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AIMS AND SCOPE

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US-CHINA RIVALRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN'S SIGNIFICANCE AS A PIVOTAL MECHANISM FOR REGIONAL STABILITY

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ABSTRACT

The Southeast Asian region offers a myriad of opportunities and risks affected by continuously evolving geopolitical construct. Its geographical location, central to the global East-West sea lane of communication in addition to the abundance of natural resources, on land and sea have propagated the region's prominence as an arena for geopolitical rivalry since ancient times. The recent assertive approach of China in the region has become a reminiscent of the Cold War era - the role of the now defunct USSR taken over enthusiastically by China, opposite the US. Regional concerns are triggered as China is observed to have used its military might and economic influence to erode the existing international order. As such, this possibility is observed to not only be a strong indicator signifying the decline of reliance on the US in the region, but raises questions concerning the balance of future security environment of the region. Hence, the fundamental problem investigated is whether China's strategic approaches is a major geopolitical factor contributing towards weakening US-ASEAN relations which in turn may influence on regional balance of power? Therefore it can be indicative of ASEAN's significance as a pivotal mechanism for regional stability. The findings show that ASEAN's role to unify Southeast Asian nations propagating positive international cooperation and strategic partnerships is seen to be pivotal for balancing disruptive forces in the region through peaceful means. In addition, hedging and enmeshment strategies remains to be popularly deployed by ASEAN as a multilateral platform or by member states through individual bilateral policies where these strategies ensure dynamic alignment options in order to facilitate the ease of adjustment when strategic opportunities arise resulting from the rivalling great powers manoeuvres.

Keywords: *Hedging, Military, BRI, Geopolitical, Rivalry, Stability, Pivotal, Soft power, Diplomacy, Sino-American*

INTRODUCTION

The Southeast Asian region is noted to offer a mix of opportunities and risks with continuously evolving geopolitical construct. Populated by people of various ethnicity, cultures, and religions, the Southeast Asian region are moreover, not of equal state of governance, levels of geopolitical construct, or pace of economic growth. Nevertheless, internal conflicts within the region in recent years are not of critical significance. Factors that threaten the security construct of the region is interrelated to South China Sea (SCS) issues - numerous non-traditional security threats from increased criminal activities ranging from piracy to drug smuggling and human trafficking forming a dynamic network of global terrorism, anarchy, piracy, and smuggling activities has since become the major concern of ASEAN. With increasing reliance on fossil fuel to supply the economic growth of the Asia Pacific regions, associated security issues have become more complicated. Location of the region in a major Sea lines of communication (SLOC) and with abundance of natural resources (particularly fossil fuel) propagated the region's increasing prominence as a potential arena for geopolitical rivalry. As such, the role of ASEAN as a united and formal grouping to collectively consolidate resources for addressing the issues mentioned above has become more prominent in the last few decades.

Aside from the above, with US and Chinese power rivalry gaining momentum since the beginning of the new century; the end of the Cold War had created opportunity for the rapid emergence of China as a major global military and economic (Allison 2020). Associated tensions are escalated with China's growing economic, foreign policy, and strategic interests in the region. Furthermore, the propagation of Chinese influence through the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) had rapidly transformed and reshaped the Asian region's geopolitical environment. Through the BRI, China deployed soft power diplomacy to ensure successful expansion of its sphere of influence around the world. The increasing presence of Chinese warships within ASEAN member states (AMS)' waters highlights Beijing's continuous use of hard power approaches too, indicating its growing attempts to change regional status quo, unilaterally. Increased mistrust from the global community on China's continuous and aggressive military presence in regional waters have become a major concern to ASEAN leading to discourse on the possible manifestation of a global scale conflict (Shambaugh 2021). In short, China is noted to have used its military might and economic influence to erode the existing international order.

As such, ASEAN's role as a unifying mechanism for Southeast Asian nations needs to be poised as a prominent factor for propagating positive international cooperation and strategic partnerships - it has the construct to become a pivotal element for balancing disruptive forces in the region through peaceful means. US-ASEAN relation has always been strong – the alliance is complementary in form and benefits all associated parties in economic and strategic terms. Although the alliance is not military in form, but the notion of superpower support carries weight in influencing regional power dynamics. China is somewhat poised to pursue the same partnership with ASEAN and is more than capable of strategically eroding US-ASEAN ties for the said purpose.

The US and China's ambition to pursue ensure their strategic interests are protected in the region prompted the race to strengthen relations in the region – ASEAN as the one and only formal regional body is as such relevant to both superpowers as the centre of significance in terms of trade and economic agenda. In this sense, US-China rivalry is centric to ASEAN concerns – member states are in fact largely aligning themselves with either China or the United States, possibly strategically hedging to keep options open to ensure economic and geopolitical advantages. For instance, the Philippines and even Malaysia have in some way knowingly developed strong ties with China in recent decades most possibly in part to ensure leverage over territorial disputes in the SCS. Smaller or weaker member states are more anxious of threats from immediate neighbouring states and therefore, are willing to compromise ASEAN centrality and ensure leverage through strong ties with a condescending great power. In short, each member country has its strategic interests in mind, conforming to the realist notion of “self-preservation”.

In such a manner, the heightening US-China rivalry in the region is forcing gaps into AMS' relation, particularly when issues associated with sovereignty of state is of significance – regional geopolitical dynamics is greatly affected and international discourse on this matter has gained momentum in recent decades. Moreover, the superpower rivalry in the region has also significantly affected ASEAN's integrity as a formal and united regional organization; consensus on decisions as a united front is another major focus of international discourse - bilateral relations of member countries with either the US or China, disrupts ASEAN's multilateral platform for realizing its regionalism agenda as a united international organization. As such, this possibility is observed to not only be a strong indicator signifying the decline of reliance on the US hegemony in the region, but raises questions concerning the balance of future security environment of the region.

Hence, the this paper is focused on whether China's strategic approaches is a major geopolitical factor contributing towards waning US-ASEAN relation which in turn may influence on regional balance of power – the effects of which are more fundamental and are of significance to other concerns for the regional community; a particular point of contention relates to territorial disputes in the Southeast Asian region, a common and longstanding concern for ASEAN. Therefore, it can be indicative of ASEAN's significance as a pivotal mechanism for regional stability.

THE US-ASEAN RELATION: DILEMMA OR POWERPLAY?

Major US interests in Southeast Asian states include maritime security, counterterrorism, transnational organised crimes, the promotion of democracy, human rights & environmental preservation, the encouragement of liberal trade etc. However, US-ASEAN relation has never been straightforward or one dimensional in form – before ASEAN was created, most of its member states have engaged with the US in one way or another. The US relation with ASEAN as a bloc, has manifested itself as an “inconvenient disruption” to respective bilateral engagements (Congressional Research Service 2010). Bilateral ties with respective member nations of ASEAN are more relevant to the US in terms of projecting its authoritative role in the region – in this respect, the US has provided numerous assistance to Southeast Asian states (ie. security and economic based bilateral initiatives).

However, multilateral based platform such as ASEAN presented difficulties for realising US ambition in the region – within the context of ASEAN's consensus-based decision-making mechanism, the US deemed the organisation to be ineffective as a channel for dialogues on solutions to regional issues (Lee 2018). This aspect is further substantiated by the fact that ASEAN members include states that span from democratic or highly developed economic centres to impoverished dictatorships; as such there would be considerable implications on effectiveness of the organisation to act united in reality – conflict of national interests among member states would be unavoidable, the realist theme (McGlinchey et al. 2017) prevails in this case. Nonetheless, in attempts to unify the grouping, a new Charter was enacted in 2007, to mitigate the predicaments although still maintaining the principles of consensus and non-interference in the internal affairs of members states. It is without doubt presented as a great challenge to all parties.

Despite the above, ASEAN countries are of the opinion that the US is lacking on commitments towards multilateral engagement with ASEAN or Southeast Asia as a region and had thus considered this aspect as a factor affecting bilateral relation negatively (Dio 2018). Significant initiatives in 2009 indicated US “compliance” towards this end; the Obama Administration was more open to multilateral platforms – ASEAN was one of them. Washington DC expressed keen intent to work more closely with multilateral organisations, particularly ASEAN - the first US-ASEAN summit attended by President Obama in 2009 for instance was lauded as “a historic new level of engagement for the United States with ASEAN” (US Government 2021). Other initiatives soon followed and were also substantiated by succeeding US leader. Nevertheless, during Trump's administration, the US had episodic engagements with ASEAN.

ASEAN is fully aware of US military and economic might in Southeast Asia and its intent to remain a significant power in the region through soft power diplomacy - the above-mentioned diplomatic gesture of goodwill is an example. The fact of the matter is that the US needs to maintain strong ties with a formal grouping such as ASEAN to become its strong and committed regional platform in order to maintain the status quo.

As host to a number of security and trade related initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, ASEAN is pivotal in its role as a significant factor to balance regional powers and beyond. The US cannot afford the risk of becoming insignificant to such a prominent organisation (Shambaugh 2020). The impact of the recent COVID-19 pandemic on the global economy has also highlighted the significance of Chinese influence on ASEAN leaders (Maude 2020).

ENTER THE DRAGON OR REVISITING OLD NEIGHBOURHOOD?

China's formal relation with Southeast Asian states can be traced back to several centuries ago (Stuart-Fox 2014), even before the current international boundaries were in place. The Straits of Malacca and littoral states (SCS) in the Southeast Asian region were central and among the most important trading ports of call for the global SLOC, then and now. China's ties with this region are deep-rooted – spanning from the aspects of economy to culture. Earlier Chinese dynasties had expanded their sphere of influence throughout the region but had halted during the turbulent period of the Qing Dynasty at the turn of the 20th century. However, China has now emerged as a strong contender to the US (Lee 2020). Soft power rivalry between the US and China is at play in the region apart from other powers showing renewed or increasing interest in the region, such as Japan and India. Even the new US president has acknowledged this reality (Churchill 2021).

At the present time, China's reasons for strengthening ties with ASEAN are multi-dimensional in nature (Astarita 2008), but through the multilateral Southeast Asian grouping, an obvious aim would be primarily to defuse security tensions in the SCS. Initiatives that promote economic integration and infrastructure development are means for Beijing to cultivate diplomatic influence and support from member states in other international arenas too (Zhou & Bermingham 2020). China's soft power approach in the region is commonly staggered with demonstrations of aggressive military posture (Wu 2021). A common geopolitical discourse on China's strategy concludes that declining US engagement with ASEAN has opened the floodgates for escalated multilateral efforts from Beijing to pursue its aspiration to secure hegemony in the region (Zhou & Bermingham 2020).

The turn of the new century bore witness to many China-ASEAN initiatives to jointly mitigate SCS and non-traditional security issues in the region. Formal cooperation relating to economic and agricultural initiatives were also pursued fervently. China's active involvement in the ASEAN Plus Three and ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) are generally of concern to the US – the US is not included in these regional groupings and thus may be of advantage for realizing Chinese agendas. The BRI is also another initiative of concern for the US, relevant discourse concerning this initiative points to China's use of economic strength for ensuring expansion of its sphere of influence. As such, some Southeast Asian countries cautiously engage with China while hedging actively against its rise (Parameswaran 2020). Nevertheless, In addition, recent commitment from Beijing towards improving on multilateral engagement as the approach for mitigating impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic may further sway support from ASEAN (Albert 2021).

US-CHINA RIVALRY: IMPACT ON THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN REGION

The COVID-19 pandemic has shrouded the whole world with anxiety and unfortunately to some extremity, some governments have adopted defeatist attitudes towards handling the crisis. In spite of the need to completely close ranks and consolidate universal efforts to ensure the continuance of humanity, geopolitical tensions between two superpowers, namely the US and China have clearly heightened rather than subsided - competition has escalated to near confrontation in recent times. Escalating domestic crisis in Myanmar has also become centric to US-China

rivalry (Ng 2021) – while the US has “suspended all engagement with Myanmar under a 2013 trade and investment agreement until the return of a democratically elected government”, Beijing “has refrained from condemning the coup, which has seen over 500 protesters killed, leading to rising anti-China sentiment and complaints in Myanmar that it is siding with the military junta”. Indonesia has prompted ASEAN to “encourage a negotiated solution despite a long-standing policy of not commenting on each other’s domestic problems” while Brunei, the current chair of ASEAN has promptly supported a call for meeting of the member states’ leaders to discuss and resolve domestic tensions escalating Myanmar.

This recent development reflects ASEAN’s readiness to act collectively for the sake of regional well-being, in spite of the organisation’s longstanding commitments towards the policy of “non-interference” in domestic affairs of member states. China’s support towards this initiative demonstrates in some way the recognition of ASEAN’s credibility and capability as a collective regional body to resolve regional affairs on the one hand, and on the other hand, in some way reflects ASEAN’s role as a pivotal platform to facilitate “middleway” solutions to regional issues centric to US-China rivalry. Meanwhile, the US has only imposed suspension of relations with Myanmar since 2013 without obvious association with any ASEAN initiatives.

Sino-American rivalry has intensified since Trump’s administration (Hui Feng 2020) and the two superpowers are irreversibly locked into such extreme rivalry that both countries’ allies and partners, need to consistently maneuver in order to avoid choosing sides (Stromseth 2019). Washington and Beijing’s relationship varies between complicated, positive and highly negative – economic ties in the 80s began to flourish albeit rivalry over the Pacific region has never ceased, each suspicious over the other’s geopolitical agenda (Woon 2018). China was denoted a “strategic competitor” by Trump’s Administration by 2017 (National Security Strategy 2017) and subsequently launched a trade war against China. By mid-2020 continuously deteriorated with both sides accusing the other of causing the COVID-19 pandemic (O’Keeffe et al. 2020) - the rhetoric relayed by US politicians or citizens condemned China as the culprit for the pandemic.

Washington has continued its campaign of increased military maneuvers to balance Beijing’s hard power assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region, highlighting its consistent intention of keeping the region free from Chinese dominance. The bilateral tension and show of force continued as both sides cannot afford to appear weak to the world, albeit the COVID-19 pandemic. The Far East region particularly the SCS and Taiwan Strait have been particularly pressured to align between one side or the other – in a sense forcing the world to accommodate to the two rivalling superpowers. As such ASEAN is the formal regional grouping that can potentially represent the face of Southeast Asia and become the pivotal mechanism to resolve the predicaments caused by the two competing superpowers – through close collaboration among member nations and other like-minded middle powers.

ASEAN: PIVOTAL MECHANISM FOR REGIONAL STABILITY

The SCS, an inherent maritime territory of the SEA region, has always been the object of global power play - a critical SLOC for a significant volume of the world’s goods are shipped through this territory, indicating its global significance as an economic and strategic sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. As such, the SCS is also the hotbed of complex maritime territorial disputes or tensions that are potentially devastating if not diplomatically contained or defused. The security construct of the SEA region, particularly that associated with the SCS (ie. eight out of ten AMS are SCS littoral states), may implicate various global issues - the Sino-US rivalry has further emphasised this fact and as central to the US initiated Indo-Pacific strategy, issues associated with

the SCS has consistently become an inherent aspect of current global geopolitical discourse. With that in mind, ASEAN, being the collective platform to represent members in the said region, has taken the initiative to become the “voice of regional stability”.

Most AMS, particularly SCS littoral states themselves, remain cautious of relations with both rivalling superpowers to date; however, still welcoming US presence while at the same time strengthening ties with its competition (i.e., China). The demise of the Cold War order had benefitted the whole world. Painful lessons learned from past conflicts caused by ideological differences during the Cold War indicate that another Cold War era would be detrimental to most developing countries. It may also set back progress to the global economy apart from stunting the growth of a civilized and progressive international society based on prosperity for all humanities. The issues of contention may have evolved, but the potentially devastating implications from intense power rivalry remain the risk of being burdened on non-participating state actors.

The people of SEA have experience first-hand, the detrimental effects of deadly conflicts initiated by competing powers – from ancient empires of the past to superpower rivalries in the modern era. Citizens of ASEAN countries are “products” of the afore-mentioned suffering. The “ASEAN way” approach can be deemed to be a culmination of good practices from past experiences handed down from leaders of the earlier generations for the purpose of addressing the implications of great power rivalry. AMS had been colonies of great powers at some point in history, be it from the East or West. In such a way, ASEAN, which is recognised as an essential regional platform by way of its relevance to the Indo-Pacific agenda, indicates its suitability and ability to engage both competing superpowers productively. AMS’ collective experience and their commitment to achieving regional prosperity and peace (ASEAN Charter) are also contributing factors.

The geopolitical foundation of ASEAN is associated with its commitment towards strengthening dialogue relations, creation of broader ASEAN-led economic and strategic initiatives denoting aspirations to ASEAN Centrality. Thus, the notion of ASEAN Centrality itself reveals the conscious positioning of ASEAN as a pivotal mechanism for addressing great power competition in the region. From a realist perspective, Chinese maritime assertiveness has allowed the US to regain regional trust to sustain its geopolitical goals, particularly in the security domain. Washington’s attraction to the region is in the security domain, which is inherent because of the need to protect its interests. By way of the intrinsic nature of security issues that mutually benefit regional state actors, individual ASEAN members or ASEAN as a collective body is united in its stand to favour US presence. On the other hand, in the same mutually benefitting way, economic advantages motivate a united ASEAN front to support Chinese ties in bilateral or multilateral terms.

The current global pandemic has opened another opportunity for rivalling powers to regain motivate regional trust – by way of vaccine diplomacy, which is instrumental for soft power strategic manoeuvring. Nevertheless, geopolitical advantages would only be realisable with careful management of their approaches. Under the Biden administration, the US had quickly further exploited the opportunity to regain regional confidence through vaccine diplomacy when issues concerning Chinese vaccines began emerging. Trump’s presidency had increased the ASEAN trust deficit in the US and had given China a head-start in strategic soft power manoeuvring. Nevertheless, foreign policies can only become the sources of soft power only if there are no other policies that “appear to be hypocritical, arrogant, indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a narrow approach to national interests” (Nye 2005). China has failed to observe that its employment of vaccine diplomacy is seriously negated by its assertiveness in the SCS, i.e., its soft

power efforts are undermined by its evident hard power approach in handling maritime territorial disputes. Biden, however, is aware of the waning US legitimacy in the SEA geopolitical construct and has revised associated policy to quickly re-engage in multilateral platforms through vaccine diplomacy to regain confidence in the region.

All AMS are demonstrating realist notions of self-preservation – for survival and autonomy. Except for Cambodia and Laos (entrenched Chinese interests), all are free to choose sides based on bilateral or multilateral considerations. For instance, ASEAN as a collective body is intuitive with its response to the rapid increases in the scale of China's economic influence in the region and reacts by way of enmeshment to ensure that some multilateral mechanism for limiting China's economic prosperity and strength from dominating the area economically and wield extraordinary political which can become a threat to SEA. Machiavellianism-based practices through ASEAN are evident, not in terms of gaining power as an outcome, but by leveraging existing powers that compete for its support through enmeshment and hedging strategies. ASEAN as a united front can become a collective entity of great significance in the regional geopolitical construct. The present and foreseeable future look bright for a united ASEAN to pose collectively as a middle power – albeit its pivotal role can only be of substance if all member states are united in their stand against the competing superpowers. Middle powers have the geopolitical leverage to increase influence as great power competition intensifies – opportunities to strategically manoeuvre and manage the outcome of the rivalry in their favour.

In sum, ASEAN's leadership capability is argued to be demonstrative of its pivotal role for influencing superpower rivalry in the Southeast Asian region. Findings from relevant analysis strongly supports the arguments that the current Sino-US rivalry in the Southeast Asian region can be managed and influenced by ASEAN, as such answering how ASEAN is a significant stabilizing factor in view of heightening US-China rivalry which is seen to be restructuring the geopolitical balance in the region.

CONCLUSION

China's strategic approach in the SCS - a perplexing mix of soft and hard power diplomacy has fuelled continuous debates on Chinese threat to economic sovereignty, thus emphasised the need for state actors in the region to seek for an equilibrium of economic gains and sovereign security - the necessity of retaining US support as a balancing factor. The arguments pursued in this paper are indicative of Southeast Asian resilient against foreign intervention and are tactful in the way they deal with dominating regional powers. Lessons learnt from the past aided regional or enhanced each country's strategic approaches for maintaining autonomy of states while maintaining mutually beneficial ties with competing powers in the region.

The realist approach for survival clearly dictates how diplomatic relations are shaped - the ASEAN way of non-interference accommodates for conformance by all member states, hence the uniqueness of the approach for ensuring a united front for dealing with issues that require collective initiatives – the omni-enmeshment approach when dealing with the US and China has typically become the common strategy. In fact, ASEAN as a collective agent have directly or indirectly benefited its members from this approach; shaping a regional power distribution outcome that retains US security leadership role while integrating China's robust geoeconomics support. Although individual state interests dominate bilateral or multilateral relations – ASEAN has consistently rely on “common grounds” such as this, in order to reign in and unite its members. As such, through ASEAN, constructive and comprehensive engagements are made priority rather than solely aligning with the US to isolate or “contain” China. A zero-sum power equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific is a thus a common objective.

It is also note that the reality of current ASEAN-centric geopolitical development in the region, the current US administration has somewhat renewed commitments towards increasing Southeast Asian confidence through ASEAN in order to regain regional significance. By banking on its FOIP strategy, Washington “has gone on the diplomatic offensive in Southeast Asia after years of passive US engagement” for this purpose. Therefore, it is sufficient to conclude that the enmeshment strategy remains to be popularly deployed by ASEAN as a multilateral platform or by member states through individual bilateral policies – “strategic hedging through enmeshment ensures dynamic alignment options in order to facilitate the ease of adjustment when strategic opportunities arise resulting from the rivalling great powers manoeuvres”.

The Sino-US competition in the Indo-Pacific, with SCS issues being central to the contentions has inadvertently emphasised ASEAN's role as a collective middle power base for handling either of the competing powers. As individual states, ASEAN member countries, particularly SCS littoral states themselves remains cautious of relations with both rivalling superpowers, nevertheless, still welcoming US presence while at the same time strengthening ties with its rival. Through ASEAN or the notion of ASEAN centrality, member states are able to leverage accordingly in order to engage both competing superpowers productively – it is also argued that ASEAN members' collective experience in addition to their commitment towards achieving regional prosperity and peace are also contributing factors.

ASEAN leadership is demonstrated through its willingness to lead or host strategic initiatives and dialogues – the conscious positioning of ASEAN as a pivotal mechanism for addressing issues arising from great power rivalry in the region is the manifestation of member states' commitments towards ASEAN centrality. All member nations are demonstrating realist notions of self-preservation - for survival and autonomy. Even in times of the pandemic, ASEAN as a multilateral mechanism is instinctive with its response to the rapid increases in the scale of external power influence in the region, wielding extraordinary political will to neutralise threats to the stability construct of the region. A united ASEAN posed collectively as a middle power base serves to benefit its member states provided that it common goal is set for peace and prosperity for all, whilst prone for leveraging to out-manoeuvre dominating intentions by external powers.

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SHAPING NAVAL POWER: IMPLICATION OF AUKUS TO MALAYSIA'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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ABSTRACT

Malaysia has placed nine core security values in its efforts to uphold the state's Federal Constitution. The existence of these nine core values that are considered dynamic and complex is aimed to evaluate changes in the current and future security environment. This is important according to Buzan who stated that national security involves relatively complex and amorphous entities. Every state is exposed to political, economic, environmental, societal, and military threats that may create insecure situations. According to Waltz, in the structure of the international relations system, security is the primary goal of a state due to the structural pressures and responses to the protection of its security. As a sovereign nation, Malaysia defines national security "as a continuous and comprehensive effort in ensuring that Malaysia remains existent, peaceful and prosperous."

Keywords: *AUKUS, Alliance, Maritime Strategy, Threat, Strategic Control, Sovereignty, Security, Defence Industry, Partnership*

INTRODUCTION

The notion is supported by Monica Gariup who explained that security is a government policy aimed at creating peace and protecting national interests from enemy threats. It can be described as a state's responsibility in defending its values of independence and sovereignty, and ensuring the safety of its people so that they live in harmony and peace. Therefore, in the face of AUKUS' establishment, Malaysia needs to be wise and stand firm in protecting its strategic interests.

DISCUSSION

The announcement by the U.S. on its withdrawal from the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan was something of a shock. The conflict is best described as a long war which began with the September 11, 2011 incident and has to date, resulted in the deaths of 2,461 military personnel and an expenditure of more than USD2 trillion.

Joe Biden's administration sees the Afghanistan war as one that is not giving returns to U.S. interests. To the current government, the need to address the rise of China which is now seen as more dominant in the Indo-Pacific region is more important as it can undermine the U.S.' priorities globally. Therefore, AUKUS' launch on 15 September 2021 as a tripartite security partnership involving the U.S., Australia and the United Kingdom (UK) took place not long after the U.S.' withdrawal from Afghanistan. The move is in line with Biden's statement which entails that the era of military operations to rebuild other countries is over. The move is also taken as a response by the U.S. towards China's maritime strategy which employs the concept of "Island Chain Strategy" as shown in Figure 1.



Figure 1: China's Island Chains Strategy

Source: U.S. Defense Naval Intelligence, 2009

Under this strategy, China has strengthened its assertiveness in the “first chain” which consists of the Kuril Islands, Japan’s main archipelago, Okinawa, and the South China Sea (SCS). Meanwhile, China’s presence in the “second chain” which extends from Japan to Guam certainly gives an advantage to Beijing in the middle of the Pacific by allowing both dominant and strategic control.

In the face of this current situation, the aim of AUKUS is to preserve the security and stability of the Indo-Pacific region through equipping the Australian Fleet with nuclear-powered submarines. This security partnership is seen as a collective commitment by the three-nation alliance in developing cyber technology, artificial intelligence, and underwater domain capabilities. To illustrate its gravity, the Prime Minister of Australia had emphasized the matter in one of his statements, saying that “our technology, our scientists, our industry, our defense forces are all working together to deliver a safer and more secure region that ultimately benefits all.” This arrangement has resulted in various reactions from many countries, with those opposing the existence of AUKUS being amongst them. Among the most prominent opponents is France since the tripartite agreement has caused the cancellation of a submarine contract with Australia at a cost of \$66 billion euros.

Consequences of the Indo-Pacific construct for Australia's regional strategy

Although the fundamental goal of AUKUS is to enhance regional cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, it is seen to be more centered on military alliances. What's more, Australia's determination to cancel the project with France invited outrage and was described as a “stab in the back.” The contract, signed in 2016, had promised the supply of 12 conventional diesel-electric submarines, with the first supply expected in 2027. Besides, Australia's agreement on the development of nuclear-powered submarine technology with the U.S. and the UK under the auspices of AUKUS is the first in sixty years, as the arrangement was only shared previously between the U.S. and the UK. It makes Australia the seventh country in the world to have a submarine powered by a nuclear reactor. The question now is, why did Australia insisted on canceling the submarine manufacturing agreement contract with France and instead, accept technical offers from the U.S. and UK to develop nuclear-powered submarines? This issue can be further elaborated on based on the following aspects:

a. **China as a threat.** Australia sees China as capable of posing a threat to the country's democratic system of administration and sovereignty. It is stated in a statement made by the Prime Minister of Australia, Scott Morrison who said that "China is not only a major trading partner but also a threat to national sovereignty. The dramatic shift shows how the country struggles with China's growing power." Among the actions seen as a threat to Australia are China's attempts to influence the decisions of Australian politicians both at the local council and federal parliamentary levels, alongside Chinese students at local Australian universities. Additionally, Beijing has also intervened in the administration of Chinese-language media in Australia. The situation became increasingly tense when Australia who was among the countries lobbying world leaders to investigate the origins of COVID 19 found out that the disease first appeared in Wuhan, China. The situation made Beijing angry, and it retaliated by imposing trade restrictions, technically suspending beef imports, and restricting a \$439 million barley trade by imposing an 80.5 percent tariff on Australian imports. In addition, China also withheld shipments of coal and wine by placing those as technical issues under customs.

b. **Force projection.** Australia sees the ability to own nuclear-powered submarines in addition to long-range missiles using U.S. technology as a benchmark in shaping "force projection". This need is also seen as a response by Prime Minister of Australia, Scott Morrison who mentioned that "China has a very strong nuclear submarine development program." Thus, Australia's decision to own nuclear-powered submarines is in essence, a determination to defend itself against China's assertiveness and aggressive policy regarding airspace in addition to the issue of overlapping maritime territorial claims. This capability also allows Australia to mobilize its strategic assets to operate remotely and act as a forward base that allows for tactical and preventive advantage. Shown in Figure 2 is a comparison of capabilities between nuclear-powered submarines and conventional class submarines. It is clear that being equipped with nuclear-powered submarines afford the Australian Fleet many advantages. This advantage will also translate into technological development of the country's defense industry.




Figure 2: Benefits of a Nuclear Submarine Fleet in Australia

Source: Brent Sadler, 2021

The U.S. influence in Indo-Pacific region

The U.S.' determination to strengthen its influence in the Indo-Pacific region through AUKUS is undeniably also seen as a deterrent signal to China. This retaliatory stance is taken in response to China's Belt and Road Initiative which has effectively expanded the nation's maritime routes across the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, making it easier for the upcoming giant to realize its economic power and strategic ambitions. Furthermore, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated that China's real military expenditure had reached USD240 billion in 2019, nearly 40 percent higher than the official budget (USD183.5 billion) reported as shown in Figure 3. The U.S. Department of Defense had also confirmed this, therefore acknowledging that China's actual defense spending that year could be higher than USD200 billion. According to SIPRI, China's defense expenditure for 2019 is much higher than the combined defense expenditures of India, Russia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Based on the increases made to China's defense allocation every year, Biden's administration has foreseen the need to priorities the Indo-Pacific region by strengthening deterrence in order to prevent the growing threat of China's military capabilities.




Figure 3: China's Estimated Defense Spending

Source: Funaiolo P. Matthew and Hart Brian, 2021

In light of this data, the U.S. realizes that it needs to build its own capacity as an effort to curb China's advance. Thus, one of the essential steps of doing so is to step up its military presence. On the other hand, it is obvious that the U.S.' efforts to strengthen the defense aspect of the region is in line with a statement by U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton who stated, "the Indo-Pacific is crucial to our future." Moreover, the Chinese government had criticized the U.S. over its relationship with Taiwan which it describes as an autonomous island belonging to China. Therefore, China is likely to pursue a more assertive approach by developing its nuclear policy capabilities to threaten the U.S.' military capabilities in the region. This can be proved based on the argument that China's claim over the SCS is due to three main factors. First, it gives China's Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN) the advantage of carrying out strategic patrols. This statement was also acknowledged by President Xi Jinping, who mentioned that the need for nuclear submarines is "to manage the SCS." Secondly, the SCS can act as a buffer zone for China if the U.S. carries out a military attack on mainland China. Third, China's maritime transportation needs sea routes, and this matches the SCS' role of hosting about a third of global maritime trade. The deployment of China SSBNs is seen as a key strategic asset in protecting China's national

security. Additionally, the U.S. worries about China's nuclear strategic development capability as it has developed relatively fast and is now treated as the main foundation for the protection of China's national sovereignty and security. It is also expected that China will possess 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, a target which is in line with its ambitions to develop its military capabilities. This effort is evidenced by China's defense budget for 2021 which has increased by 6.8 percent (equivalent to USD209 billion) compared to year before.

China's Stance on AUKUS and Influence of its 2019 Defense White Paper

China takes defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region seriously as it deems those in the area as irresponsible. China's Foreign Minister, Zhao Lijian had once voiced that AUKUS is capable of undermining regional peace and stability as well as intensify the nuclear arms race." This statement was also emphatically acknowledged by Chinese President Xi Jinping who said that the construction of a U.S.-led alliance would be the cause of a repeat of the Cold War which took place around the 1970s between the U.S. and Russia. Also slamming the U.S.' actions, an international media channel belonging to the Chinese Communist Party mentioned that Washington had lost its mind by gathering its allies to oppose China.

However, it was observed that several Chinese actions were the ones that had stimulated the establishment of AUKUS. Primarily, China's 2019 Defense White Paper had stated in detail for the first time the acts of instability by countries such as the U.S., Russia, EU, the UK, Germany, France, Japan, and India. Moreover, the white paper also contained allegations of the U.S.' actions as being the main cause of disruption in the international security order. Besides, the white paper had also linked Xi Jinping's desire to achieve the "China Dream" vision as a key element to the "strong military dream", as illustrated in Figure 4. This was outlined by Xi Jinping in his speech during the 19th Party Congress in 2017 in which he mentioned that he aspires the Chinese military to become a mechanized force with increased, informative and strategic capabilities by 2020, followed by being a fully modernized force by 2035, and a first world class military by 2049.




Figure 4: Xi Jinping's total overhaul of the Chinese military (2015-2020)

Source: Mercator Institute for China Studies, 2016

Malaysia's Stance on AUKUS and Its Implications

Malaysia has clearly stated concerns over the tripartite cooperation. This was voiced by the Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Ismail Sabri Yaakob himself during the East Asia Summit. He stated that “the development of AUKUS could lead to nuclear arms race and trigger tensions, resulting in regional instability, especially in the South China Sea.” Furthermore, Malaysia remains committed to ensuring the Southeast Asian region as a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) as delineated in the Declaration and Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty. Malaysia's firm stance on the existence of AUKUS can be highlight based on two things:

- a. Arms race. The purchases of nuclear submarines by Australia from the U.S. gives a signal that countries in the ASEAN region as well as in the Asia Pacific will also further strengthen their military systems. This notion is exemplified by China's transfer of its former diesel-electric submarines to Myanmar in the first transfer of assets involving the two countries. The move is also seen as a sign of China's support for Myanmar's military government against the backdrop of local protests and opposition. China's move to supply such strategic assets to Myanmar also raises concerns among ASEAN countries whose foreign ministers unanimously do not support the Myanmar junta's actions as they are seen as linked to human rights abuses and the undermining of the concept of democracy. The situation is increasingly challenging as Taiwan, which is currently in conflict with China, is also in the process of building eight diesel-electric-powered submarines which are expected to be handed over to the Taiwan Army in 2025. What is more worrying is that this submarine development project involves assistance from seven countries namely the U.S., UK, India, Australia, South Korea, Canada, and Spain. With the acquisition of diesel-electric-powered submarines, it is not impossible that Taiwan will also be able to build and own nuclear-powered submarines in the future.
- b. Economic growth is affected. In addition, if the existence of AUKUS causes a tense situation in the Asia Pacific region, it would undoubtedly be seen as a call for the presence of foreign troops, especially in the SCS. The seas will then effectively be a battleground, a condition that will certainly have a significant impact on the economic growth of ASEAN countries as a majority of their regional and world trade is heavily dependent on the SCS. Additionally, the sea lanes that pass through SCS are the busiest and most important trade routes in the world. In 2016, it recorded the passage of one-third of the world's maritime trade at an estimated worth of USD 3.4 trillion. It accounts for almost 40 percent of China's trade, where 90 percent is petroleum imports from Japan and South Korea, and 6 percent is its total U.S. trade. In addition, ASEAN is China's leading investment destination and largest trading partner in sectors such as manufacturing, agriculture, infrastructure, high technology, digital economy, and green economy. This is proven by strong economic growth in June 2021 where a year-on-year growth of 38.2 percent was recorded, with investments exceeding USD310 billion and business revenue of Chinese enterprises from project contracts in ASEAN countries approaching USD350 billion.

Malaysia's Approach to Ensuring Security

Malaysia uses its international cooperation and external relations as well as political, social, economic, and cultural stance to contributes to ensuring regional stability and security. As a sovereign nation, Malaysia prioritizes on the spirit of cooperation and goodwill with all countries regardless of political ideology which is in line with Malaysia's policy of neutrality. However, the

current situation calls for the country to also ensure that the region is free from political disputes between major powers, especially the U.S. and China. Table 1 shows Malaysia's policy concerning the U.S. and China. In the aspects of political and diplomatic relations, Malaysia adopts a benevolent approach with both countries to pursue what it perceives as actions that protect national interests. In terms of economy, Malaysia is more dependent on China compared to the U.S. In 2020, China was Malaysia's leading trading partner with a total trade value of RM329.77 billion. Additionally, a drastic increase in trade value of RM454.78 billion (USD108.28 billion) was recorded between both nations for the period from January to August 2021. On the other hand, Malaysia has more dominant ties to the U.S. than China in terms of security. From 2018 to 2022, the U.S. allocated security assistance of approximately USD220 million involving the provision of equipment, education, training, and other exchange programs to Malaysia. Meanwhile, approximately USD1 million was earmarked for International Military Education and Training Programs parked under a military agreement to bolster and develop human capital between the two countries.




Table 1: Regional Perspectives of Relative U.S. and Chinese Influence (2018)

Source: Regional Responses to U.S.-China Competition in the Indo-Pacific by Bonny Lin et al., 2020

Furthermore, one of Malaysia's principles in resolving international issues is negotiation based on international law. Malaysia has for now chosen to avoid any debate, more so those involving force or coercion. This cautious approach can be seen through Malaysia's effort to call the Chinese Ambassador to express Malaysia's stance and protest against the presence and activities of Chinese ships in Malaysia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) off the coast of Sabah and Sarawak as the action is contrary to the EEZ Act 1984 and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982. This firmness of stance demonstrates Malaysia's commitment to ensure that every issue of national interest is resolved peacefully and constructively according to international law.

Malaysia possesses the capability to balance the region's security through its diplomatic ties with both China and the U.S. The relationship between Malaysia and China is generally characterized as a "comprehensive strategic partnership" as it involves close collaboration in various dimensions, enhancement of strategic trust, and sharing of opportunities and joint development plans. Meanwhile, the relationship between Malaysia and the U.S. holds a "comprehensive partnership" status as it covers cooperation in the fields of politics and diplomacy, economics, education, people-to-people relations, and defense and security. Therefore, Malaysia will continue to enhance and strengthen ties with both countries simultaneously without favoring any country over the other. This approach can indirectly impact Malaysia's efforts in determining and influencing regional security issues.

Additionally, Malaysia's presence in ASEAN allows it to influence the region's stability. As one of the founding nations of ASEAN and a pioneer of the concept of ZOPFAN which is based on the "principle of peaceful coexistence," its role in balancing issues related to regional security is huge. The concept of ZOPFAN which is the backbone of ASEAN was born from Malaysia's strategy which was to ensure that Southeast Asia was not involved in major power rivalry during the Cold War. Thus, Malaysia which is often seen as the spokesperson for ASEAN needs to be firm with the AUKUS alliance in asking it to recognize the ZOPFAN concept which is integral in the regional security structure as a tool that ensures the region as free from nuclear weapons. This stance which explains Malaysia's determination was voiced by the Senior Minister of Defense, Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein who said that "Malaysia is in a position to balance the great powers of the region, but at the same time, well respected by both polar powers in the South China Sea."

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the existence of AUKUS is part of a political and military strategy to balance power in the Indo-Pacific region. Therefore, Malaysia needs to be prudent in ensuring that the country's security and sovereignty is not compromised in the face of the establishment of a military alliance between Australia, the UK, and the U.S. In addition, in the face of geopolitical challenges involving regional security, it is appropriate that the role of ASEAN through its defense diplomacy be made the focus in the efforts of balancing the influence of major powers. The element of mutual trust between Malaysia and the U.S. in the aspects of security and defense in particular is seen to be able to accommodate the need for stability in the region. This can indirectly influence other allied countries to not act aggressively. On the other hand, the element of mutual trust between Malaysia and China stems from a bilateral economic interest between the two nations. This situation pushes China into needing Malaysia in order to reach its maximum potential through the concept of peaceful rise. Therefore, Malaysia should maintain its stance on AUKUS to ensure harmony and peace in the Indo-Pacific region. (3,493 words)

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POLITICAL STABILITY AND SABAH SECURITY INTERESTS: AN OVERVIEW FROM A COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

Malaysia basically has no political stability especially after 14th Malaysian General Election (GE14) when Members of Parliament (MPs) or Assembly members jump from one party to another as well as the alternating governments. This paper aims to highlights (explains) how security interests are affected by political stability. The introduction of anti-hopping laws and lowering the eligibility of voting age to 18 reflect legislation changes due to political changes and how these moves in return can influence the enactment of government policies related to Sabah security interests. Security issues in Sabah East Coast is an overarching thematic which is like an umbrella that covers all other conflicts that are reported episodically in the mass media such as Ops Daulat, pump boat, illegal immigrants, stateless, cross-border crimes, and health issues. These pertinent issues are often manipulated by politicians with various rhetoric for their own benefit. It is public's responsibility to be cautious with any information on going issues to avoid manipulated by others.

Keywords: *Synchronized, Legislation, Communication, National Security, Kidnapping, Legislation, Insurgency, Sovereignty, Refugees, Political Ideology*

INTRODUCTION

Political stability plays important in safeguarding the national security and public interests. Often seeing a change of government witness a policy change that involves the interests of the nation. For example, efforts from Lezine and Reed (2007) show that political will is essential for public health policy change and so is implementation. Changes in government both at the federal and state levels that often occur after the 14th Malaysian General Election (GE14) also saw important policy changes related to Sabah security interest. Ironically, plenty of excuses like abuse of power, fraught in some way with some form of illegality, and abuse of process in reviewing or terminating a law like in scrapping (repealing) the anti-fake news act. Although Malaysian are basically media-savvy, but it is often misinformed. Therefore, when it comes to policy reforms, there are often diverse reactions from the community and one of the biggest challenges in the context of globalization is the spread of fake news.

Sometimes it's alarming to hear about various cross-border crimes in the Sabah East Coast areas even though the federal government and the state have worked closely with all agencies to carry out numerous endless efforts to scrub the illegal activities. Seizures of subsidized goods smuggled out to neighboring countries while the goods smuggled in are usually alcoholic beverages and cigarettes are often featured in the Malaysian news. Various committees have been form to strengthen the cooperation between all parties in this matter. The Chief Minister of the government of the day will be the State Security Committee Chairman. Under the current GRS+BN government, a Special Committee on Undocumented Foreign Workers and Foreign Nationals has also been established in seeking a permanent solution for the repatriation of illegal Indonesian and Filipino immigrants. The Deputy Chief Minister Datuk Seri Dr. Jeffrey Kitingan has been appointed to head this committee which is empowered to specifically deal with all stakeholders. Nevertheless, when the government changes due to political instability always saw change in these policies as each government tends to have a different focus or emphasis.

Sabah geographically is a maritime region surrounded by long coastal waters exposing it to various cross-border health and safety issues. Historical factors, population demographics (including socio-cultural), and law enforcement commitment have played an important role in

security in the case of Sabah. The vast sea borders across the borders of Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines make it difficult for authorities to control traffic between the three regions. Polio cases that had disappeared for so long in Malaysia suddenly appeared in Sabah due to illegal immigrants. The World Health Organization (WHO) report clearly linked the polio outbreak detected in Malaysia genetically linked to poliovirus circulating in the Philippines (2020). The distance between Lahad Datu and Tungku and more interesting is the distance from Tawi Tawi which is reported to take around 45 minutes by pump boat. Sebatik Island near Tawau is owned half by Indonesia and half by Malaysia. Many Indonesians especially those who live on the border work on the Malaysian side including the mainland and their patriotism is reflected through the slogan *“harimau di perutku, garuda di dadaku.”* Harimau refers to Malaysia while Garuda is Indonesia meaning that Malaysia is the place of their economic resources, but their soul remains Indonesian. The maritime boundary itself has turned into a dispute in the context of national sovereignty and international affairs. The overlapping claims between Pulau Ligitan and Sipadan had to be resolved in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2002 with a court verdict in favor of Malaysia.

Political Turmoil in Sabah

Party hopping in Malaysia has reached its news heights after 14th General Election (GE14) which was held on 9th May 2018. As many as 40 MPs switching sides, the federal government has changed thrice, and three prime ministers have been appointed after GE14 due to the political instability. Sabah's political turmoil started with UPKO betrays BN to switch sides to join their opponents GE14, Warisan to overthrow the BN government formed after GE14. The betrayal of the trust of the people's vote started in Sabah less than 48 hours after Tan Sri Musa Aman swore in as the Sabah Chief Minister.

At the federal level, the power struggle to become Prime Minister in Pakatan Harapan (PH) has dramatically led to the infamous Sheraton Move in February 2020 and the collapsed of the PH government after only 22 months in power. The ongoing internal disputes on when to pass baton to Anwar was believed due to there was a mutual agreement between Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad with the PH alliance to step down after two years and hand over the baton to Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim. Disagreements on the succession plan has led to Tun Dr. Mahathir stepped down as Malaysia's Prime Minister and Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin become the 8th Malaysian Prime Minister after witnessed Yang Di-Pertuan Agong's wisdom in handling the political crisis (exercised his Constitutional duties under Article 43 of the Federal Constitution in finding a solution for the country's political turmoil). Political pressure plagued by the Covid19 pandemic saw Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin hand over the Prime Minister post to Ismail Sabri. The biggest implication of the abrupt resignation of Tun Dr. Mahathir and the fall of the PH government on the federal level is again witnessing assemblymen jumping to join Warisan or its allies after GE14 returns to Tan Sri Musa Aman in July 2020. As a result of this, Shafie Apdal dissolved the state assembly to hold a new election in September 2022. Eventually, the newly formed political allies after the nomination of a candidate known as Gabungan Rakyat Sabah (GRS) with BN has won defeating Warisan.

Media and National Security

According to Rhea Abraham (2012) national security cover various disciplines including core values, theories, security interests, challenges, options for management, and other aspects that cover almost all areas of national enterprises such as defence, internal security, economic and technological security, and others that are all linked holistically. What is interesting here is that it requires the power of the media to report what the public should know or not. This was explained by Tuchman (1978) in news is a window of the world. Through its frame, society learns of themselves and others, of their institutions, leaders, and lifestyles, and those of other nations and their peoples. However, like any frame that delineates a world, the news frame may be considered problematic. This premise is also the basis in the news framing discussions where Entman (1993) explains to frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality from the event or issue to make

them more prominent in the communication text to define the problem, diagnose the underlying essence involved, proposing moral or legislation considerations and then propose its solution. This also means that the issues of national security (or any issues) that the public knows are dependent on the narrative presented by the media and their understanding is determined by which media channels they access and how much information they get. Those who are exposed to episodic frames are more likely to endorse message-consistent attitudes than those who are exposed to a thematic frame (Springer & Harwood, 2014). This argument is supported by Moniza Waheed, Schuck, Neijens, & de Vreese (2015) in their research findings besides values are a fundamental moderator of media effects in determining citizens' political attitudes.

Gatekeeping and Media Censorship

What the public knows depends on what is reported by the media outlet (Iyengar, 1991). The news that reaches audiences is the output of a process called gatekeeping and media censorship. The framing approach proposes that information in routine news reports correspond to newsroom frames whereby the journalists prefer information consistent with their own attitudes, and news reporting that is 'synchronized' with editorial tendencies (Scheufele, 2006). Theoretically the newsgathering in the context of the new mediascape has turned quicker (which also witnessed the emergence of public journalism) contributes to faster dissemination (even can go viral overnight), wider access (borderless), and amazing feedback from the audience which also results in a new research method known as user generated contents (UGC). It is not possible for someone to find the absolute truth on any issues (including national security issues) through news reporting but only closer to the truth when more information is obtained.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

The dominant narrative of political tension often revolves around racial and religious issues that erode ethnic relations and racial unity. Many overlook that the country's political turmoil has a direct impact on national security that determines social cohesion. Security-related issues that go viral are often a politicized version and require a series of reports from different sources for a long period of time, sometimes years to find out the truth of the story. Politicians are sometimes like stand-up comedians when their (campaign) speeches are meant to entertain. The majority don't like the facts (truth) which always sounds boring. Not many will take the time to follow the development (either episodic or thematic) of an issue before jumping to a conclusion. The worst part is that some even read the headlines only to draw to their conclusions. The six littoral combat ships (LCS) scandal for instance whereby isn't it strange that the forensic audit didn't emphasize on the project status during the 22 months PH ruled the federal government. This is especially after so many nationwide projects that have been reviewed and renegotiated or have been axed by the PH government. These exclude the review and renegotiation of mega projects such as East Coast Rail Link (ECRL), Light Rail Transit 3 (LRT3) and Mass Rapid Transit 2 (MRT2), cancelling the Multi-Product Pipeline, Sabah Gas Pipeline, and many others. There is no doubt that there is also information that may be classified under The Official Secrets Act 1972 that cannot be revealed. An issue sometimes takes time to find out the truth.

METHODOLOGY

The selected issues are the issues closest to Sabah security issues generated from a series of content analysis from selected online newspapers. The issue discussed is the findings are Sabah priority issue obtained from study using a theoretical framework modified from framing, moral panic, and agenda setting theory. In terms of thematically these issues fall under the political frame but narrow down to national security as its sub-frame. Initially, the issues taken from two content analysis studies of media reports sponsored by the National Professors Council (MPN) and Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS) that can be discussed are so broad including food security and digital poverty, but suit with the objective will narrow down to focus on issues that are directly related to the security issues in Sabah. The second criterion is that the issue discussed should

witnessed policy changes on the issue. Without this screening process, it is certain that the 1MDB (1Malaysia Development Berhad) scandal will occupy one of the highest places in the chart. More importantly, in this context is to explain how political change can affect policies related to national security.

FINDINGS

The past decade has seen various policy reforms and the introduction of new legislation due to political pressure. Various policies involving national security were introduced in Sabah during the National Front (BN) was in power and likewise when PH ruled, even though it was only for 22 months, it has witnessed several efforts to change or improve existing policies. For example, ESSCOM and ESSZONE was trigger by Lahad Datu Intrusion & Kampung Siminul Stand-off. Policy or legislative reforms that can affect policies that involve security issues are also important to be discussed.

Anti-Hopping Laws

The Lower House of the Parliament (Dewan Rakyat) has passed the anti-hopping bill on 28th July 2022 with more than two-thirds majority. Prime Minister Datuk Seri Ismail Sabri Yaakob tabled the Bill on the previous day (Wednesday, July 27) after the Bill was tabled for first reading by the Law Minister, Datuk Seri Dr. Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar on April 11, 2022. This anti-hopping law is crucial to enhance political stability as well as to ensure public confidence in the electoral system. Although in the early 1990's saw the late Tun Mustapha forced to vacate his Usukan seat when he moved from the USNO party to UMNO and had to hold by-elections, since the 1992 Federal Court ruling in Kelantan state legislative assembly v Nordin Salleh has breached (violate) Article 10(1)(c) of the Federal Constitution which guaranteed freedom of association, most notable is the undemocratically bringing down elected governments in Sabah in 1994, Malaysia basically has no political stability especially after 14th Malaysian General Election (GE14) when Members of Parliament (MPs) or Assembly members jump from one party to another as well as the alternating governments. Eventually party-hopping has caused political instability and subsequently poor governance. The anti-hopping laws important not because of loyalty to their parties nor the people's trust was not betrayed, but because a change of government usually involves policy changes including the purchase of military assets to safeguard and maintain the national security. To some extent in the case of the purchase of six MD530G lightweight combat helicopters for use in the East Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) has been influenced by the change of government.

“Undi18”

Elections are important not only does it reflect the democratic system practiced in our nation, but the winning candidates will become legislators who will decide whether a policy is maintained, reformed, or abolished. Earlier, the Malaysian Parliament on July 16, 2019, passed the bill amending paragraph (a), Clause 1, Article 119, of the Federal Constitution presented by then Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir to reduce the minimum voting age from 21 years to 18 years. The amendment also includes paragraph (b), Article 47 of the Federal Constitution to reduce the eligibility of candidates from 21 to 18 years. These changes will certainly affect the results of the 15th General Election (expected to be completed latest by 2023) as the automatic registration approved in conjunction with the two matters above will see an increase of 7.8 million voters across Malaysia. This amendment has placed Malaysia to be at par with other countries in Southeast Asia except for Singapore (minimum of 21 years old) and Brunei (no elections), to have a minimum age of voting below 21 years of age. This has set a benchmark to show the world a new and progressive Malaysia. With the voting and candidacy age been lowered to 18 will see more participation from Malaysian adolescents in formulating the nation's public defence policy.

Pump Boat

Warisan-led State lead by Chief Minister Datuk Seri Shafie Apdal after successfully seizing the government from BN on 12 May 2018 has lift the pump boat (bot pancung) ban which was believed to lead (contributed) to the cross-border crimes especially smuggling of subsidized goods to neighbouring countries and kidnapping for ransom. Previously starting (April 2016) January 2017 under the BN government on the recommendation of ESSCOM has banned the movement of pump boats as a measure to control criminal activities including the smuggling of illegal immigrants in the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (Esszone) waters. However, after the government changed after GE14 saw Shafie Apdal has lift the ban on the usage of the pump boats with the reason the poor fishermen need to generate income to supports their family livelihoods. Some parties have come forward to criticize it as “missed the forest for the trees.” However, the use of the pump boat was reviewed following the repeated kidnapping case involving three Indonesian fishermen in the waters of Tambisan, Lahad Datu in September 2019. On a positive note, Shafie’s insistence on sufficient military resources and assets including military personnel to be stationed in the waters off the East Coast of Sabah for the sake of national security and sovereignty is consistent with the previous government’s insistence.

Ops Daulat (Lahad Datu Incursion)

The invasion crisis on the east coast began in February 2003 when a group of armed intruders entered national waters using pump boats and gradually gathered at Felda Sahabat 17 (Labian Zone), Lahad Datu, Sabah. This incident was an invasion of the dignity and sovereignty of the Federation of Malaysia by the Sulu militia. Malaysian media has provided follow-up coverage of a police report made by a group of local fishermen who fear the group might be *mundu* (pirates in Suluk). It turns out to be self-claims “Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo” secret plot sent by Jamalul Kiram III, one of the claimants to the throne of the Sultanate of Sulu to invade Sabah. Prime Minister at that time Datuk Seri Najib Razak warned the invaders to surrender while Philippine President Benigno Aquino III also urged the intruders to surrender unconditionally. The attack was initiated by Malaysian national security forces on March 1 after several rounds of negotiations from Feb 14 to Feb 28 between the intruders and police to avoid bloodshed failed and continued with mopping and searching to clear and secure the area.

Suluk or Tausug are natives of Sabah but only in a small number which refers to the first wave that migrated to Sabah in the 15th century when Sulu and Tawi-Tawi were attacked by the Spanish. After the formation of the Federation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963, the wave of Suluk who fled to Sabah in the 1970s due to the war (armed conflict) in Mindanao were categorized as refugees. Tun Mustapha whose is known as one of the founding leaders of Sabah and play important role in the formation of the Federation of Malaysia was a Bajau-Suluk born in Kudat.



Figure 1: Ops Daulat

Kg. Siminul Stand-off

During Ops Daulat when all concentration is in Kampung Tanduo, Lahad Datu, our nation was shocked by a brutal attack on policemen in Kampung Sri Jaya Simunul in Semporna. Not only our security forces killed but badly mutilated. The incident in Kampung Simunul in Semporna happened a day after the national security forces attacked forces linked to the so-called 'Sulu Sultanate' in Kampung Tanduo, Lahad Datu. The police force patrolling the village on the water village, Kampung Simunul was ambushed causing moral panic among all Malaysians, especially in Sabah. This is because illegal immigrants are everywhere (can be found in every corner of Sabah), causing concern the possibility of them all simultaneously attacking Malaysian citizens throughout Sabah. In an ambush incident in Kg. Simunul six police personnel have been killed and their bodies have been brutally mutilated by the armed intruders (considered terroristic acts). Somehow the media is seen cooperating with the security forces to report what needs to be reported without jeopardize the mission. The public was reminded not to share the locations of roadblocks carried out by the security forces on social media. The act of uploading in social media can help the enemy escape from the sanctions.

In the midst of this crisis, seven army battalions of military personnel were deployed with C-130 Hercules aircraft of the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) beside (and) boarding an AirAsia commercial flight from Kuala Lumpur to Sabah on March 3, 2013 in the required time for the operation in Lahad Datu. Kampung Tanjung Batu and Kampung Tanjung Labian were declared "red zones" when the security forces have launched "Ops Daulat." Unfortunately, the incident in Lahad Datu was overshadowed by accusations that it was a political gimmick, farce, or orchestrated conspiracy by BN to scare and distracting the people in Sabah from the illegal immigrants' issues to win the GE13. Their arguments included why not military forces were sent immediately if it was war, and why send VAT 69 where some cynically called it the 'jungle police'. They don't know that VAT69 is a military-style multi-spectral special force that specializes in urban warfare. It started as a police case when the villagers made a report at the police station before it was identified as much more serious requiring the involvement of the Malaysian armed forces. However, the BN leaders at that time especially Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, the Home Minister and Datuk Seri Dr. Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, the Minister of Defense called on the opposition to put aside their differences and unite to face the common enemy.



Figure 2 : Kg Simunul Semporna, Sabah

As a result of this event in Tanduo, the Prime Minister of Malaysia at that time, Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak announced the creation of ESSZONE and the establishment of ESSCOM on 7 March 2013. The concept and model of ESSCOM was taken from the Rajang Area Security Command (RASCOM) established in Sibul, Sarawak on 25 March 1972 to deal with insurgency. The areas of the Rejang Valley in Sibul (the 3rd Division of Sarawak), Sarikei (the 6th Division of Sarawak) and Kapit which at that time faced threats from the communists' guerillas in Sarawak

with their allies from the North Kalimantan Communist Party (NKCP). The Sarawak People's Guerrilla Force (SPGF) and the North Kalimantan People's Army (NKPA) are two NKCP military formations involved in the communist insurgency in Sarawak from 1962 until the remaining NKCP insurgents signed a peace agreement on 17 October 1990 which formally ended the insurgency and Indonesian military forces would co-operate with the Malaysians in counter-insurgency operations against their former allies

Our nations' Sovereignty Issue

Political stability also affects the stance of the ruling government which is directly related to ensuring our sovereignty. In the case of Ligitan and Sipadan dispute ICJ has decided that both islands belonged to Malaysia. Similarly, in the issue of the Sulu sultanate's claim on Sabah, the scenario is completely different. The Philippines itself never recognized the Sultanate of Sulu in addition to various parties claiming themselves as heirs to the sultanate of Sulu. Malaysia has always maintained the position that Sabah, Sarawak, Singapore, and Malaya together formed the Federation of Malaysia on 16 September 1963 (before Singapore left Malaysia on 9 August 1965) and will not entertain any issue of the 'sultanate of Sulu' claim over Sabah. Likewise, this issue of infringing on Malaysia's sovereignty attracted public attention when Luxembourg's authorities seized the assets of two Petronas subsidiaries (Petronas Azerbaijan (Shah Deniz) and Petronas South Caucasus) on behalf of heirs of the defunct 'sultanate of Sulu.' The new government of the Philippines through the spokesperson of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. clarifies it was not an issue of sovereignty or territory and distanced themselves from the controversy and claimed it was a 'private claim' by the 'heirs of the sultanate' who were trying to seize the international assets of Malaysia's state-owned oil company. In this context, it again shows how the position taken by the government can influence the decision of the arbitration court which is directly related to the sovereignty and security of our nation.

Stateless

Illegal immigrants' issues in Sabah have turn into stateless [*Orang Tanpa Warganegara (OTN)*] issues. Stateless basically referring to "who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law" (UNHCR). Stateless are worse than illegal immigrants and refugees because they don't have any document. They have no documents showing their parents' country of origin or their place of birth as self-identification. That's why they don't have any identity documents because they are not registered in their parents' country of origin or their country of birth. The Philippines refused to accept the children without proof of their parents' status or relationship with their country. This creates a serious problem because their basic rights for education and health are also denied due to simply not having identification documents. The proactive Indonesian government cooperated in opening Indonesian schools in Sabah for education for Indonesian Migrant Workers' (TKI) children regardless of the legality (illegal or with proper travel document) status of their parents. Although the issue of stateless children not being allowed to attend school continues to plague the present government, the Education Ministry during the PH government in December 2018 reportedly announced that all stateless and undocumented children would be able to go to public (government) school from 2019 onwards but this new policy has been opposed by the average parent to the point that it is thwarted.

Despite Malaysia has not yet ratified the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, the stateless issue continues to plague us. The geographical position between The East Coast of Sabah with the South of the Philippines exposes us to various security threats. The Tripoli Agreement 1976 failed to solve the problem (failed to achieve its objective) until witnessed four special settlements for war refugees and asylum-seekers from the Southern Philippines were established in Kota Kinabalu, Tawau and Sandakan. Problems arise when refugees who are given special documents known as IMM13 settle and have families and having children. We do not need to look as far as Bangladesh in dealing with the Rohingya issue, but it is enough to take lessons from what happened in Sabah. The only riot that happened in Sabah known as The Silent Riot

which was kept secret that happened in Sabah in 1986 was also orchestrated by the refugees with the machinations of Sabah politicians. What happens is that with the emergence of new media that is increasingly popular, more and more hidden events that are kept secret will be revealed.



Figure 3 : Stateless People in Sabah

In this case, there is also the undeniable involvement of NGOs and international bodies such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees' (UNHCR) which encouraged the National security council (MKN) director-general to suggest shutting down its office in Malaysia. Their actions will only "attract" more undocumented migrants to smuggle into Malaysia. This includes syndicates that mastermind human trafficking activities, for example to help the refugee to find wife from their origin country. Even so, most of them are driven by profit and masterminded by Malaysian. In the context of Sabah, a Royal Commission of Inquiry into Illegal Immigrants in Sabah (RCI) to investigate problems related to illegal immigration in Sabah was established in 2012 and followed up by a Working Committee on the RCI report chaired by Tan Sri Joseph Pairin Kitingan but has failed to resolve the problem partly due to a lack of political will. Whoever becomes the government must resolve the long-standing issue of illegal immigrants in Sabah. The Warisan government tried to introduce Sabah Temporary Pass (PSS) to solve the issue but was defeated in the Kimanis by-election just because of that.

Health

The other major issue related to illegal immigrants are health. This includes providing Covid19 vaccines for free the undocumented immigrants (or everyone who resides in Malaysia regardless of Malaysians, non-Malaysians, and those without documents) with the notion it's only safe when everyone is vaccinated. Prior to this, the government even had to give assurances to the undocumented migrants that their presence at any health facilities and vaccine centers (PPVs) will not be subject to legal action (faced immigration action). Malaysia achieved polio-free certification in 2000 and was shocked by the first polio case detected in Sabah on 8 December 2019. The government had to provide free polio to all children after 27 years after the last reported polio case in 1992 in responding to this outbreak by ensuring all children under 13 years in Sabah. In both public health cases, the scenario is the same as the issue of education for undocumented children spending public tax money that could be used to enhance our nation's military assets.

Border Regiment (RS)

The Malaysian government in 2008 has introduced the Border Regiment (Rejimen Sempadan) as part of the measurement for the enhancement to tighten the surveillance on the border security from any form of invasion, infiltration, smuggling or criminal activities. This move

has elevated the role of the Territorial Army Regiment (Rejimen Askar Wataniah). Our reserve force which is made up of civilians has an important role in protecting national sovereignty. The establishment of RS also considered that the Indonesian capital will be moved from Jakarta to Kalimantan. In terms of benefits surely it will help will certainly benefit the safety of open waters areas from cross-border illegal activities with the presence of the Indonesian navy in the coastal areas of Kalimantan.

Political Stability and Economic Growth

A change of government sometimes witnessed a spectacular fall from grace when some sustainably profitable business projects nor what is clear for the benefit of the people started from scratch had been revised, repelled, or canceled despite a commitment from the previous government of the day. Government changes often lead investors and traders into economic insecurity because the new government is likely to introduce new policies, adopt a different approach from previous practices, or cancel something. This is not as simple as canceling goods and services tax (GST) and returning to new sales tax and service tax (SST) but Malaysian economic choices were shaped by politics. Economic setup from British colonialism, new economic policy (NEP), and the “social contract” (which includes “Malay supremacy”) have determined the choices intrinsic to the notion of a political economy. Efforts to raise the percentage ownership of Malays in the economy to a target of 30% have produced many wealthy Malays but inequality within the Malay group itself has also increased.

The coalition government were a loose political compact that always contributed to weak governments as most decisions are meant to please or accommodate terms and conditions from the political opponents to get their compromises. These rhetorical commitments have proved thus far to be disingenuous. The Foreign direct investment (FDI) stagnated because no one dared to take the risk if the government changed. This has also prompted some parties to hold the 15th General Election (GE15) soon. Most political parties have geared up and mobilized their election machinery to face the election. The Sabah, Malacca, Sarawak and Johore elections were all held during the pandemic and has succeeded in establishing a new stable government succeeded in establishing a new stable government.

Malaysia has entered endemic, but everyone should live with the new norms. The crisis caused by pandemic (Covid19) has impacted every aspect of life across the nation. At one point the public blames it all on the Movement Control Order (MCO) that caused miserably to their live. Things could have been better if the PH government took steps earlier to close the country's borders instead of waiting for the new Perikatan Nasional (PN) government to act. All the politicking are causing the people to become victims of political indifference. Various policies have been introduced in that to help ease the burden on all segments of society from traders to moratoriums for the public. Taking “a hungry man is an angry man,” it is not impossible to lead to riots if the people are hungry. Malaysian are thankful that there have been important efforts by good samaritans who launched a white flag campaign for families who really need help. For the first time, many reckoned the importance of a conducive economic environment to allow them to make a living for themselves. Earlier there were those who arrogantly openly stated that the money they had was the result of their hard work and had nothing to do with the government. Then they only realize the importance of a stable government when the pandemic struck all over the planet.

DISCUSSION

Appropriately, any policy that involves public interests, especially the security measure, should be retained even though it was introduced by the previous government. The new government should not arbitrarily cancel projects from the previous government just for the sake of political mileage to erase their legacy. What is good must be continue for the benefit of the people. Enforcement agencies should act without fear or favor towards the responsibilities entrusted to them instead of succumbing to political pressure. What important is all parties should

take it seriously to clarify pertinent issues to ward off wild gossip by certain interested parties to prevent the people from being misled. Media penetration plays an important role in determining information access by the public and how their perspective was shaped apart from prior knowledge and beliefs. All these pertinent issues reported in the news show political swift has influence on existing policies including issues related to Sabah security interests.

Some of these issues that fall under the generic framework of health and economics in the previous analysis have been redefined from a national security perspective. It may just be a sub-frame that has been reformulated as a generic frame. Polio disease detected in Malaysia for the first time in 27 years under health has been re-examined or re-evaluated from a national security perspective since it is a cross-border issue. Illegal immigrants are basically directly related to national security when there are terrorists from Moro pirates from Mindanao who are feared to be hiding in Sabah. Cross-border attacks in Sabah in 2013 are not new as they happened before in 1985 and 2000. Citizens should not just criticize or rely solely on the enforcement agencies but help by acting as “eyes and ears” (intelligence machinery) to prevent or minimize cross-border crimes and terrorist-related incidents. Success demands more than good ideas and intentions but political will. Too frequent government changes have proven elusive except that it can only be blamed on politicians who are too obsessed with politics to the point of ignoring the interests of the country and the people’s welfare. Issues involving Sabah Security Interests cover a broad variety (wide range) of topics that are influenced by political stability. Plenty of efforts can be seen taken by the government in reducing the cross-border crimes in Sabah. Illegal immigrants are also uneasily linked to public health issues, squatters, social problems and worse is involvement with criminal activities such as syabu. Doubt or prejudice against them is proven by facts that show that they are indeed involved in law-breaking issues. The Warisan government had to scratch the plans of the implementation of PSS after losing in the Kimanis by-election but whoever becomes the government must still address the illegal immigrants’ issues in Sabah. Regardless of what name will be used, it will still invite retaliation from the opponent. Therefore, in this case, an agreement beyond political boundaries is needed to resolve this issue thoroughly

SUMMARY

The description above tries to give an idea of Malaysian political scenario in the past 10 years and how political instability affects Sabah’s security issues. It is unlikely that Malaysia will achieve political stability until the end of this term and a new election is held to return the mandate to the people. The political elites are fighting among themselves has victimize the public. The actions of some irresponsible politicians manipulating security issues with political rhetoric either for political mileage or to gain votes have misled the common people. Media literacy is important as most of the issues in the past can only be concluded after the event is over. Therefore, it is important not to be manipulated by politician’s rhetoric to get support or votes. There is no need to be too obsessed with political ideology or a politician. After all, in politics there are no permanent friends or enemies. National security is a responsibility shared by all and can be started by ensuring the validity of information.

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A BRIEF OBSERVATION ON SABAH'S BORDER SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

Malaysia is a country located in the center of Southeast Asia. It borders Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines. These borders are important economic gateways for travel. Nevertheless, they also pose threats to the security of the country. Protecting the borders from drugs, weapons and even the illegal movement of people is critical to the national security, economic prosperity and sovereignty of Malaysia. This article contends that border security is the responsibility of all parties, including the government, its people as well as neighbouring countries. It is not solely the responsibility of the Malaysian government alone. This article will discuss briefly the three issues mentioned above regarding Sabah's border security and explain the steps taken by the government to address those issues.

Keywords: *Cross-Border Crimes, Conflict, Enforcement, Immigrants, Security, Maritime Border, Drug Trafficking, Territorial Claims, Disputes, commitment*

INTRODUCTION

One of the two states on the island of Borneo, Sabah, is the easternmost state of Malaysia. Sabah shares a maritime border with the Philippines and a land border with the Indonesian state of North Kalimantan. Generally, there are indeed many issues pertaining to Sabah's border security. This brief article, however, will only touch on three pressing issues that threaten Sabah's border security: overlapping territorial claims, kidnapping and illegal immigrants.

It is worth noting that there have been an abundant of studies undertaken on the subject. One of the recent works is by Ramli Dollah et.al (2021). The paper contends that there are several threats to the survival of Sabah, which includes both traditional threats such as the Philippines' claim over Sabah as well as non-traditional threats such as illegal immigrants, kidnapping and trafficking. Besides, Noor Azmi Mohd Zainol et.al (2020) examine the issues faced by Malaysian border enforcement authorities in protecting Malaysia's sovereignty, including the opportunities for integration across diverse agencies. Other important works include Mohd Zaini Salleh and Adam Leong (2018), Ramli Dollah & Mohd Zambri Suharani (2015), Radziah Abdul Rahim et.al (2014) and Wan Shawaluddin Wan Hassan and Ramli Dollah (2008).

BORDER SECURITY CONCERNS

Overlapping Territorial Claims

Strategically located in the heart of ASEAN, Malaysia is highly prone to territorial disputes. One of such example is overlapping territorial claims. Territorial disputes poses a serious security threat to any country. Malaysia is no exception. First, Malaysia is involved in the dispute over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, from which six governments (China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei) are striving to occupy, as the islands are believed to be surrounded by rich fishing grounds and hydrocarbons. The South China Sea has important communication routes that also includes some of the busiest shipping lanes in the world.

(Snyder C A, 2011). It is also a major trade route linking Asia with Europe and Africa. Countries started claiming islands and different features in the South China Sea as early as the 1970s. Malaysia's claim to the Spratly Islands is based on the fact that the islands lie within its continental shelf (UNCLOS II 1982) as depicted in Peta Baru 1979 (Sabah Maritime Boundary) (Rizal Zamani Idris et.al, 2008). It is also important to mention that the South China Sea (SCS) has become a focal point of China-U.S. strategic rivalry over the past few years. The United States regards China's increasingly aggressive moves in the South China Sea as the most immediate challenge to the security of Southeast Asia (Wu Shicun, 2021). Having said that, tensions between the two superpowers, notably in the South China Sea, should be lessened in order to avert a disastrous confrontation.

Second, Malaysia has been involved in the Ambalat dispute with Indonesia since 2005. When one of the Indonesian navy ships rammed a Royal Malaysian Navy ship in 2005, both countries were on the verge of war (Ali Maksum 2021;p.156). The Ambalat dispute arose after PETRONAS granted Shell concession rights for hydrocarbon deposits exploration (oil blocks ND6 and ND7) off the East Coast of Sabah. As a result, Indonesia protested Malaysia's action and dispatched a warship near Ambalat. The issue was resolved, thanks to the good offices of both countries' leaders at the time, Abdullah Badawi and Susilo Bambang Yudhiyono.

Third, the conflict between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah. This issue has existed since Malaysia's inception in 1963. The Philippines has yet to withdraw its claim and the issue has long been a source of friction in Malaysia-Philippine relations (Rammani Karupiah & Mohd Firdaus Abdullah, 2022). In diplomatic terms, Manila has also implied that it does not recognise Sabah as a constituent state of Malaysia. This is clear from the fact that, despite Malaysia having already opened its consulate in Davao City, it continues to put off opening a consulate in Sabah. This comes as quite a shock considering how urgently the state has to handle the issue of the influx of its people.




Figure 1: Coastal zone of sabah Maritime and Inland Boundaries

The 2013 incursion of Lahad Datu by the so-called Royal Security Forces of the Sulu Sultanate was in fact the first foreign invasion of the country since the *Konfrontasi* and it sadly resulted in the deaths of ten members of the Malaysian security forces. Thus, the Philippines' claim to Sabah will continue to pose a threat to the security of the state.

Cross-Border Crimes

Sabah has been experiencing a persistent security challenge, particularly on its east coast. More than 190 islands may be found on Sabah's east coast alone, which has more than 1,400 kilometers of shoreline. So it comes as no surprise that the east coast raises serious security issues for Sabah.

Kidnappings and other transnational crimes have occurred on multiple occasions. As a matter of fact, the threat of kidnapping began in Borneo way back in the 16th century, if not earlier (Abdul Rashid and Ramli Dollah, 2021). Since the year 2000, it was reported that more than 20 incidents of kidnapping for ransom (KFR) have occurred on Sabah's East Coast (Abdul Rashid Abdul Hamid & Ramli Dollah, 2020; p.18). Abdul Rashid and Ramli Dollah (2021) also argue that one of the key factors that eastern Sabah is still dealing with piracy and the KFR issue is the instability in the southern Philippines.

Apparently such incidents endanger the security of both our citizens and foreign nationals. The United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and Japan are among the countries that have always released travel advisory to their citizens to exercise extreme caution when visiting Sabah's East Coast. As a result, it has had a negative impact on Sabah's tourism industry as well as the economy of the country as a whole.

Illegal Immigration

Another long-standing problem that compromises Sabah's security is illegal immigration. Since the formation of Malaysia in 1963, large numbers of illegal immigrants began entering Sabah (Pugh, J K, 2015 ; Sadiq, K, 2009). Majority of illegal immigrants in Sabah are from either the Philippines or Indonesia. In Sabah, it was reported that 1.2 million of Sabah's 3.9 million residents are foreigners, with Tawau having the highest number at 180,000 (NST, 2020). When a lot of labourers were required for the timber sector in the 1950s, Indonesian immigrants began to arrive in the state. In the late 1970s, when large-scale plantations were inaugurated in Sandakan, Lahad Datu and Tawau, they were also actively involved in the plantation industry.

Filipino immigrants have been present since the 1970s, when there was political unrest in the Southern Philippines. The number rose daily as a result of expanding economic prospects in Sabah. Additionally, illegal immigrants from China, Pakistan, and India have been present in the state in recent years. In other words, their entry in the state has been influenced by the "push" and "pull" aspects. (W. Shawaluddin and Ramli Dollah, 2008; p.58).

There is no doubt that immigrants have made significant contributions to Sabah's economic development, particularly in the construction, plantation, and domestic sectors. However, their presence (undocumented/illegal immigrants) has serious political and socioeconomic consequences for the state. They are viewed as a threat to society because a significant number of them have been involved in a number of criminal activities, including drug trafficking and smuggling. Despite the fact that the crime rate has reduced in recent years, one report claims that foreigners continue to commit serious crimes in Sabah.



Figure 2 : The Authority Arrests Five Migrants Slipping In Via Rat Trail Amid a Tight Border Watch.

EFFORTS TO ADDRESS SECURITY CONCERNS

At this point, it is crucial to emphasize the ongoing efforts and steps the government has done to prevent and resolve the aforementioned problems. In the context of conflicting territorial claims, the government has strengthened its “exercise of authority” over the 12 islands in the Spratly chain in addition to actively cooperating and negotiating with other territorial claimant states on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Such move is important especially in strengthening Malaysia’s claim that is in accordance with international law.



Figure 3 : Ops Pasir

On the issue of cross-border crimes, the government has demonstrated its full commitment to safeguard the security of the state. Among others, in September 2000, Ops Pasir (Pandanan and Sipadan) was conducted with the deployment of security forces at strategic locations, strengthened and widened Sabah’s border patrol area as well as the establishment of the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) in 2002 (Ramli Dollah et.al, 2016).

The government also continues to bolster its security measures in relation to kidnappings. Following Lahad Datu’s intrusion in 2013, the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCom) was established in April 2013 to bolster the state’s marine and border security, particularly in the eastern

section of Sabah (which covers the districts of Kudat, Kota Marudu, Pitas, Beluran, Sandakan, Kinabatangan, Lahad Datu, Kunak, Semporna and Tawau). However, due to ongoing kidnapping incidents since its inception, the effectiveness of ESSCom has been heavily criticised. Residents of the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZONE) have been subject to periodic curfews since 2021, which have continued into this year (Karisma Putera Abd Rahman and Fikry A. Rahman, 2022).

The vast maritime border with open high seas makes managing Sabah's maritime border a difficult task. It must also be mentioned that one of the challenges faced is that the locals have common heritage and cultural roots with the illegal immigrants. This has made threat mitigation extremely difficult. Due to the similarities, it would be easy for outsiders to enter the state and disguise themselves as locals.



Figure 4 : Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZONE)

In actuality, efforts to address the problem of illegal immigration are not new and have been going on since the 1990s. The government has consistently fought against illegal immigration. Examples of government-led operations to thwart illegal immigration include Ops Pasir, the Ops Nyah activities, and the Eastern Command. The formation of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Illegal Immigrants in Sabah in 2012 demonstrated the government's earnest commitment to finding a solution.

CONCLUSION

It is clear from the discussion above that Sabah's border security concerns could have detrimental effects to the security of not only Sabah but also pose threat to the sovereignty of Malaysia. Many initiatives have been taken to reduce the risk that those issues pose. As a matter of fact, Sabah's cultural variety and inter-ethnic and religious tolerance continue to be assets that preserve stability despite illegal immigration and outside intrusions.

The ongoing territorial disputes between Malaysia and its neighbours would continue to pose a danger to the state's security. The competition between the two superpowers (China and the United States) in the South China Sea has obviously escalated tensions. The issue over the Spratly Islands will be resolved only if decision-makers have the political will and real commitment to do so.

It is evident that Sabah's security, particularly on its eastern coast, is indeed a very complicated subject. It is not merely about threats but also involves other elements such as geography and humanitarian considerations that must be taken into account. In this regard, the government and law enforcement are not solely responsible for the security issue of the state. It demands the collaboration of all parties; the neighbouring governments as well as the support of all citizens.

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MILITARY STRATEGY: EXPLOITATION OF MILITARY LOGISTICS INTELLIGENCE FOR THE MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES

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ABSTRACT

Military strategy dictums may be old, it is how military leaders appreciate them and find the lynchpin to the contemporary and future warfare, that will only then realise the relevancy of those ancient wisdom. Strategy is crucial to win a war. Military strategy is the art of planning on the conduct of campaigns, deployment of forces, and sustainment of capability also the deception of the enemy. Thus, military logistics which requires long term planning and preparation, plays a vital role in bringing together all the requirements including troops and supplies. Interestingly, the intelligence often times neglect the information gathering pertaining logistic preparations which could give pertinent insight on the enemy's next course of action. What are the logistic nodes that could be the key to the unique battlefield success and how the global technological advancement can be maximised? This study argues that military logistics intelligence along with the optimisation from technological evolution can be exploited for the benefits of the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF). This paper applies the qualitative methodology of an extensive secondary data research from books, military doctrines, published articles, journals from war colleges, and online sources to explore those opportunities with the research objectives in studying the roles of intelligence and logistics in military strategy, examining the elements of logistics affecting the military environment, and analysing the contributions of gathering military logistics intelligence in MAF strategy application. This study explores the ideology of logistics intelligence in military strategy, some of the findings on potential logistic centre of gravity in warfare, and the narrow viewed and outdated logistics critical factors listed in the MAF doctrines. Ultimately, strengthened with a feasibility study analysis, this study formulates a pragmatic approach and recommends three proposals which are worldview logistics intelligence, logistics center of gravity, and application of big data analytics to enhance MAF intelligence. This study concludes that the exploitation of logistics intelligence can help military commanders to make better decision making based on justifications from facts. Besides, the core foundation of this study will propel Malaysia towards a middlepower nation.

Keywords: *Military Strategy; Intelligence; Logistics; Logistics Intelligence; Big Data Analytics*

BACKGROUND

Strategy is crucial to win a war. War, famously described by Carl von Clausewitz as an act of force to drive the enemy to do our will (Mahnken & Maiolo, 2008), usually implemented by a military organisation. Military strategy is about the art of planning on the conduct of campaigns, deployment of forces, and sustainment of capability also the deception of the enemy. Diving deeper, intelligence is one of the significant components that contribute to the success of any military strategy planning. According to Trask, military intelligence is about evaluated information from the gathering, analysis, protection and dissemination of information on the enemy (Trask, 2010). However, often times the gathering of intelligence on the logistical segment is not being emphasized even though logistics is paramount in the conduct of war.

Intelligence has been regarded as a vital element in military planning. It feeds information to the commanders that help to make wise decisions. Studying battles, the defeated side can usually be traced back to the lack of knowledge on the enemy (Hughes-Wilson, 1999). It is associated with the failure to comprehend facts or is said to be an 'intelligence failure'. Hughes-Wilson (1999) defined intelligence as a piece of processed information and it undergoes a process cycle called the intelligence cycle. The cycle consists of direction, collection, collation, interpretation, and dissemination. Every process in the intelligence cycle has the vulnerability to cause 'intelligence failure' and the most critical process that is seen as the root to all failure would be the 'collection' process. It is where the intelligence staff convert the commander's intelligence requirement into a series of essential elements of information and task the intelligence agencies using a collection plan. The problem here is what information is to be identified and collected?

Human being has various behaviours and approaches towards information reception. A term that would be highlighted here, that triggers this study is the term 'selective information processing'. According to a study by Yoon et al. (2012), individuals has the tendency to selectively rely on information that is consistent with their attitudes or decision. In the military intelligence context, an intelligence personnel background or military traits would influence their information selection. Normally, intelligence is driven towards the operational environment information requirements and seldom seen beyond or behind the picture of a battle. Studies also show that the amount of pressure on individuals affects the focus on selective information process (Yoon et al., 2012). What more the amount of pressure on the military personnel during a war, the higher tendency towards selective information thus an incomplete intelligence would occur leading to the blunder of intelligence. Military strategists emphasise understanding the enemy, where gathering information is equally important. Similarly, in the implementation of a military strategy, proper planning of logistics support is one of the vital roles to ensure success. In any battle studies conducted will emphasise the importance of logistics at the planning stage which includes the preparations of the requirements such as weapons, food, and transportations for war. Renowned military strategists such as Sun Tzu, Carl von Clausewitz, and Baron de Jomini do speak about the importance of logistics in their literature respectively.

Logistics plays an important element in the supply chain. It is the detailed operations that include preparations, transportations, and the availability of materials for consumers of any projects. It requires time and proper calculation to manage the logistics operations. Interestingly, it is often neglected by military historians. Crevelde states that in most military books were written that seemingly armies being able to move at any direction and at any speed, to almost any distance once their commanders had made up their mind. Unfortunately, in reality, they cannot and failure to conduct the logistic calculation eventually led to the failure of many campaigns (Crevelde, 1977). So, logistical movements consume time and time opens up loopholes for weaknesses. This is where it can be attacked to weaken one's enemy. In recent times, Supply Chain Management has evolved especially with the impact of technological advancement. It is embarking more towards the supply chain network flow through information sharing across and beyond the organisations using the expanding Information Technology platform (Johnson N. et al., 2008). The complex supply chain network encompassing procurement of material, manufacturing, and up to the delivery of end product, are all stored into growing and increasingly complex sets of data. The big data technology in the 4th Industrial Revolution plays an important role in further enhancing data management in Supply Chain Management. However, all these lead to a growing uncertainty risk and vulnerability of electronic risks. Here, intelligence comes into the game of information exploitation.

The development of a plan can always be traced back to its preparation, namely materials readiness. Studying the cold war period during the development of nuclear weapons at its peak,

uranium, as the main source for fuelling up a nuclear bomb had been highly emphasised and its supplies were closely monitored. There is an Act to control the production, ownership, and use of fissionable material, the 1946 Atomic Energy Act (AEA) (Greenberg et al., 2014). This is an example of a material's procurement is being monitored and it is a glaring act of the application of logistical information gathering. But why only Uranium be monitored? Aren't there any other elements that are as important as uranium to tell us a story? Military strategists spoke about the importance of logistics and also intelligence. However, none spoke about gathering intelligence specifically on logistical elements. Therefore, this research is conducted to analyse the importance of military logistics intelligence in military strategy in the contemporary environment and how such information can be exploited with the advancement of technology, to the benefits of the Malaysian Armed Forces grand strategy.

MILITARY STRATEGY: LOGISTICS AND INTELLIGENCE

Military has been deployed to win a war, which eventually just as a tool to achieve political goals. In order to obtain the goal, the military forces seek military power aiming to achieve dominance on land, sea, airspace, and the recent cyber domain by applying various types of military strategies. Intelligence and logistics are the sub-elements in the planning of every military strategy, each having important roles.

Land Power

The most classic in military power is the land power where it is the ability of a ground force to exert control and influence on the land. Land power has been the basis of the development of military strategies to attain dominance on the land, thus by securing the land, only can a force declare victory. The common military strategy applied to achieve land power are annihilation, dislocation, attrition, exhaustion, coercion, deterrence, terror and terrorism, and decapitation and targeted killing (EchevarriaII, 2017). Manoeuvre warfare strategy is closely associated with land power. The US Marine Corps MCDP1 Warfighting defines manoeuvre warfare as a warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which operate a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope (MCWP2-1, 2017). The contemporary practices of manoeuvre warfare are influenced by JFC Fuller which sees the strike the enemy at the vital point enables land forces to quickly secure the land. The United States Army refines the definition for land combat by emphasising the connections relating to key elements specifically tempo, operational reach, and military objectives. Studying American civil war history, Giovanni (2019) stated that operational art is a function of intelligence, protection, sustainment, endurance, and relative combat power. Operational arts is defined as the cognitive approach by commanders and staffs to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organise and employ military forces by integrating ends, ways, means, and risks (Giovanni, 2019). The limit of a unit's operational reach is its culminating point and it balances the natural tension among endurance, momentum, and protection.

Sea Power

Sea power sees the direct and indirect source of military power at sea with the ability to control the maritime lines of communication and commerce. It is also about the ability to project military forces ashore. Vego (2008) defines the main components of sea power are the navy, coast guard, and marines and their shore establishment. The term 'sea power', coined in 1849, refers to a nation having a formidable naval strength but later evolved to a broader term covering the entire usage of the sea by the nation (Vego, 2008). According to Mahan's theory in his book 'The

Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783' published in 1890, geopolitically, the sea is the main passage for the commerce trade route that ensure the nation's wealth's expansion and growth in strength (Mahan, 1890). Therefore, it is important to have control of the sea to have a strong nation, thus stating the importance of sea power. The conditions affecting sea power according to Mahan is the geopolitical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, number of populations, national character, and character and policy of governments. He has also pointed out three key points in naval strategy which is command of the sea, decisive battles at sea, and logistic support. Obtaining sea power is different from land power. It is impossible to capture a sea area as per se where naval forces can only obtain control of the sea.

Air Power

Gaining air power is by being able to control the airspace, similar to sea power. Air power was developed early in the 1990s during the First World War. Lieutenant Giulio Gavotti an Italian aviator was known to be the first person to throw bombs from his aeroplane which gave birth to the development of air power (Hippler, 2013). Air power is the ability to operate within the air space and to project force from them. It involves strategic bombing, command of the air, and tactical air support. Today, air power has become the 'weapon of choice' for coercion and is conducted with precision weapons seek to inflict damage while minimizing collateral civilian damage. Air power gives a strategic effect by bombardment and choice of target. John A. Warden III proposed the five rings model as the key targets for air bombing starting with leadership, organic essentials, infrastructure, population, and military unit.

Cyber Power

Information technology is the recent evolution of military power. It is termed as cyber power where is the ability to control cyberspace which directly controls the flow of information in the information power (EchevarriaII, 2017). Cyberspace was also declared by the United States as the new terrain in warfare. Although the impact is still vague, however, we cannot deny the fact that many of the military exercises and equipment involve the use of information technology. As mentioned by scholars, land, sea, air, and cyber are the current four dimensions of dominance to achieve ultimate military power. Although historically it was just the land, sea, and air space, the cyber domain has now emerged as one of the dominating dimensions in the military power after the evolution of information technology. It is undeniably as we can observe countries around the world especially super power nation are enhancing their defence capabilities and through research and development in these four domains.

MILITARY STRATEGIES ON INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence usually supports the entire planning of the military strategy for a wider goal to achieve military power. Intelligence does directly contribute to each domain of strategy if the information collected is more tactical. Literature can be found describing how intelligence contributes to military strategies and operations ranging from detailed intelligence technical specifications to a piece of general open-source information. Literature also describes intelligence failures and foresight of the role of intelligence that will be explored below.

One of the intelligence success stories can be seen when the Americans had obtained intelligence on the technical specifications of the Iraqi air defence system imported from the Soviet Union during the first Gulf war. From the information, adjustments were made to the coalition electronic-warfare system that causes Iraq's anti-aircraft missiles to be extremely

ineffective (Sutherland, 2011). It is known as the 'delinking a missile' trick. The author added that the Swedish Defence Research Agency continuously gathers and shares this sort of technical information with allies which eventually contributed enormously to the whole military campaign. Open-source information can also be processed into an intelligence information environment for the considerations of military commanders. The term total information environment has been a debate among intelligence professionals. It is about whether intelligence equals secrets or whether intelligence equals information. Open sources of information such as news, social media, or sources from the internet have now been the main source of information. Studies had been carried out and found that 85 percent of the information needed by decision-makers are available through open-source (Ivor, 2007). Therefore, it is an important task of the intelligence professional to balance the secret versus open information. To achieve that, according to Ivor (2007), the intelligence personnel must maintain the core values of military intelligence in the twenty-first-century relationship which are curiosity, imagination, and flexibility (Ivor, 2007).

On the negative side, an assessment of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programme after the September 11, 2001 incident found that the error was largely due to the incompetent human intelligence (HUMINT) in collecting information. They had over-relied on the few poorly qualified Iraqi defectors, coupled with intelligence analysis that leapt to a conclusion without evidence. Russell (2007) argues that the quality of intelligence and its role on the battlefield has greatly increased and demanding since the 19th century. Clausewitz's *On War* words on intelligence are not very flattering, "Many intelligence reports in war are contradictory; even more false, and most are uncertain" and claiming the term "fog of war". Another negative example written by Russell (2007) is Libya's surrender of its nuclear weapons program. It had revealed a clandestine uranium enrichment construction program in South Africa which apparently was undetected as it was conducted in a manufacturing plant owned by a private company in South Africa that was being designed and to operate one thousand centrifuges for enriching uranium for shipment to Libya (Ivor, 2007). Other nuclear weapons programs in Iran, India, Pakistan, and North Korea too had managed to hide from the United States intelligence. The Joint House-Senate Committee in accessing these failures as analysts being inexperienced, unqualified, under-trained, and without access to critical information, claiming their hard work to be often mediocre. Russell research suggested the CIA improve their new generation of strategic analysts to have basic knowledge in military affairs.

Wesley K. Wark (1991) cited by Ivor (2007) had written an article that questions whether there is any future in intelligence. Notting the failure of intelligence in the 9/11 tragedy and the Iraq war leaves the intelligence department in a crisis of confidence. However, Wark believes that intelligence practitioners will find ways to sustain by taming information flows, inject realism into expectations, profit sensibly from mythology, exploit privatization for all its worth, and learn to live with greater public identity, greater interaction, and lessened secrecy (Ivor, 2007). Studying intelligence failures, Barger believes that there is a need to consider fundamental changes in key areas in intelligence affairs. Barger (2007) has beautifully described the increasing importance of intelligence role in the fifth generation warfare of which includes 'security' (Ivor, 2007). The growing change in the security environment, new technologies development, and operating procedures is a great challenge to intelligence professionals. Although sources of literature on intelligence are very limited, however, study from declassified war studies has undeniably pointed out the importance of intelligence in military strategy. Its contribution is not specific to the identified four dimensions of power but indirectly influence the decision on the types of strategy to be applied.

MILITARY STRATEGIES ON LOGISTICS

The importance of the logistic element has been highlighted as early as the ancient times of Sun Tzu. Citing Pereira (2019) interpreted Sun Tzu on logistics can be found in Chapter XI: The Nine Situations, “On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous stream of supplies”. The more recent and obvious one can be found in Chapter VI of Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini’s *Art of War*. The entire chapter is on logistics; the practical art of moving armies which include providing supplies, establishing and organising lines of supplies. Jomini claims it as the most essential part of the art of war. Originally, the term logistics comes from the title of *the major général des logis*, translated in German as *Quartiermeister* (Price, 2008). It is an officer whose duty was to lodge and camp the troops, to locate them upon the ground, and to give direction to the marches. As warfare evolved, so does the roles and functions of the logisticians. Price (2008) also remarked that there are two types of reconnaissance; the first is to gain knowledge of a country through topographical and statistical data such as the bridges, roads, and other resources. The other type is to gain information on the enemy’s movements.

Crevelde book on *Supplying War* (1977) studied three major questions; the logistic factors limiting an army’s operation, arrangements made to move it and keep it supplied while moving, and logistical arrangements that affect the course of the campaign. The author concentrated on three elements – subsistence, ammunition, and transport. In the book, the author quoted a great modern soldier saying “The more I see of war, the more I realise how it all depends on administration and transportation... it takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there. Knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader’s plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with those factors, and battles are won only by taking risks”. There are three distinct periods of logistic history in modern times (Crevelde, 1977). First is the age of standing armies, when military forces were magazine-fed, second embraces Napoleonic warfare, and third is marked by a system of continuous supply from the base. Each age has a different approach in managing logistical requirements. According to Crevelde (1977), Napoleonic warfare has a fundamental logistic role that has been neglected by historians and writers. There is no study made on how Napoleon managed to feed a large population of 200,000 while simultaneously marching forward fifteen miles a day. The author had also criticised on Schlieffen Plan that concentrate on logistic issue without considering the consumption and requirements of the German armies or a detailed railway map.

J. B. Bartholomees (2008) citing historian Archer Jones (1996), said that military force can achieve its objective of depleting the enemy through two methods, one is combat strategies and secondly is logistic strategies. The logistic strategies involve depriving the opponent’s supplies, forces, weapons, recruits or other resources. Bartholomees also stated that guerrilla tactics and terrorism relied on logistic independence besides listing that logistics is one of the dimensions of strategy (Bartholomees, 2008). This publication has opened up the importance of logistics to other types of asymmetrical warfare, namely threats from a non-military organisation such as terrorist groups.

A good example of how logistics plays an important role in military strategy could be seen in the American civil war history in the late 19th century led by General Ulysses S. Grant. Grant used logistics basing, supply, transportation, and distribution functions in his operation in Vicksburg, Mississippi (Giovanni, 2019). General Grant had paid particular attention to synchronising logistics support in time, space, and purpose as an operation, not an administrative requirement. Giovanni (2019) in his research on General Grant stated that although logistics support does not win battles, it

makes formations durable and resilient. General Grant's western campaigns had demonstrated the importance of operational logistics as an antecedent requirement for manoeuvre and had executed a strategy of attrition on both rebel combat formations and the logistics capacity of the Confederate States of America. Giovanni complemented Grant operational planning as exceedingly rare by taking into accounts the defence logistics nodes and also targeting of enemy's industrial capacity and logistics support. There are not many writings on logistic planning in war studies but to find the emphasis of critical logistic planning during a war, dated back to ancient military strategies and picking up bits and pieces in a more contemporary military strategist, shows the importance of logistics in a military strategy. This research then further explores the two elements highlighted; intelligence and logistics by combining both that is logistics intelligence.

Military Strategies on Logistics Intelligence

The term 'logistics intelligence' is not famous to be found in literature or published research on the internet. The researcher could only find an old monograph written by Major T.D. Moore USA back in 1990 during his studies in the United States Army Command and General Staff College. The monograph by Major Moore entitled 'Logistics Intelligence: The First Step in Operational Sustainment?' was a study conducted analysing the information required to a sustainment planner by examining the linkages between logistics and intelligence at the operational level of war (Moore, 1990). The paper had identified the 5 key sustainment considerations which are: forces available, theatre infrastructure, host nation support, the establishment of the sustainment base, and support of the major sustainment systems. The study mainly focuses on logistics information required during the conduct of any operational campaign. Taking Operation Overlord and Operation Chromite as the case study, Major Moore identified 7 operational level consideration that was then proposed to be included in the US doctrine. The 7 operational level considerations are geography, the efficiency of transportation, throughput capacity, throughput enhancements, infrastructure protection, echelonment of support, and assignment of responsibilities.

Besides the monograph by Major Moore, there is a report on logistic intelligence produced by a Finabel committee, a European Army Interoperability Centre that was created in October 1953. Finabel currently has 24 member states that promote and facilitate the interoperability of land forces through the harmonisation of military concepts, doctrine and procedures (www.finabel.org). Work Group Charlie Meeting 1/2010 had come up with a study that described principles and procedures for gathering logistic information and producing logistic intelligence that is suitable for multinational planning process on support to only Land forces (Finabel, 2010). Finabel defined logistics intelligence as the result of collection, elaboration, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of the available information gathered on friendly and hostile forces, geographical, social, and economic aspects, which are useful to a Commander in planning and execution phases of Combat Service Support/Logistic operations.

Underpinning Principles of Military Logistics Intelligence

The military logistics intelligence at the operational level aims to gain information on the enemy's movements of their logistics arrangements, transportations, and administrations that coincides with the actual time, space, and purpose. These logistics are the pertinent support of enemy's supplies, forces, or weapons and doesn't only involve traditional warfare but also non-traditional warfare such as terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Therefore, paying additional attention through conducting intelligence to the enemy's defence logistics elements which include industrial capacity and defence support shall be the underpinning principles of military logistics intelligence.

LOGISTICS INTELLIGENCE AS A MILITARY STRATEGY

Logistics in the context of the military is unique where it defines all the material and assistance conditions necessary for the good development of military actions. According to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) manual definition, logistics is the science of planning, assuring the movement and providing service to the military forces. Logistics has the responsibility to plan and execute the movement, as well as maintain the forces at a high capacity of combat (Badea, 2008). Therefore, the advancement of military logistics has to be in line with the technological development in modern conflicts that introduces the latest scientifically and technological discoveries. Pawelczyk (2018) listed three groups of services and obligations of logistics; production logistics, in-service logistics, and consumer logistics. Production logistics deals with planning, organising, design, and procurement of equipment with the industrial domain. In-service logistics is the process of receiving, procuring, storing, distributing and providing materials while consumer logistics relates to the supply and support functions of the forces. The overall core capabilities of military logistics would cover supply (manage supplies and equipment), maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, health service support, engineering, logistics services, and operational contract support (Pawelczyk, 2018). While according to Badea (2008), the modern development of military logistics implies a remarkable responsibility naming the obvious four; material management (projecting, developing, purchasing, storing, transporting, distributing, evacuating, and controlling the materials), human transport, facilities management (purchasing or building, maintaining, assigning and exploiting facilities), and insuring medical and health services (Badea, 2008).

Army Logistics

According to Faris (2014), the United States military supply network consists of 24 wholesale supply locations and approximately 33,000 retail supply locations across over 86 countries. With more than 10 different modes of transportations, the suppliers manage 2.4 million lines of inventory and receive more than 50,000 requisitions daily amounting to a total of \$109 billion inventory (citing Faris (2014) in McConnell, Hodgson, Kay, & King (2018)). The United States uses the Military Logistics Network Planning System to quickly identify a robust logistical footprint in order to sustain units deployed during mission planning. The study by McConnell et.al. (2018) through proof of concept seeks to improve logistical deficiencies using the challenges faced by the US troops during Operation Iraqi Freedom using the end-to-end movement of sustainment supplies model. By analysing the process, we can deduce that there are 6 locations or centres (DC, CCP, APEO/SPOE, APOD/SPOD, TDC, LTM) where the military item will be located before reaching the user.

According to Pawelczyk (2018), there is no meaning of a perfect logistics team as all missions have different requirements and different ways of providing services. However, the basic elements to prepare a battalion for complete duties abroad from a logistic point of view would require estimating the amount and type of materials, replacing fluids, sealants, tyres, and exact verification of equipment, carrying out medical tests and protecting injections, preparing the right transportation and customs documents, preparing financial assignments for all gathered goods, providing all necessary equipment for the current conditions at the mission area, providing the right equipment (weapon, bulletproof vest, and helmet) for soldiers who are taking part in the mission, packing all gathered equipment and staff to transport containers and preparing for them for transport, and planning and organising movement (Pawelczyk, 2018).

Naval Logistics

Generally, naval logistician relies mainly on the information system currently used across the fleet. The United States Navy operates 276 vessel battle force (Wilson et al., 2018), where each vessel requires supplies for operational effectiveness, the maintenance of the ship, shore-based operations, and feeding of the crew. According to Wilson et al., (2018), the US Navy has 16 core systems to help manage the procurement, distribution, and accounting of supplies in supporting the fleet's operational effectiveness. The 16 core systems are Relational supply, Relational Administrative Data Management, Ordnance Information System, Automated Medical System, Expeditionary Pack-Up Kit, Aviation Inventory Management System, Food Service Management, Retail Operations Management, Bar Code Supply, Integrated Bar Code System, Continuous Monitoring Program, Financial Audit Compliance Enhancement Tool, Hazardous Inventory Control System for Windows, Submarine Hazardous Material Inventory and Management System, Defence Property Accountability System, and Fleet Imaging System.

The civilian maritime logistic requirements as sea power are very much interrelated between the merchant ships and naval warships. The main function of maritime logistics is moving cargoes between ports. It involves port/terminal operations such as shipping reception, loading/unloading cargoes/ stevedoring, and connecting to inland transportation. The supportive logistics activities are documentation relating to sea trade, container tracking and information flow, and providing intermodal service which involves warehousing, distribution centres, testing, assembly, repairing, and inland connections at port/terminal operation (Caliskan & Ozturkoglu, 2016). In wartime, merchant or commerce shipping is indirectly affected if a naval blockade is being enforced. Also, at times nations use merchant ships to help transport supplies to troops as can be seen in World War 1 history. Therefore, elements in merchant shipping logistics elements contribute to this logistical intelligence military strategy paper. In addition, during peacetime, many transportations of military goods are transported using commerce shipping. The system used in maritime logistics holds critical information on military procurement.

Air Force Logistics

The air force pays particular attention to their logistics resources and concept specifically to support training, deployment, employment, and redeployment as their primary role is on the capabilities of their assets. Aircraft maintenance, inventory management, and distribution of assets are logistics activities that directly affect the ability to generate aircraft sorties (McGarvey et al., 2009). The execution and management of these logistics activities are supported with the logistics information system, which according to the report by McGarvey, consumes a huge amount in the United States Air Force budget. Generally, the logistics in the US Air Force is a demand-driven process that depends on the force structure, levels of activities, and environmental factors. The aircraft do not operate at a specific location most of the time which gives the logistician a hard to predict workload. Therefore, in order to achieve mission capability, the US Air Force logistician consider the key management options namely; Stockage, Local maintenance versus network maintenance, Contract versus organic maintenance, and Commodity orientation versus weapon system orientations.

An essay on air force logistic operations published by Csengeri (2014) stated the importance to have a common understanding and standards in the alliance of NATO on material identification in favour of interoperability, interchangeability and fluent cooperation in NATO missions. His essays elaborated on the air force logistics operations, material identification using bar code and RFID systems, and the 'Smart Defence' concept which is the pooling and

sharing capabilities among NATO members for greater security. During tight economic times, the author claims that the Smart Defence concept is a better way throughout alliances to improve effectiveness and efficiency in conducting air operations. The term 'demand driven' mention in the air force logistics is particularly much to the interest in this research. It means that when there is a requirement, there is an operation ongoing or being planned in near future. The application of bar code and RFID systems are elements related to the usage of information technology.

MILITARY STANDARDS EASE TREND SETTINGS

The military standard as adopted by the US is to achieve standardisation objectives. It is believed to be beneficial in obtaining interoperability, ensuring products meet certain requirements, commonality, reliability, the total cost of ownership, compatibility with logistics systems, and similar defence-related objectives (Melton, n.d.). It evolved from the need to ensure proper performance, maintainability and reparability, ease of maintenance-repair-overhaul, and logistical usefulness of military equipment. There are five types of military standard documents which are Defence Handbook, Defence Specification, Defence Standard, Performance Specification, and Detail Specification. Military specifications generally describe the physical and operational characteristics of a product, while military standards detail the processes and materials to be used to make the product. The adoption of military standards may ease logistical management and promotes standardisation. However, understanding the military standards eventually eases the identification of a trend in logistics supply and the ability to accurately identify effective material required for any countermeasures. For example, assuming if an enemy knows the type of steel used in the production of a naval warship, then the enemy would just require minimal design for their missile warhead with the correct material to penetrate those steel standards without wasting resources for further research and development.

Technological Advancement for the Application in Military Strategy

The technological advancement now enters the Industrial Revolution 4.0 which is an incoming era of cyber-physical systems powered by artificial intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things (IoT), autonomous machines, and big data. The defence industry is no exception are embracing it. Big data technology has been a boom in the technological advancement in the industrial revolution 4.0 (IR4.0). It is about handling a huge amount of data to discover knowledge and is regarded as the fourth paradigm in exploring the world since its nature of knowledge acquisition is different from experimentation, theoretical approaches, and computational science. The military domain is not left out in the application of big data research trends (Song et al., 2015). Military applications are producing a huge amount of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) data that can be generated by Live, Virtual, and Constructive simulations. Combat entities and events on the battlefield are also collected to create models and simulations termed to be military simulation big data. With the development of high-performance computing, the military simulation big data can simulate complex military scenarios for future research.

According to Kulshrestha (2016), big data volumes relating to national security has expanded exponentially but are unstructured and required real-time and offline analysis. Kulshrestha recognises the importance of big data information for the usage of intelligence which can benefit the planning of any military operations in peace or war. In this context, big data is referred to the whole gamut of information available from sensors, video imagery, mobile phone, signals intelligence, and electronic warfare interceptions to satellite images to create situational awareness for war commanders. It is then up to the commanders to manage and control the big data to understand and react to real-time tactical situations. The advancement of technology especially

in the big data technology coming from the IoT is undeniably playing a role in the advancement of military intelligence. However, for data to be of value to a decision-maker, it has to be made understandable and interactive. Predictive analysis is an important area of big data mining that deals with extracting information to create trends and behaviour patterns only then to be exploited for the benefits of the data.

As we have seen how some militaries in the world are actively using private companies to handle their logistics support, we should therefore explore what and how companies are utilising big data technology in logistics management. The research found that various methods are being used from applying big data in logistics such as used if RFID for optimal inventory, usage of data science and predictive analytics in supply chain environment, usage of sensor data-based predictive maintenance in manufacturing, efficient logistics, forecasting demand management, planning and scheduling, and also the usage of data-driven supply chain capabilities on the financial performance of a manufacturing company (Govindan et al., 2018). The types of methods used are not just limited to those stated because big data is a large collection of data and it is increasing exponentially and the structures of the data are getting more complicated. It has four basic characteristics; huge data size, various data types, high data processing speed, and low value of the data. These are variables and requires an algorithm which is the rule to set what kind of results to be identified (Wang et al., 2017) which is why it is still important to identify in advance what type of important element is required to achieve the value mining and analysis of the required trends.

Big data has been helping logistics enterprises understand the industry development through the analysis of large data to make predictions on the future market. It has also improved the transparency and quality service management of the logistics industry (Wang et al., 2017) as more usage of real-time on the technological network platform. It gives a prediction of the actual users need which allows strategies to understand the market behaviour forecast dynamically which significantly improves the company's profitability. This transparency gives benefits in optimising information sharing but has to be managed well.

Study shows that countries around the world are actively conducting research on the usage of big data technology and how they can exploit the technology specifically on logistics management. Leading the list is the United States followed closely by China, United Kingdom and India (Govindan et al., 2018). Malaysia is generally picking up her pace in embracing the IR4.0 where Malaysia's government inculcating elements of IR4.0 in their policymaking. Malaysia's defence sector has also mentioned its aspiration through the newly published Defence White Paper (DWP) in 2020 that all future planning to incorporate the latest technologies.

Defence Allocation Driving Development

A budget allocation for a nation's expenditure depends very much on the economic condition. The defence sector in particular, budget allocation depends on the role of the military and the size of the forces. Fonfría & Marín (2006) uses the percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) growth comparing it to the total volume defence expenditure as the main indicator for their research on the defence expenditure determinants among the NATO countries. The study may be old but it indicates the differences of power instruments used where the North American applies hard power (military) while the Europe towards soft power, which justifies the different budget allocation on defence industries which is an important point in this study. The overall key determinants of the defence budget allocation are depending on five factors; the nation's concept of defence, economic aspects, nation's income, size of the armed forces, and political factor.

Another older literature on defence allocation studies in ASEAN is by Harris (1986) which also agree that economics play the biggest factor of consideration. ASEAN, mostly being middle power nations, the budget is also determined by the geopolitical influence and perceived threat which requires social security. Expenditure is very much dependent on the government willingness to increase spending on defence and to justify reduction spending in another sector. The changes of defence allocation would not differ much on the operational expenditure such as maintenance and wages. However, the development expenditure will reflect a drastic increment in the budget allocation of a nation and this is a concern in developing countries as it indicates a perceived threat in purchasing more sophisticated equipment or military bases (Harris, 1986).

Interestingly stated by Gray (2014) that the defence budget affordability of a state is primarily a political matter rather than due to economic. The state can decide how much to invest in its defence planning for the future. In this note, it agrees to the argument that the amount of defence budget allocation of a state reflects the state's intention of the defence planning. A more recent study by (Kumar, 2017) agreed that military expenditure is one of the most critically observed components of a nation's spending. However, Kumar admits that there are various problems in studying military expenditure as governments define their ways of military expenditure by the mixtures of reliability, validity, and comparability. It has been well known that figures from the defence expenditure of a nation picture the ongoing military programs. Undeniably, these figures that are made known to the public are usually approximation figures. However, accumulated data can be another source for trend analysis and information verification of research. Therefore, it should not be discarded.

Defence Economics Complementing Defence Data

Defence economics is a relatively new field that applies economic theories to the defence sector. It can complement the defence allocation data set. Ananthan (2021) citing Le Roux, L (2005) has beautifully defined defence economics as a sub-section of the broader field of economics that focuses the economic elements in defence-related issues such as the level of national defence spending, the impact of defence spending on the economy, the opportunity cost of defence spending on social welfare and development, the spin-off for the technology of the country, and the implications of defence spending on national, regional and international peace and stability. The classic example given to the defence economy is the choice between guns and butter, or the decision for prioritising procurement on weapons for the defence sector or other sectors such as building hospitals (health sector) or schools (education sector), just to name a few.

Usually, the justification for the choice of spending on defence requirements is based on the national interest in defence issues relating to the theory of realism understanding on power struggle and self-help analogy. However, according to Hartley (2011), that justification is not entirely the case for defence economics. Hartley sees the study of defence economics look at a wider scope which includes studies of war and peace, embracing defence spending and its consequences, disarmament, and peace. Many considerations are given on the determinants of defence spending that are the nation's budgeting, arms races, and military alliances. Hartley (2007) article further listed the pioneering contribution in the defence economic study field which three among the few are; models of arms races (as early as 1960 by Richardson), procurement and contracting (by Peck and Scherer in 1962), and the demand for military expenditure (by R. Smith (1980)).

Research regarding defence economics evolved with time and major changes in world international relations, especially after the cold war period. Through time, studies in this field had proven a reputable sub-discipline of economics with the birth of the Defence Economics journal in

1990 (Hartley, 2007). There was a total of 193 articles published in this journal from the year 2000 to 2006 (Hartley, 2007) covering topics on defence-growth, conflict, defence industrial base, arms races and arms control, terrorism, military production function, defence expenditure, peace and peacekeeping, debt issues, defence R&D, alliances, manpower economics, arms trade, and country surveys.

Strategic Culture Defines Uniqueness of an Action

Jack Snyder coined the phrase ‘strategic culture’ in a paper published in 1977 on how individuals are socialised in a distinctively Soviet mode of strategic thinking that the process could be seen in a set of general beliefs, attitudes and behavioural patterns concerning nuclear strategy (Booth, 1990). Ken Booth revisits the term by referring strategic culture to a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements, and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to threat or use of force. Knowing that such an element can affect a nation’s strategic action, it can be exploited for the benefits of intelligence.

In the context of defence management, there has been a shift of management towards privatisation. Private companies are handling more and more of the defence services which includes maintenance and repair, transport of goods and people, communications, and even training. According to Taylor, the procurement of goods and services from the private sector was 52% of the United Kingdom defence budget in 2001, an increase of almost 10% compared to 15 years before (Taylor, 2005). A detailed study on the type of company spent on will surely promulgate the focus of the defence sector at any one time.

Logistics Centre of Gravity

There are key elements of logistics that can be identified as critical areas. These critical areas are the centre of gravity (COG) of logistic operations and/or preparations for war. The list of critical areas identified is compiled in Table 1 below. Although the key COG is being grouped into Army, Navy, Air Force, and Others, they are interchangeable and also it is not exhaustive.

LOGISTICS CENTRE OF GRAVITY			
Army	Navy	Air Force	Others
Logistic Centre Location	Information Management System	Training	Military Standards
Transport Preparation	Port Operation	Information System	Defence Specification
Financial Assignment	Inland Transportation	Stockage	Performance Specification
Correct Equipment	Supplies Procurement	Maintenance Culture	Detail Specification
Correct Materials	Maintenance Management	Maintenance Outsourcing	Military Scenario Simulation Big Data
Medical Preparation		Aviation Standards	Budget Allocation
			Defence Economics
			Defence Strategic Culture
			Privatisation

Table 1: List of Logistics COG

As implied by Clausewitz, “A centre of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely. It presents the most effective target for a blow; furthermore, the heaviest blow is that struck by the centre of gravity”. These logistics COG are the potential vital threat to the overall strategy of the nation’s defence. Therefore, the more knowledge of an enemy’s logistics COG that we can obtain, the better it is for the military commander to strategize the offensive and/or defensive plan. These identified logistics COG (not exhaustive) shall be the key areas of logistics information gathering, also known as logistics intelligence. It is also important to have to correct way of processing that logistic information. Comprehensive analysis methods such as trending, cluster, deductive reasoning, and sequential should be conducted in order to achieve better results from the information gathered. Intelligence in military strategies influences the general aspect of the strategy but also can be streamed down up to the tactical level intelligence. Logistics can be seen plays a very important role at every level of military strategy. Therefore, it can be summarised that the roles of intelligence and logistics is important in military strategy and have a direct impact to achieve military power, which eventually achieves political goals. The logistics centre of gravity is added at the bottom of the ‘Logistics Intelligence (LI) diagram’ indicating the basis towards achieving the ultimate goal.




Figure 1: ‘LI diagram’

Exploitation of logistics intelligence information in Malaysian Armed Forces

The intelligence community plays a role in assisting policy makers of a nation for the right decision making (Gookins, 2008). In Malaysia, the practices of intelligence are being carried out by various agencies. Mohamed & Yaacob (2019) findings stated the few agencies contributing to Malaysia’s intelligence community. They are the Malaysian Special Branch, Defence Staff Intelligence Division, Research Division of the Prime Minister’s Department, and Chief Government Security Office. As for the Malaysian Armed Forces, the Royal Intelligence Corps forms up the Defence Staff Intelligence Division, collaborating with Military Intelligence Department from the respective Army, Navy, and Air Force. Other security agencies that could be contributing too to the intelligence gathering but do not have references or literature on it are the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA), Royal Malaysian Customs Department, Immigration Department of Malaysia, and Police and Border Security Division (Mohamed & Yaacob, 2019).

At Malaysia’s national level, it is headed by the National Intelligence Council (NIC) which holds the overall responsibility for intelligence support at the Prime Minister’s department. The NIC

is chaired by the Prime Minister, in attendance of the Deputy Prime Minister with the Director of National Security Council as the Secretary and 7 permanent members; Inspector General of Police, Chief of Defence Force, Secretary General Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Secretary of Ministry of Defence, Director of Research Department Prime Minister Office, Director General of Defence Intelligence, and Director of Special Branch (MAFJD2-01, 2011). Every Royal Malaysian Police personnel is obliged for the collection of information for the usage of intelligence. Malaysia's Police Act 1967 (Act 344) Section 3 (3) reads, "The Force shall subject to this Act be employed in and throughout Malaysia (including the territorial waters thereof) for the maintenance of law and order, the preservation of the peace and security of Malaysia, the prevention and detection of crime, the apprehension and prosecution of offenders and the collection of security intelligence".

MALAYSIA'S DEFENCE STRATEGY

Malaysia sees the importance of logistical issues especially pertaining to support in times of crisis. As stated in the National Defence Policy 2010, Malaysia aspires for self-reliance ability which includes logistics support, human resources, and defence industry. Cooperative activities with neighbouring countries also include cooperation on logistical support (Ministry of Defence: Malaysia, 2010). Malaysia's National Security Policy (uploaded on 22 July 2019) retrieved from the Prime Minister's Office of Malaysia Official Website on 13 May 2021 stated that Malaysia has high intentions in strengthening its intelligence network by expanding the spectrum of intelligence as part of the national security strategy. This is to ensure the sharing and disseminating of strategic information can be accurate and timely (Malaysia: PMO, 2019).

Recently, Malaysia has published its first Defence White Paper 2020 (DWP) with the aim to embody the Government of Malaysia's aspiration in strengthening its national defence and setting strategic priorities for the nation's security. Claiming Malaysia in the direction towards middlepowership (Ministry of Defence: Malaysia, 2020), Malaysia's defence framework envisioned a secure, sovereign, and prosperous nation. In regards to the research topic context, the DWP has outlined its goal to strengthen its defence intelligence in order to achieve a credible and actionable intelligence that consists of all spectrum of threats that is essential to safeguard Malaysia's national interests. The DWP focuses on concentric areas in the information gathering processes also through cooperation with other intelligence agencies at national, regional and international levels. Also detailed in the DWP is the procurement of more sophisticated assets and equipment such as the Geographic Information System, satellite monitoring system, and Integrated Intelligence Centre to improve intelligence gathering at tactical, operational, and strategic levels mainly to detect subversive action and intervention before reaching Malaysian water.

Malaysian Armed Forces Intelligence

The Defence Staff Intelligence Division (DSID) is the heart of MAF intelligence. The division is placed reporting directly to the Malaysian Chief Defence Force with the main role in collecting, processing, and distributing operational, strategic, and psychological warfare intelligence for the Malaysian Armed Forces. The DSID also detect, destroy and deter any subversive or sabotage intended on the MAF. Besides, DSID conducts training continuously to ensure professionalism among intelligence personnel complemented with the MAF Intelligence College. The DSID has a responsibility to provide military intelligence to the National Intelligence Committee, Malaysia's national-level intelligence committee to coordinate the intelligence effort of all agencies. The DSID is supported by the Army Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, and the Joint Force Headquarters – J2.

Malaysian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine

The Malaysian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine describes intelligence as a command responsibility to identify the enemy's capabilities and intentions. It is an assessment of the enemy's capabilities and activities to estimate the probable courses of action, the centre of gravity, and vulnerabilities (MAFJD2-01, 2011). The joint warfare doctrine stated the requirements of the intelligence in providing the commander timely warning of threats to take effective counteractions, knowledge and understanding of the capabilities, likely intentions, probable actions, and vulnerabilities of an adversary, a knowledge of understanding of the geographic environment and situation, and an insight into friendly vulnerabilities to enemy action including intelligence collection, psychological operations and deception. The current intelligence disciplines adopted by the Malaysian Armed Forces are Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT), Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT), Technical Intelligence (TECHINT), and Counter Intelligence (CI). The MAF Joint Doctrine on intelligence does spell out how information is to be processed to convert it into intelligence analysis and also what sorts of information to be collected with the term logistic being mentioned in general (MAFJD2-01, 2011). However, the doctrine directed the focus on the battlespace environment in its consideration of information gathering.

Logistics intelligence has been identified by the Malaysian Armed Forces Joint Doctrine as stated to be the "key to enable the planning process and has the potential to assist in reducing the logistics footprint and identify critical vulnerabilities" (MAFJD4-01, 2013). This study has indirectly amplified the statement and the emphasis on the importance of logistics intelligence. Analysing deeper, the doctrine intends to reduce vulnerabilities on the own forces' logistical vulnerabilities and to identify logistical vulnerabilities on the enemy forces. A short statement was identified stating that it is important to provide logistics intelligence to the targeting cell in order to ensure that the enemy denies supplies or commodities, which may be critical to the success of their operations. The MAF strategy of denial does not necessarily mean the destruction of the enemy's supplies or commodities, but also on probable capture intact as it may be beneficial to own forces (MAFJD4-01, 2013). The doctrine has identified the battlespace environment with a detailed list of critical factors to be identified by the joint logistics intelligence staff. Grouping the factors into 6 areas; Area of Operation / Area of Interest, Weather and Climate, Infrastructure, Health Facilities, Local Industry and Economy, and Local Population.

Delivering values to the Malaysian Armed Forces

Military strategy lives as long as the world is still divided into states and the idea of realism still exists in the anarchic world order. Military dictums may be ancient but remain relevant. It is the role of the current military strategist to find the lynchpin that bridges the old saying to the contemporary environment. Through extensive research from literature, this study has identified that logistics plays a vital role in any military strategies being it for the battle on land, sea, or air. Logistics prepares the land troops requirements from movements, materials, fluids, to individual's equipment. This study found that in the present day, naval logisticians depend heavily on the information technology systems that are existed. In addition, commerce shipping that has been heavily involved in maritime transportation for military goods holds critical information on military procurements. As for the air force, logistics are demand-driven that differ in the types of activities and operational requirements. These critical logistical elements identified agrees with many military strategists, historians, and renowned war general that had emphasised the importance of logistics in battles or even at the beginning of conflicts among nations.

In the MAF, logistics intelligence has been defined and elaborated in the Joint Doctrine that focuses to reduce vulnerabilities of own forces' logistical elements and identifying enemy's logistical vulnerabilities. It aims to defeat the enemy's logistics element through destruction or capture intact. Unfortunately, the conduct of the logistics intelligence is at the operational level only during the battle environment and does not consider the defence sector and defence economics as a whole. The doctrine does not mention the requirements of logistics intelligence data collection at the strategic nation's level or peacetime information. Acknowledging the emergence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the MAF vision in embracing it, however, at present moment, there is no evidence of literature stating the application of IR4.0 in the MAF intelligence data gathering. The researcher realised the level of classification of the intelligence operations, therefore limiting the area of this research. Nevertheless, the researcher believes there are many areas of opportunity in data gathering by embracing IR4.0.

Thus, three areas of improvement in the MAF on logistics intelligence had been identified. They are:

- a. Narrow Viewed. The MAF joint doctrine has an extensive list of aspects to be identified by the intelligence staff. However, the list is mainly based on the battlespace environment of the military campaign conducted. The areas of interest are mainly at the military operational level. There are no strategic and national level defence sector logistic factors being identified as the requirements of logistics intelligence conduct. Such narrow-viewed areas of scope will only limit data gathering which eventually causes inaccurate intelligence reporting.
- b. Outdated Critical Factors. The logistics critical factors listed in the MAF joint doctrine are applicable but does not consider the current development in the defence nor the development of technological advancement. There is a huge evolution in warfighting with the new 5th generation of warfare relates to the application of new technology such as electronics equipment, cyber technology, and smart soldier equipment. The latest development in logistics should be considered and included as the critical factor.
- c. Usage of Cross-Field Information. The evolvement of a new sub-field in defence economic has yet to be exploited by the MAF for data collection. As found in the literature, the study of defence economics provides much-related information on logistics intelligence from a global view. Most data were intended for the usage of business developers in studying trends of arms purchases. Such information is of much value to intelligence and should be exploited. Other fields too can contribute to the study for a broader view. Think outside the box.

Based on the key findings, these actions can add values to the political goal especially for Malaysia's policy towards middlepowership from the perspective of military logistics intelligence.

- a. Worldview Logistics Intelligence (LI). The MAF should look at the worldview of logistics intelligence. Currently, the MAF only focuses on logistics intelligence during the conduct of an operation (operation level information) and not from the defence sector strategic level. The MAF should conduct a broader aspect of logistical intelligence covering states behaviour and defence policy. The broader view can help the MAF to forecast future threats and to strategize their future plan of military capabilities development.

b. Logistics Centre of Gravity (LogCOG). Secondly, by analysing the Critical Factors (CF) identified in the MAF joint doctrine and the identified LogCOG from literature (Table 1), the writes found that 13 elements of logistics are not covered by the MAF joint doctrine which are financial assignment, correct equipment, correct materials, information management system, maintenance management, training, military standards, specifications, military scenario simulation big data, defence budget allocation, defence economics, defence strategic culture, and privatisation. These 13 elements of information can be the additional CF to be added into the MAF joint doctrine. It is the simplest form and can be the immediate plan to be adopted by the MAF intelligence department.

c. Big Data Analytics (BDA). The MAF should exploit technology for intelligence. Due to the limitations of this research and confidentiality of information, the researcher believes that the MAF has currently embarked on the usage of the BDA technology, however on a small scale. With the advancement of IR4.0 and the development of a new field of economic study (Defence Economics), the MAF should tap into the information commonly used by the business industry, applying BDA software to analyse. That information can provide competitive advantages for the conduct of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).

A feasibility study by applying the SWOT analysis as an assessment of the practicality of the proposed action plans, summarised in Table 2.

	Worldview LI	LogCOG	Big Data Analytics
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More comprehensive intelligence scope • Unlimited information from the internet 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More COG • Better options for decision making 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More source of information • Faster analysis
Weaknesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not specific • Requires critical thinking 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Time-consuming data collection • Requires trending analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Financial requirements • Software applications
Opportunities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Justifying grand strategy • Justifying defence requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Alternative options decision making 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Application of technology
Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bogus data • Half cooked analysis 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creates a sceptical business environment 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leakages of self-data

Table 2: Feasibility studies – SWOT analysis

The MAF defence intelligence has been operating at the highest level to meet the MAF operational requirements and to suit Malaysia's defence policy requirements. The proposed improvement areas are an additional area of improvement and the benefits of applying the three proposals will definitely outweigh the investment for the implementation. The term of action and the requirements is as in Table 3.

Proposal	Term	Requirements for Action
Worldview LI	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training of personnel on critical thinking. • Recruitment and development of a new department/ section.
LogCOG	Immediate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Updating of the MAF joint doctrine to include the newly identified Critical Factor
Big Data Analytics (BDA)	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identification of the right BDA software • Procurement/licensing of software • Training of personnel

Table 3: Term and requirements for action

CONCLUSION

Information attained from worldview Logistics Intelligence will help commanders to make better decision making based on justifications from facts and certainly be an advantage to the MAF. The MAF will also be able to have a better prediction of the future especially in the current world of uncertainties. Knowing that it will assist in the MAF future force and capabilities-based planning (rather than threat-based planning) and being able to decide better for prioritising in funds allocations. It also indirectly increases the 'ways' to protect Malaysia's national interest as stated in the Malaysian Defence White Paper 2020. Moreover, this study contributes significantly not only to the knowledge areas but is also relevant to the current volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment.

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THE INCREASING DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES – CHINA CYBERSPACE IN 21ST CENTURY: IMPACTS ON GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

Cyberspace is viewed as a significant environment for cyber operations; Cyber sovereignty is defined as a country's specific roles and responsibilities; and acceptable cyberspace activities along with a lawful activity sanctioned by the nations with which cyber relations are conducted. The global problem that cyberspace has exposed has allowed spy activities across borders, raising legal concerns and acceptable cyber sovereignty behaviour. This study looks at the comparison in cyberspace behaviour and interest between the United States and China. Therefore, this research aims to analyze the impact of the United States and China's cyberspace development on global peace and security. This study employs a qualitative approach, relying on secondary materials such as books, journals, articles, and reports from trustworthy sources. Analysis shows the cyberspace development program impacts peace and security such as global relations, regional and global security, international governance, and citizen rights. The advancement of cyberspace in modern society has played a significant role in economic empowerment and efficiency.

Keywords: *Cyberspace, Capabilities, Criminal Gangs, Hacktivists, Security, Shape Cyber, Nuclear, Digital Weapons, Resilience, Emerging Powers*

INTRODUCTION

The nature of United States-China relations appears to have had a significant impact in the last few years. The rise of China is a fact and a peaceful process to this day. With China increasingly strong, uncertainty about Washington-bilateral Beijing's relations will only grow. Is China going to assimilate or challenge the existing order? How is the United States going to react to the rising status of China? Because of the current international system's economic and political independence, some scientists believe it can peacefully accommodate China's rise. The United States will accept China's rise on this liberal argument, and China will not challenge America's supremacy. In that light, China upholds the role of a responsible state in international affairs, avoiding the use of force, sending troops to serve as United Nations (UN) peacekeepers, as well as anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden (Golstein, 2011). However, China's tremendous economic growth expansion increased global influence, and ongoing military modernization is seen as a severe challenge to the United States' worldwide interests through a realistic lens (Glaser, 2011). The development of China is widely seen as a significant challenge for the United States from a realist perspective. Having regard to the global financial crisis, in which the United States is losing ground economically, China's containment seems a clear option (Chase, 2011).

The United States and China's relationship is essential to recognize their cyberspace policies and use them. It is critical to determine whether their acts in cyberspace reflect the many components of their personalities. Of their relationship without cyberspace. Moreover, lastly, excellent strength Cyberspace policy is still an untapped area of research. In a field where scientific findings are limited, it is necessary to test and possibly redefine theories. As Austin and Gady echo, cyberspace diplomacy is far less advanced than Taiwan or Tibet's diplomacy (Austin,

2012). In addition, the unique nature of cyberspace makes it possible to highly debate fundamental conceptions in international relations and strategies such as power balance, ethics, interdependence, sovereignty, protection, arms control, containment, and relaxation (Sanger, 2013) (Choucrist, 2012) (Betz, 2011). Therefore, this research aims to clarify and analyze the impact of the United States and China's cyberspace development on peace and security.

The United States and China have taken several official and informal initiatives to normalize their cyber relations yet protect their interests simultaneously. In international and multilateral forums on cyber concerns, both governments strive to put their policies into action. Some of the subjects dominating the United States and China cyber-security plan of action include the need to regulate the cyber activity, government sovereignty in cyberspace, internet freedom and the extent of cyber- spying between two governments, and the availability of the current Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).

UNITED STATES VIEW ON CYBERSPACE

The United States places a high priority on cybersecurity, strengthening its cyber capacity, preparedness, and resilience. They make cybersecurity a top priority for the government as a whole. They work together to manage and share risk, and at the same time, promote cross-sector collaboration at all levels to guarantee that all Americans have access to a safe and secure online environment (Biden, 2021). The United States continues to invest in the infrastructure and personnel needed to properly defend the country from harmful cyber activities, creating opportunities for Americans of all backgrounds while building an unrivalled talent pool (Jaccard & Nepal, 2014). They reiterate commitment to international engagement on cyber challenges, working with friends and partners to uphold and shape existing global cyber rules. Furthermore, the United States will punish actors responsible for destructive, disruptive, or otherwise destabilizing cyber activities and respond quickly and appropriately to cyberattacks by imposing high costs through both cyber and non-cyber means (Hathaway et al., 2012).

The United States government recommended a budget for cybersecurity of 18.78 billion dollars for Fiscal Year (FY) 2021, a drop from the previous FY (see Figure 2.1). These federal cybersecurity resources will be used to support a broad-based cybersecurity policy aimed at protecting the government, essential infrastructure, and essential technology (Johnson, 2020).




Figure 2.1: United States Government Proposed 2017-2021 Fiscal Budget for Cybersecurity (In billion USD) (Budget, 2020)

The United States Cyberspace Directives and Governance Orders

The United States of America's National Security Strategy expands on the technical definition established by the Department of Defense (DoD) dictionary by adopting a domain-based approach to cyberspace for ensuring the American people's stability and security and defending the country's infrastructure and critical institutions against cyberattacks (House T. O., 2009). Additionally, the document acknowledges the deterrent territoriality and multiplicity of actors in cyberspace, emphasizing that numerous actors can compete with the United States' capabilities with cyberspace and without necessarily reaching national borders. In 2018, 68 per cent of states in the United States had a documented and approved cybersecurity strategy, while another 22 per cent had a documented but unapproved strategy. In addition, 80 per cent of states had a defined cybersecurity governance plan outlining roles, policies, standards, and procedures (Deloitte, 2019).




Figure 2.2: States with Cybersecurity Strategies and Governance Plans Documented by State Chief Information Officers (CISOs) in 2018 (Deloitte, 2019)

Obama's Cyberspace Policies and Converting Mission Focus

The Obama administration took unprecedented steps to secure cyberspace on multiple fronts. However, the United States remains less safe in cyberspace (Marks, 2017). For the past eight years, the administration's most unpredictable adversary has been cyberspace that constantly shifting in different ideas and unexpected threat. The government has taken cyberspace seriously from the start, commissioning reviews, enacting policy, beefing up defences, and enforcing sanctions against cyberspace's most heinous actors. Russia and North Korea have been sanctioned as were indictments of hackers affiliated with the Chinese and Iranian governments (Ma2017). According to several cyber experts and former officials, this will likely happen more broadly than anything in the cyber policy history of the Obama administration, years of effort to prepare the government and the country for a technologically dangerous era have been surpassed (Marks, 2017).

To Ensure United States Dominance and Global Role Level/Maintain Hegemonic Status

The United States and China have an asymmetrical dependence on both sides (Alexander & Jaffer, 2018). In the long term, a strategy based on deterrence would permit other countries to connect to space while achieving equality with the United States. States who are allowed to pursue their own strategic goals will inevitably polish their capabilities and establish space programs for their purposes. In the same vein, The United States' current position of hegemony in cyberspace as a domain of warfare is in danger of being challenged. Today, both China and Russia are strategic cyber adversaries for the United States (Alexander & Jaffer, 2018). In addition, several adversaries, such as North Korea's and Iran's state actors and non- state actors like criminal gangs and terrorist groups, have become more active and threatening (Alexander & Jaffer, 2018). These actors are operating either in coordination with or on behalf of nations conducting cyber operations in opposition to the United States.

The United States has to fully enhance its space dominance through weaponization to maintain its Hegemony status. While proponents of space superiority will argue that this policy is wasteful and destabilizing, a hegemonic approach to space is far more consistent with American traditions and values (Alexander & Jaffer, 2018). Historically, the American response to foreign threats has been to go on the offensive, confronting, neutralizing, and, if possible, overwhelming the sources of danger rather than fleeing them. They have assumed that expansion is the only way to achieve security (Alexander & Jaffer, 2018).

NATIONAL SECURITY

The most critical functions of the state are to ensure the state's survival through the application of economic, diplomacy, power projection, and politics. It is essential to safeguard citizens' protection, economic interests, and well-being. The codes for reducing cyber threats, safeguarding state secrets, and enhancing national resilience, and economic safety are related to one another will impact political, economic, and economic social security. In the year 2020, there were many 1001 data breaches reported in the United States. Meanwhile, data exposures - the unintentional disclosure of sensitive information owing to inadequate information security - harmed nearly 155.8 million people over the same year (Johnson, 2020).




Figure 2.3: United States data breaches and exposed records from 2005 to 2020 (Johnson, 2020)

Political Security

The United States military is taking a hard line in cyberspace during the presidential election campaign, attempting to eliminate threats from foreign governments and other players before they can disrupt voting or other election-related systems. Cyber Command must compete with adversaries today, not only prepare for a future disaster. The policy, dubbed “hunt forward” by top officers at the United States Cyber Command, underscores the military’s aim to shift away from a reactive and defensive posture and face changing threats head-on (Sulmeyer, 2020). As a result, American forces are forced to compete against adversaries consistently, making it significantly more challenging and more complex to achieve the objectives. Operations involving cyber-effects also allow the cyber command to destabilize and deteriorate their enemies’ offensive ability. Protecting American democracy from cyber threats is a critical national security issue. Local organisations, the business sector, and the United States’s people, on the other hand, should make an attempt (Borghard, 2020). On top of that, a nation should serve as a model to the world, strengthening diplomacy and enhancing a country’s image, referred to as matters of politics. Cyberspace is regarded as a method for propagating national values across international lines.

Economic Security

Further, cyber conflicts have both a classic political component and, in many cases, a significant economic component. China is one good example as the United States has long known the country’s economic security. They faced a challenge by using the Chinese government’s cyber capabilities to siphon off massive amounts of wealth through the theft and coerced transfer of intellectual property. (Alexander D. C., 2017). Recognizing the critical role those economic capabilities play, the recently released National Security Strategy way so that the United States considers economic security to be an integral part of its national security interests (House T. W., 2017). Moreover, the United States is not alone among its allies in confronting such threats. Japan and South Korea have recently experienced significant economic theft due to alleged North Korean cryptocurrency hacking (McNamara, 2017). At the same time, economic threats are not the only hurdles that the United States and its adversaries must overcome in cyberspace.

Social Security

The new and rapidly rising social media phenomena and its expanding applications have several positive implications for the United States’ national security. It can be used in military campaigns, such as the war on terror, as a warning or preventative tool and a tool for institutional communication (Whelpley, 2014). However, National security may be jeopardized by social media. It has a contentious position in information warfare, as it could be used as a recruitment tool by terrorists, criminals, and hacktivists for the aim of spreading misinformation and unmanageable threats (Whelpley, 2014). These challenges and potential solutions offer numerous opportunities. They include regulating the Internet and removing social media regulations. When it comes to comprehending international relations, the pervasiveness of human interactions in cyberspace results in social developments that can be viewed as anomalies (Medeiros, 2020). It is necessary to examine several of cyberspace’s peculiarities.

Besides that, individual and small group security is also affected by cyberspace and cyber-activity. Social abilities deterioration, cyber hacking, overcoming obstacles or profiting from them, and developing radically different ways of thinking are all issues that must be addressed (Farnicka,

2017). Some alterations in psychological state that occur in the mind of human being as a result of cyber activity and their sociopsychological, cognitive-emotional, and behavioural consequences. Certain psychological factors, such as rage and motivations for young people to engage in cyber-violence and cyber-bullying, have been linked to the use of cyber-violence and cyber-bullying (Farnicka, 2017). It is critical to developing programs to safeguard cyberspace users' mental health and enhance their psychological safety.

CHINA VIEWS ON CYBERSPACE

In China, one of the fastest developing internet economies globally and possibly the most dynamic internet nations, the online protection problem is particularly intense. These cybersecurity laws and cybersecurity dissemination in China frequently raise unfair competition, political censorship, and Internet governance with infrastructure attacks. Although information technology is similar, many political issues follow the same strategic logic, and there is no reason to believe that China will not benefit in all areas (Han, 2018). China's cyber threats are at the crossroads of two issues: the impact on global security of data innovation and the political and financial destiny of the emerging powers. This cyber threat reduces the risk of innovation, cybercrime, information signals, and cyberwarfare.

With an integrated infrastructure and out-of-the-box piracy tools, the tech industry is highly vulnerable to serious interference from non-state actors. The defense industry and national security services are exaggerating cyber threats. Technological and political issues are intertwined in the cybersecurity debate as the internet provides new tools to expand and undermine trade (Han, 2018). China's e-commerce innovation and uncertain development trends are exacerbating the situation. However, this practical ambiguity can be turned into an analytical advantage. In addition to cyber policy discussions, four common threats can explain the technologies and drivers that shape cyber behavior. Each style offers different technical and political possibilities. Many Western observers believe China's e-government reforms undermine international participation in China's "multilateral" system by allowing it to justify authoritarian rule and focus on military and institutional threats (Demchak, 2019).

In some cases, the government wants to consider some of them or vice versa. Everyone participates and regularly participates in cybersecurity policy discussions with China. Each of these protests raises questions about the scale of the threat posed by China or other threats that show that Western interests are very important (Demchak, 2019). These cybersecurity laws and cybersecurity dissemination in China frequently raise unfair competition, political censorship, and Internet governance with infrastructure attacks. Although information technology is similar, many political issues follow the same strategic logic, and there is no reason to believe that China will not benefit in all areas (Han, 2018). China's cyber threats are at the crossroads of two issues: the impact on global security of data innovation and the political and financial destiny of the emerging powers. This cyber threat reduces the risk of innovation, cybercrime, information signals, and cyberwarfare.

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China Evolution of Cyberspace

With the development of civilization, cyberspace has become an indispensable part of society. Only through effective dialogue and research among all international actors can the stability-oriented network strategy world order be strengthened. China has a network strategy based on common interests and problems (Repnikova, 2019). The internet is an individual's virtual space. It goes beyond time and geographic space but changes additionally and brings science and innovation together in the present world. The internet has made better approaches for intuition and imaginative results in innovation, social framework, and development while increasing complexity. It is also able to construct agreements in various fields and trains.

Strategic Interest

With organizational security technology is increasingly important, advancing a practicable request to an organization that is viable with current global demand is an important test facing the global-local area (Hollis & Ohlin, 2018). The internet is now a critical part of public power and another area in which the two nations can compete. The internet has become the focus of global research in administration. The main test facing digital administration worldwide is to maintain the fundamental strength of the internet. The serene improvement of the internet without key strength compromises material safety and eventually undermines global harmony and progress. It cannot be done. The global-local area does not work on this path by the vital rivalry between significant forces, lack of administrative instruments, and ‘organizational security difficulties’ (Repnikova, 2019). By reconciling the internet and the actual area to structure the actual digital environment, essential network security should also add to and reflect the soundness of the worldwide nuclear frame and technology. China Cyberspace Directives and Governance Orders It is important to build a solid framework to address the progress of vital strength on the internet to improve the management of the internet worldwide. There are three levels to cover the global framework for digital administration: security of public networks such as basic foundations, advancement of the management of digital weapons and emergency services in key digital power systems, and enhance global standards and legislation (Hollis & Ohlin, 2018). To guarantee the security of the fundamental framework of their own country, the Chinese Governments should make the most efforts to ensure that they are the foundation of their people’s economy and vocation and keep up the essential goodness of the internet. The foundation helps governments establish an organized level of network safety and ensure that you can take on reasonable options and touch digital practices on this premise (Mueller, 2019).

Lack of such ability gives the Chinese government a firm sense of instability, expands the chance of errors, and accelerates an emergency. International standards, laws, and regulations guide national behavior in cyberspace. In the face of the information age war, China must adopt a new hybrid strategy that combines cyber power with the latest technology. Victory in the 21st century is determined by how the virtual world works. As a result, the debate continues, and the government will have to create a common cyber force to wage war in the future. Cyber operations are critical to national defense, and governments cannot allow foreign forces to dominate a nation’s future (Hollis & Ohlin, 2018). The expansion of Personal Computer (PC) in global business, society, and the army creates hypothetical, political, and philosophical upheavals. The next step will be to strengthen arms control and emergency on the internet by the board of governors, especially by major forces. While the internet is unique concerning actual space, the Chinese government’s fundamental thinking processes are equivalent to various nations pursuing public interests.

The ‘security problem on the Internet’ makes it difficult for executives to use all the weapons-control assets on-site (Mueller, 2019). In today’s space, digital weapons control cannot provide the same level of safety as atomic weapons control. Most digital weapons are unavailable, and many are easily accessible locally. In the worldwide bootleg market, it is incredibly difficult to control digital weapons. As a result, the unusual emergency of the internet will erupt. When a country directs a digital assault on another country, it is usually concealed without clear evidence of the attack. Thus, an emergency can unintentionally erupt following an assault (Gechlik, 2017). To address this circumstance, the Chinese government must respond to the emergency. An essential obstruction is the ideal and viable monitoring of nuclear and space weapons when an emergency arises because the current balance of vital forces has been disturbed by digital assaults on nuclear or space assets.

China Cyberspace Policies and Converting Mission Focus

The digital data exchange policy covers all aspects, including the internet, data protection, network use, and network security. Internet policy is a unique challenge in a free society like China and the United States because national security and business interests must be balanced with freedom of speech, privacy, and availability (Jiang, Meng, & Zhang, 2019). Like any other policy, network policy must find a balance between necessary rules and social freedom. The influence of network policy is not limited to large institutions but can also play an important role in daily life. For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently decided that the internet is a public service to be supervised by strong decisions made by strong supporters from both sides (Williams, 2018). It enables the FCC to maintain “net neutrality” and requires ISP to treat all content equally and prevent corporate partners from receiving preferential treatment.

Law on Cyber Safety

According to the Congress of the National People, The Law states that “State measures will monitor, forestall and monitor the dangers and risks of online protection occurring within and outside China. The State protects against attacks, interference, interference, and annihilation of the basic data framework. They approve cyberspace security and demand cybercriminal practices (Jiang, Meng, & Zhang, 2019). The Chinese legislature will take various legitimate measures to ensure classification and security. Basic Data Foundation operators must collect or produce personal information or sensitive information to store information within the People’s Republic of China (PRC) during their duties in the Mainland China field. Under “Article” 25 in the National Security Act, which the State creates a framework for public safety and data security for network communication capacity and data security; develop examination, creation, and use of imaginative data innovation and organizations; implements data and organizational foundations, key data framework spaces and key data basis and safety tests (Jiang, Meng, & Zhang, 2019).

IMPACT ON GLOBAL PEACE AND SECURITY

The expansion of Cyberspace between the United States and China must be adequately regulated since it will produce tension between the two countries for three key reasons. First, cyberspace is claimed to have a significant impact on the diplomatic relationship between the two super nations. The rise of mistrust between the two nations interfere with their relations as the concept of cyberspace is fundamental to a country’s interests. Second, both nations have advanced their capital in cybersecurity potentiality over the past few years, an action that resulted in the development of more effective cyber securities. Recent research has revealed that threats resulting from internet misapprehension have rapidly increased (Lyu, 2018). Third, the expansion of cyberspace between China and the United States will entangle measures for global administration and norms development aspects critical in handling the many challenges presented by cyberspace. The chapter will critically discuss how cyberspace impacts peace and security at international levels. The chapter is divided into three significant sections. The first section entails the implications of cyberspace on global relations. The second section covers both regional and global security. The last section will involve a detailed discussion of international governance, citizen’s rights, and a conclusion to sum up the research topic.

CYBERSPACE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

The information revolution in the development of cyberspace is the most significant concern for world security today. With attention to the hazards and risks that the information revolution poses to developing countries' national security, three critical developments to strategic considerations are highlighted: Transparency, cyber warfare, and broad cell phone access (Evanthia, 2019).

Ubiquitous Connectivity

While global mobile phone penetration has surpassed expectations, Africa and rural India quickly use cell phones and wireless connectivity to revolutionize the information revolution (Evanthia, 2019). Some results of ubiquitous communication have already appeared, but their full impact can only be guessed. Political organizations can mobilize everyone's associates to participate in demonstrations (Evanthia, 2019). The Insurgents recently targeted communication towers as part of the fight with Iraq to cut off services and help with intelligence gathering. Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn enable us to communicate with people on a global scale (Kim & Cha, 2017). Before terrorists could disrupt the internet, they must first worry about it as a sign of free and open nations (Swain, 2019). Instead, they took it as a tool for communication and recruitment (Zerzi, 2017).

A Transparency

Given today's communications networks' pervasive and immediate nature, anything in an urban space battlefield is unlikely to be kept secret much longer than the time required to access the network or use a mobile phone. The world is becoming more transparent (Gontovnikas, 2019). Quality imagery is now available to anybody with access to the internet due to the deployment of numerous satellites with Resolutions are greater (Gontovnikas, 2019). Google and Microsoft, for example, provide free or low-cost access to this imagery through their applications on the internet. Many countries have made an effort to limit or regulate the displayed picture, but they unsuccessful because no place on the planet can be hidden. Non-governmental organizations, in addition, utilized images to keep an eye on the accident areas and access state are answerable for absences and crimes. State information is harder to keep because of the potential to spread information via mobile phones and the internet (Dentzel, 2013).

Cyber Warfare

Cyber-attacks are becoming increasingly common on information technology and the internet (Sciarrone, 2017). Cyber-attacks are becoming more likely and harder to detect due to changes in the hardware and physical architecture (Julian, 2014). Governmentally cyber-attacks are another regular phenomenon. China is frequently mentioned as a cyber-espionage actor (Plan, Fraser, O'Leary, Cannon, & Read, 2019). Hackers notably released a dangerous code that may open users' data files and send massive volumes of data to the hackers: this affected defence contractors, defence facilities, and commercial enterprises. Even as computers become secure, hacking tools will continue to advance, causing network insecurity to persist (Julian, 2014). Declaring cyber espionage as a war crime would have far-reaching implications, and countries should respond to cyber-attacks and minimize the problem (Plan, Fraser, O'Leary, Cannon, & Read, 2019).

Impacts on Global Relations

The development of cyberspace has resulted in the emergence of conflict between the Western and non-Western countries concerning international legislation and fostering a balance between citizen's freedom and states power (Analytic Exchange Program, 2019). Cyberspace has presented menaces to different nations by subverting their dominance on detailed information favouring citizens and non-states countries (Lewis, 2018). Essentially, many states have gained from the significantly advanced methods of gathering intelligence and thwarting antagonist states. Super nations should therefore exercise governance over their people in the case of the authoritarian states (Lewis, 2018). The advancement of Information and Communication Technologies has transformed the security sectors by reducing human labour and depleting some of the Western army's benefits since the Cold War (Survey, 2018).

Technology and State Power

The advancement of cyberspace in modern society has played a significant role in economic empowerment and efficiency. Besides, cyberspace advancement has also sped up the transformation of economic growth in the non-Western nation, a condition that has proved difficult for Western countries to acknowledge or reject. Further, the rapid growth that the transformation is happening, especially in super states such as China (Cheung, 2018), has shocked many people. The instant effects of the transition do not directly impact citizens of Western countries (Cheung, 2018). Such as loss of jobs due to automation of many processes due to the application of advanced technologies. Many people have lost jobs as a result of automated operations brought by the advancement of technologies (Heater, 2017). Therefore, such situations would hint at why some Western authorities have refutable on the current problems due to lack of different solutions.

The current inability of the United States to solve Cyberspace problems could mean that it may no longer get global dominion over critical aspects such as the productivity, scientific and technological aspects (Finite State, 2021). The United States has taken strict measures to hinder the spread of Chinese technological advancements into the country by restricting their operations and the purchase of the American's industries (Carr, 2015). The current trend is unlikely to work since already developed countries may find out that having robust learning institutions that advocate for independent learning, innovation, inventions, and scientific practices offers excellent benefits. However, authority is being disbursed and disseminated across the globe without considering its implications (Heinl, 2014).

ICT and Statecraft

Recent research has revealed that most aspects of a state's craft, such as surveillance, foreign affairs, and the application of weapons, are mainly influenced by the virtual community (Strategic Survey, 2018). Technological advancement in cyberspace and modification of information has resulted in an extensive collection of intelligence (Gontovnikas, 2019). Further, more intelligence still needs to be gathered in volumes of data kept in intrinsically unsafe systems (Times, 2015). The social media platforms also act as storage areas of formerly uncollectible personal details on the targeted nations (Appel, Grewal, Hadi, & T.Stephen, 2020). Great nations are still said to have an ample verge. However, every nation that uses technology to foster communication has a valuable opportunity to develop various signals intelligence that entails extraordinary collection abilities that could formerly be only possible for super nations. China, for example, is one of the powerful nations whose intelligence systems have been reformed over the past few years as a result of the application of cyberspace for domestic and economic purposes (Cheung, 2018).

Essentially, many authorities in different parts of Africa and Asia continents highly depend on advanced data collection methods to effectively monitor and flatten opposition among their people (United Nation, 2020). However, the same tools get used by different groups of people to frustrate the efforts of law enforcers. North Korea has been in the limelight due to its ability to use cyberspace potentials to put down its rivals and earn some revenue from the cybercrime activities (Ketchell, 2017), as evident in the theft scandal of 81 million US dollars from the central bank of Bangladesh in the past years (Quadir, 2019).

Essentially, critical challenges have been established among the legislators of nations that engage in the act of cyber spying and those targeted for the attack. The prospective of unplanned consequences have also existed, as demonstrated by the NotPetya virus over the past few years (Banerjea, 2018). The NotPetya malware was mainly aimed at spying on the details of the Ukrainian government but ended up spreading to other countries such as Russia, America, and Europe resulting in significant destruction that entailed the loss of billions of dollars (Banerjea, 2018). The malware was attached to the intelligence agency of the Russian army, a condition that appeared to have been establishing the disputes with Ukraine as an experiment for various cyber-attacks as claimed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Shepherd, 2021). The effect of such attacks reveals the concept of connectivity paradox in that the most technologically advanced nations are also the primary targets of different kinds of cyber-attacks (Shepherd, 2021).

ICT and Military Power

The concept of armed force has contributed significantly to the existence of power estimation. ICT has impacted how the types of weapons used by a nation's army and their application in different fields (Sung-pyo, 2021). Such technologies have also resulted in developing an advanced spectrum of accuracy-oriented standard weapons that can be used in battlespace with exceptional vulgarity (Sung-pyo, 2021). Further, technological autonomous air-defence systems have developed to be more innovatory and readily available. The situation indicates that America and its defensive allies such as Canada are highly valued (U.S. Department of State, 2020), unlike nations with an antagonistic relationship over the past years.

The application of independent air-defence systems has advanced to the extent that non-state parties use them even though (Mallik, 2021). Essentially, practical conducted by several drones to overcome the defensive systems may certainly provide long-term accomplishments such as the United States battle group or at the least transform their effectiveness. The current trend of having a battlespace characterized with significant data has made the armed forces shift to systems that drive solutions independently without human intervention. However, such independent systems are prone to transparency issues resulting in a critical situation where a difficult choice must be made between two courses of action (Gontovnikas, 2019). Additionally, the armed forces should also get ready to battle in an exhausted modernized environment expecting that the rivals will destroy and break down the technology systems that depend on various weapons in the modern world before or after the rivalry (Morgan & Cohen, 2020). Therefore, it has been concluded that most modernized forces would hardly operate efficiently in such an environment (Morgan & Cohen, 2020).

ANALYSIS

Cyberspace has become a complex concept in the modern era after advancing to critical aspects of society, including the productive and security sectors. Essentially, having a look close to the fragile relationship between the United States and China, this discussion entails the current developments about two-three significant parts: double efforts in the regional and global security sector, cross-national offences, and fear and administration advancement, and rights of citizens.

Initially, unanimity was made by different nations across the globe to agree on the essential techniques of fostering security at both local and international levels. Non- profit organizations were developed to foster such techniques between the representatives of countries, as highlighted in this discussion. Typically, the founded non-profit organizations included Common Wealth of the Independent States and Collective Treaty Security Organization. The organizations concentrated on fostering security techniques, specifically in the Asia continent. However, over the past few years, the Organizations of American States have included the issue of cyberspace in their manifesto. The organizations have adopted various measures to address the issue of welfare and promote peace and security. Besides, such discussions have helped establish cordial relationships among super nations such as America, United Kingdom, China, and Russia.

Further, the analysis of unlawful acts, terrorism, and cyber insecurities has developed a sphere that regularly intimidates participants and malicious individuals. Independent people, institutions, parties take advantage of the attached sphere to extend the concept of terrorism. Modern Information and Communication Technologies, including the internet and social media platforms, have contributed significantly to the advancement of terrorism. The Islamic states, for example, use these technologies to recruit and train people interested in engaging in terrorist activities. The current indicators of terrorism have highlighted the need for global organizations to be attentive and adopting preventive measures for such activities. However, different strategies have been adopted globally to subvert the intentions of terrorists. Typically, such measures include creating regulatory frameworks that include the Global Counterterrorism Forum, European Union, and others. Besides, strategies also include creating more operational frameworks such as the Internal Referral Unit (Kavanagh, 2017).

Additionally, the overall advancement of technology has dramatically affected the cybersecurity sector. The growth of technology in modern society has resulted in the development of more disastrous weapons such as drones that have posed a more significant threat to the cybersecurity of nations. The new trend in cyber warfare has led to many people raising questions on the legislation making and protecting human rights. One of the critical problems in establishing international peace in the cyber context is coming up with the correct meaning of people's rights that all nations can agree and comply it. Notably, there have been zero advancements in reducing the threat of cyber welfare despite implementing numerous preventive measures.

CONCLUSION

The application of Information Communication Technologies for harmful engagements is one of the significant challenges facing most states across the world in modern society. The aspect ignoring the disastrous cyber threats will negatively affect the unity and stability of the country. The concept of developing legislation by the federal government to solve the highlighted cyber insecurities is complicated. The research has revealed that the current approach of handling common cyber threats is associated with extensive roles encompassing various types of policies and separate mechanisms under the scope of the UNs, which directly or indirectly affect global tranquillity and safety.

The United States and China share a common interest in sustaining and constructing accessible, stable, and reliable cyberspace. They should actively encourage the two countries' conceptions, values, and strategies regarding cyberspace security. It should promote consensus and process development. The United States and China should impose restrictions on cyber-attacks and respond to cyber threats through connection efforts at gathering intelligence involving each other and encourage pragmatic cyberspace security cooperation based on a win-win paradigm. As the

United States and China's interests in cyberspace develop, the tendency of overlaps and dependent cyberspace interest rates between two countries becomes more apparent. In terms of cyberspace security, there are also complex scenarios in which disputes and limited collaboration are linked.

Transnational corporations have a significant impact on today's world economies and societies. As they are increasingly in an emerging stage of global capitalism, the nation-state is being replaced as economic arbitrators. It eliminates past spatial and temporal barriers, resulting in an ever-expanding worldwide marketplace and division of labour, with innovative forms of speculative capital, new production methods, and new distribution methods.

Between technology and government policy, there is a breach when it comes to cyberspace and national security. Public policy should be more closely informed by science and technology, and dynamically knowledgeable leadership in politics will be better positioned to tackle the problem with cyberspace. Nevertheless, considering that most Internet users are from Western nations, it is hard to claim that the internet's position as a medium has a global reach. However, in many places of the developing world, the internet may have a considerable impact.

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AUKUS: ITS IMPLICATIONS AND THE REACTIONS OF SOUTH-EAST ASIAN STATES

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ABSTRACT

The Australia, UK and US tristate pact (AUKUS), is a pact which looks towards arming Australia with nuclear powered submarines. The enactment of this pact is not one that is particularly new, and has been, although with different parties involved namely France instead of the US and UK, part of the interests of the Australian state. This paper seeks to explore the aspects of the AUKUS pact and the collateral effects it brings about towards relevant states particularly in the South China Sea, this paper limits itself only to Southeast Asia and China. The establishment of AUKUS would drastically shift the military landscape of the region and seems to bring about a new complication in the ever growing great-power competition between the United States and China. The implications of this deal, however, do not only constrict itself to purely the US and China, arguably it challenges international norms and organisations as set by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), potentially bringing about unwanted precedents upon the sharing and handling of dangerous Atomic Energy.

Keywords: *AUKUS, Australia, China, South-East Asia, Nuclear, Submarine*

INTRODUCTION

In understanding international relations, it is unequivocally important to identify the principles behind foreign policy decision making. This part of the paper seeks to provide a simple breakdown into AUKUS, its principles and its significance in the aspects of foreign policy as of 2022. AUKUS, formulated on the 15th of September 2021, was drafted as a tristate agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States as an agreement to develop nuclear powered submarines. However, before the formation of the AUKUS agreement, Australia had prior arrangements with France in developing its submarine capabilities. Australia, as a state, established its needs to expand its capabilities and its desire to shift and improve its currently owned conventionally powered submarines. As explained in Australia's Defence White Paper 2009, initially the project was to rule out all forms of nuclear propulsion for the submarines in line with this, in 2016, in an effort to pursue this shift, Australia reached an agreement with France, "Under this "contract of the century", agreed to between Paris and Canberra in 2016, France was to provide Australia with diesel-electric Barracuda submarines for a total of 34 billion euros (A\$55 billion) over a 25-year period." (Fathi, 2021). This deal was short lived however, due to delays and issues with costing, something the Australians were not particularly appreciative of, in 2019, the estimated cost of the submarines, from an initial A\$55 billion had now skyrocketed to, adjusting with inflation, a total of A\$90 billion. Acknowledging this, Australia then decided to cancel the project with France, even though a total of \$2.4 billion had already been paid towards the project, this came along with fines that would come to hundreds of millions of Euros for undoing the project. The justification which came from the Australians in regards to cancelling of the project, was that Australia's foreign strategy in the region had now evolved beyond what the French project could provide. The then Prime Minister of Australia, Scott Morrison stated that in accordance with

Australia's maritime aspirations, there is a newfound necessity for nuclear powered submarines within the region to be able to maintain its strategic foreign interests.

Now that the situation was 'resolved' with the French, with Australia's renewed interests, Australia looked towards the formation of a new partnership. Australia then proceeded to choose the UK and the US as its replacement for the French. "The announcement of AUKUS, a new security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, on 15 September 2021 caused shockwaves around the world" (Tsuruoka, 2021). This tristate agreement fit all the parameters of Australia's newfound aspirations of nuclear powered submarines. In the pact, the United States and the United Kingdom, would assist Australia by providing the state with highly enriched Uranium nuclear powered subs, utilising 93% enriched refined Uranium as its power source. "This would extend the capabilities of the Australian Navy. The plan is to give access to cutting edge military technology to Australia by its two partners, including futuristic capabilities like artificial intelligence and quantum technologies" (Pubby, 2021). On the macro aspect, the technology advancement would allow for Australia to remain longer underwater, without the need for refuelling, greatly increasing the distances in which the submarine would be allowed to operate. In terms of weapons capability,

AUKUS seeks to add hypersonic and counter-hypersonic weapon capabilities to the nuclear submarines. According to Water Wars (2022), this technology would allow for such missiles to reach speeds of up to mach 5, (5 times the speed of sound) and could carry conventional or also nuclear warheads. Because of such speeds, it would challenge current defence systems by limiting the reaction times of counter ballistic systems against such warheads. Australia however, has made it clear that the weapons systems applied within its nuclear subs, are conventional warheads and would not be nuclear armed. This is in accordance to Australia's Foreign Minister, Penny Wong's diplomatic statement during a visit with Malaysia, she proclaimed that her country's security pact with the U.K. and the U.S. will not create nuclear weapons, which is in line with the Australian domestic framework of non-nuclear proliferation and its principled position of not regarding itself as a nuclear state. Even with such statements, there still exists concerns from the IAEA on the transferring of enriched Uranium towards other states, especially such highly enriched atomic energy substances.

IDENTIFYING ACTORS INVOLVED AND AFFECTED BY AUKUS

As AUKUS has caused numeral criticism and some saw it as positive regional progress security, many related actors around it had given words on how the AUKUS will shape the impact. The cancellation of the agreement deals with Australia purchasing 12 diesel-powered submarines, which cost 65 billion dollars a few hours before a public announcement of AUKUS and significantly impacted the France defence sector. France called this action a stab back and slammed the US by saying this brutal and unilateral resembles what Trump is doing (Vazquez, 2021). It disturbed the relations between France and Australia. However, in this journal, there will be a few actors to be discussed, which include China itself and ASEAN states.

The AUKUS Main Objectives

The primary goal of the pact is to give access to cutting edge military technology to Australia by emphasizing "cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies and additional undersea capabilities". It also aims to help developing the primary beneficiary, which is Australia, to take up security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region over the coming decades. It focuses on the strengthening of military capability in the Indo-Pacific region. Lastly, to counter China's rise globally (Deka & Kumar, 2022).

ACTORS INVOLVED

The US, UK and Australia

The AUKUS, in this situation, formed an arrangement of sharing and transferring technologies referred to as military capabilities and technologies. The US are under pressure from the Chinese in the Asia Pacific region. However, the world is too big only for one to control. The US need an excellent ally to keep watch of the region effectively. Australia is the nearest to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. "Australia is looking for more ability in military arms to deter any power aggression or threaten the Australian interest in Indo-Pacific, as referring to the 2020 Defence Strategic Update" (Corben et al., 2021)

Thus, the nuclear submarine was the best choice for Australia's strategic plan as the nuclear submarine is much faster, quieter and prolonged endurance compared to the diesel-powered sub from France (Corben, Townshend, & Patton, 2021). This arrangement is advantageous for Australia as the US and the United Kingdom are making a significant decision to collaborate in this game-changing agreement. While for the UK, this agreement will push them to work closely in Indo-Pacific with the US and Australia. It will strategically enable the UK's engagement with the Indo-Pacific states, especially in the South China Sea. The UK have a big win in this situation as the purchase of nuclear-powered submarine is a big sale to Australia. Shortly both the US and the UK will soon operate in Australia as their submarine base.

China

China is a rising power, and its influence has affected its neighbouring countries. The Chinese assertiveness in the region is disturbing the balance of the region. China's tension put most states in challenging situations in confronting the Chinese. Thus, this has made the US as hegemon feel responsible for balancing the Chinese influence from spreading and trying to keep its growth on hold as much as possible.

AUSKUS establishment was meant to indirectly counter China and strengthen the US allies' capabilities. Thus, this mini multilateral is a threat to China as it is an agreement to transfer nuclear technology. China firmly opposed the idea of AUKUS, and the Chinese embassy in Washington stated that it "should not build exclusionary blocs targeting or harming the interest of third parties. They should shake off their cold war mentality and ideology prejudice" (Deeka & Kumar, 2022).

AUKUS is part of the containment strategy toward China and a readjustment of the US in the Asia Pacific region. Thus, this arrangement can be considered a threat to the Chinese national interest, which signifies that the US is proactively in the region with a reliable ally. Even AUKUS is an arrangement in technology exchange but starting with nuclear-powered submarines is a start to extend the arrangement towards nuclear technology in other uses.

The fear of China's nuclear proliferation toward AUKUS establishes an argument globally. Some experts said that AUKUS was not a violation of international law. Still, instead, it is noted as a loophole to play dirty in other way round' that 'tramples on the spirit of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Gering, 2021). Furthermore, Beijing fears that Canberra will set a dangerous precedent by becoming the first non-nuclear weapon state to possess nuclear propulsion technology. It is regarded an act of 'opening Pandora's Box' (Gering, 2021).

According to Guo Xiaobing, director of the Arms Control Center at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), stated that AUKUS violates the mission and core

obligations of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) in five different ways (Sun, 2021):

1. It can contribute to proliferation by delivering a mass destruction weapon
2. It can contribute to the proliferation of making nuclear weapons through fissile materials
3. It leads to a high potential for proliferation through uranium enrichment technologies
4. It undermines NPT because it sets a bad precedent
5. It could fuel the regional arm race

Thus, this situation has put the Indo-Pacific region into an arms race. Anytime China becomes more assertive, the more probability of rivals placing pressure on the military. AUKUS is just a start to counter China's growth in Indo-Pacific and how the AUKUS will react as China acts. As how the new AUKUS agreement allowed the US to interfere in Taiwan's straits constantly to counter the Chinese influence, which strongly provoked the Chinese (Helmy, 2021).

Southeast Asia

The Southeast Asia region is a very tricky and complex under the ASEAN bloc. ASEAN will always play the typical ASEAN centrality rhetoric, for any foreign power intervention in the area. ASEAN has played their best since ASEAN was formed to be neutral as it can, which aims for economic prosperity by reaching strategic partners worldwide, including the US and China, as leading contributors to either FDI or trading.

After AUKUS had been announced, the ASEAN member state did not rush to react with any statements. Being more observant and cautious is what ASEAN member states can do. However, it did not wait long as Malaysia and Indonesia's joint statement was the first to come out that addressed the establishments with concern. Other member states either supported it or abstained. ASEAN centrality is put to the test in this scenario. How will ASEAN be able to confront many more issues regarding the South China Sea with China if inter-state matters are not resolved?

The impact on ASEAN itself is by damaging ASEAN centrality itself and may go far beyond soon as the decision made by each state will affect themselves bilaterally with the US and China directly. Further below in this paper will shortly brief the stands of ASEAN member states on AUKUS establishment.



Figure 1: South Asia Startegic Center

Australia, located in the indo-pacific region is connected to multiple naval states of the indo-pacific regions. Specifically, when it comes to geopolitical relevance, there is an inherent need to discuss the different state actors in the region. This part of the paper shall deeply analyse the actors involved when it comes to the affairs of AUKUS. China, as a state, has always been a major player in the Indo-Pacific region.

It is important then to note, that there exists a great-power competition happening in the South China Sea. With two hegemonic powers, the US and China continue to claim dominance over the region. "The United States finds itself in a period of renewed great power competition with a rising People's Republic of China (PRC) and a revisionist Russia. The PRC presents a unique challenge given its expansive military, economic, and development power" (*Global Development in an Era of Great Power Competition*, 2022). Therefore, there is an ability to argue that there exist vested interests coming from the arrangement of AUKUS coming from the western hemisphere, noting that Australia continues to be a close ally of the United States and would more likely than not side with the US in positions of tensions and conflict. This very 'arrangement' would to an extent, tip weapon capability in the region towards the position of the US. Applying the theoretical basis of balance of power, this would mean that in retaliation to this shift of context, China would have to equally bolster its capabilities. This in nature, brings about a parallel situation to the Arms Race during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the fear of such a recurrence would raise alarms within proximate states, acknowledging that such a tense situation is ongoing in their very backyards.

REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF AUKUS

AUKUS, brings about significant changes to the geopolitical situation, this part of the paper seeks to identify regional implications holistically in the South China Sea. The increase of weapon capability and presence in the region through AUKUS would certainly bring about an escalation of tensions in the region. In tandem, this directly affects the Southeast Asian region, noting that ASEAN, "is a region of different markets, varying economic developments, and diverse cultures, making it one of the most competitive regions in the world today" (*Diverse ASEAN*, 2022). Noting that the key makeup of ASEAN members is that it contains states with diverse forms of governance, not only limited to homogeneous democratic systems of governance. A significant principle of ASEAN is the non-interference policy which is applied in order to recognize and tolerate the differences between states, and as a means of ensuring the survival of the ASEAN bloc. The implications of AUKUS on the said region requires understanding that the reaction towards AUKUS would not be one of a uniform manner, states with different incentives and allegiances would provide different stances on AUKUS. The polarisation of the ASEAN States is a legitimate fear within the bloc, importantly so when revisiting the past situations during the Cold War, where ASEAN states were divided.

This problem is further exacerbated when it is argued that the foreign policy operations of the United States and China exist on a zero-sum equation, especially at the very least in the form of hegemonic influence. The complication of this leads to the conundrum as explained earlier, where states of certain allegiances, although they may have differing views on the circumstances of AUKUS, are forced into appeasing the major powers in order to retain favour from such powers.

Reactions of China and Southeast Asian states towards AUKUS

This part of the paper shall explore and be divided based upon the reactions of states towards the enactment of AUKUS. Firstly, China's reaction shall be the prior reaction, being the state facing the direct effect of the enactment of AUKUS, it is then followed by categorising the states with positive and welcoming reactions towards AUKUS, among them are, Philippines, Vietnam and Cambodia. On the other hand, states such as Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand

have expressed concerns against AUKUS, meanwhile Singapore sees AUKUS as not of major concern, showing indifference towards the project, instead diverting focus towards the handling of the relationship between the great powers, the US and China. The states of Laos, Myanmar have chosen to abstain from a statement regarding AUKUS, and Brunei has yet to provide a formal response towards AUKUS.

The People's Republic of China's stance towards AUKUS has been clear from the get go, AUKUS is seen as a threat to its sovereignty. The nine-dash line claim that China has been pursuing which is considered as part of its national interest seems to come under fire with the enactment of AUKUS. However, China's strategic diplomatic callout towards the AUKUS project does not come purely through the fear of sovereign breach. Instead, China argues that the problem with the enactment of AUKUS is the possibility of abuse from state actors in bad faith. China argues that with the transfer of high grade refined uranium, there are two outcomes that could possibly materialise. Firstly, that Australia has the ability to weaponize such material when there exists access to it, this would go against the principles of reducing nuclear powers in the world. Secondly, China argues that the technology sharing of Uranium, and if the IAEA chooses to turn a blind eye towards it would mean that it sets a legal precedent for other states to replicate the same scenario. In essence, the process would unleash the Pandora's box towards uncontrolled nuclear sharing and notorious states such as Iran and Russia could potentially recreate this with no fear of retaliation, on the basis that the US, UK and Australia had done it before.

The Philippines, believes that ASEAN as a bloc, does not have the military capability to effectively handle China's growing military dominance in the region. Therefore, with the enactment of AUKUS, the proximity of the US as the main challenge to China's dominance would mean a greater sense of security for the ASEAN region. "Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs Teodoro Locsin Jr said the enhancement of Australia's military capacity is essential to achieving and maintaining geostrategic balance in the region." (Popioco, 2022)

The Socialist Republic of Vietnam welcomes the enactment of AUKUS, as a state, Vietnam subscribes to the concept of a multipolar power system, and strongly believes that with the projecting of AUKUS, this would allow for a more stable region. According to Tu A. (2021), Vietnam believes that all states owe a duty towards achieving development, peace and stability in the world, therefore if AUKUS is a means to achieving that, Vietnam is supportive of the project.

Cambodia believes that the enactment of AUKUS would not necessarily fuel increased tensions in the region. Cambodia, in its concern, "wishes to see the whole region remain peaceful, stable, and prosperous, and expects that AUKUS will not fuel unhealthy rivalries and further escalate tension" (Sao, 2021). Thus, Cambodia views AUKUS as something viable, if handled properly.

Malaysia, despite strong opposition against China's encroaching of its territorial waters, believes that the addition of AUKUS would only bring about more complexity to the dynamics of power in the region. Malaysia's stance has been consistent in retaining the status quo within the region, arguing that increased presence in the region would only mean heightened conflicts, this would, as a state directly bordering the South China Sea, only bring about collateral damage towards Malaysia.

Indonesia believes that balance in the region is something that must be always upheld. Indonesia, in diplomatic statements, reiterates the importance of upholding international law, that laws such as United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) and Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) exists in order to regulate peaceful interactions between states. To Indonesia, AUKUS remains an uncertainty and could potentially upset the balance of the region.

Thailand, as a close partner of China on a Military aspect, with newly bought submarine deals with China, chooses to oppose the idea of AUKUS within the region. "Former Thai Deputy Prime Minister Pinit Jarusombat said AUKUS will intensify an arms race in the region, adding to the burdens of the region and leading to a negative impact on nuclear non-proliferation efforts" (Singh, 2021). Thailand believes that an arms race is more likely the outcome of AUKUS and is something that would directly lead to future barriers in terms of international relations especially when it comes to nuclear power.

Laos, Myanmar and Brunei, as members of the ASEAN state, have chosen to abstain from commenting regarding AUKUS. Speculating regarding the reason for abstinence would disobjectify the paper and therefore argumentation regarding abstinence could be assumed as indifference to AUKUS.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, AUKUS continues to be an uncertainty in the region, with expected escalation in regional tensions, it is important to constantly be aware of the potential impacts of AUKUS as the project continues to expand itself. It is also critical to note the implications of AUKUS and how potentially China and Southeast Asian states will continue to position themselves as a reaction to AUKUS. This paper posits that the varied reaction from ASEAN proves that there is a uncertainty to the situation and the likely impacts of AUKUS continue to be debated from different viewpoints and angles, where on one hand states believe it to be a natural course in the balance of power, other states believe it only seeks to increase regional tension and put bordering states as collateral, suffering the impacts of this escalation. In the lenses of international agencies and organisations such as the IAEA, it is still a grey area as to whether the transferring of Atomic Energy would mean the opening of the pandora box in the aspect of international norms.

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CLIMATE CHANGE AND IMPACTS TOWARDS SECURITY AND STABILITY OF ASEAN

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ABSTRACT

Climate has shaped human life from the very first civilization. A range of studies has shown how weather and climatic conditions have led to the collapse of societies, from the decline of the Tang Dynasty in China in the 10th century to the decline of the Mayan civilization around 900 A.D., to the reshaping of settlements in Africa before the common era. The impacts of climate change on different sectors of the society are interrelated. Drought can harm food production and human health, rising sea levels lead to the inundation of low-lying coastal areas, flooding can lead to disease spread and damages to the ecosystems and infrastructure, and human health issues can increase the mortality, impact food availability, and limit worker productivity. Even though the evidence that connects climate change and political stability has been less obvious, it is becoming increasingly impossible to ignore. Warmer temperatures and extreme weather exacerbate social stress and worsen economic outcomes and these, in turn, affect political behaviour.

Keywords: *Disaster Risk Management (DRM), Food Security, Eradication, economic inequality, Mechanisme, social instability, policy, natural disasters*

INTRODUCTION

Climate change represents one of the greatest threats to long-term regional stability in Southeast Asia. It is estimated that by 2050, daily high tides will flood some areas, where over 48 million people in Southeast Asia now live, while predicted average annual flood levels would inundate the homes of over 79 million people. At the same time, the direct threats of sea-level rise and super storms will compound food and water insecurity throughout the region. All of these impacts, which will disproportionately affect the communities, will contribute to political instability and damage local and national economies (ASEAN State of Climate Change Report, 2021). With the global temperatures gradually rising, economic losses caused by natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, and droughts are increasing, which greatly increases the financial risks in the affected areas and causes indirect damage to the economy by breaking the global supply chains, and thus attacking the financial stability to any nations.

A vicious cycle may result from climate change, social instability, and infectious disease outbreaks, while the climate change may weaken the state governance and health system capacity, increase the risk of disease outbreaks, which in turn may result in instability that further weakens state institutions, and increase the risks of future outbreaks. The most direct effects are seen in the short- to medium-term consequences, with risks of shortages leading to riots and social instability, as occurred in parts of Africa and South Asia. Nevertheless, the long-term and often largely unseen consequences of food and water shortages may be most damaging to the national stability and security. Climate change does not only affect health but also affects income, migration, and political instability. Climate change threatens human security by damaging livelihoods, compromising culture and identity, increasing migration (forced migration), and reducing the ability of states to provide the necessary conditions for human security (United Nations, 2018). At regional level, climate change does give security threats, especially to the countries that share borders. Illegal migration activities such as human trafficking or any other non-traditional threats may likely occur.

Over the years, ASEAN has demonstrated the commitment to addressing climate change, including through multi-sector dialogue and relevant activities involving key partners in various sectors, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, transport, disaster management, and finance. The ASEAN Joint Statements on Climate Change have identified climate change as one of its regional priorities. These initiatives have enabled ASEAN to foster strong partnerships with regional and global partners to support building local capacities, initiate sustained climate investments, and facilitate knowledge and technology exchanges (Secreteriat, 2018). Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement on key commonalities and differences such as identifying capacity-building opportunities and appropriate regional frameworks so that the ASEAN region can enhance transparency and be more proactive.

IMPACT ON CLIMATE CHANGE IN ASEAN

Southeast Asia is among the regions that are most vulnerable to climate change. With the global population growing at one point zero eight percent (1.08%) on average, it is projected to reach seven hundred seventy million (770) people in 2040. It is well known that temperatures in southeast Asia have been on the rise since 1960. As climate change accelerates, it will also shape the region's major strategic challenges. This includes a host of security issues such as boundary delimitation when the demarcation baseline changes, trans-national migration as the population flocks to greener pastures, unregulated fishing when established areas have depleted their stocks, loss of livelihoods, migration, both from within and outside the region, and many others (David K. Ding 1, 2022). No doubt that many sectors receive an impact on climate change, as listed below.




Figure 1: Impact on Climate Change on ASEAN

Sectoral Impacts

ASEAN faces a range of climate change impacts that threaten its development prospects. The priority impacts reported were in the sectors related to agriculture, water resources, fisheries and animal husbandry, coastal zones, urban infrastructure, forests and biodiversity, energy, and human health. Some of the common impacts include negative impacts on agriculture and food production, a decline in freshwater resources, the threat to coastal infrastructure due to sea level rise and associated saline water intrusion, changes in the forest species composition and related impacts

on forest biodiversity, negative impacts on rural livelihoods largely associated with agriculture and natural resources, and negative impacts on human and animal health due to the spread of infectious diseases and change in the air quality (Agya, Volume 2, Dec 2021). Increased water scarcity associated with droughts, increased floods, landslides, high temperatures, sea level rise and associated saline water intrusion, and increased frequency of rainfall events are some of the common factors behind the impact projections. These factors interact with the pre-existing vulnerabilities and development contexts of countries and produce some of the significant impacts that these countries face in the future.

Politic

When we discuss the climate change impact, we could not specify it because the impact is interrelated between one to another. Whatever happens to one sector will definitely influence another sector. Climate change affects human security in the region by threatening traditional livelihoods, worsening the existing intra-state security threats, transforming territorial disputes and bilateral tensions, and straining already limited resources (Vivekananda, 2022). It also poses threats of political instability, such as poverty, and unemployment. Demonstrations and riots, environmental conflicts, terrorism, and migration, especially if problems occurring in sectors such as water, agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, persist. Evidently, although natural events caused by climate change do not directly indicate that these developments play an important role by triggering the beginning of the process leading to political instability, the climate change may be able to weaken state governance and health system capacity, increasing the risk of disease outbreaks, which in turn may result in instability that further weakens state institutions, increasing the risks of future outbreaks, so on and so forth (Thanos Dokos (ed.), 2008). The most direct effects are in the short- to medium-term consequences, with risks of shortages leading to riots and social instability, as has occurred in parts of Africa and South Asia. Nevertheless, the long-term and often largely unseen consequences of food and water shortages may be most damaging to the stability and national security. External tension with the neighbouring country will also occur when it involves security issues such as transborder crime, illegal migration, illegal fishing, and many others. With many ASEAN countries sharing borders, things are expected to take an uglier turn.

Geopolitically

Geopolitically, climate change can alter the strategic calculus in the South China Sea disputes for the claimant states. Rising sea levels might imperil the manmade installations on the various reefs and island groups, while the pressure on inland fisheries increases the relative importance of the fish stocks in the South China Sea. In some cases, rising sea levels might submerge the entire reefs or islands, undermining claims to Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) as defined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Climate change will continue to have a significant impact on the ecosystems and organisms, also the impact on oceanic fishing resources. Changes are also occurring in the ocean. The ocean absorbs about 30% of the carbon dioxide that is released into the atmosphere from the burning of fossil fuels. As a result, the water is becoming more acidic, affecting marine life (Satarupa Ghosh, 2020).

Economic

Climate change is likely to further intensify severe weather events, with significant human and financial costs for ASEAN member states. Moreover, most of the populations are concentrated along the seaboards and on flat fertile plains threatened by the sea-level rise. The rising concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will also escalate the probability of climate disasters. This will greatly increase the financial risks in the affected areas and cause indirect damage to the economy by breaking the global supply chains and thus attacking the financial stability. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that southeast Asia could suffer bigger

losses than most regions in the world. It may shave 11 percent off the region's GDP by the end of the century as it takes a toll on key sectors such as agriculture, tourism, and fishing- along with human health and labour productivity (David A. Raitzer, 2015). Social and economic inequality, particularly between established ethnic or other established groups within countries, can increase the risk of conflict. The elite capture of natural resources, ecosystem services, and political power can breed social and economic resentment, increasing the risk of instability

Food Security

Climate change affects not one but four dimensions of food security, namely food availability, access to food, stability of food supplies, and food utilization. The importance of the various dimensions and the overall impact of climate change on food security will differ across regions and this will happen over time. Our food supply depends on climate and weather conditions. Although farmers and researchers may be able to adapt some agricultural techniques and technologies or develop new ones, some changes will be difficult to manage. Increased temperatures, drought and water stress, diseases, and weather extremes create challenges for the farmers and ranchers who put food on our tables. Human farm workers can suffer from heat-related health issues, like exhaustion, heatstroke, and heart attacks. Rising temperatures and heat stress can also harm livestock (Islam, 2021).



Figure 2 : Food Security in ASEAN

Human Health

Changes in weather and climate patterns can put lives at risk. Heat is one of the deadliest weather phenomena. As the ocean temperatures rise, hurricanes are getting stronger and wetter, which can cause direct and indirect deaths. Dry conditions lead to more wildfires, which bring many health risks. Higher incidences of flooding can lead to the spread of waterborne diseases, injuries, and chemical hazards (Jesse E Bell, 2017). Human farm workers can suffer from heat-related health issues, like exhaustion, heatstroke, and heart attacks. Rising temperatures and heat stress can also harm livestock.




Figure 3: Impact of Climate Change in Human Health

Infrastructure

Physical infrastructure includes bridges, roads, ports, electrical grids, broadband Internet, and other parts of our transportation and communication systems. It is often designed to be in use for years or decades, and many communities have infrastructure that was designed without future climate in mind. But even newer infrastructures can be vulnerable to climate change. Extreme weather events that bring heavy rains, floods, wind, snow, or temperature changes can cause stress to the existing structures and facilities (Luisa, 2019). Increased temperatures require more indoor cooling, which can put stress on an energy grid. Sudden heavy rainfall can lead to flooding that shuts down highways and major business areas.

MALAYSIA'S MECHANISM IN HANDLING CLIMATE CHANGE

Malaysia is also not spared from the impact of climate change. Malaysia is geographically located just outside the “pacific rim of fire”. However, the perception that Malaysia is safe from severe natural disasters, particularly because of climate change is no longer accurate. In recent years, our exposure to climate-related disasters has intensified.

In December 2014, Malaysia faced its worst monsoon flood in the country's history, affecting several states where five hundred forty-one thousand eight hundred ninety-six (541,896) people were affected nationwide and the government had to bear rm2.58 billion in losses to public infrastructure alone. Next, the 5.9 magnitude earthquake disasters in Ranau, Sabah on 5th June 2015 took the lives of 18 mountain climbers on Mount Kinabalu, and in recent times Malaysia or specifically Shah Alam, a capital city of Selangor faced another terrible flood where over 10 000 houses are damaged and the losses are estimated at around Ringgit Malaysia 1.4 billion. To overcome the disaster that occurs due to climate change, a few mechanisms and strategies are adopted by the Malaysian government, which is as follows:

Establishment of the National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) in 2015

The National Disaster Management Agency (NADMA) was established on 1st October 2015 under the Prime Minister's Department that was taking over the responsibility from the National Security Council. Since then, NADMA is Malaysia's new focal point for disaster

management at the regional and international levels (NADMA, 2022). Through NADMA, the government envisions a more resilient nation and society through a sustainable disaster management mechanism, which encompasses before, during, and post-disaster policies, programs, and projects such as coordinating disaster risk reduction initiatives, regulating the implementation of policies, implementing public awareness programs and after action reviews, and many more. The management of disasters in the country is well arranged through the convergence of various expertise and talents from diverse backgrounds and disciplines under one roof such as the consolidation of the disaster management division of the National Security Council, post-flood recovery unit of the Prime Minister's Department and the Special Malaysia Disaster Assistance and Rescue Agency (SMART). To further streamline the disaster management coordination, the department of Civil Defence Malaysia was also put under the Prime Ministers Department where formerly it was under the Ministry of Home Affairs. Both NADMA and the Civil Defence are under the patronage of the minister at the Prime Minister's Department.

Consolidation of All Particular Departments Which Have Various Backgrounds and Discipline Under One Roof. A comprehensive legal framework is also developed encapsulating governance aspects in disaster management, enforcement, preparedness, disaster risk reduction, and response among others. NSC No 20, as well as other Standard Operating Procedures have also been reviewed to reflect upon the current disaster management structure and needs.

Developed Standard Operating Procedures On Specific Disasters (Flood, Haze, Earthquake, Industrial, Tsunami, and Drought. Standard operating procedures for specific disasters (flood, haze, earthquake, industrial, tsunami, and drought) have been developed to clarify and detail the responsibilities of relevant agencies in managing and responding to disaster incidents. The government agencies involved in disaster management also need to prepare, update, and apply their internal SOPs in handling the disaster. The Standard Operating Procedures are subject to, and comply with, NSC NO. 20.

Establishment Of Another Layer Of Management (The Community Level)

Apart from this, the disaster management mechanism and structure are further improved with the formal establishment of another layer of management i.e. the community level with the creation of the community disaster emergency response team comprising of local leaders and volunteers.

Providing Comprehensive Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Framework.

The increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters due to the adverse impact of climate change has affected the nation. It is important to ensure that development gains are not reversed by natural disasters to ensure that the increase in the standards of living enjoyed by people today will continue to rise for future generations. The immediate step is to make sure that no one is left at risk and identify which areas and communities are at risk and provide the right tools in case such a situation occurs. To reach the objectives, the DRM framework is divided into the following three strategies:

Strategy D 1: Strengthen the policy, regulatory, and institutional framework

DRM policy and its related legislation are formulated and relevant standard operating procedures are revised to continue to reinforce the coordination and collaboration among disaster-related agencies, NGOs, and the community to ensure a faster response. Community awareness has to be created at all levels through schools, NGOs, agencies, and many others. Next, disaster detection and response capacity necessitates improvement, and the Malaysian Meteorological Department has established an early warning system, weather forecasting, and fixed line alert

system (FLAS) for extreme conditions like the tsunami. The dissemination system: warning, siren, short messaging, website, needs to be implemented as well.

Strategy D 2: Improve Flood Mitigation Programs

Improve flood mitigation by generating new investments from flood mitigation projects, enhancing long-term planning, and strengthening flood forecasting and warning systems, such as the ones developed by the Malaysia Department of Irrigation and Drainage (DIID) telemetry system- flood forecasting models and Info Banjir, The Linear Transfer Function Model (LTFM) at Pahang river and the tank model at Kelantan river. The agencies involved in flood relief will use the information to decide when they should mobilize their staff and equipment to the areas that are potentially hit.

Strategy D 3: Enhance Climate Change Adaption by Developing National Adaption Plan. (Ref: NSC No 20)

Enhance climate change adaptation by developing a national adaptation plan which includes a climate change centre that would be set up and climate change action that will be drafted sooner. MYDRR is about engaging and integrating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation with a scientific expert on disaster risk reduction through the application of science towards disaster management and building resilience at every level. This expert also brings together key public and private science institutions to provide timely and evidence-based inputs to support the national platform for Disaster Risk Reduction

Poverty Reduction/Eradication Through Millennium Development Goals (MDG)

The targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) are to halve poverty occurrence through various programs such as the people's housing program, a housing loan scheme for lower income groups, housing assistance to the rural poor, as well as empowerment of the poor. The national disaster relief fund is established to assist disaster victims to enhance the overall resilience of communities to disasters. This includes the reconstruction of settlements that have been destroyed by natural disasters. Through the 'building back better' concept, the government's goal is to construct better housing than those that were destroyed. This has led to an opportunity to tackle some of the weaknesses of low-income housing and turn it into a more sustainable, safe, and resilient habitat.

The Community-Based Disaster Management (CBDM) is a two-pronged program whereby not only does it serve as a platform to convey information on disasters to risk-prone communities, but also it encourages a community to be able to take action to save themselves, family, neighbors, and community members when disaster strikes. CBDM program is aligned with the slogan "Community Resilience Through Disaster Awareness". Apart from this, drill exercises are also conducted involving local communities and related agencies to instill awareness and equip them with knowledge on how to react properly during a disaster. An example is the school preparedness program. There should be an awareness program for students so that they can be informed about the hazard they face and minimize any risk- the students should be taught to take responsibility and precautions for their safety in any event of an emergency.

The government has also introduced a flood insurance scheme with a minimum premium for people living in flood-prone areas to help them recover better without relying solely on the government following a flood disaster. It started in 2017 in flood prone areas such as Kelantan, Terengganu, and Pahang. Through the village development and security committee (JKKK), the premium cost is RM75 and buyers will only pay RM10 and the government pays RM65. (RM 6.5 million allocated for the insurance scheme).

Engagement with Private Sector in Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility.

The government has also set up a facilitation fund under the 10th Malaysia Plan to support development projects that are implemented by the private sector. This will be the government's contribution toward enhancing the cooperation between the public and private sectors. It also seeks to promote Corporate Social Responsibility and create an enabling environment for the development of the catastrophe risk insurance market that provides financial incentives for disaster risk reduction. Business continuity plans such as fiscal policies that enhance disaster risk management including micro-credit and micro-finance schemes set to encourage the establishment of multi-stakeholder mechanisms for the promotion of public-private partnerships, are two approaches that have been implemented.

Private Finance Initiative

It is an alternative procurement method for the public sector in the development and maintenance of infrastructure and other facilities, which in turn leads to the innovation and efficiency of management in the private sector. Attention is given to projects that are implemented and funded by the private sector whether through privatization, public-private partnerships, or direct investment of the private sector in the country's development programs for disaster risk reduction. Government-linked companies such as Petronas and Sime Darby, in the effort to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and undertaking infrastructural development, have also taken the initiative to apply flood mitigation strategies and risk assessments in potential development areas such as the development of SMART Tunnel. The main purpose of SMART is to solve the problem of flash flooding in Kuala Lumpur and also to reduce traffic congestion during the daily rush hour. The motorway is suitable for light vehicles only. It was opened to traffic on 14 May 2007.



Figure 4 : SMART Tunnel

The tunnel handles more than 30,000 cars per day and has been used to divert floodwater. SMART project is the longest and most technologically advanced tunnel in Malaysia. The 13.2m diameter tunnel consists of a 9.7km storm water bypass tunnel, with a 4km dual-deck motorway within the stormwater tunnel. The project also includes a storage reservoir and twin box culvert to divert any flood water. The smart tunnel works on a three-mode system: Mode 1: normal conditions. When there is low rainfall and no storm. The motorway section is open to motorists. Mode 2: moderate storm. The smart system is activated and floodwater is diverted into the bypass tunnel in the lower channel of the motorway tunnel. The upper channel will still be open to motorists. Mode 3: storm. The tunnel will be closed to motorists. Once all vehicles have vacated the tunnel, automatic water-tight gates are opened to allow floodwater to pass through (SMART, 2021).

WAY FORWARD

Climate change does affect human security in the region by threatening traditional livelihoods, intensifying existing intra-state security threats, transforming territorial disputes and bilateral tensions, and straining already limited resources. Therefore, in this issue, ASEAN member states face the choice between cooperating more closely on mitigating climate change or risking greater regional tension in the future. ASEAN has actively promoted various actions to strengthen the capacities within AMS in the implementation of adaptation actions at the national and sub-national levels. Some of these regional actions are listed in Table 11. Notable among ASEAN cooperation on climate change is the culmination of all regional climate change ambitions in the form of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint 2025. There are several actions where ASEAN could foster regional cooperation to counteract climate change, with the added benefit of enhancing regional trust (SECRETARIAT, 2016).

Technologies

A wide range of technology options has been identified, but the basic mitigation actions are to increase the share of renewable energy in the energy mix, enhance the energy efficiency measures for all energy-related sectors, facilitate sustainable waste management, and protect forest carbon pools. Technologies such as climate-smart agriculture, water balance systems, flood and typhoon hazard, early warning systems, integrated water resource development, and disease surveillance systems appear prominently among the adaptation strategies listed by the ASEAN countries (Science Technology Plan For Disaster Risk Reduction). However, the related policy and strategy documentation often fail to identify the extent of the technological development, how far it has been adopted, and where the new technologies can be sourced from.

Establishing climate change research team– utilizing science and technology institutions. In Malaysia, we have the Science and Technology Research Institute for Defence, or STRIDE which provides technical support and scientific expertise to the Ministry of Defence in Malaysia (MALAYSIA, 2022). Other than managing and conducting R&D, STRIDE also conducts operational research in defence capabilities. Collaboration with any institute from an ASEAN country is welcomed, to contribute to more meaningful research and cooperation concerning climate change.

Sharing of Information of Experts Through a Seminar, Forum and Others

To strengthen the work on climate change adaptation in ASIAN countries, more knowledge and a better exchange of experiences are required for sharing knowledge, developing new knowledge, and applying knowledge. For example, the Inception Seminar: ASEAN Project on Disaster Risk Reduction by integrating climate change projection into flood and landslide risk management that was held in Bangkok on 7th February is a good move and ASEAN should discuss other disaster issues, not just the flood and landslide (Centre A. D., 2019).

Education and Awareness

Knowledge generation and sharing: A centralized knowledge repository for adaptation may not be within the practical limitations of the ASEAN region, although such a knowledge repository could be facilitated by the ASEAN Secretariat. Countries, however, need to put in place a reliable process to constantly screen, synthesize and share new knowledge with necessary stakeholders and decision-making processes. Knowledge generation and sharing: a reliable process to constantly screen, synthesize and share new knowledge with necessary stakeholders and decision-making processes need to be in place. The international community needs to be encouraged to engage, promote capacity building, and engage the private sector and other stakeholders in promoting climate change actions. In terms of risk assessments, disaster risk assessments that do not incorporate climate change have already been undertaken in the ASEAN region. Flood risk, drought risk, and

landslide risk assessments have been conducted at national and sub-national levels, while some countries are taking risk assessments to the community level to develop community-based disaster management plans. This has provided a good starting point for the countries in terms of experience with climate change risk assessments and adaptation planning. The major bottlenecks identified with such assessments are the quality of data, quality of climate projections, and the technical ability to downscale them to the local level

Networks, Groups of Scientists and Practitioners

Networks of professionals and groups of scientists and practitioners can play a role in knowledge generation and sharing and the creation of solutions, which can in turn help with the infusion of knowledge at the regional level and the development of knowledge and technology innovation. Good examples of stronger networks include the ASEAN specialized meteorological centre, which can be a platform for climate scientists to form a network with practitioners on climate adaptation activities. Networks, groups of scientists, and practitioners: Networks of professionals and groups of scientists and practitioners can play a role in knowledge generation and sharing and creation of solutions, which can in turn help with the infusion of knowledge at the regional level and the development of knowledge and technology innovation. Regional networks such as the Asia Pacific Adaptation Network (APAN) are working on this across Asia as a whole, but there should also be a strong network of professionals who focus on the ASEAN region specifically. Novel examples of stronger networks include the ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre, which can be a platform for climate scientists to network with practitioners on climate adaptation activities (Centre, 2016).

Activating and strengthening ASEAN cooperation on climate change guided by ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint 2025 and others. (environmental sustainability issues). These could be done with a more integrated and directed approach such as using technologies. ASEAN could increase the share of technologies which include the climate-smart agriculture, water balance systems, flood and typhoon hazard, and early warning systems, also the integrated water resource development.

Promotion and Improved Understanding of Climate Change and Enhanced Coordinated Community Engagement

Many platforms for strengthening regional cooperation on climate change need to be established. Under this broad umbrella of cooperation, several projects and programs could be implemented, including capacity-building workshops, conferences, information exchange workshops, forums, and the implementation of specific projects to address specific issues. The government must also encourage businesses to adopt green practices, enact climate laws, and allocate more funding for low carbon solutions to reduce carbon emissions in their country.

Public-Private Partnerships

Public-private partnerships: The public sector is largely comprised of governments, and is responsible for the single largest investment in adaptation. However, public sector resources alone cannot provide sufficient adaptation funding and technology for the region. This is where ASEAN needs the private sector to participate in the adaptation. The private sector engagement in areas such as risk insurance, innovative financial instruments, weather, and climate data services, resilience infrastructure, energy, and transportation have high potential in the region. The private sector is well placed to work between communities and governments, where projects that are not financially possible otherwise can be operationalized, through finance-build-operate-transfer schemes and others, in areas such as infrastructure, drinking water supply plants, etc. Additionally, the private sector in the region also needs to work on its climate readiness by assessing how investments are affected by climate risks. These could include supply chain risks, production risks, and market risks which are all exacerbated by climate change. ASEAN member governments should

develop new financial incentives and market mechanisms to facilitate investments into renewable energy projects and infrastructure in cooperation with multilateral financial institutions. Thirdly, they should engage multilateral organizations and private sector stakeholders to intensify climate adaptation measures in agriculture and river management (Secretariat, 2015). The private sector must adopt green supply chain practices, invest in research and development, and technology.

Monitoring and Evaluation

The mechanisms and tools to monitor the output of the implementation have to be developed. ASEAN countries are committed to combating climate change, with all ten member states ratifying the 2015 Paris (Climate Agreement). At the same time, ASEAN has set up multiple bodies and frameworks to adapt to climate change across multiple sectors, including the energy, transport, and agriculture sector. However, we could have intensified the monitoring and evaluation to measure the effectiveness of the strategies and effort that have been made.

Regional Cooperation

Regional cooperation is essential in a highly integrated region like ASEAN for two reasons. First of all, the adaptation interventions by one country can harm other countries in the region. Secondly, climate change vulnerabilities in one part of the region can expose other countries to climate change risks as a result of the cascading impacts that spill across borders through supply chains and biophysical resource flows. Climate change impacts cross-boundaries, and adaptation actions by an individual country can have a significant effect on others (Haakon Fossum, 2020). Hence, there is a need for coordinated responses at the regional level so that isolated responses to climate change by one country do not have any negative impacts on others. Furthermore, since regional integration is progressing at a rapid pace across ASEAN, cooperation is essential to ensure that climate change vulnerabilities in one location do not affect the rest of the region.

CONCLUSION

Over the years, ASEAN has demonstrated the commitment to addressing climate change, including through multisector dialogue and relevant activities involving key partners in various segments, such as agriculture, forestry, energy, transport, disaster management, and finance. However, many areas still need improvement, such as mitigation efforts in key sectors. Therefore, more efforts are needed to be made into our regional cooperation. Regional cooperation is crucial in a highly integrated region like ASEAN for two reasons. Firstly, adaptation interventions by one country can hurt other countries in the region. Secondly, climate change vulnerabilities in one part of the region can expose other countries to climate change risks as a result of the cascading impacts that spill across borders. Adaptation actions by an individual country can also have a significant effect on others. Hence, there is a need for coordinated responses at the regional level so that isolated responses to climate change by one country do not have negative impacts on others. With this effort, it could pre-empt potential political conflicts and not allow climate change to negatively affect regional relations, and also might avoid any international criticism.

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