THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

CONTENTS

Aims and Scope

The Journal of Defence and Security is a publication of the Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security, MiDAS. The journal publishes original papers and reviews covering all aspects of defence and security. It is a platform to promote awareness on the capabilities and requirements of modern defence & security technologies and policies, covering topics in the areas of, but not limited to, Evolution of Military Information & Communication Systems, Smart Weapons, Modern Vehicle & Aerospace Engineering Challenges, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance, Biological & Chemical Terrorism Countermeasures, Personnel Protection & Performance, Military Medicine, Emergent Naval Technology, and Defence & Security Strategic Management.

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CAPABILITY MANAGEMENT IN DEFENCE

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ABSTRACT

"In preparing for battle it is always found to be that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable and failing to plan is planning to fail."

Malaysia faces dynamic threats from non-state threats (e.g., terrorism, cyber threats, pandemics, etc.) as well as the reassertion of a more competitive international state system. Hence, the contemporary geopolitical environment contains myriad threats and challengers to the Malaysia strategic interests where today's complexities are compounded because of domestic political differences in the country that question what should, or should not, be the Nation's role in international security and the resources that should, or should not, be allocated to deal with these problems. Malaysia's national security is a complex and multifaceted topic which dictate the essentials for coping with the challenges Malaysia confronts against threats and challengers. Legitimate questions over what the nation's priorities should be and what areas of the budget should be well funded and which areas should be less well funded. Generally, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) is an expensive organisation which took a long time to build, but can quickly crumble or be lost without proper care and service. Therefore, it is essential to think about future strategic contingencies in maintaining a reliable fleet than not to think about it. But the question of just how much is enough and just where to draw a new defence perimeter budget. Hence, this paper will assess Malaysia's Strategic Environment and relate how it can influence future military capabilities of the MAF as a whole and the RMN in particular. The focus of the paper will include maritime boundary disputes, separatist movements, economy, maritime cross border issues and national policies which also derive the 4D MAF Capability Plan and the RMN Strategic Plan 2013-2020 (PS 1320).

Keywords: *MAF 4th Dimension Capability Development plan (4D MAF), Capability Management in Defence (CMID), Armed Forces Special Expansion Programme (PERISTA)*

INTRODUCTION

Capability Management in Defence (CMID) centres on strategic and operational appreciations and analysis for decision making. It examines National Interest, National Defence Policies, Strategic Planning, Economy, Acquisition and Force Generation processes for future capability decisions. In addition, by implementing Capability Based Planning it critically analyse the various national approaches which can influence future military capability planning based on uncertainty and budget (Eaton, 2014). Although this is the fundamentals of defence planning today, nevertheless for the Malaysia Armed Forces (MAF) it is relatively new in "*developing modern, deployable, sustainable and interoperable forces and capabilities which can undertake demanding operations wherever required, including being able to operate abroad with limited or no support from anyone*" (Faudzi, 2014).

Generally Malaysia has been blessed with a stable democratic environment where it enjoys good alliances with all Asian members and Western powers. Nevertheless, it is like any other country faced with internal, regional and global conventional issues ranging from economics to security. Historical unresolved land and maritime border disputes, domestic instability in this region and the will to exercise international rights has placed Malaysia in a time bomb region about to explode and implode (Razak, 2001). Furthermore, being in precarious times and the centre of the most vital waterway linking the east to the west, Straits of Malacca and South China Sea, there are also other non-conventional threats such as

piracy, illegal immigrants, human trafficking and terrorism which can impair its sovereignty. Additionally the vast separation between the two land areas, Peninsular Malaysia with Sabah and Sarawak, further manifest its need for efficiency of defence and security deployment.

Then again, ever since Communism and the Cold War was replaced by the 9/11 calamity, apparently mass violence and extremism of religious or ethnically-displaced persons posing as terrorists have emerged as the "uncertain threats". Together all these looming intimidations can influence Malaysia to re-think, re-evaluate and re-design its military capabilities to face these emerging conflicts.

This article will assess Malaysia's Strategic Environment and relate how it can influence future military capabilities of the MAF as a whole and the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) in particular. The focus of the paper will include maritime boundary disputes, separatist movements, economy, maritime cross border issues and national policies which also derive the 4D MAF Capability Plan and the RMN Strategic Plan 2013-2020 (PS 1320).

MILITARY CAPABILITY

Military capability is the war fighting ability of a country to exert its power on potential or existing enemies. A large force does not necessary commensurate an effective war fighting capability. Geography, doctrines, training, good leadership and solid organisation preludes effectiveness of military capability.

The UK defines military capability as "*the enduring ability to deliver an effect or outcome that is relative to the threat, the environment and the coalition contribution*" (Eaton, 2014). Accordingly the UK addresses this via an Integrated "*Defence Lines of Development (DLoD)*" which embrace the following key elements that are interoperable to meet coherent military capability – "*Training, Equipment, Personnel, Information, Doctrine and Concepts, Organisation, Infrastructure and Logistics (TEPIDOIL)*" (Eaton, 2014). In the Malaysian context it is defined as "*the combination of force structure and preparedness which enables a nation to exercise military power*" (Faudzi, 2014). This simply means that the military is able to be committed to operations within a specified time or in a broader sense the military's "*ability to use its resources effectively wherein its components include people, services, facilities, organisation, training, doctrine, readiness and sustainability in being deployed to guard its national interest*" (Faudzi, 2014).

Initially the fall of Saigon in 1978 was the spring board for Malaysia to equip and turn the MAF into a conventional warfare force via the Armed Forces Special Expansion Programme (PERISTA). Presently the MAF 4th Dimension Capability Development plan (4D MAF) is formulated based on the governments Strategic Guidance, National Defence Policy (NDP) and Military Strategy to "*safeguard its National Security and Interests*" (Mak, 1997).

For the RMN its Strategic Plan reflects the "*balance between short and long term objectives, between financial and non-financial measure indicators and, between internal and external performance*". It translates the "*organization's mission and strategy into a comprehensive set of performance measures that provides the framework for a strategic measurement and management system*" (RMN Strategic Dept, 2014). The strategic plan is also a tool for identifying areas for improvement within the RMN which provides criteria for prioritising challenges and enabling better decision making in promoting improvement programmes that have greater impact on RMN's overall mission, vision and objectives.

Present RMN Capability. RMN being the forerunner in maritime defence is currently equipped with ageing capabilities and warships which limits its operational objective demanded by the NDP. Its limited capabilities are further compounded by an increasing tight budget allocation for defence. The RMN fleet

comprise of 43 ageing warships, 2 new submarines, and 12 naval helicopters, outdated Command, Control, Communication, Computers and Information (C4I), but armed with relatively good medium range surface-to-surface and short range surface-to-air missile capabilities. Presently, the RMN's roles and tasks are in accordance with NDP which is during war to safeguard the maritime sovereignty of Malaysia whilst in peacetime to protect the nation's maritime interest within the EEZ that includes oil and gas platforms, shipping, islands (tourism) and fishing fleet (Tang, 2014).

ASSESSMENT OF MALAYSIA STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Since independence in 1957, Malaysia has not faced any external threat large enough to jeopardise its sovereignty. Its fight was on Communism until the early 1980s and to date; its Military Capability has only been tested on two occasions in the form of 'Confrontation with Indonesia' in 1963 and lately the *Lahat Datu* incursion in 2013. Presently the evolving strategic environment of Malaysia that dominates its security landscape exists in the form of unresolved historical ill-defined territorial and border conflicts and maritime cross border related illegal activities.

For this reason, Malaysia's strategic environment appears to be unpredictable and uncertain and it centres on the defence of national interest and territories as its "*fundamentals to sovereignty and independence*" (NDP, 2010). The NDP dictates that the defence of Malaysia's geographical interest and territories is divided into 3 areas which stretch from the Andaman Sea, through the Straits of Malacca, Singapore Straits, and South China Sea down to the Sulu Sea. However, Malaysia using the guiding principal of Self Reliance and Diplomacy as its primary tool for peace rather than the use of force does not see any threats that can threaten its sovereignty within these 3 areas (Jazlan, 2014). Even if there were to be any, border or maritime disputes, Malaysia is confident that it will not go the full length so as to warrant a full scale war. This is because it believes that all Southeast Asia states are committed in resolving disputes in a peaceful manner under the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC, 1976). Furthermore, being a member of ASEAN, which is a unique organisation that does not have war among its member nations despite certain tense situations, further strengthens its *status quo* approach towards its military capability. Nevertheless, it cannot disregard the likelihood of threats developing in the future and not prepare for the worst.

Present Influencing Factors. Although the NDP is a capability driven policy nevertheless external threats which surrounds Malaysia should be used to gauge the degree of influence it can depict on its future military capability. The following scenarios can influence Malaysia's strategic environment and dictate its defence requirements.

Separatist Movement. The ongoing Muslim Separatist insurgency in southern Thailand has the potential to destabilise the border areas of Malaysia because it is feared that these militants who take refuge from the Thai forces might retreat into the country (Figure 1). This conflict has also caused rift between both nations because the Thai authorities have accused Malaysia in assisting this group. Malaysia therefore has to be cautious about both the problems at hand, the separatist movement and the peace between both states, and equip the MAF to face any eventualities.

Figure 1: Southern Thailand Separatist dispute location
Source: http://www.expatforum

Additionally the last 4 decades of lawlesness in southern Philippines have bred an armed generation creating havoc on land and sea. The rebel Abu Sayaf group, has opt to piracy and kidnapping within the waters off Sabah as its mainstay of their struggle besides claiming autonomy in Mindanao. Evidently, this has led to a drastic fall in tourism of late which serves as the second largest revenue for the state. Furthermore, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who leads the autonomy struggle for the Bangsamoro People has brought bloodshed, unrest and an exodus of illegal immigrants and other cross border crimes into Sabah.

Worst still the 2013 Lahat Datu armed incursion by Suluk terrorist also from southern Philippines further demonstrated the weakness and lack of effective maritime security along the east coast of Sabah (Figure 2). Although the final peace agreement, the Comprehensive Agreement of the Bangsamoro (CAB), between the Philippines government and MILF on 27 March 2014 is intended to end the insurgency, nevertheless Malaysia should not lose sight of the many eventualities that might break out due the interim authority secessionist rift.

Figure 2: Sabah and Philippines borders.The Lahat Datu Incursion (Area of standoff)
Source: https://www.google.com.my/search

Border Disputes. Conflicts with Indonesia have long existed since 1963 and has spiral into border and territorial conflicts. There are two border delineation issues, the ownership of *PERAK* and *JARAK* islands in the Straits of Malacca and the *AMBALAT* Block in the Sulu Sea (Figure 3). Presently, both the islands in the straits have been occupied by Malaysian Army personnel with the RMN maintaining 24/7 presence within the waters surrounding the islands in the straits and Sulu Sea while the RMAF conducts periodical surveillance also at both locations.

Figure 3: Topographic location of Malaysia-Indonesia Straits of Malacca and Ambalat Block Dispute
Source: https://www.google.com.my/

Down south the 28 year ownership dispute over Pedra Branca Island was awarded to Singapore on 23 May 2008 and Malaysia gained Middle Rocks, while South Ledge was undecided (Figure 4). However, what's interesting to note now after the ICJ decision is the demarcation of territorial boundaries in the Singapore Straits due to the fact that these islands are small and are separated by mere 0.6 nm and 14 nm from mainland Malaysia. Asserting sovereign rights (12 nm) around the islands is fractious and therefore needs the RMN to conduct continuous patrols to stem Malaysia's claim.

Figure 4: Pedra Branca in South China Sea in relation to Malaysia-Singapore territorial dispute
Source: Directorate of Mapping Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur

Spratly Islands Issue. Malaysia being one of the six claimants has to maintain military presence on and around the 5 disputed islands to assert its claim (Figure 5). The RMN has been given the full responsibility to undertake this operation which further stretches its already over-tasked assets. The "*2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in South China Sea between ASEAN and China*" (Bateman & Emmers, 2009) has placed the risk of conflict in abeyance for the time being. Nevertheless the lure of rich hydrocarbon reserves in the area and rising regional energy security concerns has prompt all stakeholders to heighten their claims and military presence on and around the islands. Overtly, China's "*innocent passage into other claimants territorial waters of late is by far basically reaffirming its interest and keeping alive its claims of sovereignty in the area*" (NST, 2014). However, Malaysia has since been protecting its interest with a non-confrontational manner and weak strategic options or military capability in response to China's creeping assertiveness (Tang S.M, 2014). Though it has strong bilateral ties with major super-powers, the security hedging of China's claims increases the strain of Malaysia's non-confrontational approach and inadvertently strengthens the leverage of the MAF's (RMN in particular) bargaining tool to expand its military capabilities.

Figure 5: Topographic location of the Spratly Islands Dispute
Source: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific.

Piracy. This is a never-ending global menace which has become a major issue in this region and of late in the Gulf of Aden. The small-scale attacks or better known as "robbery at sea" at the northern tip of the Straits of Malacca, kidnappings in the islands off Sabah and the piracy in the Gulf of Aden is attributed explicitly due to the lack of maritime enforcement and lax in enforcement of maritime law. Again the onus is set upon the RMN not only to tackle this problem in Malaysia's maritime sphere.

Foreign Policy. Malaysia has attained a very high standard of achievement in its foreign policy since becoming a sovereign country in 1957. It has maintained good terms and relations with almost all countries on the basis of equal status and opportunities and the norms of appropriate country to country behaviour. Furthermore, the 1976 TAC, the ASEAN way of conflict prevention and resolution, and the ASEAN charter that seeks to organise intra-ASEAN relations and cooperation has become part of its normative practice and behaviour. This has also been influential in laying a new order of peace and security in the region thus negating the need for its military build-up. This is further reflected when 26 nations came together to assist in the search and rescue of the missing Malaysian airliner MH 370. This

would only be possible if a country has good relationship with other countries. However Malaysia should be cognisance and be ready for any geopolitical landscape shift that can hamper its sovereignty.

National Defence Policy. The NDP which is regarded as an extension to its foreign policy underscores Deterrence as its key element in military strategy. However deterrence has to be credible i.e. able to deter a potential enemy when provoked and prevail when attacked. Therefore its military strategy, *si vis pacem, para belum* (if you want peace, prepare for war), should be the ultimate approach, for the development of Malaysia's future military capability towards the defence and protection of its sovereignty and national integrity whilst taking into consideration the budget which patent its priorities.

Budget. Since independence, Malaysia's economic development has risen and is projected to expand further. For fiscal year 2013, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth stood at 4.7%, while its deficit dropped to 3.9% with Foreign Direct Investment increasing to RM38.77 billion (Chan, 2014). This goes to show that Malaysia's rapid development and economic efficiency was steering towards a sustainable growth to guarantee the country's future, security and independence (Matrade, 2014). Although the economy is stable and growing, the budget for defence is not set, like other nations, to the GDP but is a percentage of the annual government's expenditure every year. As Figure 6A indicates, there has been a constant decrease in military expenditure since 2008 (except 2011) which imply the decreasing importance placed on military capabilities.

Figure 6A: Malaysia Military expenditure (% of GDP) 2008-2012
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com

Military Expenditure in Malaysia decreased to 3208 USD Million in 2018 from 3495 USD Million in 2017. Military Expenditure in Malaysia averaged 1910.16 USD Million from 1957 until 2018, reaching an all time high of 4344 USD Million in 2015 and a record low of 169 USD Million in 1961 (Figure 6B).

Figure 6B: Malaysia Military expenditure (% of GDP) 2010-2018
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com

The annual budget mainly emphasis on public safety (internal security) and upgrading the living standard of the needy and lower income Malaysians by providing subsidies for food, fuel and education, rather than to spend on defence. Another reason for this could be because its economical posture further strengthens its ties with countries around the world, and therefore the axiom that there is no real threat to the sovereignty persuades the government to provide more for socio-economic reforms as compared to defence.

Defence Industry. The changing face of national security coupled with the emergence of new forms of security threats, particularly in the realm of terrorism, cybercrime and transnational crime, has spurred the innovation of new defence technologies and weaponry. This in turn, creates a need for increased bilateral cooperation and close collaboration between the MAF and defence industry. Currently Malaysia relies on foreign defence industries to augment its growing defence needs and industry. The local defence industry is more capable in maintenance and repair but has potential to grow if more offset programmes are implemented. Nonetheless there is a also drawback whereby foreign military market penetration must have a *Bumiputra* (indigenous people) status partnership (middleman) as a prerequisite. This discrimination has for some reason affected the viability of military capability upgrades and entry into the market due to the eroding procurement value by inappropriate practices of these "middleman".

FUTURE MILITARY CAPABILITY

According to Hinge (2000), "*future military capability is developed based on the analysis of experimentation and testing of existing capability performance and future capability decisions are made based on the armed forces being able to meet the challenges of a range of possible future scenarios*". In the Malaysian context its future military capability is conceptualised on Force Structure, Combat Readiness and Sustainable Capacity. As such Malaysia's 4D MAF full scale ambitious force modernisation plan, is to make the MAF a balanced and conventional war-fighting force (Faudzi, 2104). Malaysia's future military capabilities rest upon how the MAF counters the conflicts and issues that dictate its strategic environment as follows:

a. **Border Insecurity**. The escalating violence and its probable spill-over effects at Thailand's restive south will demand defensive military capability to be beefed up along the Malaysia-Thai

border in order to amicably stabilise the unease while anticipating an influx of refugees if the situation escalates.

b. **Maritime Cross Border Crimes**. The Lahat Datu incursion was thwarted with the biggest mobilisation of the country's security forces. However the incident clearly showed that available assets, namely from the RMN was void. There weren't enough assets stationed to conduct patrols or guard the confined and shallow waters off the east coast of Sabah or to mobilise troops from the West Malaysia to Sabah. Post intrusion analysis spelt out that these intruders used small riverine crafts with high mobile outboard motors to manoeuvre between the coral infested waters to reach its destination. Evidently the maritime units on routine patrolling duties were unable to detect or when detected were unable to pursue due to fears of running aground in these confined waters.

c. Nevertheless this episode literally forced the establishment of the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM); to place various enforcement agencies like the Police, MMEA and military units (Army, RMN and RMAF) under a single unified field command, to safeguard the 10 vulnerable coastal districts (Figure 7). This incursion clearly shows the indifferent priority placed on defence wherein an occasion had to arise and cause lives to be lost for the authorities to place extra resources on defence. However to fully accomplish its strategic requirement, ESSCOM has to further enhance its security capability generally and military capability specifically in terms of intelligence gathering, strengthening of coastal defence by stepping up operational capabilities to respond and implement effective enforcement and lastly increase the numbers of security personnel. Specifically for the RMN to operate successfully in these shallow waters, it will require small, shallow draft and high horse power vessels to patrol and deter these assailants from roaming freely. Additionally the Army too has to beef up the coastal defence by mobilising more troops along the most likely landing sites while the RMAF will have to provide continuous air surveillance.

Figure7: Topographic map of Sabah
Source: https://www.google.com.my/search

d. **Territorial Disputes**. In order for Malaysia to defend its maritime territorial claims, the RMN has to maintain continuous presence around the disputed waters. Considering the vast maritime area to cover with limited naval assets, the RMN undoubtedly is unable achieve its goal. The RMN should consider a substantial build-up to its aging fleet to enable this tasking to be carried out successfully.

Additionally to further strengthen its claim as administratively occupying the island and to aid in the tasking, the MAF should also consider erecting surveillance radars on the islands in the Straits of Malacca.

e. **Deterrence**. To support Malaysia's claims around the Spartly Islands, the RMN will need to exert full maritime deterrence. Although the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan W. Greenhart, assured that the "*US will help safeguard ASEAN maritime asset in the South China Sea*" (NST, 2014), nonetheless MAF and the RMN specifically, has to still play its pivotal role as a credible deterrent force in the disputed area. At present with a vast area to cover, ageing assets and numerous operations, the RMN's credibility as a deterrent force is questionable. To be able to be a real deterrence to the likes of China in asserting claims over the islands, newer larger and more sophisticated ships are required. Though the submarines are a sub-surface force multiplier, the MAF as a whole require additional significant offensive surface capabilities to deter any imminent threat. On the other hand the islands also have to be equipped significantly to be able to defend effectively.

f. **Anti-Piracy**. There are ongoing anti-piracy operations that require the RMN's commitment in this initiative, to deploy naval assets for continuous joint patrols. However as the narrow straits imply, the need for fast and mobile crafts with excess speeds of 40 knots is paramount in order to be able to deter or apprehend these pirates from performing their thriving activities.

g. **Defence Spending**. Government's defence allocation based on affordability has to be reverted to enable defence procurements to be more comprehensively planned and implemented. The NDP deterrence posture which amplifies "*shifting from a threat focus to the defence of national interest*" (Mak, 1997) reflects the importance of RMN as the first line of defence. Seemingly maritime base threats have become more prevalent and therefore the protection of offshore resources in the EEZ has now become a national priority. This strategic environment therefore should dictate the preference for the RMN to plan its future capabilities. Nevertheless with the changing of the strategic environment after the 9/11 tragedy, the importance for all 3 services to be synergised in defending the country is paramount and should be prudently 'Joint' in nature when making capability decisions.

h. **Defence Industry**. The economic development, budget constraints and strategic concerns will undoubtedly influence the defence demands and industries growth. Having more offset participation through procurements is the only way defence industries can grow via transfer of technology, training and joint ventures in Research and Development. The collaboration between MAF and defence industries for future military capabilities will also have to think conceptually tri-service inter-operability when planning for defence procurement.

i. **Strategic Rationale**. The government should aspire to not only balance the budget but also to seek a credible and balanced defence and foreign policy in pursuit of national interest. Its policy should be able to respond to conventional or un-conventional threats with ease. The peaceful existence should not be taken for granted but used explicitly to strengthen its ability to defend the country should the geopolitical landscape shift**.**

j. **Military Modernisation**. The modernisation of the MAF is influenced by all the arguments stated above and has "*evolved through time, pattern of threats, technology development and changing nature of warfare*" (Faudzi, 2014). At present the 4D MAF (Figure 6) which forms the basis for the MAF force development capability is at the 4th dimension that envisions the MAF "*to transform into a fully integrated and balanced force in all dimensions and giving emphasis on jointness and inter-operability among the 3 services*" (Faudzi, 2014).

k. For the RMN, besides this plan it has its own Strategic Plan, PS1320. The RMN has cascaded and aligned this strategic plan with the 4D MAF plan as well as cascaded and aligned its processes within the RMN itself. This strategy plan has matured and stabilized through the RMN's initiative of reviewing the plan continuously via improvement inputs and clarifications received from the various formations and units.

Figure 8: MAF 4th Dimension Plan (4D MAF) (Faudzi, 2014)

l. These reviews are also driven by expectations and directives from stakeholders, demands and challenges identified in developing capabilities, capacities towards addressing regional and extra-regional requirements as well as the economic influence on operating and development allocations. Base on the 4D MAF, the RMN has to envisage and plan its capabilities in line with the 3 main features of this plan which is Jointry, Information Superiority and Multi-dimensional operations in order to enhance maritime defence.

m. **Training**. RMN's role in maritime enforcement dimension is only secondary. Its real business is to prepare for war and this entails continuous training, endless weapons practices, war-gaming, electronic intelligence gathering and show of presence, massive mobilisation exercises, and bilateral/multilateral exercises. The ongoing Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA), bilateral exercise with US (CARAT series) and other ASEAN members serves as good platforms to enhance the fleet's performance and the same time to enhance Confident Building Measures. In order for the RMN to participate actively, its capabilities should be at par and able to inter-operate effectively with the other nation's fleet. It is of no use if sophisticated procurements are made minus the training. Internally the defence spending should emphasise on specialist training and which should include simulators and infrastructures to augment its requirements in a Multi-dimensional Warfare as follows:

(1) Sub-Surface – Submarines and Anti-submarine helicopters.
(2) Surface and Air defence environment.
(3) Amphibious, Joint Operations and Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Assistance (HADR)

CONCLUSION

Malaysia's ultimate goal is economic prosperity and political stability. However issues of conflicts and potential flashpoints envisage its strategic environment and national interest and to further extend its Future Military Capability which is the benchmark of its ability to defend itself for the economy to flourish.

To develop military capability is to strengthen its defence and security in accordance with its strategic environment. Nevertheless economic and political stability entail the future development of military capability and wittingly the Malaysia budget does not focus on defence but on more compounding priorities namely socio-economic. At the moment Malaysia being in a benign environment and in the comfort of economical growth is able to focus and place more money on the socio-economic sector. However the existing border disputes and incursion should remind the government that the need to build up the military capability to be ready to fight and address conventional and non-conventional threats is as equal importance to socio-economic reforms.

In order for the RMN in particular, to protect the nations maritime sovereignty, it has to be equipped with a balanced fleet to meet air, surface and sub-surface warfare dimensional situations, amphibious lodgements, logistic and medical support, mine countermeasures, hydrographic and Humanitarian relief assistance.

Lastly should the government still persist to neglect the future military capability, the RMN's mission accomplishment and force preservation will not have sufficient resources to effectively maintain preparedness. This is because the RMN workforce will be of a wrong size, cannot be shaped at the relevant time and cannot maintain an effective organisational structure to manage effectively as a deterrence force to meet government aspirations.

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TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF MALAYSIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTRUCT

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ABSTRACT

The discourse on transnational crime (TC) has become a major international relations narrative – at present TC ventures are fervently pursued by criminal groups (CG), inclusive of terrorist groups and warlords, becoming the enterprise of choice to source for income; either in terms of returns for materialistic needs or funds for the purpose of financially sustaining the activities of non-state actors that are threats to governments. As such, TC is presently recognized as a strategic threat to bona-fide state-actors - costing governments significant financial losses and commonly denoted as a destabilizing factor in national and regional governance due to its cross-border nature. This paper presents discussions on relevant contemporary issues and challenges faced by Malaysia, highlighting insights into TC's present day prominence as a threat to the nation's security construct.

INTRODUCTION

Historical discourse has pointed out the fact that barbaric conquerors of past centuries are precursors to the emergence of CG (Lunde, 2004). With the end of the Cold War looming in the early 90s, the uncertainties that lay ahead for many affected nations had created ample opportunities for ordinary CG and terrorist organizations to flourish through collaborations – fueling activities related to global terrorism. Although strictly speaking, according to Albanese (2013), TC involve crimes committed for financial gains which transact across two or more legal international borders while terrorism is defined as a category of international crime which can perpetuate across international borders or within the borders of any one country, recent studies have concluded that both categories of crimes have assimilated in modern times and can be appropriately defined as the same (CTED, 2018; Bielby, 2018). In retrospect, the events that unfolded at the conclusion of the Cold War are significant factors that had perpetuated modern TC activities, its implications on the security concerns of state players becoming critical as the activities continuously flourished in the new century and interlinked with terrorism - TC as an international security problem is clear.

The ease of cross border mobility and increased trade liberalization in addition to critical dependence on global markets are common factors motivating the perpetuation of TC in modern times. The strategic geographical location of Malaysia – central to the international Sea Line of Communication (SLOC) – has projected the country's significance as a focus of international commerce and migration (Sundaram, 2008). TC activities have always plagued the Southeast Asian region and have been a major issue of contention since historical times. Opportunities for TC to prosper coincide with increased trade and growing migrant population to support fast growing industries in the region (Sato, 2010). CG are capable of committing multiple crimes concurrently for material gain - established CG are well organized and difficult to contain due to the dynamic nature and adaptability of their organizations, in addition to the availability of various resources to sustain their existence. It is apparent that organized CG could conduct cross border criminal activities as well as within national borders – technically as highlighted earlier, terrorist groups conforms to this categorization; in order to fund politically motivated causes, terrorist groups are commonly involved in criminal activities for monetary gain. Common organized CG are well known, such as the Italian mafias, American mobsters, the Japanese yakuzas and the Chinese triads, which traditionally operate in smaller affiliate groups known as crime "rings" or "syndicates" (Gambetta, 1996).

In a nutshell, organized CG are nowadays commonly of enterprising nature, frequently integrating unique business strategies into their operations (UNODC, 2002). According to Payne (2013), other distinct features that are common to CG are that of their ability to network globally inclusive of links to terrorist groups, to accomplish multiple criminal activities concurrently (Bielby, 2018). In this manner, CG are able to sustain and accomplish cross border crimes effectively. The modern convenience of the globalized world has also perpetuated the ease of facilitating collaborative efforts with legal enterprises to enhance international credibility and linkages- thus CG's continuous expansion beyond legal international boundaries allow it to exploit various opportunities (Le & Lauchs, 2013).

ASIA: HOTBED FOR TRANSNATIONAL CRIMES

Asian continent is host to most of the world's fastest growing economies; its total population being more than half of the entire world. Nevertheless, the myriad of geopolitical and socioeconomic contrast among states in the continent are mirrored by extremes of impoverishment and inequality, resulting from implications of poor governance or integrity; in order for TC activities to flourish, resources to corrupt state and political authorities are necessary (Mittelman, & Johnston, 1999). As such, the region becomes the focal point for various criminal elements - countries in Asia are particularly vulnerable to TC activities, and the trend is increasing (Broadhurst, 2016; Douglas, 2017). In addition, the development and implementation of effective TC related counter strategies are difficult, owing to the fact that the multitude of different state interests in the region has continuously become barriers to prevent efforts ensuring relevant multi-lateral mechanisms are in place against TC (Gordon, 2009; Nafees, 2018). The fact is that counter TC measures need multilateral commitments, since collective mitigation strategy need to be in place to counter the cross border nature of the TC activities. Sustainable international initiatives with iron-clad political will are essential factors for handling TC.

CHALLENGES AND ISSUES FOR MALAYSIA

TC activities in the Southeast Asian region have thrived for many generations, no doubt due to the region's significance which is its central location along the global trade sea route or SLOC Leslie (Andres, 2019). Transnational issues have never ceased to pepper the region's geopolitical landscape; early civilizations in the region had flourished due to their active engagement with cross border commerce, even before the advent of Western influences - consistently exposed to global trade, exploiting the international economic linkage and trade (Sundaram, 2008). The fact is that increased trade and population to support manpower needs of growing commercial activities promote TC – particularly TC related to smuggling or trafficking commodities such as manufactured goods, undocumented migrant workers and illicit drugs (Sato, 2010). Aside from its criminal impact on society and legitimate commerce, national income losses in taxes are significant (Ahmad, 2017). The fact remains that the porous nature of Malaysian borders is a critical factor compounding to the problems associated with TC (Weiss, 2014). The two most significant TC in Malaysia are as presented in the following sections.

DRUG TRAFFICKING

Malaysia is considered to be a destination and a transit hub for illicit drugs traffickers. Its strategic geographical location and reputation as the centre for international trading, in addition to the availability of well-connected air and maritime infrastructure are clearly exploited. Illicit drugs are the most popular black market transnational commodity that had the most influence on the approaches taken by any authorities for tackling TC issues (UNODC, 2019). The first recorded international effort undertaken to address the transnational problem of illicit drug trade was the 1912 International Opium Convention, initiated by the League of Nations (UNODC, 2019). The socioeconomic implications of widespread drug abuse were acknowledged by the global community since more than a century ago and have still persisted to this day; indicating the seriousness of the problem (UNODC, 2017). Nevertheless, illicit drug trafficking activities have are still increasing and demand is still

growing, particularly 2013, most significantly in North America and in the East and Southeast Asian region (UNODC, 2018).

SMUGGLING AND TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS

Malaysia is listed as a hub for human trafficking (a common form of TC) - trafficking victims for prostitution and smuggling of consenting migrant workers in search of a better life. Whether trafficked unwillingly or voluntarily most will subsequently be forced into debt bondage (Rush, 2017). Malaysia failed to conform to the minimum requirements for eradicating human trafficking according to the latest US Department of State's Trafficking in Persons Report (2019) (*ie.* classified as Tier 2-Watchlist), prompting the Home Ministry (Malaysia) to immediately commit towards intensifying efforts towards mitigating the reported shortcomings (Farik, 2018).

Causes of the trafficking of persons are commonly identified as due to poverty and conflict related implications. Growing demand for cheap albeit undocumented laborers in Malaysia are also contributory factors perpetuating the crime – unfortunately, smuggled foreign victims in Malaysia are often perceived as asset to drive domestic economy. Most of the trafficked and undocumented migrants will eventually become entangled in debt bondage and exploited while denied benefits, burdening the Government tremendously, since these victims need legal redress now.

OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES MOTIVATED BY TC

The porosity of Malaysia's border can be accredited to its geographical location. The significant stretch of land and maritime borders is a critically compounding factor towards the perpetuation of TC activities. TC affects both land and maritime security to the state. Malaysia's significant stretch of maritime seafront borders has facilitated TC activities which motivated the use of the sea as a vital part of the TC logistic chain. In this way, Malaysia has become a destination and hub of choice in addition to becoming the source of illicit trades.

CRIMES AT SEA

According to UNODC (2018) maritime based logistic chain of TC is nowadays considered relatively insignificant for Malaysia. Only 2% of containers are checked in ports - it is often convenient for large scale smuggling of commodities through sea ports (Amin, 2016). Nevertheless, commonly occurring deaths at sea are of major concern (UNODC, 2018). Tobacco is one of the most commonly smuggled commodities in the world and Malaysia is reported to be its largest consumer (Tay, 2019; OCCRP, 2019). Another category of crime concerns illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing. Fishing vessels often provide vital support towards complementing TC logistical chain at sea (*ie.* refueling services at sea and transportation from larger ships to embarkation points), significantly for human or illicit drug smuggling/trafficking. Piracy is another crime of concern to Malaysia – involves violence when acquiring goods at sea by force (UNTAD, 2014). Technically, the ships targeted are the sovereign territory of the registered country hence the transnational element prevails. Moreover, piracy which includes robbing and kidnapping, is often in collaboration with terrorist organizations or CG (Dandurand & Chin, 2004).

MONEY LAUNDERING

Money laundering or the transfer of ill-gotten gains into legitimate activities and disguised from its origins are closely associated to TC (United Nations Office of Drugs & Crimes, 2010). Money laundering is central particularly to large scale TC activities perpetuated by organized CG – to deflect suspicions on criminal elements of income gained (Cox, 2014). Returns from TC are in turn used to maintain or expand into other legitimate or illegitimate activities *ie.* in Malaysia illicit drug trafficking is the key TC source for money laundering and its returns continue to sustain the drug trade. Implications of money laundering include the destabilizing effect to financial institutions and emerging economies.

IMPLICATIONS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTRUCT

Any categories of criminal activities are detrimental to the security and safety of Malaysian, more so if it involves cross border complications. TC activities include trafficking of illicit commodities and human exploitation that severely undermine socioeconomic integrity with other implications that go as far as threatening the environment and depleting resources. Nevertheless, the most harmful and threatening to state security concerns the weakening of good governance which can in turn influence the stability of the whole region – corruption gets in the way of development and destabilizes governments.

Corruption, in addition to various socioeconomic implications of TC is of critical concern to the international community to the extent that the UN Security Council has considered it as the source of global security threat (Vorrath, 2018). The involvement of organized CG is central to this concern. Collective regional response must be advocated because of the cross border nature of TC – without collective efforts the problems cannot be holistically resolved. The complex organized CG networks that perpetuate TC have thoroughly integrated into the international system, and in reality, are capable of projecting themselves (even non-terrorist based) as non-traditional security threats to state actors.

Malaysia clearly acknowledges the seriousness of transnational crimes as a national security threat; its national policy views security in terms of preserving peace and stability - essential for ensuring the prosperity of the nation (Anon, 2015; Malaysia's National Security Policy n.d). Since TC has presented itself as a key security issue nowadays, Malaysia has intensified its effort to handle it as a security threat that requires active participation in regional collaboration efforts for maximum effectiveness (AMMTC, 2015). Note that the Malaysian Government has now ranked TC problems to a higher priority (in line with the seriousness of its implications to national security), albeit not considered to be an essential security concern less than a decade ago (Sato, 2010). The fact that the threat of terrorism in the region has increased in the last decade is a contributory cause (Muhammad, 2017).

CONCLUSION

Of particular concern would be on Malaysia's porous borders a common denominator in TOC activities. Be it on land or at sea, the ease of TC activities through so many border points is of major concern to the Government. Aside from that legitimate border gateways also facilitate easy access for relevant crimes. In addition, as a maritime nation, Malaysia's strategic interests in surrounding seas extend beyond economic significance; interests concerning national security and sovereignty of the nation are of concern. Malaysia's strategic location offers advantages to both legitimate and non-legitimate commercial activities, the latter commonly integrated into the former (Muhammad, 2017).

The country's excellent logistic infrastructure namely, air and maritime inter-connectivity further enhances its attraction as a hub for TC operation (Tasnim, 2018; BERNAMA, 2019; The Straits Time, 2019). The frequency of these cases are alarming, nevertheless, of major concern are impacts to national security and sovereignty due to TC related activities involving the sea; thus this factor must be given priority and not be sidelined in national security considerations, albeit inadequate resources, may influence priorities of the Government. (Zuraini, Shuhadawati & Norjihan 2017; Daniel, 2019). As such, aside from strengthening domestic legal framework (*ie*. ATIPSOM Act 2007 and AKSEM Act 2017, the AMLATFA 2001) to combat the ills of TC, enhancing innovative approaches to ensure efficient inter-agency effortsand regional cooperation on security capacity-building is crucial. Inefficient inter-agency cooperation is detrimental in the fight against complex TC activities. (Rabasa & Chalk, 2012; Thomas, 2015; Andres, 2019; INTERPOL, n.d).

Thus based on the resolution that combating TC as a critical national security issue accentuates its priority. Hence, the securitization of TC (recognized as a notable security threat factor to Malaysia) has in fact provided a platform for policy makers to align inter-agency collaboration while at the same time increasing regional cooperation and solidarity towards battling a common adversary. In fact, the

effect of securitization on legislations such as the ATIPSOM 2007 and AKSEM 2017 has promoted the Malaysian Government's initiative towards streamlining the interoperability of domestic law enforcement.

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NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS THAT OBSTRUCT THE PEACE AND SECURITY IN EASTERN SABAH AND CALEBES SEA

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ABSTRACT

This article highlights the non-state actors which disrupts the peace and security of all citizen in eastern Sabah and Celebes Sea. Security challenges and threats, and shifts in terrorism and violent extremism had gone very brutal and sophisticated implicating the innocent people. By understanding terrorist activities in Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, South Thailand and New Zealand which will give us some insights of current act of terrorism. The new threats to a nation's peace and security are now in a less conspicuous but more irregular force are involved as they are in a smaller guerrilla or insurgent group. Often, they are operated by non-state actors and do not oblige by any international law. Sabah located in centre of the conflict area is highly vulnerable to numerous security threats. Malaysia's recent experiences have proven that a security threat will come from the most unlikely source and in a non- traditional manner now. It concludes with some empirical evidences that, in a globalized world, one state cannot maintain peace and stability on its own as all things are connected and interlinked.

Keywords: *Tri-Border area (TBA), terrorist, maritime piracy and sea robbery*

INTRODUCTION

Threats to a nation's security and stability have evolved over time depending on available resources, location, time, motives, and support. In the globalized society and borderless society, threats are imminent. Identifying constellations of different security issues and threats are essential in understanding the position of a developing nation like Malaysia. Traditionally, threats or enemies forces were known and distinguishable from one another but might use various warfare tactics to fight. However with rapid developments of technologies, theories, tactics and procedures of disrupting peace have taken various formations and groups. The new threats to a nation's peace and security are now in a less conspicuous but more irregular force as they are in a smaller guerrilla or insurgent group. Often, they are operated by non-state actors and do not oblige by any international law. By understanding terrorist activities in Philippines, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, South Thailand and New Zealand, terrorism became a desirable form of interfering with peace and created fears among the population and sought to legitimize their objectives by the use of violence. Terrorism is a new threat to many states, regions and world security. It conforms to the definition of non-traditional threats.

NON-TRADITIONAL THREATS

Non-traditional threats include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, international crime, drug, human trafficking and illegal immigration. These threats are also considered transnational and have become rising threats to many nation states and their regional stability including Malaysia. Terrorists exploit their interest in substantial ethnic and religious diversity and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Sub-Sahara regions. The Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) is involved in recruitment and training of guerrilla fighters to carry out a military operation in the Middle East and North Africa and some parts of South East Asia. Meanwhile, an estimated 1,300 militants from Asia-Pacific went to Syria and Iraq to join the ISIL. The security threat created in their home country when foreign terrorist fighters return, and this concerns every country. The very current spill over effect is the rehashing of LTTE.

SECURITY CONCERN IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia region has witnessed and been effected by the long and devastating Cold War. During the Cold War, the rivalry was between the world's superpowers— the Soviet Union and the United States. Geoff Wades (2009) stated that the intervention of the world's hegemonic countries in Southeast Asia was driven by their ideological differences in their politics. The communist Soviet Union and the democratic Americans had their influences in the region until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, a remarkable leap forward in an economical and relatively peaceful region have established regional security and stability. The success of this region has attracted the attention of outside investors in the form of travellers, tourist and the local market. While it is true the global economy is shifting toward Southeast Asia, the positive transformation, and upward trend also precipitate threats and criminal activities, disturbing peace, and stability in the region. The most transparent are the threat of terrorism, radicalization, and violent extremism. The most prominent of these threats are the ISIL terror movement. Ms Sidney Jones, IPAC, Australia, called these groups "gang of thugs" during her speech at the Putrajaya Forum 17 April 2018. Terrorism is an explicit and present insecurity to the Asia-Pacific region, and they are in the form of return fighters and self-radicalized individual or group. These threats have the possibility to intensify unpredictability in the region's terrorist hotbed, such as the southern three provinces of Thailand and southern half of the Mindanao Island of the Philippines, as well as exploiting other fragile areas in the region. The widespread of these organized criminals from the Middle East has evidently unfurled into the Southeast Asia region. Statements by Singaporean Minister of Defence during the Shangri-La Dialogue "approximately, terrorist groups in this region have pledged allegiance publicly to ISIL, including Abu Sayyaf and Jamaah Ansharud Daulah, which conducted the Jakarta bombing with ISIS funding. Recently, ISIS released its first propaganda video to target Southeast Asia explicitly, in the native languages of Malaysia and Indonesia. Training camps have been reported in Poso in Central Sulawesi and Southern Philippines." There is a substantiation of the ISIL terrorist coalition under the Al Baghdadi leadership in the Southern Philippines, located mainly in the harsh terrain of the Mindanao Island. This group of terrorists has disturbed peace in the region which has caused regional instability and insecurity. Subsequently, their actions have led to other domestic and transnational criminal activities within the Southeast Asia region.

EAST SABAH REGION AND SULU CELEBES SEA

The East Sabah region had the spill over effect in which became vulnerable to such non-traditional threats due to its geographical location where non-state actors have exploited to their advantage. This region is also known as the Tri-Border area (TBA), it largely consists of the Sulu-Celebes Sea surrounded by Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia, (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Tri-Border area (TBA)

It is considered as not only a nuclease of business and commercial activities and sea lanes of communication but has been recognized as a breeding ground for terrorist and other criminal activities in Southeast Asia. With a vast stretch of inhospitable, archipelagic landscape, it lies effectively outside the purview of central administration and jurisdiction of the three states. The region offers an ideal situation and terrain in which criminals and terrorists able to conceal from law enforcement and counter-terrorism agencies. The unconventional threats are becoming international concerns as stability in the region is being menaced. The region's instability, uncertainty, and conflict threaten the existing state sovereignty and cause tension among the three littoral states. The security challenges in the East Sabah region that the three littoral states are facing include weapons and explosive smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, terrorist, and other related criminal activities. In the Southern Philippines, a terrorist group called the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has been fighting the government to create a southern Islamic State, but the government calls its member's mere bandits because of the many kidnaps for ransom activities. Muslims are the majority of in the southern islands of the Philippines where the ASG operates. However, they are a minority in the mostly Roman Catholic Philippines. The ASG received international attention in 1992 when it assassinated a foreign Catholic missionary in the southern Philippines that killed two missionaries and wounded 40 people. The ASG has been conducting operations "from 1991 to 2015; the ASG reportedly engaged in 398 terrorist activities which resulted in the death of 295 civilians (CNN2016). The ASG has been involved in as many as 640 kidnapping activities totalling 2,076 victims." According to a news report by Cable News Network (CNN), more than 25 foreign hostages were kidnapped between 2012 and 2017 by the Abu Sayyaf group, and they demanded money for each hostage. Detail incidents are as shown in figure 2. This threatening gesture was to create fear among the local population and foreign tourists and to intimidate the government in achieving their objectives. Its activities seem to have an entrancing effect on young and radicalized Muslims. This report shows how such problems relate to each other and, importantly, how the improvement or worsening of any one issue area can have downstream consequences for seemingly unrelated maritime security threats.


Figure 2: Incidents reported in the Sulu-Celebes Sea

Another unique threat to the East Sabah region is the Sultanate of Sulu territorial claim of Sabah. This is a historical problem that need a holistic approach. However, this historic dispute has recently caused security challenges to the Malaysian government. A self-proclaimed heir of the Sulu Sultanate, Sultan Jamalul Kiram III, who is from the autonomous island in the province of Sulu located in the south western of Philippines' island declared civil and military contingents on North Borneo to assert their rights. Rebels group stormed and seized control of the peaceful town of Lahad Datu in East Sabah, but they were besieged by Malaysian security forces. This standoff lasted for weeks and reported 26 people from both forces killed. This incident created psychological fear to the local populace effected the tourism industry, created turmoil between the Malaysian and Filipino governments and showed how vulnerable Eastern part of Malaysia to face violence from non-state actors.

This marine zone of the Sulu-Celebes Seas is known as 'terrorist corridors' due to its vast area and geographical dispersed it becomes a terrorism and piracy-prone area. Piracy and sea robbery are common in the region due to inadequate control of littoral and maritime spaces. The hospitable terrain provides favourable conditions for the associated sea-based threats. Piracy takes many forms. The activities extend from opportunistic robberies to the sophisticated and organized hijacking of the entire vessel. Maritime border is arduous to patrol, and the criminals are capitalizing on the situation and the archipelagic nature of the region. Countering maritime piracy increases its notability among international communities as the region economic grows, piracy impedes and obstructs the freedom of sea lanes creating political implications between the three littoral states.

With more robust terrorist activities in the region, other related criminal activities such as armed smuggling, illegal trades, and illegal immigrants are also heightened. The East Sabah's porous sea borders are laborious for law enforcement to be effective and pragmatic which had made the region susceptible to a flood of illegal immigrants for decades, particularly from neighbouring Indonesia and the Philippines, leading to diverse socio-economic problems. There is evidence that illustrates the correlation between Immigration and crimes which has led to the increase of anti-immigration hate crimes. Illegal immigrants become victims due to lack of support by some of the government agencies. These illegal immigrants become undocumented workers and citizens as they seek to find employment and gain access to education for their children. Inequality of opportunities creates obstacles for the government to overcome, while the criminals exploit the opportunity to their advantage.

THREAT, CHALLENGES AND COLLECTIVE ACTIONS

Stronger maritime governance requires enacting solutions to complicated and interrelated problems like poor coastal economic welfare, rooted shadow economies, human trafficking, and organized political violence against soft coastal and offshore targets. The following steps may be bold and prudent to work on.

First, non-traditional threats to the region have been identified and described in great detail with specific example. Southeast Asia accounts for a single geopolitical entity which contributes to the stability of the greater Southeast Asia maritime territory. Transnational threats have threatened peace and stability in the Southeast Asia Region especially Sabah state. Terrorists capitalized their interests of religious and ethnic diversity and under the current regional conflicts. The threats and challenges to security frequently appear or progress more rapidly than solutions. These security threats are completely different physical force and level of operation than the previous notion—a sort of globalization of security challenges. Consequently, the responses must be adapted in battling these challenges.

Second, the threats and issues have focused on the Sabah region, also known as the Tri-Border region, which has been a source of violence for decades, now is a cradle for non-state actors' criminal activities. Historically, territorial disputes, colonization, and piracy have always been issues in Sabah, such as the 2013 violence in Lahad Datu, which negatively affected regional and international

security. In addition, the ferocity of the non-state actor has created instability to the region and a security dilemma between Malaysia and the Philippines. Applying the knowledge and practical implications for cooperation among the Tri-border States and international community gradually decrease criminal activities within the area.

Finally, the region must maintain and strengthen the various platforms of existing international cooperation such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This platform will strengthen capabilities on a mutual basis with importance in combatting non-traditional threats and transnational crimes. International Cooperation will build trust among nations. The Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which are part of the TBA, must agree on international on maritime security, such as Joint Maritime Patrol Agreement, and Memorandum of Understanding to mutually deploy of law enforcement agencies at designated border crossings. These agreements must be signed with legally binding power. Increasing military engagements and expanding the area of training operations to strengthen the multilateral cooperation's in the region as shown in figure 3.

Figure 3: Point of Interest by Both Government Agencies and Rebel Group

CONCLUSION

This holistic approach to the topic can facilitate stronger cooperation, both within and across governments, for the ultimate purpose of sustainable maritime security. In turn, this progress should hamper the illicit networks and violent political organizations that have used the poor security environment to finance and facilitate their efforts. Various components of meeting and discussion had being done to an extent to meet the objectives for better understanding the grassroots of the problems, background of the cooperation's, the current implications, and future plans. In a globalized world, one state cannot maintain peace and stability on its own as all things are connected and interlinked. Currently, the Southeast Asia region's peace and stability have been threatened by various threats.

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THE HUMANITARIAN PERSPECTIVE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND CYBER WARFARE IN ARMED CONFLICT

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses the humanitarian perspective of the use of artificial intelligence and cyber warfare in armed conflict at a time of increasing conflict and rapid technological change. Significantly, cyber warfare has been on the agenda of policymakers and military leaders around the world. As we celebrate the 70th anniversary of the 1949 Geneva Conventions that form the core of international humanitarian law which states there also must be a limit to suffering in armed conflict, this paper discusses timely the potential humanitarian impact of some cyber operations on the civilian population. What are the humanitarian challenges when artificial intelligence and cyber are used as weapons? Does international humanitarian law apply to cyber warfare? This paper also argues that a new humane culture of warfare should be developed, adapting to the latest hybrid human form of cyber humanity. Whilst pointing out the potential humanitarian impact of the artificial intelligence weapons and cyber war, the good sides of computerized warfare too are highlighted.

INTRODUCTION

The Geneva Conventions are a vital global pledge borne out of the suffering we see today in armed conflicts around the world (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2019). In 1949, in the aftermath of World War II and the Holocaust, the conventions were universally agreed upon by States because they reflect universal values of ethical behaviour. As we celebrate the 70th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, at a time of increasing conflict and rapid technological change, it is certain that new technology weapons, artificial intelligence (AI) and cyber will shape human warfare in the next 70 years.

At the dawn of this technological development, giant leaps in years to come are expected, changing the nature of war and the very nature of being human. This paper will give a humanitarian perspective on this latest revolution in military affairs focusing on the following four points:

- Relationship between human beings and technology
- Humanitarian challenges in AI, cyber and their ambiguity as weapons
- Humanitarian responsibility in AI and cyber warfare
- Conclusion: Reasons for optimism

This paper aims to set out some clear humanitarian principles to guide armed forces and policymakers as they think how best to apply AI and computer technology in new forms of attack and defence, also to apply these principles to influence others in their military diplomacy and humanitarian diplomacy across the region and worldwide.

HUMANS AND TECHNOLOGY

As a species of animal, humans are exceptional in our relationship with technology. Our imagination, reasoning and creativity set us apart. We are always inventing things and making things. Much of our history is the story of how we harness powers beyond us – animal, vegetable and physical – to our own human purposes. Through most of our existence as *homo sapiens* we have

merged ourselves with these non-human powers to operate mostly in hybrid form. We rode horses to go faster. We made spears and rifles to kill at a distance. We vaccinated ourselves to fight off microscopic predators.

Today we are deeply attached to computers which enable us to reach across time and space, and make complex calculations and connections at incredible speed. Our new cyber-humanity is set to dictate our next era as a species as we increasingly live in human-machine interactions in all parts of our lives. These human-machine interactions will become increasingly integrated as we move from hand-held devices to more sophisticated "interfaces" that respond instantly to our five senses, and are increasingly implanted and embedded in our bodies.

Our relationship with our technology has always been ambivalent – enabling good and bad outcomes. Our very first experiments with fire – a symbol of our creativity – made clear that we can use flames to warm or burn one another. Human technology is obviously not a simple thing. It is neither purely good nor purely bad. Its moral value depends on how we use it. We can expect this ambivalence to continue as we use AI and cyber increasingly in war. These new capabilities will have the power to make war better and worse.

THE HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGE OF AI AND CYBER AS WEAPONS

What is this new technology that we call AI and cyber?

Artificial intelligence is the use of computers to carry out tasks previously requiring human intelligence, cognition or reasoning (Oxford Dictionaries, [Def. 1] n.d.), and often going beyond what is humanly possible. This often leads to **machine learning** in which AI systems use large amounts of data to develop their functioning and "learn" from experience (Oxford Dictionaries, [Def. 2] n.d.). These AI systems are typically based on algorithms, a model of mathematical formulae originally developed by the ninth century Muslim scholar from Persia, Al Kwarizmi, and named after him. So we have the Islamic enlightenment to thank for this great digital leap forward!

Cyber is a word drawn from twentieth century science fiction to refer generally to the computerized or virtual space generated and maintained by computers It is also important to define what we mean by a **weapon** at this point because much of the ethical and legal dispute around AI and cyber turns on whether these systems are weapons *per se* or some form of non-human combatant complete with their own autonomy and decision-making. Clarifying this ambiguity will be the main challenge for military policy and the development of law in the years ahead.

The sword is perhaps the archetypal weapon. It is an inanimate object made by human hands and only ever operable in human hands. A sword is hammered into shape, sharpened into a blade and then held and wielded as a deadly weapon by a warrior. A sword has no mind of its own and cannot make decisions. When the warrior is resting, the sword lies inanimate beside him on the grass. A sword only becomes a weapon when taken up in human hands. Indeed the original definition of a weapon is an object that only comes to life when operated by a human. Other things like landmines and carefully covered holes are really traps set by humans that tend to function indiscriminately.

Traditionally, a weapon has no life of its own and operates only under human control. If a sword suddenly leapt into life and began fighting on its own, it would no longer be a weapon but a non-human combatant. The first humanitarian challenge from AI and deep learning machines is the challenge of **autonomy**. If an AI weapon system is launched onto a battlefield to loiter, patrol or seek out the enemy and is learning as it goes (even if it has been programmed within certain parameters by a human) then when does it stop being a weapon and become a non-human combatant with autonomy in its "critical functions" and making its own targeting and activation decisions?

The second challenge is one of **humanitarian judgement**. How can we be sure that a process of machine learning will stay true to humanitarian principles of restraint, distinction, precaution and

proportionality, even if they have initially been programmed in as defaults? Can we rely on an AI system to become more humane or less humane as its system "learns" from the environment around it? Is machine learning predictable along a given pathway, or not?

The third humanitarian problem is one of **speed** - the stunning difference between human speed and machine speed. Even if a human were still "controlling" an AI learning system on the battlefield, could they keep pace with the learning and decision-making speed of the machine? In a world in which a simple text sent from Kuala Lumpur to Jakarta arrives almost immediately you send it, what chance is there that we humans will think as fast as our machines over a complex battlefield to control them once they are in mid-flow?

Problems of autonomy, judgement and speed are significant in what we can expect to be complex AI targeting systems using big data or agile robotic weapons operating at the physical frontline like drones of many kinds. These three challenges also affect more general cyber warfare which seeks out enemy computer systems and inserts malware to pause, repurpose or destroy their core functions. But cyber warfare also presents three additional humanitarian challenges. The fundamental computer dependence of so many essential services today - like health, water, energy, finance, education and communications - makes the civilian population deeply vulnerable to precisely targeted cyber-attacks.

Cyber capability, therefore, gives rise to a very **broad attack surface** in war today and this large surface is extremely vulnerable to a single pin-point attack which could "switch off" a whole society in seconds. This capability creates the grave humanitarian risk of maximum effect from minimal strike. If cyber systems offer a broader attack surface they also potentially offer a deeper and more **personalized attack surface** by gathering highly individual data or profiling from big data to mount major surveillance and response operations at the individual level.

Millions of individual people could be monitored simultaneously by large computer systems during armed conflict in which AI could be used for machine-based decision-making about, for example, who should be detained, conscripted into the armed forces or deported. These humanitarian risks are increased by another feature of cyber-attacks – **anonymity** and problems of **attribution**. It is often difficult to know who has made the attack and, even if you do know, it can be unwise to show knowledge of the attacker for fear of revealing your own virtual position in a conflict. The current ease of anonymity and disguise in cyber warfare defuses responsibility and avoids formal systems of accountability, deterrence and shaming which usually support humanitarian norms.

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSIBILITY IN AI AND CYBER WARFARE

The humanitarian policy of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on these various computerized challenges of autonomy, judgement, speed, surface and attribution is clear and grounded in three simple positions:

- First that the existing legal obligations of international humanitarian law (IHL) apply to AI, new weapons and cyber warfare (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2019).

- Secondly, that law and ethics require a necessary policy of "human control" in the application of these new weapons.

- Thirdly, that as the nature and extent of these new weapons and methods become increasingly apparent in the years ahead, there is likely to be a need for new military policies and the development of new law specifically related to computerized warfare.

First, it is clear to the ICRC that **existing IHL already applies** to the use of all new weapons systems and cyber warfare. The law's current principles of humanity, distinction, precaution and proportionality are clearly applicable to the use of new weapons and methods of warfare

(International Committee of the Red Cross, 2019). These principles of IHL and its rules that prohibit deliberate attacks against civilians and the objects indispensable to their survival clearly and sufficiently restrict the use of new weapons within humanitarian limits. If it is unlawful to harm civilians by deliberately bombing them and their hospitals and water supplies then it is equally unlawful to deliberately harm civilians by destroying the computer systems that control their health systems and water supplies. New weapons and new means and methods of warfare are not new in themselves. Every generation tends to come up with new weapons and new methods. And there is a consistent requirement in IHL that all new weapons should be designed in such a way that they can be used in compliance with IHL.

Secondly, to ensure this respect for the existing requirements of IHL, the ICRC deems it essential that **a clear policy of human control** is firmly fixed within AI and cyber warfare systems (Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, 2018). This system of human control is needed to mitigate the humanitarian risks of AI and cyber systems (Davison, 2018). There are several dimensions of necessary human control. Real time human supervision is necessary to ensure that a human can **intervene** in the system to guide or deactivate it on humanitarian grounds according to law.

Human supervision is also required to **ensure predictability and reliability** in an AI or cyber system. Without this, the machine learning of the system could lead it to respond in unpredictable and unreliable ways that produce unlawful results. For example, it may learn to simplify its decision-making by targeting all young males across a conflicted area. Human control is required to oversee the **scope** of a weapon system so that it does not roam too widely or set itself new tasks as it learns from itself and its environment. Human control is also required to **check** highly personalized machine-based decision-making on the legal rights of individuals in armed conflict. For example, are machine-based detention policies lawful? In short, the policy of human control is necessary to ensure that all new AI and cyber systems remain weapons and do not become non-human combatants. It is also necessary to ensure that these systems stay within the laws of IHL as they operate and learn across the real-time battlefield and behind the frontlines.

Finally, we think it very likely that the next few years will reveal the need for major new policymaking and probably **the development of new law** around AI and cyber warfare. Many States and groups of States have been actively developing new norms and guidelines on AI and cyber warfare in recent years. ASEAN has itself been very active in this field. Work from this region stands alongside the work of Russia, the USA and many other States at the UN General Assembly and more spontaneous moves like the Paris Call and Microsoft's suggestion of a Digital Geneva Convention.

This buzz of activity suggests the storming and forming of new norms and the need for clearer policy and legal rules. But the ICRC is also aware that there is something of an arms race in AI, cyber and new tech weapons at the moment which means some States are reluctant to come together in a comprehensive multilateral process to agree new norms and rules. It seems, perhaps, that just as the development of a new generation of paradigm-shifting weapons is hotting-up, the difficult process of negotiating their regulation is experiencing something of a freeze.

CONCLUSION: REASONS FOR OPTIMISM

So far it has inevitably been a little pessimistic and focused on what could go wrong in the take-up and development of AI weapons and cyber war. But there are reasons for optimism because human technology is usually ambivalent as a power for good and bad. There are many things that are already extremely good about computerized warfare. It has delivered extraordinary levels of precision so that military targeting is now much better and able to show greater respect for the principles of distinction, precaution and proportionality. This precision is genuine progress in **the conduct of hostilities**. It means that in many recent wars we have seen an avoidance by some parties to conflict of the kind of blanket bombing that was such a feature of World War II and the terrible Cold War conflicts in this region in Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

The fact that greater precision is now possible makes it an even greater failure when sophisticated armed forces choose not to use it and are indiscriminate or negligent in their conduct of hostilities. It is important not to idealize human control but to remember that the myriad of war crimes and atrocities committed in wars throughout history have been a direct result of human control. Human control of the weapons and methods of war has proved truly terrible for hundreds of millions of people in history.

Ultimately, computer control has the power to make wars better by complementing the flawed ethical and legal practices of human control. The art in this will be in how we find a balance between ethics and computers. This means developing a new humane culture of warfare that is adapted to our latest hybrid human form of cyber humanity. AI is already transforming **the conduct of humanitarian operations**. The use of big data has the potential to bring effective needs assessment to scale across a conflict. Digital communications means aid resources and information can be transferred in milli-seconds to thousands of people in urgent needs. Digital recognition is already helping to accelerate family tracing and restoring family links in conflict. It is not all gloom. AI and cyber is already transforming our world for the better across many fields of human endeavour.

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THE CAUSE AND EFFECT OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN SOUTH EAST ASIA AND ITS IMPLICATION TO MALAYSIA'S STRATEGIC SECURITY OUTLOOK

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ABSTRACT

Climate change is affecting the geostrategic outlook in Southeast Asia. The effects of climate change have been more prevalent in Southeast Asia as compared to other parts of the world due to its location at the equatorial line. Climate change effects have led to several implications to Malaysia's security and livelihood. This is because climate change disrupts the ecosystem, causes famine, displacement of people or human migration, diseases and epidemics, shortage of water, depletion of natural resources and more. The requirement for natural finite resources such as water and energy to live on, land mass to build community settlements, and surviving natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes and typhoons are at threat due to climate change. Climate change will also lead to difficulties in the agriculture sector, where production of food such as rice would decrease significantly, unable to sustain Malaysia's growing population come end of the 21st century. This article is structured to firstly identify the factors affecting climate change in South East Asia and the effect it will have on Malaysia's security. Subsequently, the policies and measures adopted by Malaysia in mitigating or adapting to climate change effects will be analysed to identify gaps and inadequacies within the system. Finally, lists of viable options or measures that can be implemented by the Malaysian government in addressing the findings are suggested.

Keyword*s: climate change, food security, forced migration, Paris Agreement, The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)*

INTRODUCTION

Climate significantly affects our everyday life. We are heavily dependent on climate in so many ways that climate has become part and parcel of our lives. According to Goosse et al. (2010), "*Climate is traditionally defined as the description in terms of the mean and variability of relevant atmospheric variables such as temperature, precipitation and wind*". The changes in climate over many years is called climate change. Although intertwined, climate change can be defined as statistics of changes in weather over time (Bhandari, 2018). From the ice age to contemporary warm climate, the world has seen many variations in climate change. The effects of climate change include variations and extremities in weather around the globe, rise of sea water level, typhoons, cyclones and hurricanes. These extreme weather conditions and the rise of sea water level can affect food and shelter security, force migration of masses of populace, draught and much more. Climate change has also seen a rise in global temperature that is causing a severe global climate change phenomenon. According to Rebecca et al., (2018) global temperature has been increasing since the industrial revolution, rising nearly 0.9 degrees Celsius.

The problem with climate change is that, if left unchecked, its effects can impose a serious security risk concern for nations in the South East Asia region such as Malaysia. Malaysia may face security issues such as rise of immigration, possible famine caused by drought, depletion of food sources and rise in health-related issues such as malaria or dengue. All these would have a direct and indirect impact towards the security of Malaysia and the policies formulated in the economy, environmental and political setting of Malaysia. This paper attempts to look at the cause and severity of climate change in South East Asia and the effect it will have on Malaysia's security. In doing so, this paper will first analyse the policies formulated by Malaysia's government and other stakeholders to mitigate climate change in order to identify gaps within the system. This will then provide a significant understanding on the current inadequacies within Malaysian policies on climate change and how it affects the strategic security outlook of Malaysia.

UNDERSTANDING CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE DETERMINANT FACTORS

Countries responsible for approximately 97% of all greenhouse gas emissions globally are all signatories of the Paris Agreement to address climate change by adhering to the requirement of adopting measures that would significantly reduce emissions to a predetermined minimal level (NRDC, 2017). Worapot and Venkatachalam (2012) believe that climate change poses serious implications on the development of global economy. They highlight that most people are quite aware of the consequences of climate change and that it is undeniable that everyone and every nation contributes significantly to climate change and thus everyone and every nation too will have to suffer from the consequences of their actions .If nothing is done to mitigate climate change, global warming will continue to occur at an alarming rate and would lead to disruptions in the ecosystem and social structure that we have struggled for many years to put in its current place.

Southeast Asia is a region that has become the most susceptible region towards climate change effects, and he continues to reiterate the importance of addressing climate change urgently should states in Southeast Asia want to sustain development and eradicate poverty (Tae, 2012). As Asia and in particular Southeast Asia is largely dependent on natural resources and agriculture to sustain the populace, this makes them more vulnerable to the effects of climate change (Worapot & Venkatachalam, 2012). Hence, strategies and policies are formulated to enable these vulnerable states to adjust in the natural system of the environment, by mitigating the effects of climate change and thus enabling sustainable economic growth and development (Worapot & Venkatachalam, 2012). This includes, focus on the reduction in determinant factors of climate change through the introduction of rules and regulations to govern the processes and activities that is the source for climate change.

Greenhouse gas emissions due to human related activities has been increasing exponentially from the beginning of the industrial age in 1800s (IPCC, 2014). In the last century, Earth has experienced a significant rise of $1^{0}C$ in global temperature. This significant increase causes changes cloud patterns, rainfall, ocean currents and wind patterns thus creating the devastating domino effect on the entire global climate and ecosystem (IPCC, 2014). A study conducted by NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies show this steady rise in temperature over the span of the last century as graphically portrayed in Figure 1 (NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies).

Figure 1: Global Temperature Increase

The NASA Scientific Visualisation Studio provides a visualisation of the surface temperature difference seen from 1884 (Figure 2) and 2018 (Figure 3) which depicts how man induced activities and the advent of the industrialisation era has contributed to global warming and climate change in general.


**Figure 2: Global Temperature Average in year 1884**

Figure 3: Global Temperature Average in year 2018

CLIMATE CHANGE ON THE MALAYSIAN ECONOMY AND FOOD SECURITY

Al-Amin and Filho (2011) in their research, clusters the potential impact of climate change effects to the security state of Malaysia to several areas including food security, threat to the ecosystem, coastal and sea level rise leading to loss of land mass, health hazard exposure, occurrences of natural disasters and political instability and insecurity. Many studies or research material provide empirical evidence that climate change will bring about profound changes to the ecosystem of the planet. Disruption of the ecosystem will create a negative domino effect on many levels. Firstly, food resources will be significantly affected as depletion of natural resources and coastal resources occur rapidly and can be of grave concern as this will affect human wellbeing (Manumur et al., 2011). Secondly, effects from climate change could decrease the agriculture productivity rate and lessen forest reserves by a significant portion. Low agriculture productivity rate will bring about a negative effect to the economic development of a nation and also result in food shortages for the populace. Additionally, increasing development of built up areas replacing age old forests reserves has disturbed the ecosystem and land management of the country. Reduced forest reserves would lead to disruption in the composition of gases in the atmosphere, by increasing Carbon Dioxide and reducing Oxygen and therefore contributing even more towards climate change. All these effects would hinder economic growth and development as will be the case in Malaysia if mitigation efforts are not taken.

Malaysia's current tropical climate is extremely conducive for the farming of a variety of agriculture based food stuff, tropical fruits and vegetables including bananas, coconuts, pineapples and rice. Malaysia alike many countries globally, is susceptible towards climate change effects as the country is heavily invested in industry (Siwar et. al, 2013). According to Siwar et. al, (2013), Malaysia has been witnessing increase in surface temperature of about 1.2 degree Celsius over the past several decades. Their research also that an additional one degree rise in temperature by the year 2050 will occur, a rise that could very well affect the agriculture industry significantly (Siwar et. al, 2013). As Ariffin et al. (2002) pointed out in their research, weather is an important proponent in determining the success of agriculture production and effects or stresses from climate change such as drought, rise in temperature and pollution which can severely limit the production capacity in this industry. The rise in temperature could see a significant decrease in rice yields up to a staggering 80 percent, and other major plantation in the country such as oil palm, rubber and cocoa could also experience a huge reduction in production up to approximately 30% of current production rate (Siwar et al, 2013). Zabawi (2012), in his research also drew a comparison between rice production and rainfall/temperature, stating that an increase of 15% in temperature or rainfall will reduce rice production by up to an alarming 80% annually. According to Salmah et al. (2007), development in the industry and agriculture sector has also led to increased requirement of water supply now and in the future. Hence management of water supply in the country must be done as efficiently as possible to reduce wastage and increase supply to cater for development purposes within these sectors. Among measures that can be adapted include increasing reservoir capacity, improving hydrological forecasting and maximising use of water resources from the ground or rainfall (Salmah et al., 2007).

It is essential to understand the importance of agriculture to Malaysia's GDP. According to the Department of Statistics Malaysia, the agriculture sector contributes approximately 8.2% of Malaysia's GDP, which amounts to RM 96 billion (DOSM, 2019). From this amount, oil palm makes up the majority of the portion at 46.6% followed by livestock at 11.4%, fishing at 10.5%, rubber at 7.3% and forestry at 5.6% (DOSM, 2019). Agriculture is a very important component of the Malaysia economy as it also contributes employment opportunities for nearly 16% of the entire population in the country. According to Elini and Ramsden (2016), approximately 166,000 households, which accounts for a significant 3% of Malaysia's population, rely on the sales of rice yields as their main income. Figure 4 below shows the breakdown of Malaysia's GDP in 2017, focusing on agriculture to provide for a clearer understanding on the impact agriculture has on the Malaysian economy.

Figure 4: Malaysia's GDP Breakdown in 2017 (DOSM, 2019)

Although the production rate of rice in Malaysia amounts to millions of metrics tons annually, it is still not adequate to cater for the Malaysian population demands. Elini and Ramsden (2016) put a figure of 2.5 million metric tons of rice produced in 2011 over a land area of 687,940 hectares, and this was only enough to fulfil demand of approximately 72% of Malaysia's populace. Thus, as a result, Malaysia still has to import a large number of rice from neighbouring countries including Thailand and Vietnam (Siwar et. al, 2013). Based on these statistics, it can be assumed that climate change will cause a massive disruption to the overall food supply in Malaysia as rice yields decrease and population increase in years to come. In their research, Muhammad et al. showed statistical data that confirms the correlation of temperature rise and rainfall fluctuation with the production of rice per hectare, indicating the vulnerability of the agriculture sector to the effects of climate change (Muhammad et al., 2012). For example, crop production is heavily dependent on water resources to flourish. Livestock animals such as cattle and chickens are also dependent on the climatic conditions as shift or changes in the ecosystem would harm the food chain supply and this would lead to reduced production for human consumption. Therefore, climate change is a threat to Malaysia's National Food Security that can hinder economic growth and revenue earnings that comes from the agriculture industry (Elini and Ramsden, 2016).

However, besides food security, Manumur et al. (2011), identifies the loss of life and property loss from natural disasters such as floods, increased water stresses that could reduce fishery related food stocks as determinants that could hinder economic growth and nation development. According to them, a notable number of socio-economic activities can easily be triggered by weather conditions that may cause a socio-economic gap within a society (Manumur et al., 2011). For example, in December 2004, a tsunami hit 13 nations from two different continents, Asia and Africa, resulting in damages amounting to an approximate USD 6 billion, killing more than 200,000 thousand lives, and displacing nearly 2 million people from their residential areas (Manumur et al., 2011). The massive destruction caused by the tsunami took more than a decade for the restoration of basic infrastructure and amenities in the areas affected, and required a huge sum of financial resources for this restoration exercise. Ramalanjanona (2011), estimated that several billions of dollars in losses were incurred from this disaster worldwide. Jayasuriya and McCawley (2010), highlighted that around USD 14 billion were offered in the form of aid in the aftermath of the disaster, and that amount did not include the financial cost to rebuild homes, infrastructures and basic amenities over the course of several years.

In Malaysia, the frequency and intensity of rainfall leading to floods has been increasing over the years. Lee (2017), in her research, provided empirical data to back this finding, saying that rainfall intensity leading to floods have become rather frequent in the past decade, especially in the southern part of Peninsular Malaysia. According to Nordin et al. (2018), the worst ever flood Malaysia experienced in 2014 affected nearly 500,000 people and brought destruction to infrastructure and basic amenities in flood areas which amounted to a staggering RM 2.851 billion in total losses. Additionally, approximately 9% of land mass in Malaysia which involves a population count of almost 3.5 million people, is susceptible to flooding annually and an estimated cost of RM 100 million in damages is inflicted every year in these places whenever flooding occurs (Al-Amin & Filho, 2011). Furthermore, in Salmah et al.'s research, they reported that a twofold rise in Carbon Dioxide in the atmosphere has contributed to a projected increase in temperature at a high of 4.5 degree Celsius rise and increase in precipitation intensity (Salmah et al., 2007). Therefore this will lead to more floods and severe draughts occurring more frequently in areas already prone to these natural disasters (Salmah et al., 2007). Looking at this trend and based on additional statistics provided in the Department of Irrigation and Drainage Malaysia official website, it is revealed that Malaysia has been spending billions of Ringgit since 1970s to conduct flood mitigation work. In 2015, it was budgeted that an additional RM 15 billion will be required to improve river depths and conduct flood mitigation works at designated flood prone areas (DID, 2019). This huge amount clearly indicates that natural disasters such as floods occurrence in Malaysia is taking its toll on the growth and development of Malaysia's economy in the long term.

The effects from climate change and shift in weather patterns and fluctuation of rain density will have a profound impact on the agriculture sector in Malaysia, this leading to slower economic growth and development. Food shortages caused by climate change will disrupt the market where demand is higher than supply, and this would lead to people fighting for the remaining resources. Prices would increase exponentially; inflation rates would skyrocket and the economy of the country could be in a crisis on collapse entirely. Insufficient resources and food supply tends to lead to conflict and squabbles amongst the populace. Riots and demonstrations against the government will occur and this may lead to wars. Therefore, ways of mitigating climate change and addressing the issues that come with effects of climate change should be addressed and action oriented steps enforced. Urgent preventive and corrective acts are required to preserve the production of food to sustain the Malaysian populace and to support government financial requirements for the economy to thrive.

CLIMATE CHANGE EFFECTS ON POLITICAL AND NATIONAL SECURITY

Uncontrolled mass migration across borders is another area of concern for Malaysia's national security as this could burden the nation's economy and deplete scarce resources especially resources such as food and fresh drinking water. This would be the case once migrants from neighbouring countries who are affected from the effects of climate change seek shelter and opportunity on our lands. In Manumur et al.'s research, it is highlighted on how climate change effects can not only stagnate economic development, but would lead to mass migration globally as more places become inconducive to living due to extreme weather conditions, higher temperatures, degradation of soil for agriculture and other activities, food shortages and depletion of water resources (Manumur et al., 2011). Furthermore, this would lead to increase in insurance costs and higher risks imposed on livelihood of the populace. Manumur et al. (2011), revealed that this is probably the case of Africa in the future, where an estimate of 184 million people from that continent may suffer mortally due to effects of climate change and another one billion will seek refuge elsewhere in a massive global migration crisis induced by climate change effects.

Another area of concern is the physical security and political dimensions of climate change effects. Manumur et al. (2011), elaborate in their research on the importance of the physical security of humans, including proper access to clear water, food for consumption and land rich with natural resources for survivability. If these basic amenities and needs to survive are not available or accessible to humans at the place they live in, then it is most likely that human instincts would dictate and spur the need for them to migrate to a new habitat where these resources are abundant (Manumur

et. al, 2011). According to the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, climate change will contribute immensely to the mass migration of people across borders as the human race seek access to basic resources, healthier lifestyle and sustainability in their daily lives; while all this could lead to failure in the social structure system, induce conflicts for scarce and limited resources and cause border control difficulties for nations (CSCAP, 2010). Besides that, according to Purvis and Busby the altercation and shift in distribution of resources such as water, fertile land and maritime resources due to the effects of climate change can lead to unhealthy competition for these resources, often leading to conflicts (Purvis & Busby, 2005). Additionally, approximately 1,200km2 of Malaysia's coastal lands will be submerged thus reducing land mass and increasing frequency of floods (Salmah et al., 2007). The estimated losses arising from these sea level rise in the area is shown in the table below.

Country	Sea-level Rise (cm)	Potential Land Loss		Population Exposed	
		(km^2)	(%)	(million)	(%)
Bangladesh	45	15,668	10.9	5.5	5.0
India	100	5,763	0.4	7.1	0.8
Indonesia	60	34,000	1.9	2	1.1
Malaysia	100	7,000	2.1	>0.05	>0.3
Vietnam	100	40,000	12.1	17.1	23.1

Table 1: Potential Land Loss and Populations Exposed due to Rising Sea Levels
(Salmah et al., 2007)

NATIONAL POLICY AND STRATEGIES ADOPTED ON CLIMATE CHANGE

A National Policy on climate change was released in 2010 by the Malaysian government consisting of a number of guidance and measures for all agencies in the civil sector, private industries and all relevant stakeholders to face climate change (Elini and Ramsden, 2016). This policy was developed to ensure that measures were adapted and adopted in easing the adaptation towards climate change effects in the long term and assisting the government to sustain nation building as projected. Several objectives were stipulated including prudent management of resources and conservation of the environment for improving quality of life, enhancement of national economic growth, creating a response system that is part of the climate change policies developed at national level and increasing the capacity of the nation to recover quickly to climate change impacts (Elini and Ramsden, 2016). Besides that, the national policy on climate change was also centred around minimising the impact of climate change to the food sector, by introducing several key measures in ensuring adaptability towards climate change, with a particular focus on rice yields (Elini and Ramsden, 2016). According to Jabin (2015), in attempt to formulate an efficient adaptation policy, it would require for a study on the cost effectiveness of the measures made through the implementation of such policies. Only then would the relevant authorities in both the government and non-government organisations be able to ascertain the economic impact of these policies (Jabin, 2015).

According to Salmah et al. (2017), the economic crisis that Malaysia faced in late 90s forced the government to introduce a recovery plan in the National Economic Recovery Plan or NERP. This plan contained action oriented elements related to climate change, for example, it contained action plans for enforcement, accounting and development activities in relation to accounting of natural resources and protection of the environment (Salmah et al., 2007). The outline plans include the necessary measures to improve water quality, prudent management of industrial waste and pollutants, conservation of natural habitat and forest reserves and adopting a healthy and structured environment in built up areas (Salmah et al., 2007). Furthermore, preservation of food resources security, fresh water supply, clean energy without harming the nature of the environment was also emphasised in the plans formulated (Salmah et al., 2007). Prior to that, Malaysia established a National Climate Committee that comprised of members from all relevant stakeholders, including government agencies,

civil groups and private groups, those whose involvement was likely to affect the outcome from measures and implementation of climate change programs and activities planned (Salmah et al., 2007). The committee is chaired by the Secretary General of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (NRE) who is also responsible to coordinate efforts into the implementation of the activities planned for mitigation of climate change effects (Salmah et al., 2007). A special division was established for this purpose within the ministry, known as The Conservation and Environmental Management Division (CEMD) (Salmah et al., 2007).

Other policies related to Climate Change mitigation in Malaysia include the National Forestry Policy in 1978, National Energy Policy in 1979, National Policy on Biological Diversity in 1998, National Policy on the Environment in 2002 and the Third Agricultural Policy effective from 1998 to 2010 (Salmah et al., 2007). Besides policies, Malaysia has also enacted several laws to enforce these policies such as the Environment Quality Act 1974, Fisheries Maritime Regulations 1985, Town and Country Planning Act 1976, Land Conservation Act 1960 to name a few. All these acts contain rules and regulations that is to be followed by various stakeholders in preserving the environment. Furthermore, the introduction of the National Hydraulic Research Institute in 1995 was seen as a positive step taken by the government to enable research done on the impact of climate change on water and hydro resources in Malaysia to assist the related stakeholders especially the government in making decisions or formulating policies to mitigate climate change effects in Malaysia (Salmah et al., 2007). The government also established two centres in the Malaysian Mereological Department (MMD) and Malaysian Centre for Remote Sensing (MARCRES) that was tasked solely to collect data on climate conditions, while using this data for the projection of several climate scenarios (Salmah et al., 2007). Another organisation, the National Water Resources Council, was established in 1998 to ensure the prudent management of all water resources within the country and at the same time coordinate and plan for the long term continuous run of water supply for all purposes (Salmah et al., 2007).

Besides policies and acts, Malaysia has recognised the profound impact that energy sources such as oil and gas has on climate change based on the greenhouse gases emitted from the use of this source. Therefore, in attempt to reduce dependence on oil as source of energy, the government has been developing other natural and clean energy resources such as hydroelectricity to fulfil demands based on usage by the population (Salmah et al., 2007). In addition to this, the government has been introducing several programs that focus on creating awareness amongst the relevant agencies in the private and civil sector. This would include adopting an energy efficiency culture, by reducing wastage and maximising recycling options (Salmah et al., 2007). Effective forest and trees management is also emphasised as the maintenance of sufficient greenery could reduce Carbon Dioxide composition in the atmosphere thus reducing climate change effects (Salmah et al., 2007). Monitoring the total food production against demand from the market is also a step that the government has initiated, in order to allow the relevant authorities to identify future shortages and introduce methods or measures to enhance productivity in agriculture (Salmah et al., 2007). Lastly, to continuously monitor the effects from sea level rise in Malaysia, the government has also initiated the Coastal Vulnerability Index (CVI) study that will assist future mitigative and adaptive to face the consequences of sea rise level in the country (Salmah et al., 2007). In the case of adaptation to climate change, the government has realised the importance of adapting to the likely happenings of extreme calamities such as severe droughts and floods. Therefore, to cater for the likelihood of these events occurring, several measures were placed to continue yielding of rice with lower water requirements such as by introducing the new hybrid rice technology (Elini and Ramsden, 2016). With the advent of hybrid rice, the potential yield is expected to increase from 4.5 to an estimate 6.5 metric tons per hectare thus eliminating the huge losses predicted from climate change effects on the rice industry (Elini and Ramsden, 2016).

POLICY GAPS ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Malaysian authorities have not emphasised enough on research and collection of vital data that is necessary to assist the government in establishing priorities and adaptation strategies to mitigate climate change effects (Salmah et al., 2007). This has resulted in a gap in understanding the actual impact of temperature and rainfall fluctuations towards crop productivity especially rice which leads to policies that do not really do much on mitigating climate change (Salmah et al., 2007). Besides that, the National Policy on Climate Change that was formulated 9 years ago has not been reviewed or reported on the achievement of the policies goals and objectives set initially (McCaw, 2007). Although the National Policy on climate change provides a complete guide on key initiatives and strategies that is to be undertaken over a span of time, however it is reported that the measures fall short of the intended outcome (McCaw, 2017). This shows that the policies and planned actions to ensure the enforcement of these policies were not enforced and reveals a gap in the system.

According to McCaw, Malaysia tends to focus solely on flood mitigation and not on the overall effects of climate change (McCaw, 2017). This includes initiatives such as development of 194 flood mitigation projects that would protect and benefit nearly 1 million people from flood related disasters nationwide (McCaw, 2017). McCaw strongly highlights the deficiency in this plan as it only focuses on tactical level adaptation towards climate change and on such a small scope rather than looking at the security related risks that is associated with climate change such as reduction of land mass, mass border migration, famine and depletion of other natural resources (McCaw, 2017). In addition to that, it is quite evident that plans are formulated in silo for respective organisations and are not consolidated across these organisations for a better overall and holistic result (McCaw, 2017). Malaysia also does not consider the implication that climate change effects at neighbouring countries causes towards the country especially on food resources and border crossing as currently Malaysia is only concerned with climate change effects within its own borders (McCaw, 2017).

Elini and Ramsden (2016), offer several suggestions on minimising the effects of climate change such as maximising the use of technology to enhance water saving, increasing rice/agriculture varieties and control of health hazards and diseases. Incorporating technological advances to mitigate climate change effects could be the way in the future and Malaysia should seriously consider the benefits that can be obtained from the use of technology to enhance food production, reduce wastage of water and other scarce resources vital for livelihood. Ashfold et al. (2018) acknowledge that the Paris Agreement has garnered support and pledged commitments from countries across the globe in reducing greenhouse gases emissions by more than half of what is emitted today by the year 2030. However, according to them, based on a report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the progression made by most nations shows that these goals in 2030 is not achievable as planned (Ashfold et al., 2018). For example, for Malaysia to reduce emissions, the GDP needs to grow much faster than the rate of emission emitted to the atmosphere and therefore there is no real requirement to reduce emissions if GPD growth is growing at approximately 5% annually, cause Malaysia will still achieve the objective set for the nation in the Paris Agreement (Ashfold et al., 2018). This is somewhat debatable because it does not require Malaysia to enforce any reduction of greenhouse gas emission, but rather focus on GDP growth. Hence, the commitment made in the Paris Agreement does not really translate to reducing climate change effects.

As the energy sector from the use of coal and gas is the main contributor to greenhouse gas emissions in Malaysia, Malaysia should focus on reducing emissions in this industry through wider use of cleaner energy sources such as hydropower, solar or biofuel. Nonetheless, according to Ashfold et al.(2018), the policies on renewable green energy in Malaysia is insufficient and have all been largely unsuccessful because no effort has been made in ensuring competitive pricing between the both sources of energy thus resulting in people opting for the cheaper but more polluting one. In addition to that, it is highlighted that Malaysians are not well educated enough on the subject of climate change because the focus on high impact actions are much lower than the low impact actions on climate change. For example, living without a car, a high impact action, will contribute more to reducing greenhouse gas emission as compared to using high electric efficient light bulb, a low impact

action (Ashfold et al., 2018). The poor knowledge on climate change and its effects has resulted in the people and government focusing more on low impact actions rather than high impact actions, and therefore, this is an area where policies on climate change can be emphasised. Ashfold et al., continue to point out that the proposal for the National Coordination Council to review and organise current policies on climate change to ensure sustainable development has not really kicked off and therefore Malaysia is threading dangerous lines and may fall short of its intended targets to reduce the effects from climate change come year 2030 (Ashfold et al., 2018).

In an interview with the Star News Agency, The Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate Change Minister, Yeo Bee Yin recently stressed that she feels the importance of climate change is often neglected. She highlighted that Malaysia "*...need a plan for mitigation and adaptation*" on climate change, noting that her ministry lacks expertise and resources to accomplish this (Leoi, 2018). Furthermore, she also raised the issue of hiring expert consultant from private companies to study, research and propose policies on climate change to the ministry, but later different set of people within the ministry was tasked in executing those policies, something which she deemed was inefficient and not successful (Leoi, 2018). Currently, the ministry is studying the need to introduce a climate change act, where the study is expected to complete in 2020. Rajakumar (2019) believes that focus on high impact individual and public listed companies on climate change effects should be emphasised more, citing that the impact these businesses have on climate change if often understated. Hence, according to her, it is imperative that these businesses take steps of measures to minimise greenhouse gas emissions, and utilise resources such as energy, water and others efficiently while practising prudent management of waste to reduce pollution, as this would contribute significantly towards mitigation of climate change effects (Rajakumar, 2019). Policies that emphasise on big businesses is very much lacking and much emphasis should be placed on this especially in the upcoming Climate Change Act, if brought into effect.

ADDRESSING GAPS IN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY AND ENFORCEMENT

Malaysia has been aware of the threat that climate change poses decades ago. The earliest policy on climate change developed was back in 1978 that was specifically on National Forestry. Over the years Malaysia has developed many other policies in relation to climate change, the most notable one of course is the National Policy on Climate Change, formulated and released in 2010. This policy is the most complete policy to date that Malaysia has, however has not been reviewed or revised for nearly a decade now. Besides that, no clear appraisal of the action plan has been undertaken since the policies were released in 2010 and thus, Malaysia is unable to determine if its efforts are achieving the objective set out initially, or in short, if the country is on track with its commitment towards mitigating climate change effects or is the exact opposite. However, the Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate Change has acknowledged that the ministry in the past has placed less emphasis on climate change issues, a statement made by its incumbent minister, Yeo Bee Hin (Zakri, 2018). According to the minister, the climate change department within the ministry does not have sufficient staff to enact the policies formulated and that Malaysia does not really have a clear strategy to mitigate or adapt to climate change effects (Zakri, 2018).

Additionally, according to Zalina et. al, public knowledge of climate change is still not at a level expected, and not yet ingrained fully into each individual in this country (Zalina et. al, 2015). Zakri also agreed with this revealing in his newspaper piece that the climate change debate and discussions is very rare, although more evidence suggest that it is really happening (Zakri, 22 Oct 2018). He also cited some survey on the average Malaysian awareness at only 32 to 40 percent (Zakri, 2018). This would inadvertently lead to ignorance and lack of commitment from all quarters in combatting climate change and adhering to the policies and action plan that the government has initiated. Therefore, it is imperative for the government to first create awareness among the Malaysian people of the threat that climate change poses to all and educate them on ways each person can contribute to mitigate the effects of climate change.

Previously, the budget given to the Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate Change was very low and did not translate Malaysia's concern in addressing climate change and other environment issues, project development. However, as shown in the graph below, more recently, RM 1.53 billion was allocated to the ministry with RM 812 million for development purposes (MOF, 2019 Budget). This is a clear indication of the rising level of commitment that the government is placing on addressing climate change effects and it comes at a time when Malaysia pledged to do its part as stipulated in the Paris Agreement.


CARTA
PERBELANJAAN SEBENAR (2015 – 2017) DAN PERUNTUKAN (2018 – 2019) BAGI MENGURUS DAN PEMBANGUNAN

Figure 5: Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate Change Budget Statistics

RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE

Political Will

The government of the day plays a significant part in ensuring climate change mitigation and adaptation action plans is successful, or in short, must require strong political will. It is opined that the government has to place more emphasis on reducing greenhouse gas emissions. At present, there is no clear action plan on reducing carbon emission into the atmosphere. However, the current government is drafting policies on introducing carbon tax with the aim of encouraging use of greener energy in businesses, products and practices. Last year, Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad said that the government is not only studying the implementation of carbon tax, but is also looking at various measures or a national mitigation plan to fulfil Malaysia's commitment to the Paris Agreement (Varkley, 2019). The Ministry of Energy, Environment will be more proactive to ensure that policies formulated are enacted upon. The new minister, Yeo Bee Yin did introduce several new policies including solar leasing policies, focus on reducing solar energy prices and providing subsidies for use of public transportation (Varkley, 2019). She was also very vocal in waste management issues particularly in relation to the dangerous radioactive waste produced by Lynas Corporations (Varkley, 2019). In addition to that, Yeo Bee Yin also repledged Malaysia's agreement in UN's Framework on Climate Change last year, where Malaysia is committed to reduce carbon emissions up to 35% by 2030.

Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, these ratifications were argued to be vaguely supported by the national policies (Varkley, 2019). As the minister herself pointed out, the problem is that Malaysia is yet to have a long-term strategic outline in addressing climate change and this is the most significant short fall the nation is facing in addressing climate change (Zakri, 22 Oct 18). In fact, businesses in Malaysia did not support the initial policy released in 2002 during Tun Mahathir's first tenure as Prime Minister for fear that it would affect economic growth and business profits (Varkley, 2019). However, his current government is more ambitious to ensure that climate change is tackled. The current minister announced three main initiatives in relation to climate change this year, which includes establishment of a Climate Change Centre, the formulation of a National Strategic Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation Plan and lastly, the formulation of the Climate Change Act which is expected to be tabled in Parliament before 2021 (Varkley, 2019).

These actions taken by the minister are seen as measures indicating the government's commitment towards addressing climate change effects. Although commendable, these measures alone are inadequate in tackling the effects of climate change. However, the lack of awareness in climate change effects is disappointing. No concrete measure has been put to place to ensure that greenhouse gas emissions is reduced to achieve the intended target of 35% by 2030 as stipulated in the Paris Agreement. Hence, it is imperative for the government to amplify political will to get the unanimous support from all stakeholders of climate change. Firstly, the government must create awareness and educate the general public on the threat of climate change and make clear the role that they should play in ensuring a joint effort in combatting climate change. They must realise that each individual can contribute towards mitigating climate change effects and that the real battle begins at the comfort of their homes. To do this, the government could organise awareness campaigns that would highlight some of the main challenges that Malaysia is facing from climate change and how best the general public can assist the nation in addressing these challenges. For example, promoting the use of renewable energy at their homes or simply reducing wastage of water when showering or washing vehicles would be collectively significant in reducing climate change effects.

On top of that, the government could introduce tax reliefs for individuals who opt for renewable energy as their main domestic supply such as wind or solar powered energy. This would encourage more people to start using renewable energy for domestic usage. Another form of tax exemption that should be introduced for the use of greener technology is the use of hybrid or fully electric vehicles. Encouraging the use of these vehicle could reduce the carbon emissions by a significant amount should it be enforced appropriately. Apart from that, reaching out to bigger contributors of climate change, such as businesses and industries, by offering certain benefits or tax relief if they are able to comply to the ministry's requirement of ensuring that their buildings are environment friendly compliant, is seen as an effective process to adopt. Another option is to enforce the use of green technology in vehicles, machineries and other equipment that contribute to climate change. This is possible only if strict policies and regulations are put in place by the government and enforced accordingly through auditing and heavy fines for non-compliance. This would obviously encounter some opposition, but should be an action plan that would significantly assist in the effort of mitigating climate change effects. In addition to the measures mentioned earlier, the government may also consider to introduce a new law that would dictate that the procurement of a second car to be either a hybrid or a fully electric vehicle. Encouraging use of public transportation by reducing prices and improving the entire system is clearly another measure that should be considered seriously by the government. For example, the development of the Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) in the city areas would significantly reduce the capacity of vehicles on the road and that would lead to less carbon gases being emitted to the atmosphere. All this would inadvertently help the nation achieve its intended greenhouse gas emissions reduction by year 2030.

Reviewing National Policy on Climate Change and Tailoring Budget Requirements

In addition to that, it must be realised that drafting and formulating policies is only one aspect of it, but ensuring that it is enforced and achieving results from these policies is what that ultimately matters. Another measure that the government should enforce is to review and revise all policies in an

interval of at least 5 years once. The cycle of 5 years is suggested as this is in parallel with the Malaysian Development Plan Cycle (RMK) where the budget for the development of Malaysia is determined during this cycle. This is to ensure that policies are always up to date, and the latest technology and strategic settings is accounted for when reviewing these policies. Furthermore, this would provide the opportunity for the government to allocate sufficient budget to ensure the action plans outlined in these policies are executed as planned. It is worth highlighting here that the government needs to provide these initiatives with the appropriate funding during the annual budget for it to be as successful as intended. More funding must be allocated for developing technology to enhance the use renewable energy, use of energy efficient appliances in all government buildings, controlling carbon emission technology and research and development on new technologies for mitigating and adapting to climate change effects. Only then would continuity and dynamism in the policies entail and this will allow for action plans to be more effective and efficient. However, it has to be ensured that all these policies are to be debated in the parliament or among cabinet members before approval to ensure that it is a comprehensive policy and addresses all aspects of climate change issues affecting Malaysia. Finally, the projected action plans or measures taken should undergo a formal annual appraisal to ensure that it is meeting its intended target. This will assist the authorities to then initiate corrective measures, or improve work processes for better performance.

Enhance National Security and Readiness

Security threats arising from climate change include mass migration across the borders, depletion of natural resources that lead to survivability among the people who possibly would resort to protests and demonstrations to vent out frustrations or dissatisfaction, rise in non-traditional threats such as illegal trafficking and smuggling of goods as a result of uncontrollable border crossing and increase in intensity and occurrence of natural disasters such as floods in Malaysia. Keeping that in mind, Malaysia needs to adopt a strategy to face all these possible scenarios in the future, to ensure that their security forces, the Police, Military, Border Agency and Maritime Agency are all trained and of high readiness at all times to react to those scenarios.

The strategy should revolve around equipping and preparing the security forces to face all these threats in the future. Should mitigating climate change effects fail, then adapting to the possible threats from climate change effects must be in place. There are several options available to Malaysia. Firstly, Malaysia needs to enhance border security by providing more budget to the relevant agencies. The Malaysian Border Security Agency is currently tasked to protect the borders with assistance from the Malaysian Armed Forces, Malaysia Maritime Agency and the Royal Malaysian Police. All these agencies must be equipped with the latest equipment to enhance border security such as the use of surveillance balloons, unmanned aerial vehicles to patrol and ground surveillance radars. This can be considered as an early adaptive method towards border crossing and migration as a result of climate change effects. Besides that, security forces also should be allocated larger resources in preparation to face imminent security threats that will arise from climate change. This includes non-traditional threats and also possible internal threats from own people. This is in anticipation of plausible future scenarios that may occur as we begin to lose land mass and resources, thus creating a situation susceptible to demonstrations and protests. Moreover, security forces under the purview of the National Security Council, should also be trained and equipped accordingly to react swiftly towards natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, landslides or other disasters that may arise due to the shift in weather patterns caused by climate change. Policies to address these threats should also be reviewed and revised accordingly. Malaysia also should establish close relationship with its neighbours in dealing with these threats. For example, Malaysia is currently collaborating with Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and The Philippines in enhancing border security. This cooperation could be broadened to encompass a wider array of areas such as in addressing regional disasters including floods, earthquakes, tsunamis, forest fires, or in Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations, combatting transnational crimes and protection of natural resources from illegal activities such as logging or mining.

In effort to sustain and preserve the resources available, use of renewable energy such as hydroelectricity and bio-diesel should be prioritised over the use of coal or petroleum. Minimising and optimising the use of natural resources should be a major concern for all stakeholders of climate change. This is to ensure that the resources can be used to generate new renewable resources and is not just depleted entirely. In order to realise this measure, more budget must be allocated for developing newer technologies in the field or by procuring current technologies used by developed countries. Besides that, research and development in this field must also be emphasised through collaboration with local universities and other agencies in the country.

SELF SUSTAINABILITY AND USE OF TECHNOLOGY

It is without a doubt that climate change will deplete natural resources such as water resources and food. As mentioned earlier, Malaysia is already heavily reliant on foreign countries including Thailand and Vietnam for fulfilling its population demand for rice. Currently, Malaysia only produces enough to feed 72% of its population and this number is bound to decrease as effects of climate change began decreasing production rate of agriculture in the coming decades. Therefore, Malaysia should be looking at ways to be self-sustainable in the long run, which entails producing enough food and water to sustain their own population. This is something that China has managed to do well in recent times. To achieve this would require a significant increase in agriculture productivity in the future and the only way to achieve that is from the use of technology to maximise production. This is basically an adaptation measure that can be adopted by Malaysia. According to Krupp (2018), technology is being used extensively to counter climate change effects, such as using sensory technologies to identify air pollution mappings, use of sensor to determine the right amount of chemicals on crops to avoid wastage, use of smart boats to assist fishermen in acquiring fish efficiently and effectively and finally use of technology to measure and later reduce greenhouse gas emissions such as methane. This various use of technology to mitigate and adapt to climate change effects could very well be the way forward for Malaysia as well and is something that the government through the Ministry of Energy, Science, Technology, Environment and Climate Change could place more emphasis on.

Malaysia needs to invest more in technology that can be used to increase food productivity. For example, new technologies for irrigation methods can be introduced to increase food productivity. Malaysia needs to place more emphasis in this area as currently they do not produce sufficient food to cater for the entire population. Use of computerised irrigation management system may lead to increased crop production and conserve energy and water. In using such methods or systems, Malaysia may be able to sustain its population and adapt to climate change effects.

Collaboration with Regional Partners

Climate change is a global problem. Therefore, Malaysia cannot act alone. As part of ASEAN, Malaysia needs to not only cooperate with other nations, but also should demand commitment from other nations to address climate change in a pragmatic and wholesome approach. Collaboration among regional partners is the best approach to cope with increasing climate change effects. Malaysia has already declared its commitment with other members of ASEAN to enforce mitigation actions on climate change effects. Collaboration include in areas such as environmental sustainability, use of clean energy and commitment towards the Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC (Letchumanan, 2010). Besides that, Malaysia is also a member of the ASEAN Socio Cultural Community that is tasked to ensure that all members are doing their respective share in achieving the common goal of mitigating climate change effects. Collaboration with regional partners will ensure that all members are complying and enforcing their commitments towards addressing climate change in the region and this is probably the best way forward for Malaysia.

In addition to that, Malaysia and ASEAN member states could look at other more successful organisations such as the European Union for developing more efficient and effective model that is both adaptable and suitable within this region. Adopting successful measures that has contributed to

reducing greenhouse gas emissions, such as the increased use of public transport could be emulated by Malaysia and its regional neighbours. Apart from all these, as mentioned earlier, Malaysia could cooperate with its ASEAN counterparts in many other areas concerning mitigation or adaptation towards climate change effects such as in handling natural disasters, enhancing border control and security, combatting transnational crimes and preserving natural resources. All the collaboration and coordination between regional states would significantly assist in the effort to mitigate and adapt to climate change effects.

CONCLUSION

The cost or financial implication of carrying out mitigative and adaptive measures on climate change is so miniscule and insignificant compared to the impact from climate change when articulated in financial terms. As the effects from climate change has already taken its toll on the planet today, more proactive and adaptive measures must be immediately enforced to reduce the damage or minimise the impact that it will have on the planet. The Malaysian government must act now or the country will witness the severe and disastrous consequences from climate change to the livelihood and security of its people in two to three decades from now. They cannot work in isolation but must get all stakeholders to be involved vigorously and with utmost dedication and commitment to ensure that all policies and action plans are adhered to as required. This would also help in addressing the gaps in policies and action plans to ensure that the most comprehensive strategic long-term plan is devised. Only then would Malaysia be able to sustain growth and development at the same time the country faces threat of climate change.

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SPREAD OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IDEOLOGY IN MALAYSIA: THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS) THREAT

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ABSTRACT

ISIS extreme worldview of "jihad" in the sense of "holy war" has inadvertently romanticize religious symbolism as a mission of mankind's salvation in the perceived hereafter - attracting many followers and providing a convenient international platform for similar extremist groups from other parts of the world. The ideology propagated is radical in form (ie. based on the Salafi narrative) albeit which actively projects a collective identity to many followers sharing its apocalyptic imagery - salvation in the afterlife is perceived to be only possible through the creation of a reliable state institution based on divine guidelines. Muslim majority countries such as Malaysia are perceived as targets for Islamic militants and also as safe havens for extremists to consolidate resources for achieving the cause of extremists organizations - Malaysia is considered a secure base for transit, recruitment of member, training and supporters/sympathizers. ISIS doctrine is used as a convenient platform to unite fragmented terrorist groups in the region and for the purpose of rousing or sustaining support besides being used as propaganda for the recruitment of new members and sympathizers. In essence, religious based militancy is not unlike other forms of terrorism - the presence of factors in the ideology that are somewhat relatable to the common man are the driving force sustaining its appeal. The extremist fervor adopted is tantamount to the level that justifies extreme violence as means for divine salvation - in fact, a realist approach can be engaged to explain the popularity of ISIS ideology. This paper intends to provide an insight into the extent of influence that the ISIS ideology or worldview has towards the Malaysian mindset. The deliverable expected of the analysis presented in this paper shall hopefully serve as input or contribution to assist in the development of an updated and comprehensive strategy to counter ISIS' extreme influence and its disparaging effects in Malaysia.

Keywords: *Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), foreign terrorist fighters (FTF), wahhabism, salafists, offensive jihad.*

INTRODUCTION

Foreign terrorist fighters (FTF) have been using Malaysia as a safe transit point to harbour fellow militants and also as a base to plan large scale acts of terrorism in other countries, including Malaysia (Farik & Kumar, 2019). According to authorities, FTF have resorted to marrying local spouse in order to secure legitimate visa to stay in the country. The growing radicalization of Islamist groups affiliated with ISIS since 2013 has been alarming- nevertheless, the first and only successful attack in Malaysia so far, occurred on 28th June 2016 (The Straits Time, 2017 & 2018). Fortunately, all other ISIS related attempts were foiled by Malaysian authorities in time Chew, A. (2018). In retrospect. Malaysia has had decades of experience dealing with militants. Similar mode of threat and indoctrination is reported of the communist terror ideology in 1964. - communist insurgents for example, ended officially after the government successfully negotiated a truce on 2nd December 1989 (The New York Times, 1964 ; Ong, 2014). Although, no longer facing threats from insurgents, total relief from extremist militant threats is yet to be guaranteed - by the 1990's, Islamist extremist groups such as Malaysia's Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM), Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Philippines' Moro Islamic Liberation Front, in addition to the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) had significantly gained traction as a regional threat and has been of great concern for the Malaysian Government.

The KMM was established by veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war, radicalized and in need of a new "struggle", consolidated their extremist ideals in the home country - recruiting, training and collaborating with other extremists groups of similar cause (Arosoaie, 2016). Violent and tenacious, this group was determined to unseat the legitimate Malaysian government - planned the assassination of politicians, initiating public disturbance and mayhem. The KMM, similar to ISIS and other Islamic extremist groups, are motivated by a theological worldview that is not simply an ideological and political alternative but an imperative that justifies the use of violence as means to prevail in the "holy struggles" against the conventional construct of the modern world - recruitment and morale is maintained via indoctrinating the need to fight and die in a sacred war commanded and obligated by God; religion as a mean to justify the use of violence in conflicts and wars has always been an issue of contention (Armstrong, 2014; Wood, 2015). According to ISIS, true believers are obligated to wage a holy war against non-believers and heretics (governments or individuals) considered to be enemies of God, albeit a divine battle between good and evil or between the armies of God and the forces of Satan. KMM's activities in Malaysia were significantly curbed after 9/11. However, Malaysian members of KMM and JI was reported to have evaded persecution by fleeing to Indonesia and later were believed to have joined extremist groups to support ISIS since the related conflict began in Syria on 2011 (Ramakrishna & Tan, 2003).

As of 2018, the ISIS remains to be the greatest threat to Malaysia, due to the increasing influence of Islamic hardliners in domestic politics and the active networking of domestically radicalized Islamist militants and FTF (non-state actors) (Chew, 2017). Malaysian based Islamist militants were keen to affiliate with ISIS in order to project a united Islamic front, demonstrating that it has a common theological (albeit extremist) ideology and thus was somewhat provided with a convenient platform for "legitimizing" the "struggles" of the previously fragmented groups. In essence, its strategic interest is to facilitate the sharing of resources and other advantages with "comrades" from beyond established borders and geopolitical divide. Moreover, religious sentiments and sensitivities has also become critical and intangible factors in the Malaysian national threat construct. Nevertheless, current development has prompted the initiation of increased security counter measures by the Government of Malaysia- to disrupt multiple attempts by terrorists-cum-extremists groups attempting to initiate attacks on Malaysian soil, many were detained and various terrorist cells and networks, domestic and foreign were cut off. (Hart, 2018).

This paper discusses the impact of extremist ISIS doctrines on Malaysia's national security concerns. Even though the of ISIS expansion has halted, its extremist ideological influence still prevails and is continuously propagated by other terror organizations around the world (Rogers, & Hubbard, 2019). As highlighted by recent relevant news report of arrests in Malaysia, it is obvious that elements of ISIS' extreme ideology is still relentlessly perpetuated and is considered a prominent threat to national security. ISIS base extreme ideology is not new, however it has been elevated to an unprecedented level which challenges the norms of established international system. Therefore, the analysis presented in this paper also hopes to fill the knowledge gap that relates to the relevance of counter measures against the propagation of ISIS extreme ideology, put in place by the Malaysian Government in recent times. Moreover, the insight may also be contributing or become complementary to other relevant studies performed by researchers or analysts alike.

ISIS IDEOLOGY IN PERSPECTIVE

The extremist ideology propagated by ISIS as of today, have not manifested overnight. Aside from its root in Wahhabism, other factors, in particular a multitude of radicalized environments have seeded its mass appeal. It has been established that Wahhabism has its origin from the Salafist movement. Nevertheless, Wahhabism has diverged from traditional Salafists teachings which strictly restrict tangibility with activities such as allegiance to political entity or organizations; these activities are deemed to potentially sow disunity among believers of Islam and distract from the study of religion (Anon, 2004). Notwithstanding, ISIS enforced the ideas or concepts of Wahhabism through its penal code, effectively canonizing the concepts in the form of a political ideology. As such, the

politicization of conservative and extreme religious views became fundamental to ISIS ideology. The influence of Qutbism or Kotebism has played a significant role in fuelling the politicization of already extreme IS fundamental – by providing the basis for a political ideology that advocates Islamic supremacism and nationalism. Also known as Qutbiyya or Qutbiyyah, this Islamist ideology was developed by Sayyid Qutb, a prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood (Manne; Anon, 2017). The ideology is centred on 'offensive jihad', understood to mean waging 'jihad' in conquest or "armed jihad in the advance of Islam" - in essence, the notion politicized Islam through the promotion of conservative and radical ideas which are often taken out of context, as narratives to serve as the foundations of a political ideology (Eikmeier, 2007 ; Hossan, 2011).   Based on Qutb's own understanding on the authentic Islamic way of life, various aspects of modern Muslim society and political governance are deemed to be un-Islamic (in the state of jahiliyya) and the only successful worldly way of governance is through 'hakimiyya' or the 'sovereignty of God'(Sayed, 2006). In summary, Qutb's ideas exclusively relates to 'jahiliyya', 'hakimiyyah', and 'jihad' – that the modern Muslim societies are not truly Islamic and therefore deserved to be overthrown, insisting on the strict enforcement of laws and system of governance revealed by God only ('tawhid al-hakimiyaa').

The Qutbist ideology is fused with Wahhabism by ISIS founders, shaping its approach in dealings with the religious and ethnic communities it controls – Qutbism provides the political components while Wahhabism became the fundamental core of its doctrines. As such, ISIS appeals to the Muslim masses by accentuating that modern Muslims have fundamentally deviated from the true message of the religion and ISIS is merely carrying out the divine task of correcting this deviation in the name of Islam - requiring a radical and coercive approach in the reform process (Haneef, 2004). The key observation is that ISIS has capitalized on the politicization of the extremist Wahhabi school of Islamic thoughts through the political ideology of Qutbism, which advocates strict adherence to traditional religious rules and practices deemed to be the authentic Islamic way of life. The aforementioned hybridized ideology is not new - analysts classify this form of ideology, Jihadist Salafism (Alaa 2017). Prominent in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, the ideology places "… special emphasis on politics, the need to rebel against rulers, global Jihad, and the use of violence to achieve its aims." Those inspired and had adopted this ideology included Osama bin Laden who founded al-Qaeda and acted out 'offensive jihad' in Afghanistan. Al-Zarqawi's mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, believed to be the spiritual father of ISIS, was among the many that has been cited to have greatly influenced the Jihadist Salafist movement. In fact, both ISIS and al-Qaeda rely heavily on Jihadi Salafist ideology but ISIS focus on extreme sectarian genocidal agendas had gone against al-Qaeda's key focus against the West (Wagemakers, 2012; Shiraz, 2017). Unchecked brutality even on civilians had also greatly influenced a-Qaeda's move to distance itself from further association with ISIS in February 2014. The majority of jihadi ideologues have done the same, criticizing ISIS' indiscriminate violence and its focus on sectarian agenda – even al-Zarqawi's mentor, al-Maqdisi considered ISIS a deviant group (Shiv et al., 2014)

Another point to note is that ISIS sanctioned clerics provided justifications for explaining its use of extreme violence, especially against Muslims – mainly through the incitement of sectarian or totalitarian hatred, to the extent of claiming that the levels of brutality is religiously permissible and divinely recommended, further accentuating that aiding infidels against Muslims is a greater unbelief, which renders a person unequivocally an infidel (Sly, 2014). ISIS recruits are often indoctrinated gradually, beginning with mainstream teachings before extreme literature or doctrines are introduced, through the writings of Abu Bakr Naji, for example. This method of indoctrination is enforced in order to falsely portray IS ideology as an extension of authentic Islam and not deviating from mainstream teaching (McCants, 2006; Hall, 2019). Stories and events from Islamic history are often taken out of context or obscure stories and 'hadiths' concerning isolated incidents that should not be followed as rules are preached to convince recruits about various acts of violence condoned by ISIS. Stories used for indoctrination are often not for verifying religious discourse but are accentuated to impress or induce fighters that are conscientiously against committing acts of extreme brutality (Weiss & Hassan 2016). ISIS has exploited the fact that mainstream clerics are constantly in dilemma over stories of extreme violence depicted by ISIS doctrines from Islamic history or texts. The fact is

that mainstream Muslim clerics often find themselves unable to engage in discussions around these stories without risking sectarian implications, thus abstaining from challenging such stories in public; in this way, creating opportunities for manipulation or reinterpretation to fit the terrorist group's skewed narrative.

THE RISE OF ISIS: THE REALIST EXPLANATION

As a state-centered issue, the realist view can be applied to explain the emergence of the ISIS and Malaysia's response towards Islamic extremist threats to national security. Malaysia's realist stance is clear as a state actor, since its national interest is at stake. While the theory of realism does not traditionally fit into the approach of non-state actors, it can be argued that non-state actors such as ISIS think in realist terms - the fervent use of extreme brutality on even defenseless civilians to achieve political objectives, for instance, indicates its realist state-actor approach. Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi proclaimed the elevated global status of ISIS also known as the IS, on 29 June 2014 ; declaring himself to be caliph of the Islamic world. Known in Arabic as Daesh, the self proclaimed state or caliphate asserted its nation-state legitimacy by declaring compliance to Islamic Shariah law and by "rules of the sword" (The Straits Time, 2019). By way of unbridled violence, during its peak, ISIS had controlled a large geographical territory - essentially altering the entire map of the modern Middle Eastern world. Since 2011, ISIS succeeded in rapidly gaining substantial territories in both Iraq and Syria - exploiting the weak governance of Iraq and the Syrian civil war (BBC News, 2019). Many factions are involved in the Syrian Civil War, ISIS was the strongest group during the initial stage of the Syrian conflict - however, recent events has pointed to ISIS decline and near demise (Specia, 2019).

ISIS is deemed to be a serious security threat not only to Iraq and Syria, but neighbouring countries, particularly Turkey, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia were not spared from its onslaught. The global community outside of the sphere of the Middle Eastern enclave, although not directly involved, have also been impacted by its spill-offs - its somewhat success in convincing thousands of fellow Muslims around the world to physically become FTF in ISIS through its distorted ideology, may have in some way elevated its legitimacy in the views of some geopolitical discourse. In retrospect, it is observed that ISIS ambition is not about securing and controlling territories to exhibit military prowess for some obscure reasons - efforts were rather focused on acquiring tangible and intangible political control albeit through violent means, for the primary purpose of achieving statehood; an obvious realist agenda to achieve the basic construct of nation-state survival (Waltz, 1979; Stakelbeck, 2015). Securing the state's self interest is the primary prerequisite for its survival and existence, therefore, although as a terror organization, ISIS is categorized as a non-state actor, it has certainly demonstrated the conventional state actor's realist behavior (Coaty, 2018).

According to Forbes, ISIS top the list of ten richest terror organizations in the world during its peak in 2014 - ISIS had exploited the territory and the millions of people subjugated by the terror organization's rapid conquest - its sources of wealth were from the land's natural resources (oil, gas and precious deposits), agricultural & factory produce and proceeds from directly taxing the people under its rule (Zehorai, 2018). In essence, ISIS has the obvious realist intention to secure financial gains much needed to sustain its operations and in fact, its very existence, from the very beginning. Its leader's proclamation of statehood certainly points to its aspiration for recognition as a *bona fide* state actor (Ezrow, 2017). Thus, a simplistic conclusion based on this assessment, points to the indication that ISIS behaviour conforms to the conventional realist nation-state. Realism remains the dominant theory to explain or provide justifiable insights into real world international relations (Mearsheimer, 2002). In essence, explanations to justify the behaviour of states in the international system is primarily based on the theory of realism which assumes the following core tenets;

a) The world is brutal and anarchic

b) States are the important actors

c) States are rational actors

d) The primary aim of the states is to ensure their survival

By analyzing the significance of these core tenets to the nation state's behaviour, the theory of realism can be applied to understand and assess the source of contention and thus formulate explanations for analysis purposes. Within this context, it is obvious that ISIS realist strategy is a necessity for sustaining its relevance in the international system. Furthermore, ISIS extreme ideologyis clearly exploiting religious sentiments and distort its teachings in order to bring the fear of God to its followers to do its bidding; its followers are influenced through distorted views of religious obligations to act in extreme - inherently emphasizing the realist worldview which assumes the anarchic nature of the international system (Westphal, 2018). In such way, the rest of the world is deemed to not have conformed to its worldview and thus must be eliminated by any means because they are assumed brutal which requires brutal means of subjugation - this conclusion reflects the conformance of ISIS ideology with the first and second tenets of realism. Moreover, its subjugating actions are backed up with the means of implementation - ideology, cause, central governance, manpower, strategies, assets and firepower - another aspect of compliance to the tenets of realism; the third (Stakelbeck, 2015).

In addition, the rise of ISIS clearly coincides with the absence of central authority, to which a threatened state has no means of resistance. Mearsheimer concludes that terrorism is a phenomenon that will inherently presents itself in the context of the international system, hence will impact the state arena since the realist logic concerning state response will have a noticeable impact formulating strategy to counter the act or influence of terrorism. In this way, the theory of realism concludes that terrorism are inextricably linked (Mearsheimer, 2002).

THREAT TO MALAYSIA

Malaysia is recognized as a model Islamic country, nevertheless analyst have raised concerns about conservative Islamist groups gaining significant influence over Malaysia's overall governance, particularly since the aftermath of 9/11 had given rise to unprecedented level of anti-Muslim sentiments which in effect fueled the spread of extremism (Kurlantzick ; Ingram, 2018). However, it is clear that numerous efforts initiated by the Government demonstrates its political will to eradicate Islamist extremism (Government of Malaysia, 2014). As a Muslim majority nation, Malaysia is not new to addressing the sensitivity of the relevant issues of contention - the form of Islamist extremism propagated by ISIS has nevertheless, became a most significant influencing factor acknowledged to be disruptive to current national security concern (Rohan et al, 2016; Andre et al, 2017).

Without doubt, Malaysia as a developing nation essentially advocates the formulation of strategic policies that are primarily based on the realist notion of protecting its own interest - self preservation is priority. All Government agencies are mindful and have experienced the disruptive implications of extremist groups. Nevertheless, the latest threat, manifested as an implication derived from the spread of ISIS extremist ideology, has served as new experience gained - used as the basis for upgrading the nation's existing readiness in the perpetual combat against the continuous emergence of new threats to national security. The Prevention of Terrorism Act enforced in April 2015 is part of the Government's initiative to deter the relevant threat. Nevertheless, Arosoaie highlighted the intrinsic nature of the threat complemented by the ISIS ties, in essence amplifying the prominence of the threat in Malaysia (Arosoaie, 2016). Existing domestically grown extremist groups have taken the opportunity to affiliate with ISIS in order to legitimize their own agenda. Islamic militants in neighbouring countries followed suit. In addition, Malaysian sympathizers and followers strongly believing in the IS cause or the cause of its affiliated local extremist groups are also brazenly involved as FTF. Note that even as ISIS is collapsing at its home base in Iraq, the threat to national security is still relevant in Malaysia (Specia, 2019). The indoctrination of Malaysia's youths is of particular concern, as highlighted in a report initiated by Ministry of Higher Education in 2017.

HOME GROWN ISLAMIST EXTREMISM

The Soviet-Afghan War was a popular Islamist militant venture since the early 1980s - mujahideens, who later went on to form al-Qaeda, were ready to welcome international participation in order to legitimize their struggle against the Russians (Heghammer, 2010). In retrospect Malaysian authorities were intensively focused on fighting communist insurgents at the time, while many radical Malaysians have joined and fought in battles alongside jihadist militants overseas. A White Paper to address the threat of ISIS tabled in Parliament at the end of 2014, indicated the Government's acknowledgement that Malaysians participating in foreign conflict zones are of direct concern to national security, hence must be critically addressed through specific legal confines - delayed reaction of the Government can only imply failure to recognize the fact that foreign conflict zones are training grounds for extremists where skills and experience gained can be brought home to train or radicalized other militants that can become threats to national security (Government of Malaysia, 2014). As such it can the emergence and successes of ISIS in its earliest exploits had fueled the revival of jihadist activities in the Southeast Asian region. Veteran militants immediately saw the opportunity to offer their services again in the name of religious righteousness under the ISIS banner. As such, it would be logical to argue that the emergence of ISIS had only rejuvenated Islamist extremism and its related activities in Malaysia.

On face value, it may seem that countermeasures applied for the Emergency may not be as effective with the current brand of religious-centric extremism. The detention of KMM members in 2001 clearly shows that the Government had taken the initiative to acknowledge the dangers posed by this group. However, was the focus of detention due to KMM's association with the opposition party and merely a political ploy as claimed by the opposition at the time? Elements of crime were obvious since the group did carry out terrorist activities in close collaboration with JI and al-Qaeda in Selangor. KMM has since been declared a defunct organization but yet many of Malaysian militants arrested for association with IS plots in Malaysia or overseas are former KMM members who were imprisoned under the ISA in 2001. It has also been reported that most who joined the ISIS or other militant groups in Iraq and Syria are also former KMM members (Arosoaie, 2019).

Therefore, it is only logical to imply that the formal KMM organization has ceased to exist but has in essence continued with its extremist struggle – common in form to ISIS ideals. For the moment at least, Islamist extremist groups need not have an organizational entity to rely on for their struggle since religious-centric organizations (legitimate or otherwise) that are sympathetic to their cause and welcome their affiliation, are aplenty. Virtual affiliations (as isolated terrorist cells) are also a common feature of terrorist organizations nowadays, hence physical existence of organization and physical presence of its members are not issues of contention (Harris-Hogan, 2013). It can be rightfully argued that ISIS has become a convenient "bandwagon to jump onto" before a "home based organization" such as KMM can be firmly established again. The realist paradigm of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" may accurately explain the mindset of Malaysian Islamist extremists (Maoz et al, 2007).

The seed of Islamist extremism was sown in Malaysian soil even before the end of the Emergency era or 9/11. Malaysian legislations and enforcement strategies for counter measures against the propagation of extremism was put in place even before the formation of Malaysia, since 1948 to be exact. Beginning from the 1990s, Malaysia had enjoyed tremendous socioeconomic progress; with the CPM threat totally eliminated, the Government could focus on tackling socioeconomic issues. With the collapse of the Soviet Union earlier in the decade, the Cold War concluded, and for a time, the international and regional geopolitical discourse had focused on the new world order. Islamist extremism had not gained notoriety – al-Qaeda was an ally of the West during the Cold War (Soviet-Afghan War). Thus, it is implied that Malaysians joining the conflict with mujaheedins at the time were not considered threats to national security since no laws were broken in Malaysia. That was true, until it was realized that returning (indoctrinated) veterans brought home extremist ideology and thought it was a good idea to establish the same ideals in Malaysia. Former KMM members have thus

resumed their struggle through affiliation with ISIS and the extent of threat to national security is undeniably critical. From reviewing the historical perspective relating to the propagation of extremist ideologies in Malaysia since the Emergency era, it can be concluded that Islamist extremism is intrinsic to the sociopolitical structure of the nation – the formation of KMM was the manifestation of successful ideological indoctrination by the predecessor of ISIS, namely al-Qaeda. Similar to how the politicization of Islam had encouraged extremism in ISIS, KMM members were exposed to the same premises.

Policy makers and security forces alike have learnt from experiences when dealing with the threats from communist insurgents in the early years of Malaysia's formation. These experiences are quickly being adapted to address loopholes brought about by rapid advancement of technology and globalization. Furthermore, religious-centric extremism is a sensitive premise – the majority of the Malaysians are Muslims, and current discourse on domestic political climate indicates unhealthy levels of politicization (of Islam). Unlike the threat experience during the Emergency era, the recent defeat of ISIS on the battlefield does not mean the demise of all its affiliated extremist groups. The transnational nature of ISIS memberships or affiliations, in addition to the *incognito* based *modus operandi* of the modern terrorists will simply result in another period of *incognito* until other encouraging opportunities re-emerged for exploitation. The Malaysian Government must be vigilant in devising relevant and updated counter measures to totally eliminate the current globalized nature of extremist threats, for the sake of preserving the sanctity of the Malaysian state entity.

COUNTERMEASURES: CRITICISM AND CONTROVERSY

Malaysia had relied on the controversial ISA 1960 to curb threats of terrorism since independence and despite strong criticism about its draconian nature, it was used effectively to address the communist insurgency, particularly. Later terrorist groups were also suppressed under this Act. The issue of contention relates to it being abused for political purposes. ISA 1960 was finally repealed but replaced with yet another controversial Act, the SOSMA. Meanwhile POTA was enacted to particularly deal with the threat from ISIS and generally for suppressing potential threats of violence through any acts relating to terrorism. Issues of contention are related to the power of "detention without trial", particularly significant for extending the power of SOSMA through POTA (Dhanapal & Johan, 2015). However, the POTA is different from ISA because the executive powers of detainment rest on an independent appointed board appointed by the Head of State. In this way, fairness is ensured to better guarantee the transparency of enforcement and therefore the safety of the nation against the purported threats.

Nevertheless, the question of whether the state is just conforming to Machiavelli's observation about the realities of conflicts, remains – are we to assume that the nation's current fight against violent extremism has elevated to a critical "conflict" environment? (Machiavelli, 1900). The conflict environment of the Emergency era necessitated the enforcement of ISA 1960, but does contemporary Malaysia have the same need? It can be argued at this point, that Bennoun's accentuates the fact that in terms of security, the aspect of protecting human rights is emphasized while from the perspective of human rights groups, respecting the rights should be the priority (Bennoun, 2008). Bennoun finally concluded by highlighting the relevance to current convention - when facing the crimes of terrorism, it is the state's responsibility to ensure human rights are protected by actions that safeguard their people from violent attacks, albeit when doing so, should not violate those rights. Hence, the contemporary reality points to the fact that states have to achieve both at the same time.

The Malaysian Government has taken heed of public pressure to repeal ISA albeit acknowledges its effectiveness in curbing the rise of militants or violent extremist groups at the same time – it indicates the relevance of Bennoun's conclusion. At the very least, the formulation of SOSMA/POTA denotes the political will of the nation to compromise and take into consideration the needs of contemporary human rights in peacetime. Notwithstanding, it has also indicated the effectiveness of ISA based legislation for thwarting the rise of extremism in Malaysia, since lawmakers are keen to

maintain the fundamental aspects of ISA, albeit with amendments and rebranding. Even the new Government, elected into power in 2018 has not addressed related concerns adequately, particularly on ensuring that safeguards must be in place to avoid abuse. This observation should not come as a surprise, since law enforcement agencies, whether civilian or military, have accumulated decades of experience in combating the menace of violent extremism through ISA and are clearly confident of its fundamental effectiveness. In fact, similar legislation in developed countries such as the Prevention of Terrorism Acts (UK), the Patriot Act (US) and the Anti-terrorism Act (Canada) are controversial for the same reason – nevertheless, for the sake of security of the state as a whole, such draconian measures are deemed necessary. The holistic legislation enacted particularly to counter spread of IS extreme ideology supports the CVE approach advocated by the Government – the Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy is derived from accumulated experience of policy makers and law enforcement agencies with international inputs especially through recommendations from the UN (*ie.* Plan of Action). It is noted that the KESBAN strategy put in place since the Emergency conveniently conforms to the needs of eliminating core drivers of violent extremism, aside from being Malaysia's key strategy for an integrated socioeconomic program aimed at safeguarding all aspects of the national security construct.

For Malaysia the threat of violent extremism is not new – such brand of threat to national security came into existence before the end of the Emergency era; from both home-grown and foreign groups. The proof of effectiveness is in the relatively peaceful existence of Malaysia's population and progressing rate of socioeconomic development to-date. Although the fundamentals of relevant anti-terrorist legislation are still considered similar to the contentious ISA, its effectiveness specifically on suppressing violent extremism cannot be denied. The adverse effects of ISIS extreme ideology has required harsh judicious implementation to safeguard the safety of the nation's citizens and survival of state is paramount in the Government's mind. POTA and SOSMA were enforced in 2015, at the peak of ISIS activities. Although it was reported that active ISIS cells in Malaysia were mainly made up of de-radicalized former KMM members, it does not necessary mean the inadequacy of the new anti-terrorist legislation or failure of the current CVE approach – but rather points to the fact that the Government has understood the relevant shortcomings at the time and had acknowledged the critical urgency of revamping existing judicial instruments and CVE programs. The effectiveness of the counter measures put in place can be considered to have been upgraded with contemporary considerations and inputs. It may take some time to observe reliable and quantifiable statistical data denoting its success or failure, but the Government's commitment towards continuously improving on the holistic approach to counter extremist threat such as ISIS, is definite, as observed since independence.

CONCLUSION

The threat of Islamist extreme ideology in the Southeast Asian region is not new. The threat propagated by ISIS or in fact from any other Islamist based extremist groups is not primarily confined to Malaysia, but the significance is amplified by the fact that the majority of its population are Muslims. In addition, the globalized world of the current century has effectively compounded the security challenges faced by state actors. The exploitation of any religious beliefs as focal points in conflicts eliminates the traditional paradigms relating to inter-state conflict management practices. Nevertheless, it is not a new concept. Even though the holy wars of past centuries were projected as religious-centred conflicts, they are most often motivated by elements of ethnic animosities, and man-made boundaries still do physically restrict the battlegrounds of the corresponding conflicts. The ISIS brand of ideology, driven by a modern and globalized world, had motivated the borderless battleground worldview – its violent extremist ideology has virtually become the purported battleground perimeters, in effect complicating traditional notions pertaining to rules of engagements while significantly adding to the predicaments of international relations; militants involved could be of any nationality or ethnicity.

Islamic extremism had existed on Malaysian soil since the Emergency era but due to the focus on the immediate CPM threat, Malaysian legislation and enforcement strategies for CVE are already in place by then, albeit focused on extremist communist ideology. The experience gained by the Government and enforcement agencies for dealing with violent extremists are significant for formulating contemporary CVE approaches. In addition, based on the review of current threat of Islamist extremism in Malaysia, it is clear that the associated ideology is intrinsic to the sociopolitical structure of the nation – the formation of KMM in the 1990s, was the manifestation of ISIS brand of ideological indoctrination, where former members were reported to have become key FTF and local ISIS affiliated terrorist cells. The extent of threat to national security is undeniably critical and had rooted itself in the domestic sociopolitical construct even since before the end of the Emergency era. The politicization of Islam in Malaysia is also a factor deemed to have possibly encouraged the spread of ISIS ideology.

With reference to the effectiveness of current approaches to counter the spread of ISIS extreme ideology in Malaysia – the reality, the proof of effectiveness is in the relative peace and prosperity enjoyed by Malaysians to-date. It is concluded that the effectiveness of past and current counter measures of CVE on suppressing violent extremism is commendable and that the derogatory implications of ISIS extreme ideology had required harsh judicious tool to guarantee the state's safety and survival, albeit the fundamentals of relevant anti-terrorist legislation are still considered similar to the contentious ISA. It is also accentuated that the CVE strategy implemented by Malaysia is derived from decades of accumulated experience, in addition to contemporary recommendations by the UN. The KESBAN strategy, a strategy put in place since the Emergency to eliminate core drivers of violent extremism and concurrently for driving the nation's socioeconomic progress is also a contributory factor towards Malaysia's effective CVE approach.

The discourse presented in this paper also points out the Malaysian Government's commitment towards continuously improving on the holistic approach to counter extremist threats in general. Law makers and security forces have gained important experiences from the Emergency era but the need for quick adaptation to contemporary requirements is accentuated since religious-centric extremism is a sensitive premise in Malaysia - the Communist Party of Malaya's (CPM) defeat in Malaysia was total but the recent defeat of ISIS in the Middleast does not mean the total end of all its affiliated groups based all over the world; the transnational dimension is present, in addition to the well known *modus operandi* of terrorist groups such as ISIS to become *incognito* until another opportunity exist for them to re-emerge.

In conclusion, the threat of IS extreme ideology in Malaysia is disconcerting. Although not at critically damaging levels such as experienced during the early years of the Emergency, the threat is analyzed to be progressively becoming more intense, in particular when motivation by actions or successes of foreign based extremists pursuing similar agendas. This factor seems to have greatly influenced Malaysian Islamic extremists hence may be designated as one of the core drivers of ISIS ideology propagation in Malaysia. Nevertheless, the continuous progress of Malaysia's socioeconomic environment attributed to the successes of the KESBAN strategy put in place originally to counter the CPM threat have positively minimized the spread of ISIS ideology too. Generally, core drivers of extremism are observed to be extremely minimal in Malaysia and as mentioned earlier, Islamic extremist ideology such as propagated by ISIS was mainly brought home from foreign sources. Therefore, the Government had rightfully continued to apply this concept of nation building until now. The peace and prosperity enjoyed by Malaysians further accentuate on KESBAN's significance and importance. Although the threat of ISIS extreme ideology still exists, the effectiveness of Malaysia's anti-terrorist legislation and CVE strategy has obviously denied the growth of ISIS based home-grown extremist groups. In addition, the following consensuses are made apparent in this study:

1. The realist nature of IS extreme ideology is clear. The fact that it can be explained through a realist perspective points to the possibility of finding sustainable real world solutions to address the associated threats.

2. Malaysian CVE approach advocates the combined dimensions of harsh judicious tool followed through with humanitarian based rehabilitation processes, wholly supported by an integrated socioeconomic development strategy (KESBAN). Hence, conforming to the fact that the state's aim is to guarantee its own safety and survival, although at the cost of compromising the individual citizen his/her human rights.

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ADDRESSING THE HUMAN RIGHTS CRISIS AFFECTING THE ROHINGYA PEOPLE OF MYANMAR

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ABSTRACT

The situation of the Rohingya people of Myanmar is not something new, though the recent attack by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) on Myanmar's security personnel last year has reignited the world's attention, particularly the UN. The problem and persecution of the Rohingya ethnic minority has been going on for decades. Many have fled their homes seeking refuge in other countries for fear of their lives, requirement for basic needs and in search for a better future for their children. They are and have been subjected to violations of Human Rights and do not enjoy the liberty of freedom to move and live, denied many rights such as jobs, security, healthcare, education and other basic amenities. They also fear for their lives as they are continuously subject to harassment and persecution by security authorities in Myanmar. The Citizenship Law 1982 enacted by the Myanmar's government that is considered as one of the root causes of Rohingya human rights violation that has unfolded into an international crisis. Although Myanmar government claimed that it is an internal problem and have taken enough measures to address the problem, however it seems to insufficient. Regional and the international organisations should work hand in hand in resolving this crisis for long term benefits of Myanmar- creating a conducive environment for her diverse communities with different religion and cultures and helping her in transition to a fully democratic nation.

Keywords: *United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), Citizenship Law 1982, ethnic minority, human rights*

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of the Union of Myanmar (Myanmar) or formerly known as Burma, is a nation located in Southeast Asia. Myanmar is home to approximately 54 million people comprising mostly of Theravada Buddhists whom make up nearly 88% of the population (The World Factbook, n.d.). This is followed by the Christians at 6.2% and Muslims at about 4.3%. Myanmar is an ethnically diverse nation comprising of 135 ethnic groups consisting mainly of distinct Tibeto-Burman peoples followed by Tai–Kadai, Hmong–Mien, and Austro-Asiatic (Mon–Khmer) people.

Myanmar achieved independence in 1948 from the British as a democratic nation. Nonetheless, in an unprecedented move, the military stage a coup d'état in 1962 and ruled this nation for 49 years in a military styled dictatorship. The military junta introduced an act called the Citizenship Act in 1982 that only recognises descendants of people born in Myanmar before 1824 as lawful citizens (Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, 2014), resulting in certain ethnic groups being denied the right to citizenship, despite having been born in the country. Although the Citizenship Act 1982 allows for those born in Myanmar prior to 1948 to obtain Naturalised Citizenships, nonetheless proof in the form of documents and so forth must be submitted to validate claims 9 (Burmese RohingyaO rganisation UK, 2014, pp.3), and this is the foremost problem facing the Rohingya ethnic minority.

In 2010, the military backed government began a series of political, economic and administrative reforms towards a democracy state. This included the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission and release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. Aung San Suu Kyi's party the National

League for Democracy won the 2012 by-elections and hence marking a new chapter in Myanmar's history (Jones, 2013, pp.1).

In the 2015 general elections; the first openly contested elections held in Myanmar since 1990, witnessed the National League for Democracy winning in a landslide victory. Aung San Suu Kyi was elected as State Counsellor a post similar to Prime Minister as the constitution bars her from being the President. The positive reforms and outcomes have been a slow and uphill task for Myanmar in becoming a totally democratic nation (Ribeiro & Vieira, 2016, pp. 51).

Despite the reforms, Myanmar is still plagued by multiple human rights violation issues against ethnic minorities, women and children. The United Nations have also been extremely critical and vocal on this matter based on reports of extensive human rights violations in Myanmar (UNCHR, 2016). Human rights violations on ethnic minorities are mostly notable against the Rohingya people of the Rakhine State in Myanmar (UNCHR, 2016, pp.7). These people have consistently faced various human rights abuses and violations because of previous regime's stance on them not being recognized as citizens of Myanmar (UNCHR, 2016, pp.8). This has led to multiple genocides and caused hundreds displaced (UNCHR, 2016, pp.3).

In 2016, the Myanmar government began a major operation to crackdown Rohingya people in response to attacks on its border posts by unidentified insurgents (The Guardian, 2016). This has caused for the international community to criticise Myanmar's government for wide scale violations on the Rohingya people including mass murders, gang rapes, arson and infanticides which has been dismissed as mere baseless allegations by the government (UNCHR, 2016). Aung San Suu Kyi as the de facto head of government has also come under fire from various international groups for her inaction and silence in handling the Rohingya people human rights violation allegations (BBC News, 2018).

ROHINGYA ETHNIC MINORITY

Over the years, many controversies surround the plight and origins of the Rohingya Ethnic Minority of Myanmar. Conflicting stories and accounts of their origins has been the centre of that controversy. The Myanmar government is adamant that the Rohingya are actually from the state of Bengal, India, considering them as Bengali Muslims (Warzone Initiatives, 2015).

This has caused for the term Rohingya not being officially recognised by the Myanmar government thus creating discontent and much disagreement between the two sides. According to Sohel (2017), Rohingya people are known as a community made up of minority Muslims that live North of Myanmar in the state of Rakhine (Sohel, 2017, pp. 1).Ullah (2016) pointed out that the Rohingya word is a historical term used to describe the Arakanese Muslims (Ullah, 2017). Furthermore, there is still a village occupied by majority Muslims in Sittwe, the capital of Rakhine state that is named as the Rohingya Para (Charney, 2005). Jilani (1999) explains that the term Rohingya is actually derived from the word Rohan, an older name for the prehistoric Arakan Kingdom (Jilani, 1999).

It is claimed that the Rohingya people migrated to Myanmar's Rakhine state from Bengal somewhere between the year 1824 and 1948 during the British colonial period (Warzone Initiatives, 2015). However, most experts outside of Myanmar agree that the Rohingya have been living in Rakhine state since at least the 15th century, and possibly as early as the 7th century (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.1). Claims that the Rohingya are just recent immigrants from Bangladesh are argued by many to be simply not true (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.1).

Myanmar currently houses approximately 800,000 to 1,100,000 Rohingya Ethnic Minorities, totalling 2 percent of Myanmar's population of 51,000,000 people (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.1). According to the Rohingya Briefing Report (2015), 80 percent of the Rohingya Ethnic Minority currently resides in the state of Rakhine, north of Myanmar comprising of two main towns namely Maung Daw and Bu ThiDaung bordering Bangladesh (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.1). Although most of the Rohingya Ethnic Minority people are from the Rakhine state, the majority population in Rakhine state consists of Rakhine Buddhists. Differences in religion and culture have led to tension and violence between the two ethnicities.

Based on the information found in the Warzone Initiative (2015), there is currently 1.1 million Rohingya people in Myanmar who make up one third of the populace at the Rakhine State which is approximately 2 percent of the entire population of Myanmar (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.1). Most of them live in Maung Daw and Bu ThiDaung townships and currently have a significant number at various nations including Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Malaysia (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.1). According to the same source, the Myanmar government claims that they are illegal immigrants from Bangladesh thus rejecting them as part of the nation's ethnic groups (Warzone Initiatives, 2015). It can be summarised that the Rohingya Ethnic Minority people are descendants of Bengal and in some point back in history migrated across the borders into Myanmar contrary to the claims by the Myanmar government that they were new migrants from Bangladesh. Under the Citizenship Law 1982, the Rohingya Ethnic Minority has not been recognised and listed as one of the nation's official ethnic society.(Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.1)

The Rohingya Briefing Report acknowledges that the government is largely to be blamed for the oppression of the Rohingya people, but also not placing much blame on the citizens of Myanmar who have enormous dislike and hatred against the Rohingya Ethnic Minority (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.1). The Myanmar government under the administration of President Thein Sein actually used this sentiment to garner support from the majority population, using the anti-Muslim rhetoric to fuel support from the Buddhists in Myanmar. This move has only deteriorated the situation and amplified the human rights discrimination against the Ethnic Minority Rohingya in Myanmar over the years.

THE HISTORICAL FACTS OF MYANMAR

In order to understand the crisis affecting the Rohingya people, it is important to get a look at the history of Myanmar. Looking back into Myanmar's history, the country, like many other countries in South East Asia such as Malaysia and Singapore, was colonised by the British back in 1885, or 133 years ago. British rule brought about many significant cultural changes to the people of that nation. Social, economy and administrative changes also were introduced that completely brought about transformation to the nation (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.2). In 1941, during World War 2, Bangkok was occupied by the Japanese invading army. The Burmese people under Aung San formed the Burma Independence Army or BIA to fight the Japanese invasion. This paved a path to many Burmese to believe that military action was the best solution in desperate times (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.2). After World War 2, the country pushed for and achieved independence from the British in 1948. The colonialism and World War 2 era brought about many changes to the Burmese people and had a significant after effect to the nation's discourse over the years till today (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.2). This is because, since achieving independence, Myanmar has been in political turmoil and encountered countless civil wars (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.2). The underlying factors contributing or reason behind this is because during the British rule of Myanmar, they emphasised on the differences in the ethnic groups in Myanmar causing displeasure and conflict especially amongst those feeling oppressed and unequal (Oxford Burma Alliance, n.d.) .

Ethnic Composition in Myanmar (Rough Estimate)

Bamar		68%
Shan		9%
Kayin		7%
Rakhine		3.5%
Chinese		2.5%
Mon		2%
Kachin		1.5%
Indians		1.25%
Kayah		0.75%
Other groups including		
Wa, Naga, Lahu, Lisu and		4.5%
Palaung		

Chart 1: Ethnic Composition in Myanmar (Oxford Burma Alliance, n.d.)

The military coup later in 1962 placed Myanmar under military control, where most members of the military forces were made up of the Bamar ethnicity (Oxford Burma Alliance, n.d.). Since the coup, the military has had significant influence on almost any matter or decision made by the Myanmar government including matters regarding governance and formulation and passing of laws (Oxford Burma Alliance, n.d.). The country was under military rule for a staggering 48 years from 1962 till 2010. This has hindered development and progress in the nation throughout the years and has been one of the slowest developing nations in the world (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.4). Although, more recently the military's influence has been mitigated extensively as Myanmar progresses towards being a democratic nation, nonetheless, the military still does exert some influence on the Rohingya crisis in the Rakhine state of Myanmar. The military is also very influential in the development of Myanmar's economy of Myanmar (Stokke, Vakulchuk, & Overland, 2018). According to Kristian et all, the informal economy of Myanmar, considered to be one of the top informal economies of the world, is controlled extensively by members of the military elite and their cronies and has made the military extremely powerful and influential in the political economy of the country till today (Stokke, Vakulchuk, & Overland, 2018).

MYANMAR'S 1982 CITIZENSHIP ACT

The United Nations has a number of reports focusing on the 1982 citizenship act. One such report in 2014 explains this act in detail which says that is based on races that has settled in the state before 1824 which was drafted and constituted during the colonial period (Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, 2014). This report highlights the problems faced due to this draconian law such as non-compliance with international obligations, main cause of statelessness in Myanmar, discriminatory in nature with particular reference to the Rohingya community and how this law is perceived to result in ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya people. Nonetheless this report also provides a number of solutions to overcoming these problems including revision of the law and removal of race criterion in the law entirely.

José-María (2017) in her study reiterates the need for the Myanmar government to revise this act or law to address the citizenship crisis facing the nation. She points out that "*addressing Myanmar´s decades-old statelessness question will require significant changes in the way its law and policy makers – as well as their fellow citizens– understand its root causes*" (Arraiza, 2017). She also stresses that this law is the main cause for statelessness affecting millions of people in Myanmar with particular reference to

the Rohingya people. Other literatures highlight that the 1982 Citizenship Law of Myanmar include (Lall et al., 2015). Lall et al in their research point out that the 1982 law was a revision made by General Ne Win on the 1948 Citizenship Act (Lall et al., n.d.).

According to their research, General Ne Win crafted the law as such to protect Burma from foreign suppression hence for the race-based nature of the law. Another important point to note is that Lall et al extensively covers the 1982 Citizenship Law, explaining each law comprehensively including types of citizenships provided by this law. Most of these literatures agree that the Rohingya people although as history points out have resided in Myanmar for many generations, are not considered as citizens of the state due to the fact that they were not one of the races that are included in the citizenship law of Myanmar.

According to the UN report in 2014, this law serves as discrimination towards the Rohingya people and thus is downright a violation of Human Rights and does not comply with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Mcauliffe points out that the international community condemns this law as an outright form of racial discrimination and which has caused thousands to be stateless and without a country of their own (McAuliffe, 2016). Furthermore, based on the rights of a child, Myanmar is obliged to provide children born in the state with citizenship regardless of race or religion. Mcauliffe in her research states that the international community is pressuring Myanmar to review the citizenship law to consider all these flaws and shortcomings for a more resolute solution or end to the Rohingya crisis plaguing the nation (McAuliffe, 2016). Nevertheless, the Myanmar Government stands firm on grounds that the law, regardless of how outdated and irrelevant it may seem, does not contain any measure or solution to ensure stateless children born in Myanmar are provided with citizenship of the nation and that demands from the international community are seen as attempts to violate the state's sovereignty.

According to research on the conflict in Myanmar, laments on the refusal of the previous President of Myanmar, Thein Sein to review of revise the citizenship law in place which caused an outcry amongst international Human Right groups (Durand, 2013). Many have questioned the international community and its failure to exert more pressure on the Myanmar government to review and revise the act in accordance with human rights laws. Myanmar's current leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, in an interview with BBC, nonetheless has clearly stated that one of the very first actions of her government was to conduct the Citizenship Verification Process to grant citizenships to those born in Myanmar. The details and outcome of this effort is still somewhat vague and not made clear.

EFFECTS OF COLONIALISM ON THE ROHINGYA CITIZENSHIP ISSUE

The colonialism effect left by the British is a major contributing factor to the Rohingya crisis. According to research, once Myanmar once colonised by the British, they were unable to recover from the after effects of colonisation (Firang, 2011, pp.5). Development and progress socially and economically were at a snail's pace. The feeling of being exploited, degraded and dehumanised brought the Burmese people to an all-time low in morale and self-confidence (Firang, 2011, pp.5). The Rohingya Briefing Report also concur with this view as considers the legacy of being colonised by the British having a profound after effect on the nation's progress and is largely to be blamed as root of cause for the country's predicament (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.4-5).

Due to British colonisation of Myanmar in the early twentieth century, the citizens of Myanmar are gripped with a false sense of losing power and influence over the future of the country. This fear is intensely embedded in each of its citizen's mind and thought. This has led to the formulations of certain policies and enactment of strict laws that would guarantee and avoid interference from foreign powers to avoid yet another colonialism era (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.5). Simply said, the Burmese want full control over government related matters, economy, managing and handling of the nation's natural

resources and administrative control that were beyond their control during the British rule of Myanmar (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.5). Furthermore, when the British were in power in Myanmar, they enabled and encouraged the immigration of foreigners from India and South Asia into Myanmar as workers (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.5). This resulted in the foreigners having more control on the internal governance of the nation, being more influential and had more authority when compared to the locals.

This has created a rather apprehensive condition towards foreign intervention in Myanmar these days (Firang, 2011, pp.5). British colonialism has inflicted upon much damage to Burmese sense of belonging and this has inadvertently led to the rise in nationalism and patriotism (Firang, 2011, pp.5). Myanmar seeks to avoid being colonised yet again, knowingly or unknowingly, and this has led to them taking preventive measures by reviewing or making new policies and enacting new laws to guarantee their rights as citizens (Firang, 2011, pp.5). The government has also capitalised on this fear of colonialism in achieving its goals by directing that fear towards Islamist extremism, something which has been claimed to be closely related to the Rohingya Ethnic Minority (Firang, 2011, pp.5). Hence, after independence, the centralised control over the governance and economy of Myanmar was introduced in attempt to avoid being colonised yet again by a foreign power (Firang, 2011, pp.5).

Among the policies introduced include anti-immigration laws to apprehend the growing resentment and sentiments against foreign immigration into Myanmar. As stated earlier, these laws more recently through the Citizenship Act of 1982 openly discriminate against the Rohingya Ethnic Minority as the Myanmar government refuses to acknowledge the existence of this community prior to independence and beliefs that they are new immigrants from Bangladesh (Lall et al., n.d., pp. 5).

The Rohingya Briefing Report also reported that the colonialism of Myanmar resulted in the conflict and division between the ethnic groups in Myanmar (Firang, 2011, pp.5). For example, the British formed military units of the Burma Army based on ethnicity where during World War 2, certain units even fought one another when the Burmans were in favour of the Japanese forces whilst the other ethnic groups were fighting for the British (Firang,2011, pp.5). This and more situation similar to this, created a huge disparity and gap between the ethnic groups since after independence.

EFFECTS OF RELIGION ON THE ROHINGYA CRISIS

Besides being diversely divided into different ethnic groups, Myanmar's populace is also divided by the differing religions that they practice. In a 2014 census made and reported by Newsinfield (2017), Myanmar's majority populace is predominantly Buddhists, accounting for 87.9% of the entire population (religion-in-myanmar - Newsinfield, 2017). Non-Buddhists include the likes of Christians, Muslims and Hindus. A source in the Rohingya Briefing Report estimates almost all Burmans profess Buddhism while other ethnic minority groups account for the remaining religions. The Ethnic Minority Rohingya, are mostly Muslims by birth and origin. The Buddhist society has vast amounts of control over the governance of Myanmar and the people of Myanmar as a whole (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.6).

This considerable power and influence possessed by the Monks has a profound effect on the Rohingya crisis. During the colonisation period, the British took power away from the Buddhist Kings and undermined many Buddhists institutions. Besides that, the economy was controlled by the Indians from India, at the time mostly Muslims (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.5). Furthermore, British rule saw an end towards the Buddhists controlling the economy and they were disadvantaged socially when compared to other races of different religion (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.5). This only built and created huge resentment against the Muslim community of Myanmar.

After the colonisation period, the Buddhists slowly gained power again. The government controlled by Burmans who were mostly Buddhists, used this opportunity to empower themselves and discriminate against other, notably the Rohingyaminority Muslims in Rakhine (Sohel, 2017, pp. 4). Although Buddhism is considered to be one of the many religions that advocate peace and harmony, in Myanmar, certain Buddhists groups led by Buddhist monks are allegedly responsible for violence and attacks on the Rohingya minority Muslims community (Sohel, 2017, pp. 4). On top of that, the government of Myanmar has used this resentment that the Buddhist community has over the Non-Buddhist community by reinforcing its stronghold and authority over the people of Myanmar by legalising discriminative laws against the minority ethnic groups of differing religious backgrounds (Sohel, 2017, pp. 4).


**Chart 2: Religions in Myanmar (religion-in-myanmar - Newsinfield, 2017)**

Figure 1: Dispersion of Religions by State and Region in Myanmar (reddit,n.d.)

ETHNIC GROUPS AND ITS CAUSE EFFECT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE ROHINGYA CASE

Differences in ethnicity are a major contributor to the current situation in the Rakhine state. As previously mentioned, Myanmar is home to about 135 ethnic groups that are recognised and legitimised as citizens of the nation, except for the Rohingya Ethnic group. These ethnic groups are widely distributed across the nation as depicted in Figure 1 below (Al Jazeera, 2017). Conflicts and fights between ethnic groups are also distributed at certain areas where these ethnic groups collide, most notably between the Rakhine Buddhist and the Rohingya Muslims in western Myanmar. The conflict that has resulted to major civil war that has torn the nation apart has been going on for too long from the British colonial times.

The ethnic groups believe that they must protect the traditions, culture, territory, resources and basic rights of their respective groups from the Myanmar government largely controlled by the majority Burmese ethnic group (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.6).

Figure 2: Distribution of major ethnic groups in Myanmar (Al Jazeera, 2017).

This is due to the lack of trust and bad relationship that the ethnic groups have between them. This has created a condition vulnerable to acts that can create disputes, fights and unwanted incidents. The government fears that these groups would create a socio-political turmoil and destabilise the political scenario of the country leading to a disjointed and broken nation (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.6). Fuelled by this scepticism, international intervention is viewed with scepticism and distrust as is the case of the Rohingya Ethnic minority. However, post-independence, when Myanmar was under military control and governance, the ethnic minorities was ruled with force as in an authoritarian way (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.6). This made the ethnic groups to view the government controlled by the military as an invading force rather than a legitimate government which resulted in some such as a number of the Rohingya people to retaliate with violence (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.6).

The Panglong agreement signed between the government and certain ethnic groups in 1947 with the ultimate aim to provide internal administrative power to the ethnic groups in certain areas were never fully realised and only increased the level of distrust among the groups. Since certain groups were denied basic rights such as education, health care, and basic amenities to name a few, they then took up arms to rebel against the government in 1958 (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.6). When in 1960, the Myanmar government officially claimed Buddhism as the state's official religion, tension increased and fear of losing the right to practice their own religion only bridged the gap between the ethnic groups further and fuelled further rebellions (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.6).

Many efforts focusing on reconciliation between ethnic groups have been attempted but in vain over the many years of Myanmar's history. A renewed ethnic dispute that led to violence in 2013 and 2014 clearly indicate the differences between the ethnic groups and the vulnerability of the situation that is impacting on Myanmar becoming a democratic nation. Some authors however, believe that the current ethnic conflicts or situation in Myanmar only increases the military's control over certain areas predominantly occupied by the ethnic minority groups.

This is the case of the Rohingya in the Rakhine state where although no longer controlled by the military, the government has little influence to control the conflict there as it is still largely influenced and controlled by the military due to the deteriorating situation there. In 2016, for example, unidentified insurgents from the Rohingya ethnic group were allegedly responsible for attacks on the border posts of the government, resulting in a major operation to crackdown on terrorism in the state by the government, mobilising its military in the process (The Guardian, 2016). The military claims that without the use of force by them, this would inadvertently lead to further violence and unrest between the Rohingya Muslims and the majority Rakhine Buddhists (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.6). In view of this stance, the case of the Rohingya ethnic minority Muslims seem far from a resolution as of yet.

CURRENT SITUATION OF THE ROHINGYA ETHNIC MINORITY

According to several authors such as Ullah (2014) and a report by Equal Rights (2014), the Rohingya Muslims are amongst the most discriminated against people in the world. The discrimination against the Rohingya people are fuelled by hatred and dislike built over many years of conflict and disdain from the colonialism era.

The Myanmar government is alleged to have manipulated the flow of information and history of the Rohingya community to fuel its agenda and political survival, as evident during President Thein Sein's use of the large Barmas population's resentment or anti Islam sentiment to garner votes and gain public support (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.7). This allegation is further supported by the government's act in introducing the 1974 Emergency Immigration Act that requires lawful citizens to be in possession of a national identification card, namely the National Registration Certificate where the Rohingya people were ineligible as their status as citizen were not recognised by the government. They were however allowed for the possession of Foreign Registration Cards that provided certain rights but were strictly for non-citizens or foreigners (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.7). This inevitably confirmed their status as non-citizens by the government but as simply outsiders that were residing in Myanmar (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.7).Even that not all were eligible.

To worsen the situation, the emergence of the 1982 Citizenship Law only further amplified the non-citizenship status of the Rohingya people leaving them with no place to go and no access to basic amenities such as health care and social well-being (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.7). Before the introduction of the 1982 Citizenship Act, the Rohingya people enjoyed some sort of eligibility as residents of Myanmar with limited rights. Nonetheless, the discriminative law of 1982, once introduced diminished all rights that theRohingya Muslims ever had (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.7). Those

Rohingya people who had citizenship status found it to be revoked as the Rohingya race was clearly not recognised by the Myanmar government as eligible citizens. This law split the citizenship status of thepopulace into three different tiers, none of which were prerequisites that enabled for the Rohingya Muslims to obtain any form of citizenship(Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK, 2014). As previously mentioned the government of Myanmar refused to budge from their decision as they believed strongly that the Rohingya people are newly illegal migrants from Bangladesh who are therefore not eligible to be included in the already registered 135 ethnic groups residing in Myanmar (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.7).

This two acts or laws have resulted in hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Rohingya people, some seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. The situation has created an international outcry, many demanding the Myanmar government to resolve the situation and protect the rights of the ethnic minority groups in the country. According to the UN Report on this Human Rights violation of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar, close to 120,000 predominantly Rohingya Muslims are displaced internally in the Rakhine state as of the time of this report (UNHCR, 2016, pp.12). To make matters worse, a number of the internally displaced people are also not recognised to be officially IDPs thus denying them assistance and aid that is provided to IDPs (UNHCR, 2016, pp.12). This displacement of the Rohingya Muslims has created an immense humanitarian disaster of our time, affecting living conditions of this ethnic minority group and denying them the basic access to food, shelter and other services (UNHCR, 2016, pp.12). The government's action in curbing their freedom of movement and not allowing the inflows back of refugees who initially fled the country is seen as the open discrimination of a particular race based on ethnicity and religion (UNHCR, 2016, pp.12). This however was vehemently denied by Aung Sang Suu Kyi during an interview with BBC's Fergal Keane as she strongly believes that the government is taking corrective measures to fix the refugee crisis in the Rakhine state (BBC New, 2018).

MYANMAR AS A NEW DEMOCRACY

November 2015 is a historical day for all Myanmar citizens. It was in this day that Myanmar's National League for Democracy (NLD) Party won the parliamentary elections in what was considered to be a landslide victory. The parliamentary results on that day saw the end on a more than 50 years of military rule in Myanmar and paved the way for a new and democratic state (Barany, 2017, pp.2). The party then formed the government and began to carry out reform processes, or to affect a smooth transition of power from military control or dictatorship to a democracy. The government also pledged reforms on ethnic-religious reconciliation and economic recovery and prosperity (Barany, 2017, pp.3). The international community for one had much faith in the event as all these processes and transition period was being overseen by the party's founder and leader in Aung San Suu Kyi, the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize laureate for her role in the democracy struggle (Barany, 2017, pp.3).

However, the NLD's government's promises for a more democratic government did not materialise as many had envisioned it would. Although being the main opposition party in the parliament since 1988, the NLD never quite formulated a detailed policy proposals or plan with regards to democracy, rule of law, economic and political reforms should the party come into power(Wilson, 2017). These issues or reforms were not the main concerns for the majority populace who were quite content with toppling the army's Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and the popularity of Aung San Suu Kyi (Wilson, 2017). Therefore, it came as no surprise to many when the performance of the NLD government in Myanmar was well below expectations and were unable to address major issues plaguing Myanmar such as the economic situation, ethnic and religious issues and conflicts and the effective removal of Myanmar's military influence and presence in the political arena of the country.

This situation of aftermath of the election should have been predicted as in Myanmar's uncertain and volatile political environment, transition from a military rule to a democratic nation never seemed as easy

task at all. The NLD government must be very careful and thorough in this transition process as not to lead to yet another military coup by displeasing the military generals support (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.8). Furthermore, being tied constitutionally by the 2008 military revised constitution would require for the military's approval and agreement for all reform agendas or amendments to the constitution support (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.8). Striking a balance seems to be the key point here for a chance to move forward towards reforms and better government policies support (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.8).

According to Anne Barker (2015), as the elections were such that the military will retain 25 percent of the house seats, the military would then be given veto power over any decision or effort made towards amending the constitution support (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.1). In spite of the so-called democratic elections, the constitution of Myanmar dictates that the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) as the highest authoritative body in the country thus allocating this council with the power to even remove an elected government should it wish too (Barker,2015, pp.1). This has created a situation in which places the country's leadership in an indeterminate state.

Although seemingly democratic in nature, the military still has strong influence in the decisions made by the government (Barker, 2015, pp.1). To make matters worse, the constitution of 2008 also requires for the President of the state to be "*well acquainted with the affairs of the Union such as political, administrative, economic and military*" thus effectively barring Aung San Suu Kyi, although NDP's party president to become Myanmar's President (Barker, 2015, pp.1). To overcome this hurdle, Aung San Suu Kyi created the position of State Counsellor, a position akin to Prime Minister with executive powers (Barker, 2015, pp.1). The current President has become one merely appointed for ceremonial functions and events. This still limits Aung San Suu Kyi's influence on all matters related to government policies and reforms (Barker, 2015, pp.1).

GOVERNMENT POLICIES DURING MILITARY RULE

Myanmar was under military rule from 1962 to 2011. In 1962, under the command of General Ne Win, the military staged a coup on the then democratic government due to the poor economy, political infighting and multiple insurgencies occurring of the country (Devi, 2014, pp. 1). The military then formed a military government and arrested members of the incumbent government. During this period of military rule, Myanmar's military government avoided foreign intervention by totally relieving itself from all international affiliation and affairs (Devi, 2014, pp. 1). The regime adopted this foreign policy as to resist external influence and pursued a total independent and nonaligned government.

During the military ruling period in Myanmar, the military formed new constitution that transformed the country from a democratic country to a constitutional dictatorship (Devi, 2014, pp. 1). Successfully isolating itself from the world, the military ruled Myanmar authoritatively and implemented military rule of law. The introduction of the 1982 citizenship act or law only amplified its strong grip over the people of the state and denied basic human rights to the Rohingya Ethnic Minority (Devi, 2014, pp. 1). As the military avoided direct interference from the international community, all decisions and executive actions taken during this period only received international criticism but no action was taken to make matters right (Devi, 2014, pp. 1). The military formed government was majority Buddhists and therefore had not the slightest intention to overcome Rohingya crisis. The hit hard on suspected Rohingya rebel fighters and were accused for alleged massacres of this ethnic minority groups (Devi, 2014, pp. 1). Although the military formed government in Myanmar received severe criticism and backlash from the international community, especially the United Nations, little was done to overcome or address the plight of the Rohingya community (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.5).

Based on historical accounts, rivalry and clashed between Myanmar Buddhists and the Rohingya Ethnic Minority began as early as post-colonial era in 1948. The instability caused by ethnic rivalry continued till today as a result of non-action by the government of Myanmar. In 1978, the government conducted the infamous Dragon King Operation that was aimed at targeting illegal immigrants in Myanmar by using force and torture to force them to depart or leave Myanmar. This operation was considered a success as it led to the deportation of nearly 200,000 Rohingya Ethnic Minority to neighbouring Bangladesh (Yunus, 1994). This operation was aimed at Muslims in particular with no discrimination on gender or age. According to Yunus (1994) many Muslims were tortured, raped or killed brutally as extreme measures to force them to leave the Rakhine state indefinitely.

At the helm of Myanmar's military government in 1982, General Ne Win introduced the new citizenship law which only recognised 135 minority groups that were officially considered as citizens of Myanmar. This act brought hardship and difficulty to the Rohingya community as it conveniently left out the Rohingya Ethnic Minority from citizenship status thus leaving many of them in a state of limbo, statelessness and in deeper crisis then before (Lall et al., n.d., pp. 5).

The Rohingya community continued to be persecuted by the military throughout the many years it was in power, and somehow continues to do so even though the NLD claim governance of this nation (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.5). Reports emerged of coordinated mass killings, raping of women and other atrocities by the military (Warzone Initiatives, 2015, pp.5). Nevertheless, this human rights crisis and violation was denied vehemently by the current government as mere accusations by the international community and is made to look worse than it really is (BBC News, 2018). However, the persecution of the Rohingya Ethnic Minority is a direct violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Right (1948), Article 5 which clearly states that "*No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment*".

In 2012, renewed conflict between the Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims resulted in the ongoingRohingya crisis in Myanmar. The crises have caused massive destruction of properties and infrastructure including but not limited to places of worship, residences and shops. Displaced Rohingya people were placed at a camp of internally displaced people. They however were still denied or had very limited access to daily basic needs and thus are tortured systematically (Lindblom et al., 2015).

CURRENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND ACTIONS ADDRESSING THECRISIS

The many years or decades of military control of Myanmar has made the country economically poor and poorly developed. The nation's Gross Domestic Product per capita is so low at 1,300 U.S. Dollars only which is about a fifth of what is made by other South East Asian nations such as Thailand (Barany, 2015, pp.3). Pursuing economic reforms since after winning the elections in 2015 has been one of the many priorities of Aung Suu San Kyi's government (Barany, 2017, pp.9). Therefore, it came as a surprise that the NLD only introduced its first major economic policy statement in July 2016 that was general in nature and did not contain measures or initiatives to achieve the objectives set out (Barany, 2015, pp.9). The slow pace of which the NLD were carrying out reforms had a major impact on the Rohingya crisis (Barany, 2015, pp.9). It was no surprise that the government has till this day failed to address the crisis in Rakhine as economic reforms were also slow and indefinite (Barany,2017,pp.4) .

Besides that, the policies of the state government somehow formalise the crisis in Rakhine. Condemnation of the 1982 Citizenship Law has fallen into deaf ears. Attempts by NGOs and the International community to pressure the current government to make amendments and resolve this crisis has been seen as violation into the sovereignty of Myanmar (BBC NEWS, 2018). Fearing for their lives, the Rohingya Ethnic Minority has resorted to fleeing the country into neighbouring countries for prospects of a better life. Nonetheless, this has created yet another refugee crisis and humanitarian

disaster across the borders. During the electoral campaign, one of Aung San Suu Kyi main campaign promises was to end the decade long civil war and the creation of a federal system (Barany, 2015, pp.3). To ensure the meeting of this objective, Suu Kyi established a centre under the Ministry for State Counsellor's office to initiate peace talks and implement measures to end the war amongst ethnic groups (Barany, 2015, pp.9). The centre organised a conference or meeting called the Union Peace Conference in 2016 that brought leaders of these ethnic groups (although three major groups did not attend) together with representative of the government, political parties and the military to discuss issues regarding ethnic relations (Barany, 2015, pp.9). A year later, another meeting was called to discuss on surrendering arms, secession and integration; however, all efforts broke down as a permanent resolution to please all parties involved was not obtained (Barany, 2015, pp.4).

According to Azeem (2016), the Rakhine crisis present itself as a major challenge concerning ethnic-religious conflicts that has set much pressure on Aung San Suu Kyi's government where nearly one million Rohingya Muslims do not enjoy civil rights and suffer from severe discrimination and persecution for many years . Aung San Suu Kyi's public statements and interviews clearly indicate her unwillingness to accept that the crisis is serious and that massacres and human rights violations are happening extensively and without restraint against the Rohingya Muslims (BBC News, 2018). Many have criticised her for this stance as most scholars believe that the reason for her silence and inaction is because she was trying to avoid losing support from the majority Buddhist population in Myanmar (Barany, 2015, pp.10). She has only taken small measures to address the conflict and develop the economy in Rakhine since becoming State Counsellor of Myanmar. Due to continuous pressure from the United Nations, she eventually succumbed in establishing a national commission which was headed by former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan for the purpose of presenting a comprehensive and independent report of the alleged human rights crisis and persecution occurring in Rakhine against minority Rohingya Muslims (Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, 2017, pp.1083). The findings were presented to the government of Myanmar in August 2017 but nonetheless little has been done since the report emerged (Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, 2017, pp.1083).

The situation in Rakhine subdued significantly in 2017. Nevertheless, when Rohingya insurgents killed nine border guards and police officers this year, the military were quick to respond by unleashing wrath upon Rohingya villages and people, burning down villages, systematic and indiscriminate execution of Rohingya Muslims, rape of woman and more (Barany,2015,pp.10). Once again, thousands fled to neighbouring Bangladesh for fear of their lives. Aung San Suu Kyi and her government were condemned internationally for the manner of which the incident was handled. The Myanmar government also prohibited foreign journalists from entering the region and discredited media reports on the act of violence and brutality of the Tatmadaw military forces against the Rohingya Ethnic Minority (BBC News, 2018). Nevertheless, it should be stated here clearly that the government does not have control over military actions in the state. This is due to the constitution of 2008 that allows for military action should there be any type of threat to national security.

The insurgent group responsible for the attacks on the guards were a group known as Harakah Al-Yaqin which was financed by Rohingya emigrants in Saudi Arabia, Southeast Asia and the Middle East (International Crisis Group, 2018). The ongoing conflict has garnered much support for this militia group with many new recruits coming from the Myanmar Muslim population. Hence, currently, Myanmar is facing a crisis of enormous proportions consisting of the Rohingya Human Rights crisis coupled with Islamic and Buddhism extremism.

This situation should prompt the Myanmar government to seek and implement long term measures or solutions in addressing the growing tensions in the state. It is highly likely that should Aung San Suu Kyi's government continue to remain silent and indecisive in resolving this conflict, the government should have cloudy days ahead in their administration and would not be able to create a peaceful

environment for all to enjoy. Many former political activists are increasingly voicing their concern and displeasure with Aung San Suu Kyi's leadership and her policies with regards to the ethnic minority communities (International Crisis Group, 2018). Looking at the crisis worsening over time, some of her former comrades in the fight against autocracy are increasingly voicing their disapproval of her minority policies (Gray, 2017). Aung San Suu Kyi's government has not only remained quiet over the situation unfolding there but has also denied United Nations interventions (Gray, 2017). This move was simply to ensure a controlled media and reports on the situation are scrutinised heavily before released to the international community.

POLITICAL BUDDHISM IN MYANMAR

Many factors contribute to the Rohingya Ethnic Minority Crisis. One very prominent factor is that of political Buddhism. Political Buddhism is a form of nationalism intertwined with religion and ethnicity. Contemporary Myanmar or Burmese nationalist movements have always focused on enhancing nationalism and national self-image of Myanmar (Prasse-Freeman, 2017, pp.1-2). These Buddhist Nationalists seek to garner support from the majority populace to ensure the protection and survival of race and religion. In doing so, these movements often discredit and condemn Islam and Muslims in Myanmar especially the Rohingya people and associate them to Islamic extremism and terrorism (Prasse-Freeman, 2017, pp.1-2). They also claim that should the Rohingya Ethnic Minority be given citizenship status, they will use it against the Buddhist Nationalist by converting them (Buddhists) into Islam (Prasse-Freeman, 2017, pp.1-2).

Political Buddhism is therefore used as a tool to target the Rohingya Ethnic Minority and persecute them systematically. This is probably why the 1982 Citizenship Act was never revised to offer the Rohingya people citizenship status. Buddhism has also widely been used by political parties to identify itself and align policies and reforms in accordance with the religion. This is also the case with Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD party where the majority of party members are Buddhists and association or even slightest attempt at recognising the Rohingya people as rightful citizens of Myanmar could be detrimental in the survival of the party in the long term. According to Nilsen (2016), a complete overhaul and new national policy aimed at reconciliation of all ethnic groups should be of priority for the new government as this be beneficial for the entire nation as it would promote peace, understanding and respect amongst all ethnic groups (Nilsen, 2016). However, unfortunately, the majority of the Myanmar population does not believe this is to their best interest due to indoctrination of political Buddhism so deeply entrenched in the minds of the Burmese Buddhists community (Nilsen, 2016, pp.1).

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY RESPONSE TO THE ROHINGYA CRISIS

As the Rohingya Ethnic Minority human rights violation and crisis in Myanmar continues, the international community has yet to act upon it as effectively as many would have desired, with mixed reactions from all corners of the world making the situation more complex and much more difficult to resolve. Apart from the United States of America and Russia, the backing by India and China given to the Myanmar state government led by Aung San Suu Kyi pictures a gloomy future ahead for the Rohingya people, making it difficult even for the UN to pressure Myanmar to oversee rehabilitation and addressing the Rohingya crisis.

According to Theodora (2018), there has been no United Nations humanitarian intervention on the Rohingya crisis. The most reasonable action by the United Nations is to conduct a criminal investigation on the allegations of ethnic cleansing and persecution of the Rohingya people at the Rakhine State. This can only be achieved should the UN choose to refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Gruseke, 2018). Nonetheless, this has not materialised as it requires for the UN Security Council to vote in favour of such a move, and nations on the Security Council with veto power include Russia and

China, both countries backing Myanmar led government and refusing to vote to such a move (Gruseke, 2018, pp. 1–3).

The United Nations have been pressuring Myanmar to allow for an independent commission to review the situation in Myanmar from as early as 2012 after a series of deadly clashes between the Rohingya Muslims and Buddhist broke out (Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, 2012). This request has been vehemently denied by the government of Myanmar at the time, when President Thein Sein issued a statement saying that Myanmar's government will handle the situation on their own (Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, 2012). The UN Secretary General himself met with President Thein Sein in September 2012 to discuss the situation and was guaranteed that Myanmar will take measures to address the root cause for this conflict and crisis (Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, 2012).

In December the same year, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution pressuring the Myanmar government to address the crisis and human rights violation of the ethnic minorities in the Rakhine and Kachin states. UN has been very vocal on the situation in Myanmar and continues to press for reforms and for the government of Myanmar to put an end to the violation and persecution of Rohingya ethnic minority in the country (Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect, 2012).

The recent attacks by ARSA on security personnel of Myanmar have worsened the situation in Myanmar. April this year, the UN sent a 30-member team in a fact-finding mission at refugee camps located at borders of Myanmar and Bangladesh. The report revealed that there was serious war crimes and crimes against humanity conducted by the Myanmar security forces towards the Rohingya Muslims and that if the situation was not addressed accordingly, it would deteriorate even further (UNHRC, 2017).

The UN has also deployed several commission and fact-finding missions to investigate and report the situation or crisis happening in Myanmar. The organisation also has appointed several Special Rapporteurs on the situation of Human Rights in Myanmar to provide the body with the facts and current situation from time to time. UN through several spokesmenhas issued several statements condemning the human rights violation and persecution of the Rohingya Ethnic Minority in Myanmar. They have been doing so on a regular basis since 2012 till today. Despite this, the response by UN towards the situation in Myanmar has been seen as slow and not forceful enough.

As the crisis continues, the UN is finding it difficult to pressure the Myanmar government into addressing the situation towards a long term and permanent solution. A concerted and affirmative action as yet has been taken by UN to address this crisis, and at present actions have come in forms of statements issued to the Myanmar government. It is noted that this can be linked to the intervention of Russia and China through their influence in the United Nations Security Council, which will be discussed below.

The most important body in the UN to address this crisis would be the United Nations Security Council. As mentioned earlier, permanent members who have veto power n the council include the likes of China and Russia, have shown their strong support for the Myanmar government led by Aung San Suu Kyi. As the situation in the Rakhine state deteriorates significantly in recent years, growing number of refugees, alleged ethnic cleansing and escalation of violence by Tatmadaw on the Rohingya Ethnic Minority, the UNSC has been pressured into addressing this crisis by including the crisis in its agenda recently in 2017 (UNSC,2018).

This meeting can be seen as a renewed commitment down the road by UNSC to obtaining a long-term solution to the crisis in Rakhine. The meeting also involved the participation of UN Secretary General Antonio Gutteres, an achievement in itself, even though the objective or purpose of the meeting has to

this date yet to be fulfilled (UNSC, 2018, pp.1). During this meeting, the members shared their concern about the escalation of violence and the persecution of the Rohingya Ethnic Minority. They also condemned the attacks by ARSA on Myanmar security forces. Nonetheless, the UNSC is advocating the access to humanitarian aid to those affected by granting safe passage to human rights and humanitarian groups to aid those in need. The UNSC also voiced regret over the citizenship law of 1982 and the fact that the Rohingya ethnic minority were not recognised at citizens of Myanmar (UNSC, 2018, pp.7). However, UNSC permanent member are still split in decision and opinion. For example, one side of UNSC condemns the treatment and persecution of the Rohingya community. On the other hand, the other side of UNSC believes and supports the Myanmar government's efforts in handling the situation (UNSC, 2018, pp.8).

The difficulty of the UN to intervene collectively in the Rohingya crisis has led to individual states such as the United States of America to respond separately. The USA has taken steps by imposing sanctions and travel restrictions on all Myanmar military and security personnel directly or indirectly involved in the persecution of the Rohingya Ethnic Minority in hopes that this would pressure the State government of Myanmar to finally seek for a resolution to the Rohingya human right violations and crisis engulfing the state of Rakhine (UNSC, 2018, pp.1).

ASEAN'S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS

The plight of the Rohingya Muslims was considered as a regional crisis especially by Malaysia and the country called for ASEAN to intervene by establishing an investigation into the alleged persecution of the Rohingya people whilst at the same time to coordinate humanitarian aid and relief to the people suffering from this crisis (Shivakoti, 2017). This strong call from the Malaysian authorities forces the State government of Myanmar to react accordingly and at Malaysia's request; a special meeting was conducted to discuss concerns over the crisis (Shivakoti, 2017, pp. 1).

As a result of this meeting, Aung San Suu Kyi promised to inform her ASEAN counterparts regularly on the crisis development and measures taken to attain a permanent and binding resolution. She also allowed for the media to visit one of the most prominent areas of the crisis in Maungdaw. An emergency meeting by The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) was also held in Kuala Lumpur in January 2017 at Malaysia's request for the purpose in discussing and finding long term solutions to the Rohingya humanitarian crisis.

The urgency in which the discussion and meeting between ASEAN member states is a progress towards attaining a long-term solution to the Rohingya crisis. Nevertheless, continuity and close monitoring of the situation is warranted to protect refugees arising from this crisis. Policies need to be reviewed, or created to help ASEAN member states to better deal with the refuges and humanitarian crisis occurring at the region. ASEAN also needs to address several human rights laws and issues in order to enforce the Human Rights Declaration made by ASEAN member states. Nevertheless, the Rohingya humanitarian crisis has ASEAN member states realising just how unprepared they were in facing a crisis of this magnitude.

CONCLUSION

Myanmar is at an important and significant crossroad of its history, it has since achieving independence in 1948, not really been at peace. A military coup in 1962 allowed for the military to control and rule the nation until 2011.The laws enacted and Constitutions written at present does not suit a democratic society such as the one Myanmar is trying hard to be. Although the National League of Democracy led by State Chancellor Aung San Suu Kyi won the 2015 general elections decisively,

Myanmar road to democracy is still rocky, as the current government is still subject to laws and constitutions introduced by the previous military junta.

One such law in the 1982 Citizenship Act, which has excluded the Rohingya people of the Kachin, Rakhine and Shan states, making the community stateless, resulting in a massive refugee influx into neighbouring countries. Furthermore, based on the Constitution drafted before NLD came into power, the military still must retain a minimum of 20% of all seats in the parliament, providing them with much control and influence on government decisions in the nation. Further, in any matter related to security threats to the stability and sovereignty of the state, the military can take actions and conduct operations without prior approval from the parliament, as seen from the example of ARSA's attack on security personnel at the borders of Rakhine.

Since the attack in 2017, the military has conducted several operations targeting the Rohingya Ethnic Minority at the Rakhine, Kachin and Shan states. International groups such as UN through a fact-finding mission in April 2018, have reported that the operations by the military has targeted innocent people including women and children and are discriminatory in the sense that they target Rohingya Muslims specifically in what amounts and is considered *ethnic cleansing and genocide*. The continued persecution and violence on the Rohingya people have led to nearly 700,000 to flee their homes as refugees and cross the borders onto neighbouring nations such as Bangladesh, Thailand and Malaysia. The UN report notes that this has created an international humanitarian crisis one of the most severe witnessed in history. The sheer violence exerted towards the Rohingya people has been condemned as crimes against humanity as all actions by the Tatmadaw and Myanmar's security forces are in direct violation of International Laws and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.

International organisations such as the UN have been taking several steps in addressing the human rights violation of the Rohingya community in Myanmar. Besides releasing many statements condemning the situation and persecution of the Rohingya people of Myanmar, one of the more prominent steps was to send a fact-finding mission to refuges sites to investigate the extent of the crisis. This mission led by UN Security Council President, recently released a report verifying previous allegations made against the Myanmar state government for crimes against humanity and the violation of international laws in crackdown operations conducted by its security forces against the Rohingya people from Kachin, Rakhine and Shan states.

The UN has been pressurising the Myanmar government to take affirmative actions to overcome this crisis and has threatened sanctions against individual and groups who are accused of these horrendous crimes amounting to genocide and ethnic cleansing. Nations such as United States of America have already imposed economic sanctions on these individuals for their endeavours and crimes against the Rohingya people. The UN report is seen to be instrumental as it has shown the desperate need for the Myanmar government into fulfill its obligations in abiding by international laws and providing basic human rights to all people residing within its borders, be it citizens as recognised under the Citizenship Act 1982 or not.

WAY FORWARD FOR MYANMAR

Based on the study, finding a permanent long-term solution to end this crisis still seems difficult. There are several recommendations that may address the humanitarian crisis and human rights violations against the Rohingya community. These include:

  a. The government of Myanmar should introduce new internal policies to safeguard the interest and human rights of its people within the borders of its nation. The safeguard should be in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in line with relevant International Laws.

b. The 1982 Citizenship Act that was passed by the military at that time must be revised, as it should not be discriminatory and should not identify citizens by ethnicity or religions professed. The Rohingya people, rightful descendants of Myanmar as history clearly shows, should be given citizenship stature and granted freedom and rights as such that is currently provided to all citizens of Myanmar.

c. Consideration should be taken to relook at the Constitution of Myanmar, in particular the specific reference to the requirement for the military to control 20% of the seats in parliament. In order for a democratic state to exist, choices as to who should govern should be democratic, and such a clause indicates that there is still influence of the military on administrative decisions and executive actions. This would also allow the Myanmar government to monitor the operations conducted by the military more closely and scrutinise every action taken by the security forces and at the same time halt all crackdown operations on the ARSA as it is also targeting innocents such as women and children. The Myanmar government will also be able to exercise its function as a government more effectively without interference by the military.

d. The government should initiate peace talks with ARSA and force the laying down of arms to avoid further crisis. Laying down of arms would also end the need or justification for military operations in the affected areas.

e. The government should also hold talks with MaBaTha to find a permanent agreement with the organisation as to avoid further instigation and spread of hatred towards the Muslim community in Myanmar. Should the organisation refuse to reach an agreement, then it should be branded as a terrorist organisation and dealt with accordingly. This should apply the same towards ARSA. There should be no room for violence and hatred anywhere in the world we live in today.

f. The state government of Myanmar should come to accept that the situation is beyond internal control and has already turned into an international crisis with more than 700,000 in just a year seeking refuge at neighbouring countries. Therefore, it would be prudent for Myanmar to accept assistance from UN and other international organisations. The assistance rendered to Myanmar can come in various forms including humanitarian aid such as food and medicine or peacekeeping missions headed by UN to avoid further escalation of violence in the affected states. Regional neighbouring nations such as Malaysia, Thailand and Bangladesh could also assist Myanmar to finding a solution to this crisis.

g. The UN and the international community should begin to impose economic sanctions on Myanmar in efforts to pressurise the government into guaranteeing the safety and security of the Rohingya community. This would entail for the displaced refugees to return home to a peaceful and sustainable future ahead.

h. The refugee crisis surrounding the Rohingya community across the globe must be addressed accordingly. Firstly, the Rohingyas who fled their homes in Myanmar must be treated as refuges and as such are to be accorded their rights as enshrined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Nations in recipient of Rohingya refuges should instil proper protection framework for these refugees and grant them access to their lands without discrimination and favour. They also should be provided with basic amenities and given a place to live so as long until the situation in Myanmar recedes and the refugees decide to go home.

i. In the end, the most important step that Myanmar should take is to adapt and institutionalise human rights norms in the country in accordance with international standards as prescribed in

Convention of 1948 (Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Only then would the Rohingya community finally have the freedom to live as human beings.

The future of the Rohingya people looks undeniably very gloomy at the moment. In order to change this future to a brighter one, all stakeholders must work hand in hand to address issues surrounding this crisis towards achieving a permanent and long-lasting resolution. It is hoped that the human rights violations and persecution of the Rohingya community would come to an end as soon as possible.

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FUTURE COMBAT VEHICLE SYSTEM (FCVS): THE WAY FORWARD AGAINST HYBRID THREATS

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ABSTRACT

Hybrid Warfare is the combination of conventional warfare and non-conventional warfare. Combination of these two types of warfare with additional variables contributes to the said warfare which exposes the strategic level and the dynamic thinking, operational, and tactical implementations within the operational environment of Malaysian Armed Forces. With the emerging threat and technologies, the Malaysian Army needs to mitigate this Hybrid Warfare or any kind of warfare at all times in protecting and defending the nation's interests and sovereignty. The suggested Future Combat Vehicle System (FCVS) provides an opportunity to Malaysian Army to plug the gap between legacy fleets and to enhance survivability. It will bring new dimensional in battlefield as it will give an impact to the operational environment of the Malaysian Army.

Keywords: *survivability, mobility, firepower, protection, capability & technology demonstrator (CTD)*

INTRODUCTION

The demise of Cold War witnessed the end of the major rivalry between the US and Russia (formerly Soviet) and these also included their partners and allies. The repercussion was detrimental for the former Soviet Union which ultimately disintegrated and many states broke away to establish nation state of their own. In addition to that the world also evolved from industrialized era towards the advent of technology and information era. The military all over the world had to deal with the revolution in military affairs with the inception of digitization making up the new inventory and future systems. Computers and internet was the catalyst of the information era that change the geo-strategic environment as new players emerged and technology had affected many countries both advantage and disadvantage.

In line with that development of the military hardware, majority are taking cognizance of the new perceived threat in order to mitigate effectively. The global geo strategic and security environment has become volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA) making the military hierarchy to analyze and ponder avenues plus strategies to respond to these emerging vulnerabilities. The major role players like the US and European countries having experienced the setbacks from this new threat had embarked on future combat systems taking serious considerations to facilitate this new challenge. The Malaysian Army also had to face this contemporary hybrid threat challenge after having experienced the intrusion by the Sulu terrorist in 2013.

It was imminent that this was the new paradigm in warfare that all armies must be prepared to face and in tandem develop the required weaponry and other platforms to mitigate this problem. It is paramount to identify the nature of the hybrid warfare and understand the fundamentals in the approach to conduct a thorough capability analysis to verify the existing fleet and suggest future systems that are need to enhance our Malaysian Army inventory.

OVERVIEW OF HYBRID WARFARE

Incidentally, there is no any universally accepted definition of 'hybrid warfare'. General Goerge Casey, the Chief of Staff of United States Army defined the hybrid warfare as combination of conventional, irregular, intelligence and crimanal activities used by an adversary to achieve its political objectives (Assosiation of U.S Army,2008, pp1). The NATO on the other end defined hybrid warfare as the merging of conventional and non-conventional warefare tactics by the state and non-

state actors to pursuit their objectives (Julio.M.C.,2015). Based on few definitions on hybrid warfare provided, we can summarize that:

'hybird warfare is a combination of conventional and irregular warfare by state and non-state actors in order to achieve their political objectives'

Hybrid war threat intersection consists of three fundamental elements which include capability, complexity of terrain and maturity as illustrated in Figure 1. In order to understand better:

a. **Capability**. The types of weapon system, the training required to operate these weapons and to sustain through the operation is explained in the capability section. The types of weapons used in by a hybrid adversary ranges from small arms up to sophisticated weapons such as rockets and missiles. Some of them also are believed to have the capabilities to use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) gained from the state actors or failing states. (Christopher. O., 2012, pp 41).

b. **Maturity**. In order to become a prominent hybrid adversary the maturity of the force is vital. The maturity includes the support they receive form population, the leadership qualities from their leader, the cohesion among them and their ability to influence state actors to support them. By attaining the level of maturity required they can grow from street gangs up to the rebels or terrorists and ultimately they will become full-fledgedhybrid force which is competent with the modern state military forces.(Christopher. O., 2012, pp 43).

c. **Complexity**.   The complexity section explains the various geographical conditions of the terrains where an adversary hybrid force able to suit and operate effectively in order to win decisively against their opponents. This includes cyber space where they are capable of conducting network based attacks. This section also explains increasing capabilities of the hybrid force through human terrain where they start from a small group until they expand to a large group (multiple religious or ethnic groups) who has the ability to conduct civil war.(Christopher. O., 2012, pp 45).


Figure 1: Hybrid Threat Intersection (Christopher. O., 2012, pp 42)

The combination or intersection of the three elements give real advantage to the rebels or terrorist to launch civil war and they have the advantages in terms of fire power and mobility which is likely attainable in combat effectiveness. This is the ultimate war whereby all the factors will be combined to assist the other major factors that influence the interrelated Hybrid Warfare.

Malaysia's Experience – Lahad Datu Intrusion. Lahad Datu invasion by the Sulu Army on February 11, 2013 is one of most recent hybrid warfare experienced by Malaysia. The Lahad Datu intrusion gave a valuable lesson to the MAF and especially the Army in facing wider spectrum of challenges. This incident is an eye opener for the Malaysian Army to relook at their current assets especially the combat vehicle fleet. In order to achieve this, the Army through its transformation plan is in the process of enhancing its conventional and non-conventional capabilities to prepare for any eventualities such as the Lahad Datu intrusion (Mahadzir, 2016, pp8).

CAPABILITY CONTEXT

Presently, the Malaysian Army's Combat Vehicle System (CVS) family comprises Condor, Sibmas, Scorpion, Stormer, Adnan, MIFV, Pendekar MBT and Gempita AV8 AFV. It is anticipated that the current CVS will provide a declining level of capability in the latter years and more so from the period beyond 2020 (Defence & Security News, 2013),the realm of the 4D MAF, where a Future Combat Vehicle System (FCVS) capability will be essential.

The operational context, within which the FCVS will operate, is diverse and complex. This context consists of three distinct environments, the physical, threat and military. These factors must be considered in conjunction with Army's development continuum which is the *Army 2 10 plus 10* and also the reviewed plan *Army for Next Generation* (Army 4nextG) which is the continuation of *Army 2 10 Plus 10* after the year 2020 as announced by the Chief of Army during Army Day 2016. (Bernama, 2016)

The *Malaysian Army Transformation Plan* concept paper identifies three broad generic threat types; state actor, non-state actor and terrorism (Army HQ, 2011, pp. 21). It is anticipated that a future threat scenario will comprise a mixture of both traditional and non-traditional threats known as the hybrid threats. Capability development within Army is based upon a 'concept-led, capability –based' approach. The timeframe within which capability decisions are made exists within a framework referred to as the Army development Continuum. The *Intermediate Force* provides the focus for the development of the *'Force in Being'* and *Consolidated Force*. The *Objective Force* considerations are looking beyond the *Intermediate Force* which is targeted to be established in the year 2020.

A capability gap analysis has indicated that upgrading legacy combat vehicles fleets beyond its economic lifewould not be operationally viable against the probable threats and within the range of contingencies required of land forces in the future and will not be able to support *Malaysian Army Transformation Plan* which is to establish objective force. In order to address the capability gap, the Army has to formulate the replacement of combat vehicle fleets, which is aimed to face future threats and enhance the survivability in battlefield.

REQUIREMENT OF COMBAT VEHICLE CAPABILTIES AGAINST HYBRID THREATS

Design Criteria. Future conflict is a multifaceted affair, concerning the extensive use of extremely advanced technology. Existing combat vehicles fleets have quite disparate levels of operational capability, survivability and logistic compatibility. Hence modern armies are exploring new common or modular combat vehicles concepts. There is no exception to the Malaysian Army where it is also required to explore the new technologies available for modular vehicles under the *Army 2 10 Plus 10* strategy.

The current combat vehicles fleets were built based on progressive trade-offs between the traditional design trinity of firepower, protection and mobility. 'This design balance was rarely affected by requirements such as communications, logistics or ease of reconfiguration or upgrade' (Haub, J., Unewisse, M., &Akhurt, G., 2003). The traditional design trinity needs reassessment to account for evolutionary threat upgrades, more efficient and cohesively planned logistics and importantly, to be designed from the outset for NCW operations.

The FCVS design criteria, replaces protection with survivability as a continuum effect rather than passive protection measures and the inclusion of a new element knowledge (a function of the vehicle as an active node within a network) as a basic design function that is necessary to provide the battlefield effects required for successful NCW operations'. (Haub, J., et. al., 2003). The migration of design from legacy CVS to FCVS is shown in Figure 2.


Figure 2: CVS and FCVS design criteria (Haub, J., et. al., 2003, pp158)

Survivability.Survivability has always been a major concern of combat vehicles and the key question is 'how FCVS will survive with less protection (armour) and firepower on the battlefield?' Figure 3 shows how the FCVS are expected to trade the weight of armour for networked knowledge of the threat, better weapons to combat threats, greater mobility (to avoid targeting), and active protection(DRS Technologies, 2016) This apparently will be useful to fight against Hybrid Warfare.


Figure 3: Current vs FCVS survivability (Boston. S., 2004)

Arguably the key challenge for designers of new combat vehicle will be providing a balance between weight and survivability characteristics. Thus, the capability context of new combat vehicle system will depend on achieving modularized and networked vehicles that combine the lethality and survivability of heavy forces and the deploy ability of light forces. Such combat system should also weigh less than 20 tonnes to enable them to be readily transported by C 130 and A 400M aircraft. Maximum payload for C-130 aircraft is 20,412 kg and A400M is 37,000 kg.

FOREIGN FCVS DEVELOPMENTS

Some Western armies have recognised the increased environmental complexity of the future battlespace and are progressively working toward the development of their own Future Combat Vehicle Systems (FCVS). For Malaysia, this presents Army with the opportunity to apply lessons identified by other programs to inform FCVS developments for the Objective Force under *Army 2 10 Plus 10*.

US - Future Combat System (FCS).This program aims to replace all cyber virtual systems from the main   howitzers and battle tanks through to Armored Personnel Carriers (APC) with a modular fleet of combat vehicles comprises of manned and unmanned ground vehicles, unattended munitions and unmanned air vehicles (Figure 4)(Biass& Kemp, 2006).


Figure 4: FCS 'System of systems' approach (Biass& Kemp, 2006, pp2)

FCS technologies being investigated include full spectrum active protection systems, advanced vetronics and communications, hybrid power systems, improved drive trains, band-track, robotics (unmanned ground and air platforms) and sensors, to name a few. This project currently has been cancelled due to budget constraints and the sub-systems have been transferred to other programs. However the ideas, concept and technologies of these vehicles can be used by the Malaysian Army in their planning for future procurement purposes.

UK – Future Rapid Effect System (FRES).The FRES is a multi-phase program that aims to replace UK's existing fleet of Saxon Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC), Combat Vehicle Reconnaissance-Tracked (CVR-T) and FV430 series with new and more mobile vehicles. Some of the technologies is being proposed for the FRES include electronic architecture (including situational awareness linkages and tools), electric armour, hard kill Defensive Aide System (DAS), advanced hybrid electric drive (AHED) and band-track. The UK Ministry of Defence has replaced the FRES project to AJAX programme where modular armoured fighting vehicles (589 tracked armoured

vehicles) will be developed incorporating some of the technologies from FRES (Think Defence, n.d). AJAX is expected to equip the new Strike Brigades together with Boxer Mechanised Infantry Vehicle as stated in the UK's Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015.The first vehicle is expected to be delivered early 2020 and subsequent vehicles will be delivered until 2025 (Holland. L.B., 2018).

Germany & Netherlands - BOXER Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle (MRAV).This is among the 'not too futuristic' FCVS compared to the FCS and FRES.The design is based on a modular structure using a common basic vehicle which can be fitted with interchangeable mission specific modules to give the maximum flexibility for multi-purpose operation. These vehicles are currently in service and used by the German and Dutch Army respectively.

Australia –Project Land 400. This program aims to 'enhance the survivability of land forces in combat operations through the provision of new war fighting systems (next generation of armoured fighting vehicles) that will replace the Army's legacy combat, combat support and combat service support fleets' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005). The Land 400 project is most expensive project and it is expected to deliver 611 military vehicles over the next 15 years to the Australian Army. Presently the project has completed capability definition process and the first vehicle combat reconnaissance vehicle (Boxer) has been delivered to the Australian Army in September 2019. The next phase will be acquisition of 383 infantry fighting vehicles and 17 manoeuvre support vehicles and currently Australia has shortlisted two tenderers. These vehicles is expected to undergo test and evaluation before the they announce the suitable vehicle which is expected in the 2022 (Queensland Government, n.d).

EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND FUTURE DESIGN TRENDS

The review of key foreign FCVS programs has shown there is similarity in design trends. The trends are focused on achieving modularized and networked vehicles with a combination of the lethality and survivability of a heavy force with the deploy ability of a light force. Achieving lighter weight (which drives mobility) and enhanced survivability is the common design challenge of foreign FCVS.There are a number of emerging key technologies each at different stages of maturity (see figure 5). These are likely to present significant advantages; however with significant cost. Therefore the focuses of emerging FCVS design trends are therefore upon mobility and survivability technologies.


Figure 5: FCVS emerging technologies

The key to FCVS survival is its ability to keep ahead of emerging threats.(Cimpoeru, 2000). To ensure these stay a safe distance from the FCVS, many systems have adopted a layered approach which involves utilising a variety of technical solutions, as illustrated in at Figure 6 (Biass& Kemp, 2006, pp10).These include active and passive strategies such as improved situational awareness, electronic warfare, DAS, complex composite ceramics, electric or smart armour.


Figure 6: Example of layered survivability (Biass& Kemp, 2006, pp11)

WAY AHEAD FOR MALAYSIAN ARMY

The introduction of Gempita AV8 Armoured Fighting Vehicles into the service with incorporation of various technologies is a positive step towards the foundation for the *Army 2 10 Plus 10* initiatives. These vehicle fleets will provide Army with increased capability until for next 20 to 25 years. However Gempita will not be the only solution for the Army for a long term as the Army's Objective Force will seek capabilities optimised for the battlespace of 2020 and beyond. The backbone of this capability will be provided by the FCVS which is capable of operating in complex terrains, across the spectrum of conflict, with increased lethality, mobility and survivability, within a networked and combined arms organization in order to overcome future threats such as the hybrid threats.

The Army is well positioned to exploit advances in foreign FVCS design and technological research, as some of the programs have completed their feasibility analysis and has been acquired into service well before the Objective Force timeframe. This will ensure that Army is able to refine its Objective Force definition and make informed decisions on the required combat vehicle fleets. The approaches and technology trends utilised in foreign CVS programs provide a useful benchmark for FCVS planning. Proposed characteristics of a FCVS include a common fleet of medium weight CVS incorporating mission specific modules with increased emphasis upon survivability and mobility. Optimised for NCW, the FCVS will be interoperable with Malaysia's allies. To maximise the benefit of these technologies, it is essential that a detailed planning be conducted to establish the broad requirements of FCVS, particularly mobility and survivability.

CONCLUSION

Malaysia is currently in the process of developing her inaugural Defence White Paper this year. Malaysia will share in a transparent manner its strategic outlook of the global and regional security environment; state its strategies and capabilities needed to address the opportunities and challenges

identified; elucidate how it would modernise its force-in-being to become a future force and cost it and endeavour to explain how it intends to develop its defence and security industries within the next decade. Thus, the FCVS presents an opportunity not only to counter the hybrid war but also to plug the gap between legacy fleets and establish the CVS for the Objective Force under Army 2 10 Plus 10 and Army for Next Generation (Army 4nextG). It will bring new dimensional in battlefield as it will give an impact to the operational environment of the Malaysian Army.

A number of emerging key technologies are likely to present significant advantages but at significant cost. With the current economic situation and the depreciation of Ringgit Malaysia, it is a big a pinch to the all sectors including the defence, therefore a thorough planning should be established to identify if the FCVS presents an opportunity to be acquired. Therefore, it is not feasible for the Malaysian Army to conduct an isolated FCVS program based on the indicative costs of the foreign FCVS programs. It will be essential that the Malaysian Army leverages technologies from these programs and based on the time lines, many technologies will be proven in time for the Objective Force. While the technologies being developed afford the luxury of time, planning and requirements development must be conducted to determine the context for FCVS. The key issues which derived from foreign FCVS programmes that must be scoped under FCVS are mobility (as affected by weight) and survivability, as these two requirements will have a dramatic effect on the system.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that the Malaysian Army to:

a. Examine and review foreign programs and their potential for *Army 2 10 Plus 10* and *Army for Next Generation* (Army 4nextG).

b. Note the advantages gained from FCVS design trends and key emerging technologies.

c. Apply the lessons acquired from foreign programs in the continued development of the 'way ahead' for Army.

d. Adopt Capability & Technology Demonstrator (CTD) for the relevant FCVS technologies as is will demonstrate how technology innovation might enhance defence capability in a new, innovative or previously unexplored manner.

e. Cooperate with the foreign program with exchange officers building project management experience and technological awareness in anticipation of adapting such options.

f. Consider '5 layer survivability model' for the FCVS acquisition strategy.

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All manuscripts must be in English which should generally consists of title, author affiliation, abstract, introduction, body, conclusions and references. A manuscript may also include an acknowledgement. For the review process, manuscripts should be prepared in A4 with single spacing. Each manuscript, including tables, figures, and appendices, shall not exceed 30 pages. Online submission should be via e-mail to the Editor-In-Chief. The text should be Times New Roman font size 11 (except if required within tables where size 10 may be used). All graphics and figure should be in good quality attached directly in the body of paper. For Greek letters and symbols, the font 'symbol' should be used. Upon acceptance, a formatted version will be sent to corresponding author for proofreading. Consult recent issues for examples of journal style.

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Chapter in Book
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Journals /Serials
Henderson, D.A., The looming threat of bioterrorism, *Sci.,*283: 1279-1283, 1999.

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Hurlbert, R.E., Chapter XV, Addendum: Biological Weapons, Malignant Biology, Available from http://www.wsu.edu/~hurlbert/pages/101biologicalweapons.html. (Accessed on 30 January 2010).

Unpublished Materials (e.g. theses, reports and documents)
Carus, W.S., Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century, Center for Counterproliferation Research, national Defense University, August 1998.

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