periods.

It was merely an immediate factor and timely wrong when he holds the position and political power. The separatist movements and security forces were just waiting for the right time to pull the trigger or to press the time-bomb button. The conflicting parties have their own agenda and interest in the region. The situation in Southern Thailand had called the international community to put a strong pressure over the Thai government under Thaksin administration, particularly the way security forces handle the operations which involved the innocent public. Even though the conflict of Southern Thailand is a domestic problem, the international community was suggesting that the Thai government should handle the crisis in a more civilize way according to the law and justice of human rights, identify the root cause, and settle the issues through negotiation and diplomatic way by involving all the interest groups.

CONTEMPORARY PEACE INITIATIVE

It took 25 years to sit down together in a peace forum between the Thai government and the separatist groups since the first afore in 1987. It also took eight years from 2005 up to 2012 for all parties involved in the conflict, including the Malaysian government to initiate and pioneering the negotiation. The first initiative was sponsored by the former and exiled Prime Minister, Thaksin Sinawatra which held in Kuala Lumpur in the middle of April, 2012 [55]. Nevertheless, the first meeting was failed to bring the main leaders of two influential organisations, BRN and PULO to sit down together in a roundtable discussion or dialogue. Prior to the date, the Malaysian government offered some assistance and initiative to restore peace in the region by establishing Task Force on 8th January 2007 [56]. But the initiative gained little achievement without a strong commitment from the Thai government and the separatist groups. This is due to the failure of achieving the strategic plan and operation which laid down by the 'Task Force 2010'. In general the initial strategic plan were; first, identifying target groups, particularly youth generation of the three provinces, villages and religious leaders (the pillar of social institution) [57], second, to win hearts and minds which apparently close related to the first strategic plan [58], third, approaching and convincing the influential Thai leaders including military leaders [59], and, last but not least, to restore peace and stability by establish a Joint Working Committee [60].

The period of 2010 to 2011 showed a realignment of peace negotiation or dialogue due to the internal political turmoil in Bangkok. The first attempt was responded by the Thai government under the new leadership of Yingluck Sinawatra. An initiative took place by the official visit of Yingluck Sinawatra to Malaysia on 20 February 2012 [61], and willingness of the Malaysian government to be the middle party. The selection of Malaysian government to be the middle party in this negotiation process was based on many factors i.e. shared borderline, common cultures and religions with the community of the Southern Thai, many of the Southern Thai are working in Malaysia, valued Malaysia's experiences in dealing with the Southern Philippines issues, involved widely in humanitarian issues and conflict and etc.

After 2004 to the present, there were four official series of negotiations took place involving the Thai government and separatist movements, particularly BRN, which all were taking place in 2013. The first one was in February 2013 by the signing of MOA that both parties agreed to continue the process of negotiation in the future. During the second negotiation in March 2013, the separatist party had laid down five points of demand as the pre-conditions to continue the peace process. First, the Thai government should be ready to negotiate about Malay suzerainty status over the three regions, second, to release imprisoned political members of Southern Thai, third, the status of Malaysian government should be upgraded from a *facilitator* task to a *mediator* duty. This is due to the separatist party misperception about ‘facilitator’ and ‘mediator’ status which may give different meanings, responsibilities, and outcome of the peace negotiation. Fourth, the negotiation process should not only restrict to the Malaysian government, but also involves ASEAN and OIC organisations. Fifth, to reduce the number of military strength (particularly in terms of personnel) from the region, and replace with the local security forces. These are the five focal points of peace conditions laid down by separatists’ movement led by BRN-C in representing majority of the people in the three southern regions. These conditions infact are almost similar with the previous vision of early struggle in 1960s, 1970s and 1980s which led by Tengku Bira Kutanila and Hj Sulong Tokmena. The conditions will remain regardless the change in the government and any turmoil of Thai internal political scenario.

The agendas of the third and fourth series of negotiations which respectively took place in April and May 2013 were highlighting the five points of demand by the separatist party. The Thai government in real sense was heavy-hearted to accept the demands. In June 2013, in responding to the separatists’ five points of demand, Yingluck government said that the demand would be considered in accordance with the law. However, after the coup in April 2014 and the establishment of the new military government led by Prime Minister General Prayuth Chan-ocha, there was no peace talk and negotiation taking place until December 2014. The first meeting between Najib Razak and Chan-ocha on 1st December 2014 had resulted in continuing the peace initiative in the month of Ramadhan and month after in 2015. But the peace initiative was still in a halt and slow motion mood until today even though with the proclamation of MARA Pattani on 5 June 2015 in Kuala Lumpur, followed by a series of secret meeting in Malaysia which involved the both conflicting parties and Malaysian government in the negotiation process.

It is due to two main reasons; internal political turmoil of Thailand under the present Prime Minister, and second, on the issue of Malay suzerainty over the three regions. In short, the suzerainty issue is the most fundamental issue involving both sides. It involved so many composite issues including the status of full independence or autonomous region, the status of political rights among Malay ethnic, the use of Malay language as an official language in the region apart of Thai language, etc. In general, the open door negotiation throughout the year 2013 could be considered as an ‘official coffee shop talks’, just to get to know each other. The Malaysian government,

as the mediator also face a problem in striking the right balance between the Thai government and the separatist groups.

CONCLUSION

The peace initiative process of the Southern Thailand conflict is still far away from the definitive point, to seek a better and transparent understanding of all parties involved. In order to respond to the main question, whether the peace initiative moving forward or step backward is not an easy answer. The answer is in the minds of both parties, the Thai consisting of the government, security forces, and royal institutions; and the Malays of the Southern Thailand who have gone through the never ending historical struggle. Southern Thailand regions are the pride, honour and dignity of the 'Siamese Kingdom' over centuries which annexed to Thai entity holistically. On the separatist side, the conflict of the region is a long journey to regain the Malays suzerainty and sovereignty. It is different in many areas if to compare with the conflict in the Southern Philippines, Timor Leste, and Aceh. In short, the conflict remains status quo, neither moving forward, nor step backward. The progress to resolve the conflict is moving in a very slow motion mood and plotted by so many contemporary issues. It depends on the cohesion of the Thai state-nation to retain their weak or strong power over the Southern Thailand region. It also needs a hardwork and long process to come to the final resolution, including the involvement and role of the international community.

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LEADERSHIP CONFLICT AND IDENTITY CRISIS WITHIN AL JAMA'AH AL ISLAMIYAH : REVISITED

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ABSTRACT

This article analyses the leadership conflict and identity crisis faced by the Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah group after the death of its first leader, Abdullah Sungkar. After the leadership transition in 1999, it is believed that this group experienced a leadership conflict and an identity crisis in an attempt to determine its future direction and the aim of its struggle. These issues will be analysed from the perspective of the group's leadership, the change in its organisational orientation, its interests, motivations, global influence, communication patterns among group members and its socio-cultural relations with the surrounding community. The crisis is proven by the series of violent incidents which have occurred since 1999, bearing in mind that since it was founded in 1993 the group had never been involved in any violent or terrorist activities. This article also explores what happened after 1999 and examines whether the group continued to operate as an entity or whether it ceased to exist structurally and was divided into splinter groups which operated without a well organised leadership, hence leading to greater divisions within the group and tarnishing the image of the group and the religion of Islam as a whole.

Keywords: Transition, leadership, identity, crisis, terrorist, splinter

INTRODUCTION

Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah is an Islamic movement which was established on 1 January 1993 in Malaysia by two religious preachers from Indonesia and a number of their followers who had fled Indonesia to avoid being captured by the Suharto regime in 1985. This movement is often referred to as a terrorist organisation and was listed by the United Nations (UN) as a terrorist organisation in 2002. Nevertheless, labelling this movement as a terrorist organisation is questionable as there are many factors which must be taken into consideration. Since its establishment in 1993 until around 1999, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* operated as an organised movement under the effective leadership of its first *Amir* namely Abdullah Sungkar. Since its inception until its peak in 2002, it is estimated that the number of its members reached 5000. However, in 2009 only 200 people remained as its members.[1]

After the death of Sungkar in October 1999, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* ceased to exist structurally. Abu Bakar Ba'asyir who is often referred to as Sungkar's successor was actually never appointed as the *Amir* (leader) by the *Majlis Syuro* (Consultative Council)

of the organisation. The court which tried Ba'asyir also failed to prove that he was the *Amir* of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* [2]. Moreover, Ba'asyir's successors, namely Abu Rusydan, Sunarto bin Kartodiharjo @ Adung and Zakarsih @ Nuaim @ Abu Irsyad who assumed the role of the *Amir Darurat* (Emergency *Amir*) and *Pelaksana Tugas Harian Amir* (Acting *Amir*) actually assumed positions that did not exist in the *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* (PUPJI) [3] or the General Guide for the Struggle of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* and have never been appointed by the *Majlis Syuro*.

The first issue faced by *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* after October 1999 was its internal division and the absence of a highly charismatic and effective leader. The death of Sungkar had a great impact on the continuity and future direction of the organisation. This resulted in the organisation being labelled as a terrorist organisation due to the involvement of a number of its followers in domestic and regional terrorist activities. Sungkar's radical views and approach had a great influence on a number of the followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. Hence, when Ba'asyir wanted to join their struggle by using an open platform through *Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI), there were objections from some of the hardcore followers of the organisation.

In any organisation, there will be different views on ideological, strategic and tactical issues among its leaders at various levels. It is often that such differences will result in conflicts, and affect the smooth running of the organisation's management and jeopardise the objectives sought after. In this context, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* suffered from a leadership conflict and an identity crisis in its attempt to emerge as a *da'wah* (Islamic preaching) organisation. This matter can be analysed in terms of the change in identity orientation, leadership transition, interest, global influence, internal communication and socio-cultural relations with the surrounding community. As stated by Fischer, when the identity of a group or organisation is threatened or frustrated, internal conflict is inevitable[4].

After Sungkar's death, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* divided into several splinter groups, each with its own orientation and ideology. In this context, the leadership of the organisation was divided into several groups with different approaches, ideologies, strategies and tactics. This article concludes that the splinter groups which operated after 1999 were elements which emerged from the internal crisis and conflict of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. These groups are linked to *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* from a historical point of view only. In terms of ideology and structure, they no longer follow the original ideology and structure of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* [5].

The identity crisis and leadership conflict in *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* were rather obvious particularly after the death of Sungkar in October 1999. This article is intended to revisit the events which led to the followers of this organisation being labeled as terrorists. After the death of Sungkar, internal divisions and changes in organisation orientation became major issues that determined the future direction of the organisation[6]. This was caused by a number of factors such as Ba'asyir's weaknesses which was reflected in his inability to control the organisation, unorganised transition

of leadership, covert protests by some of Sungkar's loyalists (mostly from Mantiqi I including Hambali, Imam Samudera and Mukhlas), the establishment of *Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI) or Indonesian Mujahidin Council on 7 August 2000 in which Ba'asyir was elected as its first *Amir*, the implications of Osama's "fatwa" in 1998, the issue on the *manhaj* [7] of the struggle, as well as the massive anti terrorist campaign launched by the governments of Singapore and Malaysia in 2001 which eventually paralysed this group. Hence, this article aims at exploring a number of issues by analysing the events which took place as well as examining PUPJI's documents in order to identify and ascertain the crisis and conflict that occurred.

AL JAMA'AH AL ISLAMIYAH: AN OVERVIEW

Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah is an Islamist movement established on 1 January 1993 by two religious preachers from Indonesia, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. This movement is the legacy of Darul Islam's (DI) struggle to establish an Islamic State of Indonesia under the leadership of SM Kartosuwiryo in Indonesia. *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* was formally established after it separated from DI in 1993 following a dispute between Sungkar and the leader of DI, Ajengan Masduki, in the early 1990s[8]. From a theological perspective, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* holds the view that Islam is a universal (*kaffah*) way of life and provides answers for all matters relating to life and nationhood. It believes that the Muslim *ummah* has an obligation to implement Islamic *sharia* law, failing which one will be a non-believer[9]. *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* also views Islam as an integration between religion and politics (power) or '*Al Islam huwaddinu wa'ad daulah*'. Consequently, Ba'asyir holds the view that the Muslim *ummah* has an obligation to establish an Islamic State and implement Islamic *sharia* based on the Quran.

The aim of this group is to establish an Islamic State (*Daulah Islamiyah*) in Indonesia[10] by adopting the *da'wah wal jihad* approach. This group subscribes to the belief of *ahlus sunnah wal jamaah minhajis salafus soleh*[11]. Nevertheless, the group which was established in 1993 experienced internal divisions following the death of its first leader. After 2000, splinter groups of differing ideologies emerged. Although these splinter groups were officially no longer members of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*, they shared a common background and history[12].

LEADERSHIP CONFLICT

The first issue that will be discussed in relation to the leadership conflict is the process of leadership transition in the organisation following the death of Sungkar. There are two issues here which must be clearly understood with regard to the appointment of the *Amir* of the organisation after the death of Sungkar in October 1999. Firstly, the *Majlis Syuro* responsible for appointing an *Amir* met only once after the death of Sungkar and members of the *Majlis* did not reach a consensus on appointing his successor. In 2001, the *Syuro Council* did not meet due to pressures from the governments of

Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia which launched a large-scale operation to hunt down the leaders and followers of the *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*[13]. Furthermore, at the international level, there were major incidents such as the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September 2001. During this time, the leaders and followers of the group focused more on their survival and on their *jihad* agenda in the religious conflicts which occurred in Maluku, Ambon and Poso.

Secondly, after the arrest of Ba'asyir in 2002, based on the 4th criteria stated in Section 10 of PUPJI, he was no longer eligible to assume the role of an *Amir* (**if he was indeed the *Amir* at that time as claimed by most researchers**). However, it must be stated here that the first thing that must be acknowledged is the fact that based on the PUPJI charter, Ba'asyir was never officially appointed as the *Amir* of the group. In fact, the court that tried him failed to prove that he was the *Amir* of the group. He was referred to as the *Amir* or leader due to his close relationship with Sungkar as he was one of those who established the group in 1993[14]. In addition, due to the close relationship between him and Sungkar, he was automatically referred to as the *Amir*. However, in terms of religious knowledge, Arabic competency and training experience in Afghanistan, Abu Rusydan was actually more qualified to be appointed as the *Amir* after Sungkar's death[15]. In fact, in a closed door meeting in 2000, Ba'asyir proposed that Abu Rusydan should take over the position of *Amir*. This however did not materialise as Abu Rusydan himself objected to the proposal[16] which was also not in line with the procedures outlined in PUPJI.

Hence, Abu Rusydan was appointed the *Pelaksana Tugas Harian Amir* (Acting *Amir*) or *Amir Darurat* (Emergency *Amir*) in 2002, a position which actually did not exist in PUPJI. In the section on *An Nidhom Asasi* (Fundamental Rules) of PUPJI, the term *Amir Darurat* or *Pelaksana Tugas Amir* does not exist. Therefore the question is: where did these terms come from? What can be concluded is that this position was created to enable a person to assume the role of a caretaker of the group in the absence of the *Amir*. The second question which arises is: who appointed Abu Rusydan as *Amir Darurat* until his arrest in 2003? And was his appointment valid according to PUPJI? According to Nasir Abas and Abu Rusydan himself, he (Abu Rusydan) was never appointed by the *Majlis Syuro* as the *Amir* (because the *Majlis Syuro* never met in 2001 and 2002). His position as *Pelaksana Tugas Amir* was only proposed by Ba'asyir in a closed meeting and no official appointment took place through the *Majlis Syuro* nor was the appointment agreed by the supreme leaders of the group[17]. Thus, the appointment as *Pelaksana Tugas Amir* or *Amir Darurat* is questionable as it is not valid in terms of the charter of the organisation itself.

In terms of organisational structure, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* in reality has not had a leader since the death of Sungkar in October 1999. This might not have been seen as significant in discussing the identity conflict of the group as most literature stated that the *Amir* of the group after Sungkar was Ba'asyir. Since he was not appointed officially, the transition of the leadership cannot be assumed to be automatic. The view which states that Ba'asyir was automatically the *Amir* must be opposed as such a view will validate

more biased views and will tarnish the image of the group's leaders. It must be pointed out here that because the leadership transition did not take place in an orderly manner and in accordance with the procedures laid down in PUPJI's, various other issues have emerged namely the issue of identity and ideology, the issue of direction and the overall management of the group[18].

THE STATUS OF THE GROUP *AMIR* ACCORDING TO PUPJI

Sections 8, 9 and 10 of Chapter IV of the charter *An Nidhom Asasi (Fundamental Rules)* of PUPJI, clearly stated the function and duties of an *Amir*. Section 8 of PUPJI, clearly states that among the duties of the *Amir* is that, the *Amir* who has received the *mubaaya'ah*[19] (pledge allegiances) of group members may appoint and dismiss the members of *Majlis Syuro*, *Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah*, *Majlis Fatwa* and *Majlis Hisbah*. The *Amir* is also responsible for collecting *infaq* (donation) from group members, witnessing as well as penalising group members who violate the rules, and mediating with other parties in the interest of the group. Under Section 9, the *Amir* is responsible for leading the group, meeting with the *Majlis Syuro* and all *Majlis Qiyadah*, defending, protecting and looking after the welfare of group members, and implementing the *sharia* laws as much as possible[20].

However, the question is, how can these responsibilities be carried out if an *Amir* was never appointed, or if the so-called *Amir* was detained and therefore lost his capacity as the group leader? Hence, based on the events which took place and the chronology of events which led to the capture of the group leaders, it seems that *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* actually did not have a leader after the death of Abdullah Sungkar.

The period from 1999 to 2001 was critical for the group. Many incidents occurred during this period which made this secret society (*tandzim sirri*) the focus of the international community. How could an organisation without an authoritative effective leader operate efficiently and be on the right track? The main problem faced by *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* after October 1999 was internal divisions and the absence of an effective and charismatic leader. Signs of divisions within the group began to emerge due to conflicts caused by personal interests and interests of certain sub-groups which wanted to take over the leadership. This conflict of interest was the result of different views that existed among some of the leaders on issues relating to ideology, strategy and tactics.


CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP ORIENTATION AND ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

In discussing the leadership aspect of the group, this article will not refer to Ba'asyir, Abu Rusydan, Sunarto @ Adung and Zakarsih @ Nuaim as the *Amirs* of the group, as an official appointment of the *Amir* in accordance with PUPJI never took place. On the contrary, this article will refer only to the leadership transition as the leadership phase

until year 2010. It is quite clear that the group did not have an official *Amir* selected through the *Majlis Syuro* after the death of Sungkar. Those regarded as the leaders of the group can be considered only as the *Amir Darurat* or *Lajnah Ikhtisar Linasbil Amir Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* (LILA) as understood by the followers of the group. This term do not actually exist in PUPJI and was created to enable a leader to manage the group in case of an emergency.


After the death of Sungkar in 1999, the leadership phase was continued by Ba'asyir until 2002. After he was detained, the leadership phase was continued by Abu Rusydan @ Toriqudin from 2002 until 2003. Subsequently, the leadership phase was continued by Sunarto @ Adung until 2005. From 2005 to 2007 the leadership phase was continued by Zakarsih @ Nu'aim @ Abu Irsyad[21]. In terms of the hierarchy of the group's leadership, several changes had been made since the establishment of the group, particularly during the leadership phase of Zakarsih. Zakarsih implemented several changes which had not existed previously to ensure the efficiency of the group and to adapt to the situation of the group at the time. According to Jones and Libicki, if a radical group does not adapt to the current situation in order to improve and become more effective in line with current changes, its existence might come to an end[22]. In this context, the leaders at that time encouraged followers to prepare themselves and apply new skills in order to diversify their abilities, survive and develop themselves amidst the war on terror which was taking place at that time. To explain the change in leadership orientation and the organisation of the group, one can look at the organisational structure of the group in three different phases.

The Original Organisational Structure Under Abdullah Sungkar - 1993-1999




Source: The General Guide for the Struggle of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* (PUPJI) – May 1996

**The Organisational Structure Of The Group Under The Leadership of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir,
Abu Rusydan and Sunarto @ Adung (2000-2005)**



Source: Adapted from Nasir Abas 2005 and Satgas Bom POLRI cited in Ricky Sistarwanto 2011

The Organisational Structure of the Group under Zakarsih (2005-2007)



Source: Satgas Bom POLRI cited in Rocky Sistarwanto 2011

What can be concluded from these leadership phases is that *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* went through a reorientation process to determine its future direction and preserve the relevance of its struggle, hence the changes in its organisational structure. The changes in the organisational structure also imply that the leadership crisis required the group to implement changes and adapt to the original aim of its struggle. After Sungkar's death, the group was still being led albeit by an *Amir Darurat* or *LILA* so as to enable it to continue its operations. Nevertheless, the appointment of the *Amir Darurat* or *LILA* was not done in accordance with the charter of the group nor with the approval of the leaders at the *Mantiqiyah* (regional) level. This had direct bearing on the control of the Central Command on group members, and the management of the group as a whole. It is not surprising to learn that activities were carried out outside the knowledge of the Central Command. This was because leaders at the *Mantiqi* level would make their own decisions without any control by the *Amir* (as done by Hambali and leaders from Mantiqi I).

According to the charter of the group (PUPJI), the *Amir* is responsible of ensuring that the *bai'ah* (pledge of allegiance by group members) process takes place. Hence, when an *Amir* was not officially appointed after the death of Sungkar, the *bai'ah* process did not take place. As a result, followers such as Hambali, Mukhlas and Imam Samudera felt that they were not obliged to obey Ba'asyir, Abu Rusydan, Sunarto, Zakarsih or who were appointed as *Amir Darurat*. There is no doubt that although the group seemed to be divided and disorganised, members who shared similar ideologies were still able to unite in smaller cells. Had the leadership of the group been effective, there would not have

been changes to the original structure of the group. Had the appointment of the *Amir* after the death of Sungkar been carried out efficiently and in accordance with PUPJI, followers of the group would not have been involved in terrorist activities. This is because had Ba'asyir or Abu Rusydan been officially appointed as the *Amir* replacing Sungkar, he would have been able to control the followers of the group in his capacity as the official *Amir* (the followers would have pledged allegiance to the *Amir*). These two leaders are charismatic in their own ways and view *jihad* from different perspectives [23].

IDENTITY CRISIS AND THE DILEMMA OF *AL JAMA'AH AL ISLAMIYAH*

The leadership transition which did not take place smoothly and orderly as well as the pressure from security forces resulted in an identity conflict in determining the future direction and original aims of the group's struggle. The group was at an intersection and had to choose whether to continue its original aims or to carry out *da'wah* activities openly. The political situation after the downfall of Suharto in 1999-2000 and the religious conflict in Ambon, Poso and Maluku had an impact on the future direction of the group and even sparked a debate among its top leaders. The debate was started by the involvement of its followers in the religious conflict in 1999, the start of operation of *Al Immatul Kuffar* [24] by Hambali and followers from Mantiqi I followed by the establishment of MMI in 2000. The combination of these events destabilised the group, crippled its original mission and made it seem unable to function as a strong movement. As a result, splinter groups that operated autonomously beyond the control of the Central Command emerged.

The religious conflict in Ambon and Poso mobilised many Islamic groups in Indonesia including *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. These conflicts opened the door of *jihad* to *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* although it was still not prepared for *jihad amaliy* (global/offensive *jihad*). As a result, there were two differing views among the top leaders of the group: whether they should not get involved in the conflict or whether they should get involved for the reason that *jihad* could not be delayed further and did not require the permission of the *Amir*. In this context, there were leaders (e.g. Hambali, Mukhlis, Imam Samudera) who made their own decisions as they knew that Ba'asyir was not the official *Amir* of the group and that they did not have to obey his orders. It must be remembered that the original aim of the group was to perform *jihad* to establish an Islamic State by fighting against *thogut* rulers. Thus, the question is, why must they perform *jihad* for other purposes, particularly as they were not well prepared to perform *jihad amaliy*. However, it is understood that the involvement of the group in this religious conflict was on the basis of Muslim brotherhood and to preserve religion and protect fellow Muslims in the conflict.

Based on its initial strategy at the time of its establishment in 1999-2000, the group was still at the stage of *i'dad asykari* (military training), that is, the stage of gaining strength in preparation for *jihad*. Nevertheless, finally a decision was made to involve the group in the said conflict based on the argument that although the group was still weak

and unprepared, *jihad* could not be delayed as the enemy involved were the Christians who were far less weaker compared to the Indonesian government or the US and its allies. Meanwhile, some of the group leaders saw that performing *jihad* in the said conflict was an opportunity for the group to widen the scope of its outreach programme and to establish new *wakalabs* (districts) in the conflict regions. However, this *jihad* episode was exploited by Hambali and leaders from Mantiqi I to continue the secret project of *Al Immatul Kuffar*. Hambali's aim was to open the door of *jihad* in Indonesia and not only to seek revenge on the Christians.

As stated by Ali Imron (dec), one of those involved in the Bali bombings:

My involvement in the series of bombings was with its own aims and aspirations. Perhaps by carrying out bomb attacks against parties which we consider enemies and within the framework of performing the obligation of *jihad* in the way of Allah, Allah will open the door to a war between the Muslims and the infidels[25].

Followers from Mantiqi I (Malaysian/Singapore region) under the leadership of Mukhlas, Ali Imron, Imam Samudera, Dr Azahari, Nordin Md Top and Taufik Abdul Halim (these were followers from the *Wakalah* of Selangor and the *Wakalah* of Johor) committed various acts of bombings and murder in the region of Mantiqi II (Indonesian region) without the knowledge of the leaders of that region. The operations which began at the end of 1999 continued until the incident which shocked the world took place, that is, the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002. Hambali had the confidence and courage to carry out these attacks after Sungkar's death as he knew that Ba'asyir was not officially appointed by the *Majlis Syuro* to replace Sungkar and that he was not obliged to obey him. Hambali also did not have respect for Ba'asyir whom he considered to be weak and non-aggressive and whom he thought had betrayed Sungkar's struggle by choosing to use an open platform (through MMI) to carry out the group's struggle[26].

After the death of Sungkar, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* also faced the dilemma of whether to choose the parliament as their platform or to make the group as formal organisation. According to Ba'asyir and Sunarto @ Adung, after the fall of Suharto and with the conducive political environment, Sungkar was invited to join the Bulan Bintang Party (PBB), that is, a party established by activists from Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) to continue his struggle through the democratic channel. Nevertheless, the offer was declined as it was against the group's *manhaj* which rejects the system of democracy and considers participating in the parliamentary system and elections as a form of infidelity. However, some members of the group did join the said party including Muhamad Zainuri (the father of Faturrahman Al Ghazi), a group member from the *wakalah* of Jawa Timur, who was subsequently selected as a member of Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD) or the Regional People's Representatives Assembly in Madiun[27].

In addition, there were plans to turn *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* into a formal organisation. This proposal was agreed by some of the group's leaders. In fact, there were plans to declare the group as a formal organisation in an event to be held at the Senayan Main Stadium and attended by the followers and leaders of Egypt's *Jemaah Islamiyah*. Nevertheless, this plan never materialised as it was opposed by some other leaders of the group who considered doing so as being against the principles of the struggle of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* which was considered a *tandzim sirri* (secret society)[28].

The establishment of MMI on 7 August 2000 was also regarded as a dilemma by some of the group's followers particularly those who had previously fought and trained in Afghanistan. The Afghanistan alumni opposed the use of the word '*mujahidin*' by MMI as it was of the view that the word was exclusively for those who had fought in Afghanistan. As a result of this disagreement, some of the Afghanistan alumni from the group boycotted the event of 7 August 2000. Although the establishment of MMI was actually to realise the original struggle of Darul Islam, some of the leaders who were committed to the original struggle of Darul Islam, such as Abu Rusydan, boycotted the event. Because MMI was a formal organisation, it was against the *manhaj* of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* which was a secret society. When Ba'asyir was appointed *Amir* to MMI, the conflict and division could no longer be contained. Hence Ba'asyir was considered a traitor to the original struggle of Sungkar, and from here one can understand why Hambali, Imam Samudera, Mukhlas and Ali Imron no longer had any respect for him as the leader of the group.

THE INFLUENCE AND IMPLICATION OF OSAMA'S *JIHAD* FATWA

The final dilemma faced by the group was the call for global/offensive *jihād* by Osama bin Laden's '*fatwa*' in 1998[29]. This *fatwa* was the main reason behind the division of the group as leaders were no longer united in determining the *manhaj* and future direction of the group. Although it might have seemed that they operated as an organisation, in reality the actions carried out were the actions of some leaders and followers who could no longer wait to perform *jihād*. As pointed out by Abu Rusydan, those who committed violence and carried out the bombings were members of the group who were historically linked to *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* but were no longer its members in terms of ideology and organisational structure.

In the context of global/offensive *jihād*, there were debates on whether to fight against the enemy at home (near enemy) or the enemy abroad (far enemy). This factor was linked to two other factors, that is, the original objective of the group to establish an Islamic state, and the desire to perform *jihād* among some Afghanistan veterans. Those who opposed Osama's *fatwa* argued that the main enemy of the group was the government of Indonesia (near enemy) and that within the framework of establishing an Islamic State the enemy which must be fought was the enemy at home, that is, the Indonesian government, and not the United States and its allies. Furthermore, the group did not have sufficient strength to perform *jihād* against the US and its allies.

The teachings of *jihadi salafism* also gave priority to the enemy at home and state that fighting apostates is more important than fighting belligerent infidels. This is because, apostates are worse than belligerent infidels. In fact, apostates can be killed. The explanation to this is clear: an apostate is originally a Muslim who knows the teachings of the religion but chooses to violate them, whereas a belligerent infidel is originally an infidel who does not know the teachings of Islam. Thus, the apostate deserves a heavier punishment.

THE DIVISION AND EMERGENCE OF SPLINTER GROUPS

It is important to highlight this internal division in this article to differentiate between groups of different ideologies, tactics and strategies within *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. The splinter group focused by this article is that which was pioneered by Hambali, Mukhlas, Amrozi, Ali Imron, Imam Samudera, Nordin Md Top, Dr Azahari, Dulmatin and a number of other personalities from Mantiqi I (the Malaysia/Singapore region). This group has launched a series of bomb attacks across South-East Asia. This must be highlighted in order to explain that *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* experienced internal division following the death of its first leader. The features and main causes of the conflict in *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* clearly reflect the condition and situation of the group after the death of Sungkar, its first *Amir*.

After Sungkar died, he was replaced by Ba'asyir who was seen as being more tolerant and having a softer approach. He was not seen as a leader who received the support of all of his followers[30]. After Ba'asyir was detained and imprisoned, he was replaced by Abu Rusydan who was also detained as soon as he was appointed as the *Amir Darurat*. Hence, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* never actually had an effective leader from 1999 until 2002 and even until now. This is acknowledged by Umar Abduh, an observer of Islamic movements in Indonesia. He found that after the death of Sungkar, the group broke into three splinter groups, that is, the moderates which were led by Ba'asyir, the ideologists led by Abu Rusydan and the terrorists led by Hambali[31]. Meanwhile, Kippie highlights that division occurred within *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* with two main splinter groups emerging, that is, the traditionalists and the pro-terrorists[32].


In his analysis, Kippie states that the traditionalists were led by Abu Rusydan. The aspirations of this group, according to him, were consistent with those popularised by Sungkar, that is to establish an Islamic State. On the other hand, the pro-terrorists were led by Hambali and later by Nordin Md Top, Dr Azahari and Dulmatin. It is believed that the pro-terrorists had close links with Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) founded by Zainon Ismail, an Afghanistan alumnus. The relationship between the splinter group led by Hambali and KMM is based on two main factors: the relationship established in Afghanistan, and the fact that they both operate in Malaysia[33]. Meanwhile, according to Noor Huda, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* divided into four main splinter groups. The first splinter group was the Abu Rusydan group which continued its *da'wah* outreach activities in small groups at mosques. The second splinter group was led by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir

which was active in *Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid* (JAT). The third splinter group was led by an *ustaz* named Aman Abdurrahman who was not a member of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* but was popular among the younger followers of the group. The fourth splinter group was the group of Nordin Md Top who was associated with terrorist activities [34].

What can be concluded is that *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* broke into splinter groups and experienced an identity and leadership crisis after 1999. The Central Command was unable to coordinate and monitor the group resulting in leaders at the *mantiqi* (regional) and *wakalah* (district) levels organising their movements without the control of an effective *Amir*. Some members chose to perform *jihād* by themselves and not through an organisation and under the *manhaj* of a group. As a result, several incidents might have happened without the knowledge of Ba'asyir or whoever was appointed as *Amir Darurat*. However, as the head of an organisation, he was held responsible for the actions of the followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*.

Hence, this article concludes that as of 2000, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* which was established in 1993 was divided into four main splinter groups. The orientations and ideologies of these splinter groups are reflected in their leaders. As a matter of fact, it is quite difficult to define the boundaries which separate these splinter groups. This is because *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* was established on three main foundations: ideology, history and structure. Hence, these groups might be separated in terms of ideology and structure, but share a common history. What differentiate them are the *manhaj* of the struggle, position on *jihād*, and their attitude towards terrorist activities. The split and emerging splinter groups are illustrated in the following diagram.

Splinter Groups from Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah – Post 1999



BETWEEN IDEALISTS, TRADITIONALISTS, MODERATES, PRO-TERRORISTS AND TERRORISTS

As a result of the conflict in determining the strategies and tactics which should be implemented, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* continued to experience inevitable divisions within its ranks. The leaders of the group agreed in principle that their struggle was to establish an Islamic State and to protect the Muslim community from being pressured by the government of Indonesia which they considered a *toghut* government. This is consistent with the analysis by Pavlova who examined the PUPJI. Pavlova points out that in the beginning, this group was a counter society movement and upon reaching the stages outlined in PUPJI it became a counter state movement[35]. However, due to anti-terrorism operations which started in Singapore and Malaysia, and later in Indonesia, leaders of the group re-examined the effectiveness of the bombing attacks launched against western nationals and their interests. Some of the leaders were of the view that these attacks were not only unproductive but also inconsistent with the strategies and tactics of the group in spreading its influence. They believed that these attacks would only jeopardise the main objective of their struggle.

In this context, the leadership of the group was divided into several splinter groups of differing approaches, ideologies, strategies and tactics. The first group was known as the traditionalists and comprised leaders from Mantiqi II such as Abu Rusydan and Ahmad Roichan. This was the largest group among the followers of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. The traditionalists were also the group which was committed to the original mission of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*, that is to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia. This group strictly opposed the Bali bombings stating that the bombings, apart from being unproductive, tarnished the image of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. It also stated that the condition of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* at that time did not permit it to perform *jihad* against the Indonesian government. They opposed terrorist activities and discouraged their followers from taking part in bombing attacks against western interest.

The traditionalist group focused on recruiting new followers, developing its human resources and logistics, spreading its ideology in the community, and taking part in conflicts in which Muslims were the victims of non-Muslims. Leaders from the traditionalist group reiterated that *jihad* should be focused on fighting to protect Muslims including in Poso and Ambon, and to avoid attacks, the victims of which might include Muslims. The traditionalists also looked at *jihad* from a long-term point of view and opposed suicide bombings. According to them, the group and its followers did not yet have the necessary preparation to perform *jihad* for the purpose of establishing an Islamic State. The strategy of this particular group was consistent with that outlined in PUPJI with regard to the levels of *jihad* and the phases which the group must go through to establish an Islamic State. Owing to the stance of the traditionalist group, it is often referred to as the idealist group.

There was also a group which is called the moderates. This group was associated with Ba'asyir who led MMI. It was referred to as the moderates because it operated in a formal

way and the government was aware of all its activities. It did not take part in terrorist activities directly nor did it support terrorist activities but it shared a common stance and ideology in terms of establishing an Islamic State.

At the same time, there was another group which supported terrorism activities. This group was known as the terrorist group due to its bombing activities across Southeast Asia. This group, which was pioneered by Hambali and his followers from Mantiqi I, justified its terrorist actions based on religion and ideology. Since the leadership of Mantiqi I was taken over by Mukhlis from Hambali in 2001, the group adopted some changes in its strategies and tactics. The activities of the group were carried out through what is called *Al Immatul Kuffar* operation, as explained earlier. This group believed that defensive *jihād* could not be delayed any longer as claimed by Imam Samudera. Hence, who was the person who led the group at that time and who was the one who made the decisions? This pro terrorist group was also referred to as the terrorist because its actions were no longer consistent with the *manhaj* of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. In fact, it is quite hard to determine the aim of its bombing activities. This article concludes that this group has deviated from the *manhaj* of struggle outlined in PUPJI and deserves to be labelled as a terrorist group.

CONCLUSION

Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah has operated as a solid and strong secret society since it was founded in 1993 until late 1999. After the death of Sungkar, this organisation faced a critical identity and leadership conflict. The transition of leadership which did not take place smoothly followed by the pressure from the governments of Southeast Asian countries which launched anti-terrorism operations destabilised the group. Furthermore, several incidents which occurred at the regional and international levels also heightened the leadership and ideological crisis in the group. Divisions among the ranks of the group widened, but because its followers shared a common ideology and history, they were all associated with *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. As a result, due to the actions of a few followers of the group who were no longer under the control of the Central Command, the image of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* was tarnished.

The changes that have occurred in the leadership phases since 2000 showed that the group actually went through a process of reorientation to determine its future direction and the relevance of its struggle. Changes which happened to the organisational structure of the group imply that the leadership crisis required the group to change to adapt to the original aim of its struggle. The leadership transition which did not take place smoothly and orderly and the pressure from the security forces caused an identity conflict. This group was at an intersection and had to choose whether to continue the original aim of its struggle or to perform *da'wah* openly, or to involve in global *jihād* in line with Osama's *fatwa*.

After the death of Sungkar, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* was divided into several splinter groups, with each group operating in accordance with the orientation and ideology of its leader. In this regard, the leadership of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* was divided into several splinter groups with different approaches, ideologies, strategies and tactics, which in turn resulted in an identity conflict. *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* which was founded on 1 January 1993 was divided and ceased to operate as a united movement after the death of Sungkar. This article concludes that the splinter groups which operated after 1999 were elements which emerged as a result of the internal conflict in *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. These groups are linked to one another only in terms of history but in terms of structure and ideology they are no longer followers of the original *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. Hence, the post Sungkar period witnessed the actions and involvement of elements which were connected to *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* from a historical perspective only. In terms of organisational structure and ideology, *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* has long ceased to function as an effective and organised movement.

REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES

- [1] International Crisis Group (ICG), Asia Briefing No 94, *Indonesia: The Hotel Bombings*, 24 July 2009, p 1.
- [2] Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was detained on 28 October 2002 and after a long court trial which continued for 20 sessions, a panel of judges in the Central Jakarta District Court led by Chief Judge Muhammad Saleh sentenced him to 4 years in prison. In their verdict, the panel of judges decided that there was not enough evidence to prove that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was the *Amir* of JI. He was, therefore, not subject to Section 107, Article 2 of the Kitab Undang-undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) as the leader and organiser of violence intended to overthrow the government, Section 266, Article 1 of KUHP and Section 53, UU No 9/1992. For further information, see *Abu Bakar Ba'asyir; Catatan Dari Penjara, Untuk Mengamalkan dan Menegakkan Dinul Islam*, Mushaf, 2006, pp xxx-xxxii.
- [3] PUPJI is the acronym for *Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* (The General Guide for the Struggle of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*). This guide was issued by the Central Command of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* on 30 May 1996 (1417H). Not all members of the group have access to this guide which is made available only to the top leaders of the group. The guide consists of 65 pages and has four main themes namely, religious principles, general guide to uphold religion, general guide to operations, and basic rules and regulations. The guide has 42 sections which explain the organisational structure and the struggle of the group.
- [4] Fischer, Ronald J, 2001, *The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of a Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*; *Journal of Peace Research* 38(3), p 307.

- [5] According to Abu Rusydan @ Thoriquddin @ Hamzah who assumed the role of acting *Amir* of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah (Pelaksana Tugas Harian Amir Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah)* in April 2002 after Ba'asyir was detained and charged, the existence of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* was based on three fundamentals namely **ideology**, **historical relation** and **structural relation**. Interview with Abu Rusydan on March 2012, Senayan, Jakarta.
- [6] See Umar Abduh, 2003, *Konspirasi Intelijen dan Gerakan Radikal*, Centre for Democracy and Social Justice, Jakarta.
- [7] *Manhaj* linguistically means 'a clear path' in Arabic. Allah says in the Quran: 'To each of you we prescribed a law and a minhaj' (Al-Maidah: 48). The meaning of *minhaj* is the same as *manhaj*. The meaning of *minhaj* in the said verse is explained by Ibnu Abbas. He explains that *minhaj* means *sunnah*. Therefore, '*manhaj*' linguistically is 'a clear path' and contextually is 'the religious path to achieve a particular aim'. For further information, refer to Tafsir Ibnu Katsir 2/67-68 and Mu'jamul Wasith. See also Iqbal, Muhammad; *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore: SH Muhammad Ashraf, 1975, p 12.
- [8] The division (*infhisol*) in the group is quite complicated as it involved matters related to *tawhid* and the future direction of Darul Islam (DI) during the period 1992-1993. There were disagreements on these issues between Ajengan Masduki and Abdullah Sungkar. For further discussion see Al Chaidar; *Perpecahan dan Integrasi: Perkembangan Gerakan Darul Islam di Indonesia dan Jaringannya di Asia Tenggara*, 1962-2006, p 31.
- [9] An interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir (An Ex Amir to Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) at Jakarta on the March 2012.
- [10] There are different views among researchers on the aim of the struggle of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. Some say that the aim of the group is to establish an Islamic State or an Islamic Caliphate in the region. For example, researchers such as Greg Barton, in "*Jemaah Islamiyah: Radical Islamism in Indonesia*", Singapore University Press, Singapore 2005; Council on Foreign Relations, '*Backgrounder: Jemaah Islamiyah (a.k.a. Jemaah Islamiyah)*', 2007 and K Ramakrishna, '*Countering Radical Islam in Southeast Asia*' in PJ Smith (ed) *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability* (ME Sharpe, New York 2005) assert that the struggle of *Al Jamaah Al Islamiyah* is to establish a pan-Islamic State in Southeast Asia. Meanwhile researchers such as Sidney Jones in '*The Changing Nature of Jemaah Islamiyah*' ,2005; Australian Journal of International Affairs and report of the Republic of Singapore, '*White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism*', Ministry of Home Affairs, Singapore, 7 January 2003 stated that the group is the legacy of the DI/NII movement which aspires to establish the Islamic State of Indonesia and not a caliphate or a regional Islamic state.

- [11] As stipulated in PUPJI and reinforced by an interview with Nasir Abas (former Head of *Mantiqi III* JI) at Jakarta on March 2012 and an interview with Said (former JI - members of 5th group Akademi Militer Afghanistan) at Kuala Lumpur on the December 2011.
- [12] The splinter groups referred to are those led by Hambali, Mukhlas, Amrozi, Ali Imron, Imam Samudera, Nordin Md Top, Dr Azahari, Dulmatin and several other personalities from *Mantiqi I* (the Malaysian/Singapore region). These are the groups which have launched bomb attacks across Southeast Asia. This point must be highlighted in order to emphasise that *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* was divided following the death of its first *Amir*, that is, Abdullah Sungkar, in October 1999.
- [13] An interview with Ustaz Abu Rusydan (former *Amir Darurat* JI) and Nasir Abas at Jakarta on March 2012.
- [14] This is why in most Western news reports the line used is “Ba’asyir as **alleged** leader to JI” or “Ba’asyir as spiritual leader”. This shows that they were unsure about the status of Ba’asyir as the *Amir* of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. For example see the news report from BBC titled *Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in terror arrest*, 9 August 2010 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-10910310> accessed on 28 November 2012, news report from The Jakarta Post, *Can prison bars put an end to Ba’asyir’s access to jihadists?* <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/06/17/can-prison-bars-put-end-ba%E2%80%99asyir%E2%80%99s-access-jihadists.html> accessed on 28 November 2012 and Scott Atran’s interview with Ba’asyir on 16 December 2005, *The Emir: An Interview with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Alleged Leader of the Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiyah Organisation* which was accessed at [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=562&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=26&cHash](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=562&tx_ttnews[backPid]=26&cHash) on 28 November 2012.
- [15] According to an expert on JI, Abu Rusydan has an advantage over Abu Bakar Ba’asyir in terms of religious knowledge and Arabic competency. Therefore, Abu Rusydan was more qualified to assume the role of *Amir* as compared to Ba’asyir following the death of Sungkar.
- [16] An interview with Abu Rusydan and Nasir Abas at Jakarta on March 2012.
- [17] An interview with Abu Rusydan and Nasir Abas at Jakarta on March 2012. In 2001, Abu Rusydan was the Secretary of the group, making him the third highest ranking person in the group.
- [18] Sungkar passed away on 23 October 1999 and on 7 August 2000, Ba’asyir was appointed as the *Amir* of MMI. The question is how Ba’asyir could assume the role of *Amir* for two major organisations if he was indeed appointed previously as the *Amir* of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*.
- [19] *Mubaaya’ah* or *bai’ah* is the pledge of allegiance to the leader. All members of the group must go through this process in order to be a member.

- [20] See PUPJI: *An Nidhom Asasi*, Chapter IV, Sections 8, 9 and 10.
- [21] An interview with Abu Rusydan and Nasir Abas at Jakarta on March 2012.
- [22] See Jones, Seth. G dan Libicki, Martin, 2008, C, *How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering Al Qaeda*, RAND Corporation.
- [23] An interview with Abu Rusydan and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir at Jakarta on March 2012.
- [24] This operation was a secret project organised by Hambali at the end of 1999. It was an operation to defeat infidel governments by implementing the *irhabiyah* (terror) doctrine based on the teachings of jihadi salafism. The initial purpose of the operation was to seek revenge for the death of the Muslims in Maluku and Poso. This operation then developed into an operation of bombing churches on the eve of Christmas in 2000 due to information which claimed that these churches were used to store weapons and ammunition and that Christian priests were masterminding a religious crisis. The operation was launched by Tentera Islam Batalion Badar (TIBB) led by Imam Samudera (dec). As a matter of fact, Hambali had a bigger mission and plan. He wanted to use this operation to open the 'door of *Jihad*' in Indonesia in order to facilitate the process of establishing an Islamic State. Unfortunately, this operation did not receive the response sought after from the Christian community. In fact, the operation tarnished the image of the group and led to a conflict between the leaders of the group. For further discussion, see Solahudin, 2011, *NII Sampai Ji; Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia*, Komunitas Bambu, p 257-261.
- [25] Ali Imron, 2007, "*Ali Imron Sang Pengebom*" (Ali Imron the Bomber), Republika, Jakarta.
- [26] Hambali @ Riduan Isamudin, Mukhlas @ Ali Ghufroon, Amrozi @ Ali Imron, Imam Samudera @ Abdul Aziz and Abu Fatih @ Abdullah Anshori were often referred to as the younger generation which was more militant and was recruited by Sungkar. They were very dissatisfied with the transfer of leadership from Sungkar to Ba'asyir whom they considered to be too weak, too accommodating and easily influenced by others. See ICG, *Indonesia Backgrounder: How JI Terrorist Network Operates*, 2002, p 5.
- [27] Solahudin, 2011, *NII Sampai Ji; Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia*, Komunitas Bambu.
- [28] Solahudin, 2011, *NII Sampai Ji; Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia*, Komunitas Bambu.
- [29] This "*fatwa*" was issued by Osama on 23 February 1998. The *fatwa* which declared war against the Americans was issued in the name of the World Islamic Front. It was signed by Ayman Al Zhawahiri (*Jihad al Islami*, Egypt), Rifa'i Ahmad Taha (*Jamaah Islamiyah*, Egypt), Syaik Mir Hamzah (*Jamiatul Ulama*, Pakistan) and Fazlur Rahman (a jihadist personality from Bangladesh). This "*fatwa*" can be referred to in Oliveti, Vincenzo; 2001, *Terror's Source, The Ideology of Wahhabi-Salafism and its Consequences*, Amadeus Books, UK, p 80-83.

- [30] This can be seen during the establishment of *Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT)* by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 2008 as not many former members of *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* followed him and joined the newly established group. According to Noorhuda Ismail, the two leaders had very different personalities and characters. Sungkar was seen as being more visionary, strict and charismatic while Ba'asyir was seen as a scholar who was strict in religious matters but soft in other matters. An interview with Noor Huda Ismail (Alumni Pesantren Ngruki) on March 2012, Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian, Jakarta.
- [31] See Umar Abduh, 2003, *Konspirasi Intelijen dan Gerakan Radikal*, Centre for Democracy and Social Justice, Jakarta.
- [32] See Kippie, Gregory R. 2010, *Jemaah Islamiyah; Reevaluating the Most Dangerous Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia*, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California.
- [33] This article focuses only on the identity and leadership conflict within *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*. The group's relationship and network with other militant groups in Southeast Asia are not discussed in detail. Further information on Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) can be found in Kamarulnizam Abdullah, "Understanding and Responding to the Threats of Muslim Militant Groups in Malaysia," in Kamarulzaman Askandar (ed.), *Understanding and Managing Militant Movements in Southeast Asia*; Penang: Southeast Asian Studies Conflict Network, 2005, p 33-48; and Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, 'Transnational Islam in Malaysia', in Peter Mandaville, Farish A Noor, Alexander Horstmann, Dietrich Reetz, Ali Riaz, Animesh Roul, Noorhaidi Hassan, Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Rommel C Banlaoi and Joseph C Liow, *Transnational Islam in South and Southeast Asia: Movements, Networks and Conflict Dynamics*, Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2009.
- [34] Noor Huda and Carl Ungerer, 2009, *Jemaah Islamiyah, A Renewed Struggle?*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
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NORTH KOREA'S FOREIGN POLICY PATTERNS TOWARDS MAJOR POWERS: FROM THE COLD WAR ERA UNTIL THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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ABSTRACT

*This study seeks to answer the question of why does North Korea choose to keep on changing its foreign policy pattern towards the major powers (the U.S., China and Russia) between hard and soft lines foreign policies (confrontation and cooperation) despite its thirst for economic supports and aids from them? In finding the answer, an analysis has been done on the pattern of North Korea's foreign policy towards the major powers during three distinct periods; cold war, end of cold war up until 2006 nuclear test (first nuclear test by North Korea) and post-2006 nuclear test. From the pattern analysis, four hypotheses relating to the U.S., China and Russian factors, and the regime survival have been derived. Based on the analytical and theoretical standpoint, this study proposes that the domestic factor (regime survival) is the main factor that influences the foreign policy pattern of North Korea towards the major powers. The regime survival cannot be compromised despite the pressure from those major powers especially the U.S. which is considered as the main threat to North Korea's national security. This study concludes that the foreign policy of North Korea will remain in the same pattern, switching from hard line to soft line policies or vice versa depending on the prompted issues arise between her and the major powers until the autocratic regime collapse and replaced by a new reasonable regime or the Korean reunification is achieved with South Korean government dominates the peninsula. Finally this study proved that, within the context of *juche* ideology and *songun* policy, the nuclear weapon program has been used intelligently by North Korea as the instrument of its foreign policy in achieving its national goals and strategic interest.*

Keywords: *North Korea, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapon, Major Powers*

INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of this study is to analyse the pattern of North Korea's (also known as Democratic People Republic of Korea, DPRK) foreign policy towards major powers namely the United States (U.S.), China and Russia during three distinct periods; the cold war, the end of the cold war up until 2006 nuclear test, and post-2006 nuclear test (the first nuclear test by North Korea). The analysis will help to answer the question of why does North Korea choose to keep on changing its foreign policy pattern towards those major powers between hard and soft lines foreign policies (confrontation and cooperation) despite its thirst for economic support and aid from them?

Since 1945, North Korea's relationship with the U.S. has been marked by almost continuous confrontation and mistrust. North Korea views the U.S. as the strongest imperialist force in the world and as the successor to Japanese imperialism. The Korean War only intensified this perception. The U.S. views North Korea as an international outlaw. Despite some efforts done in normalizing their relationship, the confrontation and mistrust have hampered the efforts [1].

As for the relationship with China, North Korea considered China as a long-time main ally and benefactor. North Korea relies on China for trade and diplomatic support, but ties between the two have become strained in recent years due in large part to China's growing frustration with the country's refusal to give up its nuclear weapons program. The current state of relations between Beijing and Pyongyang is being in "an unprecedented crisis." Chinese President, Xi Jinping last year made an official visit to South Korea but has still not visited the North. In the past, Chinese leaders have customarily visited North Korea before the South. North Korea is believed to resent its dependence on China and appears interested in developing partnerships with other countries. However, with North Korea's reputation as a state with a dangerous nuclear weapons program and shameful human rights record, new friends are hard to come by [2].

In relations to Russia, North Korea regarded the Soviet Union as its ideological ally especially during the Cold War that had provided large amounts of aid, which dried up after the Soviet Union fall in the early 1990s. Poor and isolated North Korea may be hoping for a resumption of that generosity. North Korean leaders obviously believe that Russia under Vladimir Putin will behave like the Soviet Union once did and shower North Korea with aid grants as a reward for Pyongyang's militant anti-Americanism. The signs of increased cooperation come as Russia is in the midst of efforts to develop its large, resource-rich far east region, in line with Russian President, Vladimir Putin's Look East policy, which is now a central foreign policy strategy in the wake of the breakdown of relations with the West [3].

Based on the latest development of North Korean relations with the U.S., China and Russia, North Korea seems to continue to have a confrontation and mistrust towards the U.S., reduce its overdependence on China and strengthen its relationship with Russia. The changes in North Korea's foreign policy towards those major powers appeared to have been influenced by numerous factors that need to be identified and analysed. This study will also demonstrate how a poor and isolated nuclear state deals with major powers (U.S., China and Russia) in ensuring its survivability.

NORTH KOREA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS MAJOR POWERS: DURING THE COLD WAR

Like most other countries, the primary objective of North Korea's foreign policy is preservation of national security (regime survival), which in the context of the volatile

division in the Korean peninsula includes reunification [4]. In understanding the North Korea's foreign policy, it is also important to comprehend North Korea's national goals.

North Korean government regards South Korea and the United States as "its foremost enemies" and it also considers the South Korean-American alliance as the principal threat to its national security and the survival of its regime [5]. Due to this constant and proximate threat, "maintaining its military alliances with China and the Soviet Union" as a counteraction was an essential part of North Korea's foreign policy throughout the Cold War era [6].

North Korea's National Goals

Similar to other countries in the world, North Korea has the same national goal of achieving survival, prosperity, prestige and other general national interests [7]. National security which relates to survival is the immediate concern for any state including North Korea which is a political organism that has both life and death [8]. North Korea's foreign policy could be regarded one of the most important means to achieve its goal of national security and other various national interests. The *national security* has been equated to the *regime security* of its supreme dictator.

It is believed that North Korean leaders do not allow economic reform and the opening of the society because they know that these will endanger their political regime even though it is a good way to save North Korea's ailing economy [9]. The North Korean leaders consider *the regime's survival, rather than the survival of the North Korean state, is more crucial*.

North Korea's Policy towards the United States

North Korea's foreign policy towards the United States during the Cold War has been formed by the bitter experience of the Korean War and the DPRK's position in the bipolar Cold War. The North Korea detested the United States for few reasons such as disturbing North Korea's effort to unite Korea by military force, and for the damage caused by the U.S. military bombing campaigns during the war. There was little contact between the two countries during the Cold War, except for periodic clashes between the two militaries in areas surrounding the North Korea such as Pueblo incident [10]. It could be derived that during the Cold War, North Korea's main foreign policy objective towards the U.S. was to split the U.S.-ROK (Republic of Korea) alliance and to achieve the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from South Korea. At the same time, in order to deter the U.S. from intervening in Korea again, North Korea has established formal alliances with the Soviet Union on 6 July 1961 and China on 11 July 1961 through "treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" [11].

North Korea's Policy towards China

The North Korea and China relations began unofficially when U.S. forces came to South Korea's defence at the beginning of the Korean War and was formalized under the

Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance in July 1961 [12]. North Korea and China were bonded by blood-ties through fighting together during the Korean War, by their shared communist ideologies, and by China's reconstruction efforts in North Korea after the Korean War. Therefore, they were regarded as special allies, with the relationship considered "as close as lips and teeth." Their cordial relations for decades was assured by the shared interests and identities but these mutual empathy began to deviate in the early 1980s when China initiated economic reforms and open market systems under Deng Xiaoping's leadership and when Beijing normalized diplomatic relations with South Korea in 1992 [13]. While the relationship has fluctuated over the years, official ties (measured in terms of bilateral meetings) have grown stronger along with the economic ties between the two countries [14].

North Korea's Policy towards the Soviet Union

Soviet Union had assisted in the formation of North Korea as a communist satellite state in 1948 and thus North Korea's foreign policy in its earlier stage was heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. North Korea just followed the guidance of the Soviet Union where its security would be guaranteed by the communist bloc. However, after the mid 1950s when the Sino-Soviet rifts began, North Korea implemented the independent and impartial foreign policy in the middle of China and the Soviet Union. In order to gain benefit from both countries, North Korea has signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with them separately in 1961. When China began its reform under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, North Korea leaned towards the Soviet Union, and in 1985 when the Soviet Union began perestroika [15], North Korea once again maintained independent in its foreign relations [16].

North Korea became closer with Russia during the Cold War was designed at gaining political, military and economic supports while at the same time maintained close relationship with China to gain the similar supports. The Russia support was to avoid any sudden collapse of North Korea as it hoped to use North Korea as a 'buffer zone' in Northeast Asia or as a 'card up its sleeve' in any negotiations with South Korea, China, the United States, or Japan. [17]." Consequently, North Korea's policy towards Russia during the Cold War was becoming closer.

NORTH KOREA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS MAJOR POWERS: POST-COLD WAR UP UNTIL 2006 NUCLEAR TEST

The North Korea's foreign policy track record in this era could be considered as mixed. Most remarkable events were the diplomatic normalization between the Russia and South Korea, the reversal of its UN policy that paved the way for the simultaneous admission of the two Korean states to the world organisation, and the diplomatic normalization between China and South Korea [18]. Meanwhile, its relations with the U.S. was greatly influenced by its nuclear weapons development program.

Conceptually, North Korea's foreign policy can be described in terms of its quest for three interrelated goals: security, legitimacy and development. However, in the post-cold war era, security appears to have emerged as the most important of the three goals. North Korea seemed was at a decisive moment because the choices it made in foreign policy would establish not only the direction of its domestic policy but, ultimately, the survival of the regime itself. The external players in Washington, Beijing and Moscow had varying degrees of leverage over Pyongyang's foreign policy as well [19].

Therefore, North Korea has to choose a reasonable foreign policy in dealing with those major powers if it desires to survive long enough in this anarchic world system. Its strategy to use a nuclear brinkmanship has made those major powers especially the U.S. to be more cautious and willing to negotiate in freezing and finally demolishing the North Korea's nuclear programme.

North Korea's Policy towards the United States

In the post-Cold War era, despite North Korea criticizing U.S. as an imperialist, the U.S. has become central in Pyongyang's strategic thinking and behaviour, alternately seemed as a mortal threat or an external life support system, and sometimes as both. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, uncertain aid from China, and increasingly close China-South Korea relations, the United States has become the functional equivalent of China and the Soviet Union in Pyongyang's perspective [20]. However, the DPRK must now seek to achieve the same aid (economic, technical, and military aid which it has received from China and Russia) and also international legitimacy, investment, and trade from a single adversary that is increasingly inclined to use force rather than favour [21].

However, the Pyongyang's nuclear weapon development program was considered as the main driving factor that drew the U.S. to be engaged with North Korea. The starting point was on 11 March 1993 when North Korea issued a 90-day legal notice that it was withdrawing from the nuclear weapon Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which it had signed in December 1985 [22]. Among the measures taken to end the nuclear weapon program were by signing bilateral and multilateral accords between North Korea and the U.S. as follows:

- a. 1994 Agreed Framework (Bilaterally between North Korea and the U.S.)
- b. Six Party Talks (Multilaterally among North Korea, the U.S., China, Russia, Japan and South Korea).

North Korea's Policy towards China

Without a doubt, China holds greater importance in North Korea's foreign policy than the DPRK holds in Chinese foreign policy. China's potential trump cards in Korean affairs are legion, including demographic weight as the world's most populous country, territorial size and contiguity, military power as the world's third-largest nuclear weapons state after the United States and Russia, veto power in the UNSC, new market power as

the world's fastest growing economy, and the traditional Confucian cultural influence with strong historical roots [23].

As the Cold War ended and the global socialist ideology diminished, Sino-North Korean relations have been developed with a growing concern on both South Korea and the United States. While the relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang remains a special one, its unique characteristics are now defined by China's use of its connections with the DPRK for the maintenance of domestic and "near abroad" stability rather than for any grander ambitions [24].

For North Korea, China and the Soviet Union were its important allies during the Cold War. Although some conflicts existed in their relationships due to varying interests and goals, until the late 1980s, the three countries had formed a vertical alliance with the Communist ideology as a bond where China and Russia provided economic, military, and diplomatic assistance to the North Korean regime. However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, China became "North Korea's major supplier of military and economic aid and middleman to the world", determined to save North Korea from international isolation. Also China's primary policy goal regarding the Korean peninsula remained "keeping peace" in the region, meaning "it would not risk upsetting the South-North power balance by weakening or disrupting its relations with North Korea." [25].

North Korea's Policy Towards Russia

Since the late 1950s, North Korea managed to exploit the emerging Soviet-Sino rift in gaining independence from both of the two large socialist states. Both countries tried to offset each other's influence in North Korea with generous economic and military assistance. Thereafter, North Korea adapted adroitly to its two patrons, whose enmity and status competition continued through the 1970s and most of the 1980s. Moscow's aim was to keep Pyongyang from slipping too close to China; the Russia did not want a new war attempting to reunify Korea [26].

In 1990s, there were variability and fluctuations of Moscow's relations with Pyongyang but the downward spiral of Russia-DPRK relations resulting from a series of domestic and external shocks has been reversed and put back on a renormalization track since the mid-1990s especially when Vladimir Putin's vigorous pursuit of realpolitik coincided with Kim Jong Il's new diplomatic opening to the outside world. In July 2000, Putin visited North Korea and became the first Kremlin leader ever to visit the neighbouring communist country and the first among the major powers to make an official state visit to North Korea. Kim Jong Il returned Putin's visit in a bizarre 6,000-mile train trip across Russia to Moscow a year later in August 2001 [27].

Russia believes that the United States alone cannot untie the "Korean knot" but must rely on a multilateral approach to supporting lasting peace and security in North East Asia (NEA). Russia's involvement in the Six Party talks in 2003-06 was cautious but committed. Although China played the frontline role, ensuring that the talks got

off the ground and continued, Russia also came to play an important supporting role. Throughout the talks, Russia continued to supply modest food aid to North Korea and to have meetings with North Korean representatives [28]. Since Russia's policy towards North Korea was more accommodative especially when Putin became Russian President, Pyongyang has tried to maintain a good relationship with Russia.

NORTH KOREA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS MAJOR POWERS: POST-2006 NUCLEAR TEST

It is quite interesting to learn how North Korea still survives until today despite all the sanctions. Like the previous periods (cold war and end of cold war up until 2006 nuclear test periods), North Korea is still using soft and hard lines policy strategies when dealing with those major powers in safeguarding its national interests. However, its strategy more often than not, proven to be successful through which it gained the essential economic supports and aids from those major powers.

The behaviour of those major powers in convincing North Korea to stop its nuclear weapon program has shaped its policy pattern towards them. The *carrot and stick* strategy used by the major powers seemed to be successful to certain extent in making North Korea to halt or temporarily delay its nuclear weapon program. However, since the 2006 nuclear test till today, all efforts done by the major powers seem to be unable to fully stop North Korea from pursuing its nuclear weapon program.

North Korea's Policy towards the U.S.

North Korea's foreign policy towards the U.S. in the post 2006 nuclear test period could be considered more of hostile or hard line policy. Its first nuclear test in October 2006, has painted the U.S. (George W. Bush administration) into a corner and caused a strongly-worded U.N. Security Council resolution as well as triggered a change of perception in the U.S. administration. Since Bush's "hard line" policy in his first term seemed to have led North Korea to test its first nuclear weapon, President Bush chose to abandon an effective policy of freezing the North Korean elites' account of USD 25 million in Macao-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) [29]. The U.S. then negotiated a nuclear agreement with North Korea in February 2007 after easing the BDA sanctions and Washington even went further to remove North Korea from the list of state-sponsored terrorism and to resume food aid in 2008 even though these might strain its relationship with its close ally, Japan [30].

In its effort to get similar concession from the Obama administration, the North Korea subsequently conducted a second nuclear test on May 2009 and followed by another one in March 2013 [31]. Following the third nuclear test, North Korea declared that its nuclear weapons were "not a bargaining chip" and would not be abandoned, even for "billions of dollars. [32]".

Pyongyang's brinkmanship policies have never seriously endangered the state's survival but they have brought considerable benefits to its rulers. The Kim dynasty has shown itself to be intelligent, calculating and resilient for ensuring its state's continued existence. If foreign policy is intended to aid a regime's security and survival, then North Korean foreign policy may be judged a success especially in dealing with its utmost enemy, the U.S. [33].

North Korea's Policy towards China

North Korea's foreign policy towards its close ally, China in the post 2006 nuclear test period is more of reducing its overdependence on China. In 2006, Pyongyang's missile and nuclear tests severely strained its relations with China due to North Korea ignored Beijing warning of not to conduct the tests. Consequently, for the first time China agreed to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718 (2006) imposing sanctions on the DPRK, [34] stopped some banking transactions with certain North Korean entities and temporarily reduced shipments of petroleum to Pyongyang. Nevertheless, shipments of other goods along its borders with North Korea were still allowed without stern inspections. However, following North Korea's second nuclear test in May 2009 and third test in February 2013, China issued a strong statement of condemnation and in June 2009 and March 2013 backed U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874 and 2094 that provided for additional sanctions on the DPRK [35]. However, China has taken modest approach in implementing UNSC Resolutions 1718, 1874 and 2094 on North Korea.

Since Pyongyang's relations with the United States and South Korea were strained due to the ongoing nuclear issue and the sinking of the *Cheonan* (South Korean Naval Ship) and the shelling of Yeonpyeong Island (South Korean island bordering North Korea) by North Korean military, it had to rely more on China for both economic and security support. As the North Korean regime announced that it will achieve a "Strong and Prosperous Nation" by 2012, it will have to draw back from its overdependence on China in order to revive its self-reliance ideology of *Juche*. Based on the concept of "balance of dependence," numerous North Korea's experts believe that the recent efforts to build a close relationship with Russia as well as with other nations reflect Pyongyang's attempt to rebalance its ties with Beijing [36].

North Korea's Policy towards Russia

North Korea's foreign policy towards Russia in the post 2006 nuclear test period could be regarded as more of trying to become closer with its ally. North Korea now strives to boost its relationship with Russia and enhance their bilateral strategic cooperation which has not been the same since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this context, during Russia-North Korea summit and high level meeting since 2011 (Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il held a joint summit in Eastern Siberia on 24 August 2011, the first such meeting between the two countries since 2002), both countries have revived their Intergovernmental Committee for Cooperation in Trade, Economy, Science and Technology. They have also managed to discuss about

resolving the North Korean debt problem which has been the main hurdle to advancing their bilateral economic cooperation. These actions are evocative of Russia-North Korea relations in 2006-2007 when Russia assisted in resolving the tensions surrounding the Banco Delta Asia issue. During that time, Russian pursuit was to maximize its economic interests by promoting the Trans-Korea Railway Project and energy cooperation on the Korean Peninsula. However, the Russian efforts yielded no benefits as the Six-Party Talks eventually broke down [37].

The DPRK-Russia close relations will also help to shape desirable conditions for balanced diplomacy between China and Russia. Apparently, Russia is also observing China in responding to North Korea's requests for enhanced security cooperation. China has taken advantage over North Korea by leasing the port of Rajin near Russian border and sometimes positioned its warships at the port [38].

FINDINGS

Based on the previous discussion, it is reasonable to answer the puzzle of this study, i.e. the main reason for North Korea to keep on changing its foreign policy pattern towards the major powers is due to the goal of preserving its national security which is more related to its regime security or survival. The regime survival is considered the determining factor for foreign policy makers in devising the North Korea foreign policy. The regime survival cannot be compromised in dealing with those major powers especially the U.S. which is considered the main threat to North Korea's national security. The U.S. hostile policy towards North Korea such as attacking North Korea during Korean War, positioning its military in South Korea to guard against North Korea, conducting yearly joint military exercise with South Korea, threatening North Korea with severe consequences if it continue its nuclear weapon program and passing UNSC sanctions with regards to North Korea nuclear test, has made North Korea worried about its regime survival and has adjusted its foreign policy pattern towards the U.S. to be a hard line policy. The same pattern was also applied against China and Russia when they supported UNSC sanction towards North Korea in 2006, 2009 and 2013 due to the nuclear tests. In order to protect its national security, North Korea has to develop a nuclear weapon for strategy of deterrence and as an instrument of foreign policy to deal with the major powers' behaviour.

Another reason for North Korea to keep on changing its foreign policy pattern is to get economic supports and aids from those major powers. It will suddenly switch its foreign policy from hard line (confrontation) to soft line (cooperation) if it need the economic assistance. This happen during the signing of 1994 Agreed Framework with the U.S. and certain periods during Six Party Talks. However, when it have obtained the supports and aids to certain extent, it will suddenly switch to hard line policy by launching rhetoric provocation as well as missile and nuclear tests. Therefore, it is difficult to predict its behaviour and this has made the major powers especially the U.S.

sometimes feel very upset and reluctant to continue dealing with it unless North Korea demonstrates its seriousness and commitment to stop its nuclear weapon program.

This study has confirmed that North Korea's foreign policy towards the major powers has been formulated based on a neoclassical realism standpoint. The regime's survival (domestic factor) is used as the intervening variable by foreign policy makers to respond to the U.S., China's and Russia's factor (structural factors) in formulating the North Korea's foreign policy towards those major powers. In responding to the structural factors, the regime's survival (domestic factor) which is also the main national goal/interest has been given paramount consideration and all actions have been taken to ensure its security. The most important step taken to ensure the regime survival is by developing a nuclear weapon program and this has been able to deter the major powers especially the U.S. from attacking North Korea due to the catastrophic consequences caused by the nuclear weapon.

CONCLUSION

It can be concluded that the foreign policy of North Korea will remain in the same pattern, switching from hard line to soft line policies or vice versa depending on the prompted issues arise between her and the major powers (the U.S., China and Russia) until the autocratic regime changed to a new reasonable regime or the Korean reunification is achieved, with South Korea government dominates the peninsula.

The denuclearization of Korean peninsula is very hard to be achieved due to the nuclear weapon program is used by North Korea as an instrument of foreign policy in protecting its regime survival and getting economic supports and aids from the major powers. The U.S. was found willing to engage or deal with North Korea because of the nuclear weapon program whereas China and Russia are more interested in using North Korea to their advantages as a buffer zone against the U.S. and a leverage when dealing with the U.S. in showing that they have some controlling factor upon North Korea due to their economic assistances provided to the country.

Another valid factor that North Korea regime will continue to behave belligerently towards the U.S. and South Korea is because it believes that China and Russia will not allow the regime to collapse due to they are very concerned about the influx of millions of refugees in their territories and mishandling of the nuclear weapon by irresponsible personnel in North Korea. Those are among the reasons why they especially China continue to provide economic supports and aids to allow North Korean people to survive and prevent the regime from collapse.

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ETHNIC CONFLICT: THEORIES AND UNDERSTANDING THE ROOT CAUSES

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ABSTRACT

Throughout history, ethnic conflicts have long been a component of international politics. Even today, ethnic wars continue to be the most common form of armed conflicts around the world. Ethnic conflict is defined as disputes between groups of people defined by a common heritage, language, and/or culture. This article provides evidence that pre-existing ethnic problems do influence ethnic conflict. In explaining ethnic conflicts, major scholars have agreed that there are three ideologies for it, which are primordialist, instrumentalist and constructivist. Ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia is used as a case example in explaining how the country was spawned with ethnic conflict.

Keywords: *ethnicity, conflict, primordialist, identity and linguistic*

INTRODUCTION

Ethnic community and identity are also often associated with conflict, particularly with political struggles in various parts of the world. Yet there is no essential connection between ethnicity and conflict, and in many instances, relations may in fact be peaceful and cooperative. Some of the works relate to the study of ethnicity and conflicts include by all the major contributors to debates on ethnicity, including Horowitz, Anthony Smith and conflict resolution in particular in the textbook by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall.

Over the second half of the 20th century, conflicts within national boundaries became increasingly dominant. Within the borders of most of states there exist numerous ethnic, national, racial, linguistic or cultural groups. In other words, the majority of states are composed of more than one ethnic group. Sometimes these groups are not accepted as full members of this state or the nation, which it purports to be or presented, or who actually excluded from it. In such circumstance number of ethnic groups demands more rights and recognition that leads in many cases to ethnic conflicts. One-third of all countries experienced civil conflict. Many (if not most) such conflicts involved violence along ethnic lines according to Gleditsch [1].

There are two remarkable facts about conflict that deserve notice. First, within country conflicts or intra-state conflicts, account for an enormous share of deaths and hardship in the world today. Since the Second World War, there have been 22 interstate conflicts with more than 25 battle-related deaths per year, and 9 of them have killed at least 1000 over the entire history of conflict [2].

Second, internal conflicts often appear to be ethnic in nature. Some scholars even identified ethnic conflict as an intrastate conflict. More than half of the civil conflicts recorded since the end of the Second World War have been classified as ethnic or religious [3]. One criterion for a conflict to be classified as ethnic is that it involves a rebellion against the state on behalf of some ethnic group [4]. Clear evidence of these ethnic conflicts which are mostly intrastate in nature as been described in the report by the Peace Research Institute in Oslo[5].

DEFINITION

Ethnic – Anthony Smith (1987) [6] defines ethnic as named human population with a myth of common ancestral, shared memories, cultural similarities, historical territory and sense of solidarity. He further explains that for a population to be considered as an ethnic they must be able to pronounce the six criteria as follow:

The group must have a name as identity.

They must believe in common ancestry.

They must have historical memories.

They share the same culture.

They feel attached to a specific territory.

They must think as a group to constitute an ethnic community.

Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall in their extensive work on conflict resolution discussed about conflict at length. In defining conflict alone, it is very obvious that their study discovered how most of the conflicts are internal in nature. This is because they found out that main sources of conflict and the available relations of conflicting parties are mostly domestic and within states [7]. Taking this into consideration, it would helpful to further share some definition of conflict by European early theorist as follows:

Machiavelli – Conflict was a result of the human desire for self-preservation and power.

Hobbes – Three ‘principal causes of quarrel’ in a state of nature were competition for gain, fear of insecurity and defence of honour.

Ethnic Conflict – Disputes between groups of people defined by a common heritage, language, and/or culture. The members of particular competing groups may not necessarily live within the same territorial borders. Ethnic conflict overlaps with national conflict, as both are based on claims for special recognition, through secession (the attempt of a region within a state, usually inhabited by a minority, to separate and become an independent state, or less frequently, to unify or federate with another state) as described by Smith [8]. It can also be considered as a conflict between ethnic groups as a result of nationalism.

THE SCHOOL OF THOUGHTS

In studying ethnicity and ethnic conflict, most scholars have agreed to the three schools of thought which can be described as follow:

The Primordialist. Proponents of primordialist accounts of ethnic conflict argue that “ethnic groups and nationalities exist because there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location”[9]. The primordialist account relies on a concept of kinship between members of an ethnic group. Horowitz (1985) argues that this kinship “makes it possible for ethnic groups to think in terms of family resemblances”[10]. There are a number of political scientists who refer to the concept of ethnic wars as a myth because they argue that the root causes of ethnic conflict do not involve ethnicity but rather institutional, political, and economic factors. These political scientists argue that the concept of ethnic war is misleading because it leads to an essentialist conclusion that certain groups are doomed to fight each other when in fact the wars between them are the result of political decisions. Opposing groups may substitute ethnicity for the underlying factors to simplify identification of friend and foe.

The Instrumentalist. Smith notes that the instrumentalist account “came to prominence in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States, in the debate about “ethnic persistence in what was supposed to have been an effective melting pot”[11]. This new theory sought to explain such persistence as the result of the actions of community leaders, “who used their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, because they found them more effective than social classes”[12]. In this account of ethnic identification, “ethnicity and race are viewed as instrumental identities, organized as means to particular ends”[13].

Whether ethnicity is a fixed perception is not crucial in the instrumentalist accounts. Moreover, the scholars of this school do generally not oppose neither that ethnic difference is a part of many conflicts nor that a lot of belligerent human beings believe that they are fighting over such difference. Therefore, it can be understood that instrumentalists simply claim that ethnic difference is not sufficient to explain conflicts. The specific description of instrumentalist line of actions can be later discussed in the conflict of the former Yugoslavia.

The Constructivist. The theory of constructivism is generally attributed to Jean Piaget, who articulated mechanisms by which knowledge is internalized by learners[14]. In most of his works, he suggested that through processes of *accommodation* and *assimilation*, individuals construct new knowledge from their experiences. Constructivism which is also known as cognitive approach discussed ethnicity in a subjective manner. When individuals assimilate, they incorporate the

new experience into an already existing group of young generation in the group in an interactive communication continuously.

In contrast, Mamdani who also discussed Piaget works on this theory explains that accommodation can be understood as the mechanism by which failure leads to learning[15]: when we act on the expectation that the world operates in one way and it violates our expectations, we often fail, but by accommodating this new experience and reframing our model of the way the world works, we learn from the experience of failure, or others' failure.

CAUSES OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS

What causes ethnic conflict? It is not caused directly by intergroup differences. Most ethnic groups, in most cases, pursue their interests peacefully through established political channels[16]. Some scholars explain reasons of ethnic conflicts with collapse of the authoritarian rule. As an example, the main reasons why ethnic conflicts have sprung up in Eastern Europe especially the former Federated Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere, because the authoritarian rule has collapsed and made such conflicts possible. This argument offers an inadequate explanation of the causes of ethnic conflicts. It is more difficult to explain why conflicts have broken out in some places, but not others, and why some ethnic conflicts are more violent than others. The complicated study on ethnic conflict explains the causes of ethnic conflict based on two levels of analysis: the systemic level, the domestic level[17].

SYSTEMIC EXPLANATION

Systemic explanations of ethnic conflict focus on the nature of the security systems in which ethnic groups operate and the security concerns of these groups. The first and most obvious systemic prerequisite for ethnic conflict is that two or more ethnic groups must reside in close proximity. Conflict arises in a mixed ethnic community within a single state. Ethnic conflict is based on the struggle between different groups for political power and status. The potential for ethnic conflict is almost universal because there are very few states with only one ethnic group.

The second systematic prerequisite for ethnic conflict is that national, regional, and international authorities must be too weak to keep groups from fighting and too weak ensure the security of individual groups. In systems where anarchy prevails individual groups have to provide for their own defense. These groups fear for their physical safety and survival – especially when groups are more or less evenly matched and neither can absorb the other politically, economically, or culturally[18]. Collective fears of the future arise when states lose their ability to arbitrate between groups or provide credible guarantees of protection for groups. Barry Posen argues that security becomes of paramount concern under this condition [19]. Groups have to worry if neighboring groups

pose security threat and if threats will grow or diminish. In this case, the problem groups begin to take actions to defend themselves by mobilizing armies and deploying military forces. In turn, this can lead the second group to take their actions to diminish the security of the first group. This is the security dilemma. Groups are often unaware of the impact their actions will have on others.

These conditions are often generated when empires collapse and ethnic groups suddenly have to provide for their own security. We can see this situation in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The collapse of imperial regimes can be viewed as a problem of emerging anarchy. Authority system collapsed in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and individual groups have to provide for their own defense and security in anarchy system.

According to Posen, instabilities develop when two conditions hold. First, when offensive and defensive military forces are hard to distinguish, groups cannot signal their defensive intentions by the kinds of military forces, which they deploy. Groups cannot distinguish one another's intentions, whether forces are defensive or offensive. Because forces deployed for defensive purposes will have offensive capabilities and therefore will be seen as threatening by others. Second, if offensive military operations are more effective than defensive operations, due to the nature of military technology or the kinds of available capabilities, groups will choose the offensive if they want to survive. The offensive advantage can cause preemptive war because the superiority of the offensive capability will greatly increase prospects for military success.

DOMESTIC EXPLANATIONS

Other explanation of ethnic conflict focus on factors that operate primarily at the domestic level: the effectiveness of states in addressing the concerns of their constituents, the impact of nationalism on inter-ethnic relations, and the impact of democratization on inter-ethnic relations. People look to states to provide security and promote economic prosperity. Nationalism reflects the need to establish states capable of achieving these goals [20]. Intense nationalism and a heightened risk of national conflict are caused when states fail to meet military and economic threats to their peoples and when they fail to develop effective institutions for managing increased levels of political participation. As an example, nationalism has flared up in parts of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, where state structures and political institutions have weakened or diminished capacities. In other words, the collapse of the Soviet Union and east European communist states is unleashing a new round of nationalism. That has caused ethnic warfare in the post-Soviet states and mounting nationalist opinion in Russia itself. This can be witnessed in the recent incidents in Kosovo or even more recent the Crimean situation.

The emergence of ethnic nationalism makes some form of ethnic conflict almost inevitable. The rise of ethnic nationalism in one group can be seen as threatening by others. In turn, this will lead to the development of similar elements elsewhere.

Ethnic nationalism also makes groups to field large, highly motivated armies. Another factor of domestic level, which impacts on ethnic conflict, is democratization. In fact, democratization has the potential to help mitigate ethnic tension by allowing for the establishment of an inclusive means of governance to address the needs of all ethnic groups in the state [21].

However, democratization is problematic in multiethnic societies, particularly in the beginning stage, when the old regime is changed to the new democratic regime. This process can effect to existing ethnic problem. Democratization process depends on two factors. The first is the level of ethnic tension. If the old regime used forced assimilation, forced relocation, ethnic expulsion, extermination campaigns toward ethnic problems, in this case the democratization process will be very problematic and many ethnic problems will be on the agenda. The second factor is the equation of the ethnic groups in the country or their relative size. If one group is larger than others are, the majority group will be able to dominate discussions about new political arrangement. In this case minority interest will be neglected. If two or more groups are almost equal in size, in this case all groups' concern will be addressed.

EDWARD AZAR THEORY OF PROTRACTED SOCIAL CONFLICT (PSC)

Edward Azar who is a Lebanon born American introduce the PSC theory which very much assisted many academics to understand conflicts and move about ways to prevent conflict. Being a student and professor of International Relation and experienced conflict in his birthplace, he was able to develop a Conflict and Peace Research Data Bank in the University of North Carolina. As a renowned conflict resolution theorist, Azar made it clear that ethnic conflict “represented and often violent struggle by communal groups for such basic needs as security, recognition and acceptance, fair access to political institution and economic participation”[22]. He further explained his opinion that state's institution which was the case of many post-colonial states are “dominated by a single communal identity group or a coalition of few from these groups that are unresponsive to the needs of other groups in the society”. PSC is been seen as an attempt to synthesize the problem arose in ethnic conflict by explaining prevalent patterns of conflict. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall although not claiming that the work of Azar relating to PSC as the last work in the subject, strongly took into account the extension of Azar's PSC examination towards conflict which went beyond the work of Horowitz and Smith. This includes the framework for the analysis of prevailing patterns of war which differed from what was usual when interstate war was the object of analysis [23].

Further extension of Azar's PSC study emphasized that the sources of such conflicts lay predominantly within and across rather than between states, with four clusters of variables identified as follow:

The most useful unit of analysis in conflict situations is the identity group which include racial, religious, ethnic, cultural and others' which are in contrast with

Kenneth Waltz well known three level of analysis that include system, state and individual levels [24]. At this point, he took stand in his argument that the core problem for conflict is basically the relationship between these identity groups and the states.

Deprivation of human needs as the underlying source of conflict. This relate to the notion of 'grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively'. The failure of addressing these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for conflict.

Governance and the state's role as the critical factor in the satisfaction or frustration of individual and identity groups need. Most states which experience conflict tend to be characterised by incompetent, fragile and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs.

The role of 'International Linkages' which relate to political economic relations of economic dependency within the international economic system. It also involves the network of political and military linkages which constitute regional and global patterns of cross border interest. This can directly influence the character of the particular state involved in conflict and how she behave in the international system [25].

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AS AN EXAMPLE

Upon going through and understanding the discussion above, it would be useful to look at the conflict in the former Yugoslavia to further comprehend the issue of ethnic conflict within a state or what have been described earlier as an intra-state conflict.



Figure 1: Map of The Former Yugoslavia after 1991

(Source: <http://www.cftech.com/BrainBank/GEOGRAPHY/FormerYugoslavia.html> (2014))

The former Yugoslavia was a federated of republics which consisted of six republics namely Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia – Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia. Additional to these are two autonomous regions of Vojvodina and Kosovo within the Serbian Republic as shown in Figure 1. As clearly indicated, the federation had many ethnic groups with the Serbian as the controlling ethnic with the biggest state but unfortunately not the majority in number. The main complication as a result of World War II and the geographical situation of the state is, boundaries of the ethnic groups are not the same with the republics' boundaries. This resulted to having minority Serbs in Croatia, minority Bosnian in the Serbs Republic and elsewhere. The problem of ethnicity was never discussed before 1991 because they as a whole was dominated by Austro Hungarian and the Ottoman Empire historically thus brought them together to fight against the colonials. The first Yugoslav state was formed after World War I with a huge challenge. As a poor state with war scars and diversity in nature, Serbia was stronger and managed to centrally control the whole state while other ethnicity wanted a decentralised state to protect them against Serbian domination. Fighting through World War II brought them together against Hitler invasion [26].

Their war against Hitler brought about a popular partisan leader Marshall Josef Tito who re-unites the Yugoslav republics. He fought with the allies, win over their support (international) and also the common people on the street and introduce a communist centralised controlled of Yugoslav Federation of Republics. To overcome the tension between ethnics, he strode on the Communist Party grip over federal government and promoted the ideology of growth and development. He managed to stomp out nationalism and applied Consociationalism theory of government through power sharing of ethnic groups which devolve as much as possible to the sub-national level [27]. Every republic and the two autonomous regions were given a veto vote in the Federal Presidency Election. This measure was able to balance and constrain the Serbian power within the federation and able to achieve economic growth until his death in 1980.

The problem started when Slobodan Milosevic came into picture and promoted the Serbian nationalism. The Serbian being minority in Kosovo, Croatia and other republics were instigated to fight against economic/political discrimination and demanded for the end of autonomous control of Vojvodina and Kosovo. He also dramatized the suffering of Serbian ethnic historically under the government of Croatia, Bosnia and other republics in the Balkan. The situation was successful to instil fear, dissatisfaction and anger among the minority Serbs. Along the way, he was able to topple leaders in Vojvina, Kosovo and Montenegro and installed his strong supporters who are loyal to him. This resulted in his control over the balance of power in the Federal Presidency (four out of eight vote). Slovenia was able to pull out of the federation in 1991 thus provide a room for majority control by Milosevic. Croatia under the leadership of Franco Tudjman however was not allowed independence thus resulted in a large scale armed conflict which later spread into Bosnia.

The implication of situation in the former Yugoslavia provided us with some ideas on the application of theory in the ethnicity study. Based on these studies, the war was

not the result of historical hatreds. Conflict between the republics or ethnics is relatively new when it was propagated by Slobodan Milosevic to create a Greater Serbian State. In terms of the ethnicity school of thoughts, contrary to the Primordialist theory, which has been described above, the Instrumentalist helps explain the timing which saw the rise of Milosevic and even the Croatian Franco Tudjman who evidently promoted nationalism among the Serbian and Croatian. Politicians as leaders played an important and critical role in initiating conflict through anger, distrust, fear, distrust, resentment and grievances. Although at federal level, Tito as the leader was able to suppress nationalism, his successors have failed, in fact they encouraged it. There was also major weakness of Yugoslavia as a state when she experienced economic difficulties after the demise of Marshall Tito, political instability as a result of weak political institution to control the federation, deadlock in the voting process of federal presidency thus provided critical window of opportunity for Serbian leaders to initiate and propagate the fight against other ethnicity [28].

The Ethnic war in the former Yugoslavia which is often described as the deadliest war in Europe after World War II witnessed the intervention of international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and other non-state actors to mediate the grave situation. This international intervention which was related to the way states interact in the international system in dealing with conflict situation. The prevention and resolution of this particular ethnic conflict was done and brought about the trial and prosecution of war crimes including ethnic cleansing and other crimes against humanity and ethnicity. This was the first conflict since World War II to be formally judged genocidal in character and many key individual participants were subsequently charged with war crimes [29]. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by the UN to prosecute these crimes [30].

CONCLUSION

On the basis of recent research on the ethnicity and ethnic conflict, this article provides evidence that pre-existing ethnic problems do influence ethnic conflict. However, as the political institution and leadership get to influence the mass to advance for better political power, the available arguments appear to strongly support existing theories of intergroup conflict. The argument also provides indirect evidence that ethnic conflicts are likely to be instrumental, rather than driven by primordial hatreds.

The account on the former Yugoslavia is not a narrative of events but an analytic explanation for the breakup of Yugoslavia amid collective violence. To explain their success this article draws on elements from the primordialist, instrumentalist and constructionist views on ethnicity and on the theory of ethnic violence originating in fear and insecurity. To these the author adds the concept of a cognitive frame which clarifies ethnic manipulation. Nationalism, ethnic identity and attachment alone, however intense, do not explain grass-roots ethnic actions.

Deprivation of human needs is still the underlying source of conflict. State and the governance of political institution play an important role to provide for the people and it is very paramount for the state authority as an institution in the satisfaction or frustration of individual and identity groups need in avoiding conflict within state.

The resolution and prevention of ethnic conflict although can be domestic in nature demanded the coordinated effort by international players such as state actors, international organisations, non-government organisations as well as other actors in the pretext of International Political and economy platform to provide conducive and peaceful world.

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THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE FORMULATION OF STATE'S FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICIES

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ABSTRACT

This article examines the influence of public opinion in the formulation of state's foreign and defence policies. Public opinion is said to play an important role in shaping the foreign and defence policies of state. The deliberations and arguments on the extend of its influence hinge heavily on the definitions that are used to describe public opinion as well as an accurate understanding of its meaning and connotation towards state's foreign and defence policies. The article uses models of foreign and defence policies for its analysis pertaining to the opinion-policy relationship. The findings show that the utilisation of the theory and concept could provide input on the dynamics of the opinion-policy relationship and how public opinion influences state's foreign and defence policies. This article concludes that public opinions plays an important function as a constraint on policy but it does not show a direct connection between opinion and state's foreign and defence policy formulation.

Keywords: *Public opinion, foreign and defence policies, influence, relationship, theory and concept.*

INTRODUCTION

The information revolution has profoundly altered the way mass media covers news and issues. In turn, media has a tremendous influence on public opinion by transforming news and issues of relations between states into sensational issues (Baum, 2011)[1]. This sensationalizing of news report could be seen during the reporting of the disappearance of the Malaysian airplane MH 370. Nevertheless, it is questionable whether public opinion plays a role in shaping foreign and defence policies. The origins of public opinion dated back to the time of ancient Greece and Rome. This term was frequently used during the French Revolution (Krieger, 2001)[2]. Since then, there have been arguments whether public opinion could influence the outcome of foreign and defence policies. Although there are numerous literatures on public opinion and its relationship with state's foreign and defence policies, there have not been any consensuses regarding what the public thinks and how they hold their opinions regarding those policies; or whether those opinions influence and shape the state's foreign and defence policies. Interestingly, there are increasing evidences that show how public opinion influenced or swayed the outcome of the formulation of foreign and defence policies. However, there are also many studies done that inferred public opinion has not played a role in deciding the outcome of foreign

and defence policies. Hence, it is pertinent for this article to examine the influence of public opinion in the formulation of state's foreign and defence policies.

This article seeks to ascertain whether public opinion plays a role in shaping the foreign and defence policies of states. Foremost, this article looks into the definitions of the main terms used. After which the article discusses on a brief theoretical perspective of public opinion, foreign and defence policies. Then, it analyses the dynamics of the foreign and defence policies. Next, deliberation is done on public opinion to determine how the utilisation of the theory and concept would provide inputs to the foreign and defence policies. Concomitantly, this article analyses the dynamics of the opinion-policy relationship and way forward for public opinion. The deliberation conducted enables a conclusion to be drawn on whether public opinion influences the formulation of state's foreign and defence policies. For congruence of thought, the discussions in this article uses commonly accepted definitions of foreign and defence policies.

DEFINITION

Goldstein (1999) defined public opinion as "...the range of views on foreign policy issues held by the citizen"[3]. However, this definition is inconclusive. Therefore, to augment this, Rosenau's (1961) definition of public opinion has also been used for this article. His definition of public opinion refers generally to different publics that have formed around the various issues preoccupying the nation at any moment[4]. The difference in meanings provided by the two definitions on public opinions forms the basis for the arguments in this article.

For the purpose of this article, the definition of foreign policy by Krieger (2001) in his book entitled "Oxford Companion to Politics of the World" is used. According to him, foreign policy is said to be "...the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent state in international relations"[5]. In order to generate a wider scope for discussion, the Penguin Dictionary of International Relations definition of foreign policy as the activity whereby state actors act, react and interact is also used (Evan and Newham, 1998) [6]. Likewise, this article also relies on the Defence Policy definition by John Garnett as the aggregate of the plans, programme and actions taken to achieve security against external military threat, in time of peace as well as war and against domestic insurrection[7].

The definitions above on public opinion serve to prevent ambiguity in streamlining the understanding as well as facilitating the discussions throughout the article; especially during the consideration of the theoretical perspective that requires inferences to specific meaning of the terms used.


THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND THE FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICIES

There is an extensive body of literature that covers the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. Of concern is the “Almond-Lippmann” consensus that viewed public opinion as volatile and incoherent. As a result, it has little impact on policy output (Almond, 1950; Lippmann, 1955; Cohen, 1973; Morgenthau, 1973)[8,9,10,11]. Those works see a direct correlation between the informed nature of public opinion and its effect on policy[12]. Further studies after the United States debacle in the Vietnam War have argued for a more positive view of public opinion and the need for its role in understanding the policy making process [13]. However, there are recent studies that differ from the Almond-Lippmann findings that viewed relationship between opinion and foreign policy as more complex and variable which demonstrated no direct correlation between opinion and its ability to impact policy outputs. The Quantitative Studies (Hartley and Russett, 1992; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Bartels, 1991; Jentleson, 1992) and Case Studies (Graham, 1986; Powlick, 1991) has shown mixed relationship between opinion and policy[14,15,16,17,18,19]. They derived at the finding that public opinion played the most important function as a constraint on policy but did not show a direct connection between opinion and policy. The studies also emphasised on the importance of contingent factors.

With the dichotomy of the co-relationship of public opinion on foreign and defence policies mentioned above, this article dwells into the dynamics of foreign and defence policies as well as public opinion in order to identify what the actual opinion-policy relationship is.

DYNAMICS OF STATE FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOUR

Public opinion plays a role in foreign policy behaviour. However, how much of this public opinion input is actually considered by the policy elites in coming up with their choice of foreign policy? Does it conform to the Almond-Lippmann consensus of no correlation or the Quantitative and Case Studies findings that public opinion played the most important function as a constraint on policy without a direct connection between opinion and policy? Basing on a model of Dynamics of State Foreign Policy Behaviour as reflected in Figure 1 below, it can be construed that the choice of foreign policy not only solicits input from public opinion but also that of other parameters [20]. It can be seen that public opinion input together with the consideration of other national attributes could provide a choice for the foreign policy. However, this choice is also subjected to inputs from the characteristics of the international system and that of other states policies. The final choice of foreign policy would be dependent on the characteristics of leaders and the nature of government system (Snow and Brown, 2000)[21]. Figure 1 below clearly illustrates the interaction of the various elements in the dynamics of foreign policybehaviour.



Domain of Internal Public Opinion

Figure 1: Model of Dynamics of State Foreign Policy Behaviour

(Source: J.E. Dougherty & R.L. Pfaltzgraff, 1981)

The following discussions further illustrate the dynamics of state's foreign and defence policies. British Prime Minister (PM), Tony Blair was asked during a speech on the eve of the invasion of Iraq "What are the Foreign Policy principles that should guide us?" He answered "First, we should remain the closest ally of the United States, and as allies influence them to continue broadening their agenda. We are ally of the United States not because they are powerful, but because we share their values... it is massively in our self-interest to remain close allies" (Soroka, 2009)[22]. Later, there were hue and public outcries over the United Kingdom's involvement in the Iraq war. However, is it appropriate for the PM to come up with this type of foreign policy to support the United States? Would this curtail the public debate over the national security issues and the foreign and defence policies? It can be argued that the British PM's statement on the stated foreign policy with the United States is a valid one in accordance with the theory of the formulation of foreign policies. As the Penguin Dictionary of International Relations defines foreign policy as "the activity whereby state actors act, react and interact", the PM as a decision-maker would have approached the policy from a regional perspective. He would have given due consideration to the international environment and evaluated the geopolitics parameters. Hence, it can be inferred that this policy was made on the basis of a rational calculation of the advantage and disadvantage the British could gain by acting, reacting and interacting with the United States. Therefore, it is reasonable to postulate that the finding above is more inclined toward the findings of the quantitative studies (Hartley and Russett, 1992; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Bartels, 1991; Jentleson, 1992) and

case studies (Graham 1986: Powlick, 1991) whereby public opinion is a constraint but had not influenced the PM's decision on the foreign policy with the United States.

DYNAMICS OF DEFENCE POLICY

Richard Nottage, the former Secretary, Foreign Affairs and Trade of New Zealand once said that the relationship between foreign and defence policy is one of partnership [23]. Foreign policy and defence policy are often formulated separately in most countries except in some advance states that incorporate both into the domain of national security strategies. Hence, an analysis of the defense planning process would assist in the argument whether public opinion has a role to play in the formulation of defence policy. The model of the Defence Planning Process indicates that both the parameters of external and internal pressures as well as the constraint on national power have an influence on the national objective which in turn affects the output of foreign and defence policies (Collins, 1990) [24]. Figure 2 below shows the interrelationships of the various parameters and the dynamic of defence policy formulation.




Figure 2: Model of Defence Planning Process
(Source: J.M. Collins, 1990)

The formulation of Japan's defence policy is a contemporary example that can illustrate how much public opinion could influence defence planning. The aftermath of World War II has resulted in Japan maintaining only a Self Defence Force. Japan has to rely on the United States-Japan Security Arrangement for support against any aggression. Hence the Japanese government has been trying to review the legislature

of its Self Defence Force but has faced resistance from the public. Japan in a major reformation created its National Security Council (NSC) in 1986 as prime coordinator of security issues. This was in response to the consistent failure of the traditional Japanese decision-making system that was bottom up. This NSC takes input from the Japanese Defence Agency where its decision-making is largely handled by Internal Bureaus. However, Article 7 of the Self-Defence Law stipulates that the Prime Minister is the supreme commander of the forces (Murray and Viotti, 1994) [25]. As for the Japanese system, there is control within control assurance that major decisions ultimately reflect the wishes of the political leadership. Therefore in this case, it can be postulated that Japanese's public opinion domestic pressure could only constrain the decision of defence policy. However, the actual outcome of the defence policy does not reflect the relationship between the opinion and policy. This again concurred with the Quantitative and Case Studies findings Models as deliberated earlier.

THE DYNAMICS OF OPINION-POLICY RELATIONSHIP

Is there a relationship in which policy is always a reflection of opinion? This relationship is difficult to define. Firstly, it is difficult to measure opinion and changes in opinion. Secondly, individuals were forced to structure their opinions according to contrasting core dimensions due to the complexity of many foreign policy issues as expounded by Holsti (1992) [26]. Hence, there is a need to outline the nature of the relationship between opinion and policy to identify whether public opinion plays a contending role in foreign and defence policies. Rosenau (1961) viewed this relationship between public opinion and foreign policy as composed of three distinctly, but closely related social processes; namely, the *governmental decision-making* process, the *opinion-submitting process* and the *opinion-making process*[27]. The interaction of these three separate systems would determine the outcome of the policy. It can be seen here that in order for public opinion to have an impact on the policy making process, it must be transmitted effectively. However, it is unclear whether the public can exert such influence for their opinion to be heard (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1981) [28]. Therefore, it can be argued here that the public opinion would only have an impact in the political systems that allow the transmissions of opinion into the policy formulation process. There are no available instances of political systems that could indicate such public opinion influence. The closest that comes to mind is the United States' decision to participate and withdraw from the Somalia Peacekeeping Operation due to public opinion (Snow and Brown, 2000) [29]. Nevertheless, it can be said that *policy-makers lead opinion* predominates the *opinion leads policy makers* or otherwise would be determined by the dominance of any one of the social process determinants mentioned by Rosenau (1961). Basing on observed practices, it would seem that public opinion has not managed to influence the foreign and defence policies formulation.

WAY FORWARD

It was found that public opinion is a key determinant in foreign and defence policies. However, this determinant though constrained but has not directly affected the formulation of foreign and defence policies. Nevertheless, with the current state and international system, does public opinion play a bigger role in the policy formulation? Will the dynamics of public opinion change the foreign and defence policies? What would then be the sources of public opinion that can affect the policy formulation? If public opinion managed to influence the formulation of foreign and defence policies, what would the impact on the state and the international system be?

The world is slowly transforming into a globalised entity. The advancement of technology has enabled information to be transmitted and received in real time. It is postulated that this information received by the public would greatly contribute towards their opinion forming. As it is, the media is playing a major role in shaping the opinion of the public. Hence, the public would be able to expediently know and react to the effect of the implementation of foreign and defence policies of its own state and that of other states. It is in the interest of the public to safeguard their national interests and their own interests by monitoring the outcome of the implemented states public and defence policies. This can be seen in the current global system by the establishment of International Organisations and International Non Governmental Organisations that play prominent roles in the world political situation now. An example is the Green Peace Movement that concerns environmental politics. Therefore, it is foreseen in the future that the public would play a bigger role to exercise more influence in safeguarding their own and national interests. Hence, the policy-maker will be subjected to close scrutiny of the public for decisions made. Consequently, the policy maker has to come up with workable foreign and defence policies. Therefore, it could be postulated that this check and balance would enable the state and international foreign and defence policies to be formulated more rationally. Nevertheless, public opinion needs to play a significant role.

Can public opinion play a significant role in the foreign and defence policy considering the emergence of many actors in the states and international system? The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations mentioned that the majority of the populations are probably ruled out from exercising any significant influence in the area of foreign policy-making. It is surmised that this could be due to the fact that in all political system, foreign policy is perceived as an area of executive predominance. Furthermore, in low politics, many foreign policies are made on the basis of rather specialist knowledge. What more when foreign policy decisions are essentially reactive in character; where time is a premium leading to minimum consultation. On top of that there is the tendency in many democracies for foreign policy issues to be approached from a bipartisan perspective means where the customary definition of the situation provided by the party politics is not available [30]. A clear example that could illustrate that public opinion lacks influence in the defence and foreign policies formulation is the United States' decision to launch the attack on Iraq where the world public opinions were not heeded by the policy-maker despite major demonstrations and rallies staged by many countries. This

reflected the submission of opinions on foreign policy issues. What would then be the sources of public opinion that can affect the policy formulation?

The media role could shape international events in shaping public perspectives and public attitudes towards important issues such as internationalism and isolationism, the use of force and economic issues (Markel, 1949) [31]. It is postulated that the mass and attentive publics' structures could influence the public opinion. However, Lentner's (1974) *Foreign Policy Analysis* brought up a valid issue of structure in decision-making and communications systems. He outlined that bureaucracies have direct access for aggregated opinion while public opinion's direct access is unaggregated. He went on to elaborate that the timing of participation in debate is different. Where the press is free, it intervenes between the political elite and the public and thus is an important factor in the policy process. They also serve to inform the entire bureaucracies about policy questions that are outside the jurisdictions of most segments (Lentner, 1974) [32]. Hence, it is foreseen that the media and press must ensure information is communicated in both directions to influence the outcome of the policy. An example that illustrates how the press and media affect world opinion is the issue of the Dili Massacre that occurred in 12 November 1991. The press managed to capture video footages and images of the shooting of a defenceless mass funeral procession (Brogan, 1989) [33]. This consequently led the world to focus on the neglect to East Timor in their quest for independence. Due to pressure by the world community, East Timor finally was granted a referendum in 1999 and independence on 20 May 2002.

It is posited that public opinion that could influence the formulation of foreign and defence policies would have both positive and negative impact on the state and the international system. This will depend on the inclinations of public opinion towards realism and liberalism/idealism. If the inclination is towards realism and the foreign policy is meted out without restraint, it would cause chaos or instability. On the other hand, public opinion that is more idealistic or pacifistic by nature would lead to a more harmonious approach in the handling of state and inter-state relations. Thus, it is inferred that there is a need for the state and the international system to shape the public to form the right opinion.

Does this public opinion theory apply to Malaysia? In Malaysia; Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Members of the Parliament make policy decisions. It could be seen that the media on many issues is increasingly highlighting the politicians. There were incidents whereby the issues involving Malaysia and other countries have resulted in enormous public opinion that could shape the decision on foreign and defence policies in relation to that particular country. However, it is observed that the use of diplomacy is still an overriding factor that influences decision in Malaysia's handling of issues. For example, the Ambalat incident in Sulawesi Sea between the Indonesian Navy and Malaysian Navy was handled amicably by both the countries, contradicting the public provocations and their opinions. Hence, it can be conceived that though public opinion plays an important function as a constraint on policy but it does not show a direct

connection between opinion and policy. This again confirms the Quantitative and Case Studies findings highlighted in the article earlier.

CONCLUSION

The contention of whether public opinion seriously influences the formulation of state's foreign and defence policies was analysed firstly from the theoretical perspective of the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. The Almond-Lippmann consensus and the Quantitative and Case Studies Findings were considered for the discussion of the theoretical approach to the subject matter. It was found that public opinion played an important function as a constraint on policy but did not show a direct connection between opinion and policy. Therefore, a further analysis was done on the dynamics of state foreign policy behaviour through the use of the Dynamics of State Foreign Policy Behaviour Model by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff (1981). Using the applications of input and examples into the model, it was inferred that public opinion is a constraint but had not influenced the decision of foreign policy. To confirm the findings from the previous analysis, a Model of Defence Planning Process by Collins (1990) was used. After considering the determinants of the model and by applying a contemporary example, it was postulated that public opinion could act as a constraint on policy and that direct connection between opinion and policy could not be established as that of the Quantitative and Case Studies Findings.

Since the analysis has reflected no direct connection between the opinion and policy, the article then attempted to determine the opinion-policy relationship. A review of the literature by Holsti (1992) and Rosenau (1961) was done to identify this relationship. It was found that *policy-makers lead opinion* predominated the *opinion leads policy makers*. However, it is foreseen that with the globalisation of the world, public opinion formulation could be influenced by the media. This would have a direct bearing on the public opinion-policy relationship in the future. It is conceived that the public would want to safeguard their own and national interests while the policy-makers would be subjected to closer scrutiny not only by local public opinion but also from public opinions of other states. However, the opinion-submitting process is yet to be desired. For the way forward, the opinion-policy relationship must be viewed from the state and global perspectives. It is also important to consider the mass and attentive public. It is inferred that the interaction patterns of opinion-making public at the national level and the communication system could change the foreign and defence policies. The media would have a major role to play in both the opinion making and policy-making process.

Basing on the deliberations above, it can be concluded that public opinion plays an important function as a constraint on policy but there is no direct connection between opinion and policy. Though public opinion does influence the formulation of a state's foreign and defence policies, other factors that might be more important could overshadow public opinion. Hence, the government might adopt a policy that might

be unpopular with the people but is crucial for national security or national interest. Therefore, public opinion could have an influence in the formulation of state's foreign and defence policies but not a serious influence *per se*.

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EXOGENOUS AND ENDOGENOUS FACTORS OF INDIA'S ENDURING AMBIVALENCE TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

This study is focused on India's ambivalent foreign policy towards the United States. It shows how India, as a rising regional power, is ambivalent to the United States, an established global hegemon. Historically, India has a legacy of a non-alignment stance and a preference for avoidance of alliance. Nevertheless, the aftermaths of 9/11 and the Mumbai terrorist attack in 2008 have strengthened the India-United States relations. However, there were instances when the relations became uncertain and more complicated. Issues such as India's domestic political challenges, history of distrust between them, tensions in the Asian strategic landscape, the endorsement for permanent membership to United Nations Security Council, are some of India's concerns. For these reasons, India is seen to adjust its foreign policy towards the United States. This study has employed a qualitative research design with the gathering and analysis of both primary and secondary data. The concept of ambivalence has been employed to analyse India's foreign policy. This study has revealed that economic interests is the determinant factor. The enablers and challenges to India's economic interests are the driving factors to India's ambivalence. Therefore, in considering its status as a rising regional power and its strategic geographic location to several security issues, ambivalence is a smart strategy employed by India. This strategy could be used by India, to its interest and advantage, in its quest to leverage on the United States, vis-à-vis other major powers.

Keywords: *ambivalence, perceived threat, terrorism, economic interests, trade protectionism, regionalism, economic collaborations*

INTRODUCTION

India has a legacy of non-alignment [1] stance and has a preference to avoid any alliance with major powers [2] and has co-founded the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) [3]. During the Cold War, the India-United States relations could be considered as cold. India-United States relations improved positively following the September 11 attack. The then President George W. Bush lifted the 1998 sanction following India's agreement to support the United States' global war on terror campaign. The improved relations were then translated into Defence Framework Agreement in 2005 for a period of 10 years [4].

In 2012, tensions began to develop when the government of India condemned the United States for the killing of six Sikh worshippers in Milwaukee, United States (Ganguly 2012) [5]. The allegation that the United States National Security Agency

(NSA) was spying on the Indian embassy, the Indian United Nations (UN) mission and the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), also worsened the relations [6].

In late 2014, with a turn of events, the India-United States relations improved when India's newly elected Prime Minister, Narendra Modi made a five-day trip to the United States in September 2014 even though he was denied a visa to United States in 2005 [7]. The relations reached another milestone on the 25th Jan 2015 when President Obama's visit to India as the chief guest to the Indian Republic Day parade [8].

Nevertheless, the invitation by Prime Minister Modi to Obama as the Chief of Guests at the India's Republic Day ceremony signified 'tilt' or adjustment in India's foreign policy towards the United States. Considering India's legacy of its non-alignment stance, India's decades old mistrust of the United States over support to Pakistan, India-United States volatile [9] bilateral relations, and the adjustment of its foreign policy towards the United States indicate India's ambivalence and raises a paradoxical position in India's foreign policy towards the United States. Therefore, what remains to be explained is, why would India with its non-alignment stance with regards to international relations, adjust its policy towards the United States? How are the exogenous and endogenous sources of the enduring ambivalence affecting the India-United States relationship? What is the determinant factor to India's ambivalence? Therefore this study will identify the sources of India's enduring ambivalence. Subsequently, the study will identify and analyse the determinant factor that contributed to the adjustment of India's foreign policy towards the United States.

THEORIES AND CONCEPTS

In this study, India is seen as employing ambivalent policy either to balance or to bandwagon with the United States. There has yet to be a clear definition of ambivalence in the social sciences. Nonetheless, ambivalence is measured when this "feeling" is translated into behaviour within the context of international relations. Thus this study employed realism and liberalism theories as the framework in tandem with the application of key concepts that include bandwagoning, soft balancing and hard balancing. Bandwagoning, according to Walt (1987: 17) [10], is to create alliance with the sources of threat, whilst balancing, is to make alliance against the threat. Paul (2004: 14) explains that soft balancing refers to limited arms build up, make informal or ad-hoc security understanding among affected states, within or outside international institutions. On the other hand, hard balancing is formally making an alliance or opens arms build up, or, both making an alliance and arms build up [11].

FACTORS OF INDIA'S AMBIVALENCE

Exogenous and endogenous factors have contributed to India's ambivalence. The exogenous factors identified are perceived threat of China and non-traditional threat of

counter terrorism whilst endogenous factors are economic interests and domestic politics. The details are discussed in the following.

Perceived Threat of China

The perceived threat from China has brought India closer to the United States. In the words of Modi in 2014, “The oldest democracy in the world and the largest democracy in the world are natural allies and we must work together towards global peace and prosperity.” Amorim argued that the balancing act is the main point of “natural alliance” [12]. Mohan also argued that India has consistently exercised a balancing policy against China [13]. Likewise, Joshi et al. opined that while clearly engaged in a balancing behaviour, India and United States are extremely careful not to complicate the relationship with China [14]. However, Basrur cautioned that natural allies are a mere symbol, since India has nuclear weapons and does not need the United States to defend it [15]. India could also enforce a blockade on sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf and Africa in Indian Ocean to stop the two third supplies of oil to China [16].

Therefore, there are two views concerning India’s foreign policy with the rise of China [17]. The first deems that India is bandwagoning with the United States, while the second sees India as performing soft balancing against China.

Hence, it could be summarised that India perceived China as a threat and in so doing, India is exercising a soft balancing act against China in order to benefit from the quest of hegemon in the global balance of power. Therefore, the perceived threat of China is the exogenous factor in consideration of India’s ambivalent foreign policy in order to secure national security in the longer period.

Terrorism

Terrorism in India is quite alarming. For a period from 1994 to March 2015, terrorism in India has claimed the lives of 24,527 civilians, 9,565 security personnel and 30,036 terrorists (SATP 2015) [18]. India has challenges in terms of cross-border terrorism along its border, committed by the alleged Pakistani-led groups and the possibility of domestic group linking up with groups in Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh [19].

The 26/11 bombing in Mumbai has left its mark in India’s history and raised the need to have a reliable intelligence network on counter terrorism. Following that, India and United States signed counter terrorism cooperation agreement for information and intelligence sharing in combating terrorism in 2009 and 2010 [20]. In addition, the United States Department’s Anti-Terrorism Country Assistance Plan has trained more than 2000 officials from intelligence, police, security agencies and paramilitary [21]. In short, India has embarked on a comprehensive collaboration on counter terrorism with the United States.

Domestic Politics

In general, the foreign policy of Manmohan and Modi are not very different in terms of fundamentals, multiple security partnerships, reserved closeness with the United States, no changes in the nuclear policy, and enduring interest in foreign trade and investment [22]. However, Modi has a more pro-active foreign policy in shaping and driving events compared to mere reacting. Therefore, domestic politics is the endogenous factor to the ambivalence.

Economic Interests

The India and United States' economic relationship has developed from strength to strength. The United States is the world's largest economy and India is the second fastest growing economy in the world. According to the Indian Ministry of Commerce, the United States is ranked third after the United Arab Emirates and China in terms of total trade with India in 2012 to 2013.

The defence trade between India and United States is growing and has grown significantly from 2010 onwards to become the second largest supplier to India [23]. However, India acquired over 75 per cent of its military assets from Russia thus making Russia the largest arms supplier to India. In 2012, India denied American companies contract to deliver fighter jets worth USD12 billion and opted for French made jets [24]. This indicates an uncertainty, and as Daniel [25] argues, some parties in the Indian defence establishment are still not fully confident of the United States, especially in front line assets.

Furthermore, despite the improved economic ties, the fact that India does not have a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States indicates its worry and fear. India has a total of 28 FTAs enforced and in negotiations, whilst the United States has FTA with 20 countries [26]. However, none of the on-going India's bilateral and multilateral negotiations is with the United States.

Therefore the absence of India-United States FTA and the uncertainties in India, especially on the procurement of front line military assets with the United States, could undoubtedly be summed up to reflect India's ambivalence to the United States.

DETERMINANT FACTOR

A strong economy is definitely very important to any nation. As articulated by John Kerry, "Foreign policy is economic policy." [27]. Hence, economic policy could be considered as an integral part of foreign policy and would shape foreign policy to a certain extent. This was exemplified during Manmohan's tenure where his doctrine of foreign policy was to treat economic goals as the drivers to national interests. Mohan proposed that economic and strategic considerations act as complimentary to India's

foreign policy and diplomacy [28]. Therefore, the enablers and the challenges to the economic interests are analysed as follows:

The Enablers

There are six enablers in terms of economic interests that contributed to the India-United States economic relationship namely; leadership, economic cooperation, defence framework agreement, civil nuclear cooperation, people to people engagement and defence industry.

In terms of leadership, both the Prime Ministers Manmohan and Modi leaderships, in their own ways, have been the enablers to the significant increase in India-United States economic relations. Narang proposed that Manmohan has adopted a principle that is based on neoliberal maxim theory, where “States that trade with each other would not attack each other” [29]. Additionally, the Manmohan Doctrine has five principles of Indian foreign policy that revolved around the economy. Along a similar vein, in 2014, Modi launched a “Make in India” campaign with the aim of putting India prominently on the global manufacturing map, to facilitate the inflow of new technology, capital and to create jobs for the people [30]. His foreign policy is built around the objectives of domestic economic growth and expansion of Indian economy. Even though both Manmohan and Modi are from rival political parties, they have a similar balanced policy. They have explored ways to strengthen military relations and at the same time broaden economic ties with the United States and other nations.

For economic cooperation, India and United States have signed a Commercial Dialogue on the 23rd March 2006. In 2010, a Strategic Dialogue between the two countries was launched. In January 2015, the United States-India Strategic and Commercial Dialogue (S&CD) was established to elevate the existing economic partnership and bilateral commerce. However for India, its optimum policy is to have better relations with China and United States [31]. Thus, India’s foreign policy is driven by the economic priorities [32].

India has signed two Defence Framework Agreements with the United States in 2005 and 2015 respectively. The Defence Agreement Framework has managed to build a strong foundation in mutual defence cooperation such as security dialogue, defence exercises, defence trades, service-level exchanges and technology collaboration.

A civil nuclear cooperation agreement was concluded between India and United States in 2006. In 2008, India was given a waiver by the Nuclear Suppliers Group to become the only non-nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) compliant state, which has active nuclear weapons programs and involved in normal nuclear business.

In terms of people to people engagement, the number of United States citizens travelled to India increased tremendously. In 1983, 95,847 United States tourists were recorded and in 2013, 1,085,309 Americans were recorded. The United States is now

the highest source of tourists to India. Indian diaspora in the United States has become a source of revenue as well with 17.2 per cent remittance to India [33],

To safeguard the defence industry, Obama and Modi affirmed that they would “treat each other at the same level as their closest partners” on issues with Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI). These issues include defence technology transfers, trade, research, co-production, and co-development apart from increased partnership in September 2014 [34]. This is in line with Modi’s plan to increase defence self-sufficiency and to increase the share of military hardware manufactured in India. In addition, Obama’s visit in January 2015 has resulted in the joint production of parts and systems of Lockheed C-130 and RQ-11 Raven drones. India and United States are currently on negotiation for the design and development of aircraft carriers as well.

The Challenges

India is the 11th largest trading partner for the United States and the 18th largest exports market. According to Pritzker, the United States Secretary of Commerce, she would like India to be in the top five [35] but is mindful that there are many hurdles in doing business with India [36]. Three challenges discussed in the study are protectionism, regionalism and ability.

Trade protectionism is a deliberate attempt by countries to limit imports through the imposition of barriers to trade despite the increasing trade openness and free trade following the globalisation of market. The two instruments of protectionism are tariffs and quotas [37]. Presently, there is no FTA between India and United States. An FTA would definitely require India to make changes to the current law and practices. Michael Froman, the United States Trade Representative has urged India to dismantle the “wall of protectionism” and to strengthen the intellectual property right (IPR).

In terms of regionalism, India is a member to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) but not a party to the larger regional trade that involve the United States, namely the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) [38]. Currently, India is not part of TPPA negotiations and not a member to APEC as well, notwithstanding that India has requested to join APEC for the past twenty years.

India has economic collaborations with seven other South Asian nations through the SAARC, which was established in December 1985 [39]. In terms of economic engagement with East Asian countries, India became ASEAN’s full dialogue partner in 1995 and currently negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) with ASEAN [40]. In addition, India is engaged with BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). India is also the member of IBSA, a prospective founding member for Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) [41] and currently accepted as a full member to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) [42]. Interestingly, all these cooperation are led by China but not the United States. Further, India has economic partnership agreements with Japan and South Korea as well [43].

India-United States Transfer of Technology (ToT) agreements are currently through the Defence Framework Agreement. The India-United States defence partnership has embarked into the co-development and co-production of defence technologies. However, there are concerns on India's ability as argued by Mishra [44] that India is not ready to absorb the transfer of advanced technologies.

Yet, another obstacle to the development of the defence industry is the signing of agreements with the United States for transfer of weapons and technology to India that are still pending, such as the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA); Logistics Supply Agreement (LSA); and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for geo-spatial cooperation. As a federal state, there are internal procedures that ended up taking longer time in implementation and inter-ministry rivalry as well that hinder developments. This was clearly demonstrated when the former UPA government under Manmohan had hesitated in the signing of the agreements based on the security concerns with regards to sensitive technology matters [45].

The Ambivalence

India and United States' economic trade has increased significantly over the past decade with the belief of their overlapping interests. However, Carpenter argues that India is playing a cautious and sometimes ambivalent role, neither an ally nor an adversary [46].

The United States is the top economy in the world, followed by China, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Brazil, Italy, Russia and India [47]. Among the top ten economies, the only country that India does not have FTA is with the United States. Nine of India's enforced bilateral FTAs are with Afghanistan, Bhutan, Chile, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Republic of Korea, Nepal, Japan and Malaysia. The on-going bilateral FTA negotiations are with Australia, Canada, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Mauritius, Thailand and New Zealand. In terms of multilateral FTAs, India has signed with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) [48], ASEAN, Asia Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA) [49], MERCOSUR [50] and SAARC (ARIC 2015) [51]. The on-going multilateral negotiations are BIMSTEC [48], Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, [52] European Union, Southern African Customs Union [53] and RCEP.

Does this position indicate that India is ambivalent to the United States? Amorim argued that every country is somehow ambivalent to others, what differentiates the two is the extent of the ambivalence [54]. In the India-United States relationship, he was of the opinion that the difference was in the economic development between the two countries that is one of the key factors to the ambivalence.

India has had a long-standing mistrust with the United States. Daniel articulated that "Close relations between Washington and Islamabad was always a source of concern for India." [55] The United States had opposed to India's nuclear programme and imposed economic sanctions following the 1998 nuclear tests. The sanctions were only lifted

following the India's support for the global war on terror post 9/11. To this, Daniel opined that, "The sanctions imposed after Indian nuclear tests...remain a chip in the shoulder for India-U.S relations[56]." Narang further contended that India still prefers to deal with United States at arm's length, thereby reflecting the long-standing mistrust between them and its reluctance to be a junior partner of the United States [57]. Basrur further enjoined with the view and in his interview he opined that the "Remnants of distrust from Cold War era and India's desire not to overly dependent on the United States" are the factors to the ambivalence [58]. Finally, Daniel contended that "Some in the Indian defence establishment still do not have complete confidence or trust in the United States...in deals involving key frontline assets like fighter jets, the latter preferred to go with its more traditional supplier." [59] Consequently, the distrust from Cold War and the economics sanction has developed ambivalence to India in relations to the United States.

In addition, Ghoshal opined "The question of ambivalence comes in essentially because India does not want to identify herself fully (*aligned*) with any major power... ambivalence exists in all foreign policy." [60] He further argued "India has always acted on its own national interests...there are numerous instances when India has opposed the US when it found to be contrary to its national interests...similarly with Soviet Union and now Russia. India also maintains excellent relations with China, reflected in its growing trade relations with Beijing." Hence, the ambivalence could happen to any states. Nevertheless the national interests normally shape the levels and differences of ambivalence. Likewise, Mishra argued "India's ambition of playing a more important global role has led India to proactively follow a policy that reflects the logic and reality of India's critical economic interdependence with the rest of the world." [61]

From the discussion, it has now become evident that to a certain extent, India is ambivalent to the United States. The national interests particularly on economic related issues have been the source of ambivalence to India.

CONCLUSION

A vibrant economy is definitely very important to any nation. An economic policy, to a certain extent, could be considered as an integral part of a foreign policy and would shape the foreign policy. The India-United States economic relations have improved significantly over the years especially after the active rebalancing policy by Obama. On the one hand, there are enabling factors namely leadership, economic cooperation, defence framework agreement, civil nuclear cooperation, people to people engagement and defence industry. On the other hand, the existing challenges are protectionism, regionalism and India's ability and capacity to receive the ToT. These factors together with the India's long-standing mistrust of the United States have resulted in India's ambivalence to the United States. India is seen to be employing this ambivalent strategy towards the United States vis-à-vis China to leverage to its interests. Therefore, it is concluded that economic interests is the determinant factor in the India's ambivalent foreign policy towards the United States.

Therefore, on the one hand, India is afforded privileges in leveraging on the India-United States relationship due to its strategic location in the Asia Pacific region and in particular, South Asia where most of the contemporary strategic issues and interests, for instance, partnerships, are revolving. Nevertheless, on the other hand, India is leveraging to other major powers as well, as and when it deemed appropriate and best for its national interests. Hence, an ambivalent foreign policy is also a way to disguise a state's real position and any domestic problems underlying the relations. As a whole, the ambivalent foreign policy is a smart strategy taken by India to leverage to its advantages and interests.

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Journals /Serials

Henderson, D.A., The looming threat of bioterrorism, *Sci.*, **283** : 1279-1283, 1999.

Online sources

Hurlbert, R.E., Chapter XV, Addendum: Biological Weapons, Malignant Biology, Available from <http://www.wsu.edu/~hurlbert/pages/101biologicalweapons.html>. (Accessed on 30 January 2010).

Unpublished Materials (e.g. theses, reports and documents)

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