

THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Volume 6 Number 1 / 2015

ISSN 2180-284X

CONTENTS

Malaysia's Defence and Security Policies <i>Hishammuddin Tun Hussein</i>	1
Fundamentalists and the Utopia of a Daulah Islamiyah/ Khilafah Islamiyah <i>Zulkarnain Haron</i>	11
Artificial Islands in the South China Sea: Rationale for Terrestrial Increase, Incremental Maritime Jurisdictional Creep and Military Bases <i>Vivian Louis Forbes</i>	30
The Determinants to the Outcomes of the United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur Conflict <i>T.Azharan bin T.Putra</i>	56
Japan: Looking for a Role, but Whither Southeast Asia in Japan's Outreach? <i>Ruhanas Harun</i>	70
A Review of Security Threats of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Mitigation Steps <i>Dinesh Sathyamoorthy</i>	81
Non-Traditional Security Threats and Crisis Management: Is Malaysia Ready? <i>Shasshi Kunjunie Narayanan, Rosmini Omar</i>	98
Islamic Practice Among the Malaysian Armed Forces Personnel <i>Burhanuddin Jalal</i>	114

Aim and Scope

The Journal of Defence and Security is a publication of the Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security (MiDAS). The journal publishes original papers and reviews covering all aspects of defence and security. It is a platform to promote awareness on the capabilities and requirements of modern defence & security technologies and policies, covering topics in the areas of, but not limited to, Evolution of Military Information & Communication Systems, Smart Weapons, Military Engineering, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance, Biological & Chemical Terrorism Countermeasures, Personnel Protection & Performance, Military Medicine, Emergent Naval Technology, Defence & Security and Strategic Management.

EDITORIAL BOARD

Chairman

Dato' Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein
Defence Minister of Malaysia

Chief Executive of MiDAS

Lt Gen Datuk Dr. William Stevenson

Editor-in-Chief

Ms. Siti Salmiah binti Haji Dimyati

Associate Editor-in-Chief

Col Prof. Dr. Norazman bin Mohd Nor

Editors

Col Dr. A. Endry Nixon
Col Dr. Ismail bin Manuri RMAF
Dr. Dinesh Sathyamoorthy
Lt Col Dr. Zulkarnain bin Haron
Mej Erina Tricia Gregory

Publisher

Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security (MiDAS)
Aras G, Blok A Mindef 2, Bangunan ZETRO Jalan 9/27C, Seksyen 5,
Wangsa Maju 53300 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Tel: +603 40274547; Fax: +603 40274081
Email: midas@mod.gov.my
<http://midas.mod.gov.my>

Disclaimer

The views expressed are the author's own and not necessarily those of the Ministry of Defence.
The Government of Malaysia will not be legally responsible in contract, tort or otherwise, for any statement made in this publication.

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Dato' Seri Hishamuddin bin Tun Hussein is the current Minister of Defence. He is also a member of parliament for the constituency of Sembrong, in the state of Johor. Previously he served as the Minister of Home Affairs from 2009-2013, where he was responsible for major internal security agencies, among others the Royal Malaysian Police, Immigration and National Registration Department. He was also the Minister of Education from 2004-2009, Minister of Youth and Sports from 1999-2004 and Deputy Minister of Primary Industries from 1997-1999. Prior to that, he was the Parliamentary Secretary in the Ministry of International Trade & Industry from 1995 through 1997. Beside his Government appointments, he is also a Vice President of UMNO, which he successfully defended in the 2013 party elections, after first winning the post in 2009. Prior to that, he led the Youth Wing of UMNO since 1997. He received his early education at the prestigious Malay Collage Kuala Kangsar, before enrolling into Cheltenham Boys Collage in the UK. He received his LL.B from University of Wales, Aberystwyth and LL.M in Commercial & Corporate Law from London School of Economics.

Zulkarnain Haron was born in 1969. He graduated from Royal Military College Duntroon, Canberra, Australia in 1990. He holds a Master Degree in Defence Studies from King's College, London and a PhD from University Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM). His area of research is on religious fundamentalism, terrorism and political violence. He has published several articles in academic journal on religious fundamentalism and political violence as well as presenting paper in the international conferences and workshop on related issues. He spent a short stint in MiDAS and held a position as Assistant Director, Non Traditional Military Affairs (NTMA) before assuming his current position as an Analyst Officer at Defence Intelligence Staff Division at the Armed Forces Headquarters.

Professor Dr Vivian Louis Forbes is a Visiting Research Fellow and Mentor at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (MIMA). He is also Guest Professor at CIBOS, Wuhan University and SCSL, Xiamen University; an Adjunct Research Professor at the National Institute of South China Sea Studies, Hainan Island; and Professor at the School of Earth and Environment at the University of Western Australia. He has developed a close honorary research/working relationship with MIMA since its inception in 1994, through offering technical advice and attendances at Conferences, Seminars, publication of Occasional Papers, compiling and publishing two atlases: Atlas of Malaysia's Maritime Space (1998) and Malaysia's Maritime Realm (2008), articles for MIMA Bulletin, Special Issues and facilitating Workshops on the cartographic aspects and geographical concepts of maritime boundary delimitation and archival research on terrestrial and maritime boundary issues. His book on Indonesia's Delimited Maritime Boundaries was published by Springer in April 2014.

Lieutenant Colonel T.Azharan bin T.Putra was born on 26 Sept 1965. He joined the service in 1987 as a cadet in Royal Military College, Sg Besi and was commissioned to the Royal Signal Regiment on 1988. Throughout his career, he has served at most Signal's unit at all level such as Troop Commander up to Commanding Officer. He has also served as Staff Officer Grade 3 up to Staff Officer 1 appointment in Signal's Directorate. Besides Signal Directorate, he uses to serve in the Army Communication Project Team. Currently, he is the Directing Staff in the Malaysian Armed Forces Staff Colleges since Jan 2015. He had the opportunity to serve as the Malaysian Exchange Officer (MEO) at Army School of Signal, Melbourne, Australia in 2001 until 2003. He has served as the Military Observer in the United Nation African Union Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), SUDAN in 2012. To furnish himself with suitable military knowledge and skills, he has also attended various courses internally and abroad. He has attended several important courses and possessed the Diploma in Electrical Engineering from University of Technology, Diploma in Strategic and Defence Studies from University of Malaya. He was the alumni of the Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College.

Prof Ruhanas binti Harun is currently professor at the Department of Strategic Studies, Faculty of Defence Studies and Management, National Defence University of Malaysia (UPNM), Kuala Lumpur. Prior to joining UPNM in 2010, she has served as Head of Strategic Studies Program at the National University of Malaya (UKM) and before that as Head, Department of International and Strategic Studies, University of Malaya. She lectures, researches and publishes on the themes of foreign policy, national security and contemporary politics of developing countries.

Dinesh Sathyamoorthy received the B.Eng. and M.Eng.Sc. degrees in computer engineering from Multimedia University (MMU) in 2003 and 2006 respectively, and the PhD degree in electrical & electronics engineering from Universiti Teknologi Petronas (UTP) in 2013. He is currently a research officer in the Science & Technology Research Institute of Defence (STRIDE), Ministry of Defence. He serves on the editorial boards for the Defence S&T Technical Bulletin, Malaysian Journal of Remote Sensing & GIS, and The Journal of Defence and Security, as well as reviewer for several international journals and conferences, including the Defence Science Journal, Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence, International Journal of Water Resources and Environmental Engineering, and the annual IEEE International Geoscience & Remote Sensing Symposium (IGARSS). He is also of the Secretary of the Institution of Geospatial & Remote Sensing Malaysia (IGRSM) and a committee member of IEEE Geoscience & Remote Sensing Malaysia Chapter. His research interests include geospatial technologies, and digital signal & image processing.

Capt. Shasshi Kunjunie Narayanan earned his Bachelor of Science degree in Human Resource Management from Universiti Teknologi Malaysia in 2003, and obtained his Master in Business Administration specialising in Strategic Management from the International Business School, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia in 2015. He joined the army in 2004 under the graduate officers' scheme and was commissioned into the Royal Engineer Regiment Corp in the same year. Currently he is the officer second in-command of 92 Park Squadron, Royal Engineer Regiment, Batu Kentonmen Camp, Kuala Lumpur.

Rosmini Omar, PhD is an associate professor of management at International Business School, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. She is also an adjunct at Helsinki School of Business, Finland and College of Business, Minot State University, North Dakota, USA. Her academic portfolio is mainly derived from teaching experiences in Asia, Europe and the United States, supervising and examining PhD theses for UTM and other institutions (nationally and abroad), consultancy projects and executive training programs with governments and industry at national and international level as well as collaboratively work with various publishers in reviewing articles and textbooks. In terms of societal contributions, she is a patient representative for KPJ Ampang Puteri Specialist Hospital, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It is a special project under the World Health Organization, Patients for Patient Safety Malaysia and Malaysian Society for Quality and Healthcare in which a patient champion collaborates with respective healthcare stakeholders and the scientific community to create a positive, constructive and meaningful engagement.

Associate Professor Lieutenant Colonel Dr Burhanuddin Bin Jalal was born on 1st January 1963. Join into Malaysian Army in 1988 and commissioned into Malaysian Armed Forces Religious Corp (KAGAT). Having held various positions in the service such as staff officer in brigade and division level, KAGAT Directorate and Deputy Commandant at Islamic and Training Institute of Malaysian Armed Forces (ILMI). He completed his PhD in Islamic Studies from National University of Malaysia and currently he was seconded to National Defence University of Malaysia as senior lecturer.

MALAYSIA'S DEFENCE AND SECURITY POLICIES

¹Hishammuddin Tun Hussein

Office of Minister of Defence, Ministry of Defence, Malaysia

Email: hishammuddin@mod.gov.my

ABSTRACT

Malaysia published its inaugural National Defence Policy in 2010. It serves as a guiding principle towards a self-reliant nation which is vital to her defence. The National Defence Policy outlined that the defence of the nation requires not only the total commitment of Malaysia's security forces but all aspects of society. Since its publication, in the span of five years, the security dynamics of the region have changed even beyond our prediction and anticipation with the likes of the IS and cyber threats looming. One could in fact say that the borders of the world are now disappearing and with them, the certainties of the past. The world is becoming a "global village", but this also means that the dangers can come from anywhere and anyone in the world.

Keywords: *National Defence Policy, Security, Nation-Building, Cooperation, Security and Development, Regional Cooperation*

INTRODUCTION

The biggest threats to nation states today are not so much from each other but from non-statist—and as is often the case—transnational entities. These come in many forms, from religious extremists to cyber terrorists. At the same time, knowledge, information and news of varying quality and in a dizzying array of mediums have become a very important component in shaping our political, economic, cultural and security concerns. Local and international events are inevitably linked in complex and unpredictable ways. These new dynamics, especially threats by non-state actors, have posed a serious challenge to how the defence communities of nation states operate. The present landscape requires that militaries and other security agencies work closely with one another in dealing with issues and challenges. It can no longer operate in silos for the sake of preserving institutional dignity.

This is appropriate and necessary as the borderless world has brought about threats which are more universal in nature. To name just one and as mentioned earlier, the spread of information communication technology has united the world and reaching out to each other easier than ever before. But it has also provided terrorists and criminals a new

¹ This paper was presented by The Honourable Dato' Seri Hishammuddin Tun Hussein, Defence Minister of Malaysia at the Malaysian Armed Forces Defence College (MAFDC) on 20 April 2015.

way to communicate, plan attacks and launder money. Worse still, new communications platform especially through social media networks such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and even WhatsApp have allowed these terrorists plenty of avenue to spread their twisted message of hatred. We are, ironically, despite the increased affordability of mobile data the world over, paying a heavy price living in a hyper-connected world.

THE EVOLUTION OF MALAYSIA'S VULNERABILITIES AND SECURITY THREATS

It has often been said that to understand security, we must first understand insecurity. Insecurity is a combination of threats and vulnerabilities [1]. Malaysia's close proximity with her neighbours has blessed it with both strategic and economic significance in the region. It has, however, also left us vulnerable to numerous security threats. These reasons are the cause of some conflicts in the past, especially those during our formative years as a nation- immediately before and after Independence in 1957.

Malaysia is a multiracial and multi-religious country of more than 28 million people from a multitude of ethnic groups. Indeed, the great civilizations of the world have met and found peaceful coexistence here. Malaysia's geographic location in the centre of Southeast Asia is highly strategic. The Malacca straits, which Malaysia partly controls holds a position of critical strategic, economic, political and military importance to the ships of many countries that ply her route. Similarly, the South China Sea is another vital sea line of communication connecting the Indian and Pacific oceans. The South China Sea and the Straits of Malacca are maritime areas where Malaysia's resources such as oil, gas and fisheries are found. These industries generate some 12% of Malaysia's GDP [2]. At the same time, the South China Sea separates the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak from the Peninsula. This makes the maritime environment critical for Malaysia's defence and security. Malaysia also shares common land borders with three of our ASEAN neighbours – Brunei, Indonesia and Thailand. Of course conflicts with them are unthinkable now or in the future. However, the main threats to us today are non-traditional and from non-state actors, the threats could come not from but through our neighbours. Malaysia's unique geographical location has meant that it has had to be vigilant at all times towards both external but more importantly internal threats to its security.

THE HISTORY IN MALAYSIA'S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPTION

One of the most severe internal threats to Malaysia was the communist insurgency which occurred over the First Emergency 1948-60 and the Second Emergency from 1968-1989. Defeating communism became a cardinal principle strategy in Malaysia's security policies. The goal of the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) was to carry out what they saw as a struggle of national liberation, formulate a military program and overthrow the ruling government. Although Malaysia achieved her independence in 1957, the threat

of Communism did not diminish but remained a force to be reckoned with well into the early 1960s. Whilst the Vietnam War was raging, Malaysia itself faced its own bloody communist insurgency until the CPM finally laid down its arms on 2 December 1989. But while South Vietnam fell, Malaysia survived, one of the few nations in the world to successfully defeat a communist insurgency. How did it do so? Here we must turn to several measures which seemed unconventional at the time but have since become cornerstones of counter-insurgencies strategies.

HEARTS AND MINDS AND THE *KESBAN* STRATEGY

Malaysia, is a vibrant multiracial country. However, the vagaries of history also means that its people have had to experience deep socio-economic, sectarian and geographic differences. To deal with this, the British administration at the height of the first Malayan Emergency, devised the *Briggs Plan* (named after British General Sir Harold Briggs) which focused on the relocation of certain communities particularly at the jungle fringes who were subjected to Communist influence and fear [3]. They were moved to restricted residential areas called '*New Villages*' and at the same time their movement monitored. This strategy cut-off the Communist supply chain and it was then up to the security forces to deal with them in various strikes as well as search and destroy operations. The relocated communities were also rehabilitated and included in various government programs to improve their quality of life. This helped to improve perceptions of Malaya's fledgling government at the time. As Malaysia's 2nd Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak who was also our first Defence Minister, later said in 1970:

"The primary task of the Armed Forces is to fight the communists. But at the same time, they must also help implement the Government's development plan-this is part of the fight against the communists. Defence and development go hand-in-hand."[4]

A 'spin-off' of the Briggs Plan became known by its Malay acronym of KESBAN, which is *Keselamatan dan Pembangunan*, or Security and Development. This strategy, adopted during the Second Emergency in 1970 linked security and development with nation-building. Malaysia at the time was going through a difficult transition. It had just survived a Confrontation with Indonesia (1963 -1966) and suffered from brutal racial riots in May 1969. As such, nation-building was at the forefront of our policy orientations. Although the KESBAN doctrine was formally introduced during the Second Malayan Emergency, much facets of this doctrine were already implemented during the First Emergency by then High Commissioner of Malaya, Sir Gerald Templer. Templer noted that "...the answer lies not in pouring more troops into the jungle, but in the hearts and minds of the people." [5]. In Malaya, Templer sought to win the hearts and minds of the local civilian population by promoting not only military and political advances, but social welfare as well. As a strategy, the combined efforts of the security forces and the population during both Emergency periods succeeded where our people withstood the perils of Communist terror and stood as one against a common foe. This was not easy but with systematic plans such as the Briggs relocation plan and the KESBAN strategy, our people understood what the government was doing and that it was in their best interests.

As such, they cooperated and had faith in the government efforts which eventually led to the demise of the enemy.

While the Emergency is long over and Malaysia's Armed Forces (MAF) are apolitical, the spirit of KESBAN and nation-building still features prominently in MAF's ethos. The MAF provides services to the population of Malaysia when needed such as through civic action programs, hearts and minds campaigns as well as assisting civil agencies in times of national disasters such as floods and landslides. For example, MAF was at the forefront coordinating rapid response to the worst flooding in Malaysia's recent history especially in the East Coast, last December. In times of great need, together with other relevant government agencies, we helped evacuate victims to safe area, distributed aid, cooked and ate with the displaced souls, and after the water has subsided, helped them to repair their houses and the surrounding infrastructure such as bridges and roads. The military was there to lend more than just a helping hand, but also emotional support to the civilian brothers and sisters, in their hours of great distress and grief.

It is believed that with the current security threats particularly with the IS and cyber influence 'Winning the Hearts and Minds' could be one of the multi-faceted measures to be adopted. This strategy should not only be used on IS sympathisers and followers, but in countering the negative perceptions on Islam held by some in the Western world.

HANRUH (Keselamatan Menyeluruh - Total Defence)

To ensure that we are always prepared for security challenges that are bound to occur over time, it is important that the nation has a total defence capability that not only involves the Malaysian Armed Forces, but the Royal Malaysian Police, other enforcement agencies as well as the entire population. This concept has been in place since 1986 when the CPM threat was still looming. Over time, HANRUH has been reviewed and revisited to address new security threats which were often unseen and unpredictable. Total Defence/HANRUH therefore is about the ability as a nation to garner the support of every level of the society in times of crisis [6]. There is no doubt that the Total Defence concept will be at the forefront of the security policy orientations moving forward. This is because these threats will appear in the most unexpected circumstances and with such speed that any delay in response may be detrimental to the security and well-being of the nation and the people.

Thanks to the strategies of KESBAN and HANRUH as well as the sacrifices of the serving men and the people, Malaysia was able to overcome the First and Second Emergencies. Indeed, the MAF has not only remained the central pillar in the defence policy of the nation but also continues to play a role in nation-building and security. Most recently, under the National Blue Ocean Strategy (NBOS), the MAF in collaboration with the Royal Malaysian Police have been involved in several initiatives to ensure that our internal security is maintained in a more coordinated and efficient manner [7]. Several

initiatives such as the *Community Policing* which integrates the Police, Army and fellow citizens have been implemented in stages in residential areas nationwide. The MAF has also assisted in the formulation and training of the National Service program which started in December 2003. It was introduced to instil patriotism and encourage integration amongst Malaysian youth. By providing service to the population, the MAF has achieved its secondary role which is extending aid to the people and contributing to nation building. These attributes are actually enshrined amongst the secondary roles of the MAF and the Defence Policy of the nation.

REGIONAL AND GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT

Malaysia in her foreign policy has consistently sought to pursue its national interest based on the principles of humanity, justice and equality. We have always sought to fulfil our responsibilities as a staunch member of the international community. This can be seen first, in strong commitment to regional cooperation and integration, second, in firm belief in increased cooperation, collaboration and solidarity among developing countries and lastly, strong support for the quest for a peaceful and secure world. With diplomacy at the forefront of Malaysia's foreign policy, it will continue to work towards resolving regional or global issues by engagement with countries in the region and beyond. Conversely it also reminds us that rivalries and suspicions—some of which are old and run deep in national psyches—still haunt us despite the niceties of modern diplomacy and regional cooperation. It reminds us that resolving overlapping border disputes, not only in Southeast Asia but further afield—is a complicated and emotive task—often the work of several lifetimes. And again, it reminds us that people-to-people ties require just as much, if not more work and wisdom as those between states.

ASEAN

Malaysia's primary platform for regional cooperation is ASEAN. It is one of its founding members in 1967. ASEAN has always been the cornerstone of Malaysia's foreign policy. Malaysia has championed the idea that a successful ASEAN is not only an economic necessity, but also a strategic imperative. Since its inception, Malaysia has never been involved in any conflict with any of the ASEAN members. Cooperation remains strong with several spin-offs to address regional issues—including security matters—such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM and ADMM Plus) and ASEAN plus Three. As the Chairman of the ADMM in 2015, it is worth to note in the 9th ADMM in Langkawi last month, all ASEAN ministers in a joint declaration pledged to work together in facing current threats, particularly the IS. Facing security challenges is not a question of 'who' leads but of working together in facing a common foe [8].

Malaysia also believes that a strong ASEAN is a stabilizing influence in the region. Indeed, many nations have now come to realize the importance of ASEAN and have moved to engage it. The US has acknowledged the role that ASEAN can play in the

stability of the region. As mentioned by the then Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel during his visit to Malaysia, ASEAN remains an important organization to the US in its re-balancing of her overtures in the Asia-Pacific region. The US hosted an inaugural meeting of all ASEAN Defence Ministers which the author was privileged to attend in April 2014. Similarly, China will be hosting the ADMM plus at the sidelines of the 6th Xiang Shan forum in October this year in Beijing [9]. These recognitions bode well for ASEAN as a platform in engaging the major powers in addressing some of the security challenges collectively.

DEFENCE COOPERATION PROGRAMMES

Malaysia has also taken part in defence cooperation to support our interests and those of the region. Due to the instability of the Asia-Pacific from the 1950s to the 1970s, many security initiatives were formulated in order to address the growing threat of Communism and radicalism. For example, the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA) proved critical to Malaysia's survival during the period of Indonesian Confrontation (1963-66). The requirements of national survival made it imperative that Malaysia fit into externally devised security structures during this period.

In countering the threat of communism in the 1960s, Malaysia was a clear beneficiary of the US-sponsored network of global military alliances. Essentially, Malaysia's security needs were well-provided for within the local framework of Anglo-American defence cooperation during the Cold War period through the Five-Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) formed in 1971 to replace AMDA. The FPDA, (comprising Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and Britain) was formed initially with the intent of assisting both Malaysia and Singapore in the event of an aggression towards both nations. Since then, it has grown into a formidable alliance where more security issues are being addressed now with constant meetings and training done amongst its member countries.

The modernization of the Malaysian Armed Forces in particular, has enabled Malaysia to participate extensively in various bilateral and multilateral defence programmes. These include Peacekeeping, Humanitarian and Disaster Relief as well as other bilateral and multi-lateral military engagements. Such activities not only raised the profile of the country but have fostered the good relationships between Malaysia and her allies. As the MAF progressed, it began to accept foreign participants at all levels from the three services in the variety of courses at its military institutions. Such reciprocal gestures were very much appreciated by the military personnel of the nations to whom the MAF institutions had successfully trained.

In 2002, an initiative called the Malaysian Defence Cooperation Programme (MDCP) was established to assist foreign military personnel where the MAF would bear the costs and training allowances for them. That year, military personnel from 13 countries benefited from this. Gradually, the countries grew to 17 in 2008 and last year,

there were a total of 40 countries under this program. The ability of the MAF to extend military training to the personnel of these countries would have an enduring effect in fostering the bilateral relationship between Malaysia and the countries involved. There were also numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises conducted at the services level in Malaysian territory as well as on foreign soil under the variety of bilateral collective training arrangements. The MAF is now engaged in bilateral military training exercises with most of her ASEAN neighbours, the FPDA members as well as the US forces and most recently the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of China. With the successful conduct of these exercises, the MAF is given the opportunity to experience valuable operational procedures which could be vital for future inter-operability tasks that it could undertake. As the focus and central themes of joint bilateral exercises evolve to meet the current security threats, the ability to perform and successfully complete such exercises have strengthened the bonds between the participants. It also remains as a strategic platform for us to address current security challenges.

DEFENCE DIPLOMACY

An often overlooked-aspect in the discussion are defence diplomacy initiatives. The concept of defence diplomacy espouses the notion that the armed forces of nations have the ability to contribute to international security not only by the use of force but also by promoting a more cooperative international environment. Defence diplomacy is not an alternative to the more traditional role of the armed forces, but supplements it by a host of other activities that contribute to the prevention of conflict by building and maintaining trust.

The MAF has played a pivotal role in the implementation of these policies. It has undertaken bilateral and multilateral engagements in different facets such as training, participation in UN peacekeeping as well as humanitarian and disaster relief operations. Again, the successful efforts of the MAF not only raised Malaysia's profile but cemented long-standing bonds between the MAF and her counterparts regionally as well as globally. It is of great strategic imperative for Malaysia to be an active responsible member of the global community [10].

PRESENT AND FUTURE SECURITY CHALLENGES

Malaysia's past and present internal and external strategies have helped guarantee its peace and sovereignty. We are however under no illusions that this will be a permanent, static scenario. Indeed, the world is a very different place now and likewise, threats to security has changed dramatically especially in light of earth-shaking events like the 9/11 attacks, the Arab Spring and now the rise of the IS. Nations now have to contend with challenges like piracy, the passage for illegal immigrants, smuggling and trans-border crimes such as drug trafficking, terrorism and even cyber threats.

Malaysia inaugural National Defence Policy was published in 2010. It serves as a guiding principle towards a self-reliant nation which is vital to our defence. This requires not only the total commitment of our security forces but all aspects of society. Since its publication, in the span of five years, the security dynamics of the region have changed even beyond our prediction and anticipation with the likes of the IS and cyber threats looming. One could in fact say that the borders of the world are now disappearing and with them, the certainties of the past. The world is becoming a “global village”, but this also means that the dangers can come from anywhere and anyone in the world. Malaysia understands this all too well. In early 2013, the country was confronted with its gravest security breach since the Confrontation and Emergencies when gunmen aligned to the so-called Sultanate of Sulu in the Philippines landed in Lahad Datu, Sabah.

These men were attempting to enforce what they believed what a centuries-old claim to the state. In the subsequent Ops Daulat to repel the intruders, 71 Sulu Intruders were killed at the expense of 10 Malaysian Security personnel killed in action. At the same time, Malaysia established the 1,400-kilometre Eastern Sabah Security Command (*ESSCOM*) in the state of Sabah to better ensure the security of the state. There are many lessons that could be gained from this incident. Certainly one that is most prominent is the threat from non-state actors and in a non-traditional manner. Another vital factor was the close cooperation with our ASEAN neighbours, in this case the Philippines where vital information and security cooperation prevailed at the height of the crisis. Still, the incident shows that the biggest threats to nations today are not always from each other, but from shadowy groups, often with historical grievances not easily addressed. These groups recognize no national boundaries, are often not easily categorized and whose motivations are often unclear or shifting.

THE ISLAMIC STATE (IS) AND CYBER THREATS

Indeed, the most prominent and recent non-traditional security threat that has been the threats by non-state actors. This is the threat that will continue to haunt us, in more unpredictable ways, moving forward. The recent events in Sydney and Paris. These “lone wolf” attacks have posed a very serious challenge to the fundamental ethos by which nation states deal with threats. These new dynamics demand of us to think outside the box, testing “blue ocean” strategies, primarily in the interest of peace and stability of our nation states. These “lone wolf” attacks are serious and disturbing. It is almost impossible to predict and pre-empt. What is more disquieting is the fact that many of these attacks are carried out by the young. Young men who had bright futures ahead of them instead choose to take their lives and the lives of countless others in a hail of gunfire and bomb shrapnel. What’s more painful is the fact that these young men were often educated and from affluent backgrounds. This however did not stop them from falling under the influence of radical ideologies. Of course, no one religion, culture or ideology has ever been completely free from the danger of extremism or radicalization. But this should not detract from the fundamental challenge that there are still people, and young people at that, willing to engage in acts of violence out of what they think is piety or patriotism.

Indeed, the overall threat of terrorism is greatly amplified by today's hyper-connected and interlinked world, where an incident in one corner of the globe can instantly spark a reaction thousands of miles away; and when lone extremist can go online and learn how to carry out an attack even without leaving the comforts of his or her home. What we have feared all this while has come to reality- the emergence of terrorist threat that is increasingly decentralized, difficult to track and difficult to thwart. Universal threats such as these require approaches which are anchored by cooperative, comprehensive and collective measures. The fight against terrorism does not merely entail the neutralisation of threats after they have struck. It also demands a "whole of government" approach involving not only a multitude of agencies but the multilateral participation of many governments to eliminate or reduce the possibility of terrorist organisations establishing operating bases across borders. These new dynamics and threats demand of us to think outside the box. They require testing "blue ocean" strategies, primarily in the interest of peace and stability.

Nevertheless, ASEAN's emphasis on collective action and close cooperation can provide its member states with the wherewithal to meet such challenges. It is also interesting to study the concept of *Moderation* which has been consistent in Malaysia's foreign policy orientations, which has its roots through the concept of Islam *Hadhari* and *Wasatiyah* espoused by both our present and former Prime Ministers. Malaysia has stressed that it is possible to achieve *Peace and Security through moderation*, which was our theme in bidding for inclusion in the UN Security Council.

CONCLUSION

It has been 58 years since we achieved our independence. Malaysia has progressed as a nation despite the turbulent period in our formative years, as well as the many incidents the past decades that threatened our national security. There is no doubt that the security threats that affected our country before will continue to remain although they may take a different form and from a different source. However, in view of numerous engagements and security cooperation in the region and beyond, such security threats will be overcome. It is therefore vital that we maintain and nurture the existing initiatives in place whilst at the same time promote goodwill and diplomacy where appropriate as a responsible nation.

As a modest nation with limited economic and military capabilities, Malaysia is unable to exert influence on certain regional and global issues. Nevertheless, our participation in the numerous UN peacekeeping, humanitarian and disaster relief operations reflect our commitment towards global peace. With effective counter-measures built upon by strong bilateral and multilateral security cooperation, we will prevail against the threats that confront us. At the same time, such cooperation could diffuse tensions and be a catalyst for peace and stability.

REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES

- [1] Buzan, B. *People States & Fears*, Hartnolls Limited, Cornwall, England, p.1, 1991.
- [2] Hj Sutarji bin Hj Kasmin, Malaysia's Maritime Law Enforcement in Abdul Razak Baginda (ed) *Malaysia's Defence and Security since 1957*, Malaysian Strategic Research Centre, p.187, 2009.
- [3] Cloake, J, '*Templer-Tiger of Malaya*', Harrap Publishers, London, p 27, 1985.
- [4] Nordin Yusof and Abdul Razak Baginda. *Honour and Sacrifice*, p.136, 1994.
- [5] Cloake, J, '*Templer-Tiger of Malaya*', Harrap Publishers, London, p 27, 1985.
- [6] Kementerian Pertahanan, *Dasar Pertahanan Negara*, p 30, 2010.
- [7] Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security, *National Blue Ocean Strategy*, p54, 2013.
- [8] Joint Declaration of the ASEAN Defence Ministers on Maintaining Regional Security and Stability for and by the People, 16th March 2015, Langkawi, Malaysia.
- [9] Bilateral Meeting with His Excellency General Chang Wangquan, Minister of National Defence China at Hotel Xiang Shan Yi He Hotel, Beijing, 20th Nov 2015 at the sidelines of the 5th Xiangshan Forum.
- [10] Kementerian Pertahanan, *Dasar Pertahanan Negara*, p 33, 2010.

FUNDAMENTALISTS AND THE UTOPIA OF A DAULAH ISLAMIYAH / KHILAFAH ISLAMIYAH

Zulkarnain Haron

Defence Intelligence Staff Division, Armed Forces HQ

Email: zulkarnain@ mod. gov.my

ABSTRACT

This article discusses the polemic of Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) or Khilafah Islamiyah (Caliphate) that represent the main concepts of fundamentalist groups' endeavours. In looking for the implementation of the concept and forms of the Islamic State, Muslim fundamentalist groups consider the Islamic model to be an ideal and to guarantee equality to its citizens. However, what is the concept of an ideal Islamic State, and how it fit in with the contemporary world today, as claimed by these fundamentalist groups? The first question which must be answered is, does the concept of Islamic State or Caliphate appear in the Qur'an? This article also explains why fundamentalist groups reject the democratic system which has been adopted by most countries in the world today. This article concludes that the concepts of Islamic State or Caliphate that represent the goal of fundamentalist groups are creative inventions conceived by past Islamic figures in order to revive the lost glory of the Muslim community.

Keywords: *fundamentalist, caliphate, daulah, tawhid, hakimiyah*

INTRODUCTION

The debate about the relationship between state and religion (*din wa'ad daulah*) in countries where Muslims represent the majority of the population has become a prominent issue. This topic has been debated for a long time, since the post-colonial era, namely since the birth of the concept of nation state that appeared in the Islamic world at the turn of the 20th century and the decline of the Ottoman empire model of Islamic government in 1924. During this period, the emergence of ideas and reflections from influential intellectual figures started to question the rightful place of religion in the government of a country. It is understood that the original concept of the nation state implied the separation of religion and state. The term 'nation state' encapsulates the principle of secularism which separates a country's secular authority (political power) and religious authority (religious power).

The concept of nation state later spread its influence to regions of the Muslim world in the 19th and early 20th centuries, bringing with it new issues. The Muslim community saw what happened during the Middle Ages in Europe, where there was a separation between political and religious powers. However, in the political reality of the Muslim world, both forms of power cannot be separated as they belong to the same domain. Islam

as a totalist concept means that it comprises *ad din wa'ad daulah*, or religious power which encompasses the country [1].

Nevertheless, the concept of nation state has been adopted by most Muslim countries due to the difficult political situation then, which had a bearing on the concept of nation state implemented in their form of government. Most Muslim countries that exist today are built based on that concept of the nation state. Only a handful of countries uphold their form of government with a few changes as countries govern their state based on religious principles, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and Sudan. After careful analysis, although some countries claim that their government's are Islamic in nature, in reality there is no representation of good political power or of a truly Islamic government [2].

The purpose of this article is to analyse the struggle of fundamentalists to establish a *Daulah Islamiyah* or *Khilafah Islamiyah*. In order to explain the phenomenon of the fundamentalists' quest, this article will discuss what a fundamentalist is, how they understand religious laws and whether to establish a *Daulah Islamiyah* or *Khilafah Islamiyah* as is reflected in the Qur'an or in the hadiths. Consequently, this article will conclude that the concepts of *Daulah Islam* or *Khilafah Islamiyah* championed by fundamentalists are an utopia that arises from confusion among contemporary Muslims.

FUNDAMENTALISTS AND THE AGENDA OF AN ISLAMIC STATE OR ISLAMIC CALIPHATE

The debate on *Daulah Islamiyah* or Islamic State is endless for there is no country in the world truly represent an Islamic government. In fact, Islamic governments are frequently criticised as being undemocratic, rigid and cruel. For example, the process of power transfer among leaders does not involve the people and takes place only within the ruling elite, as can be seen in Saudi Arabia, Brunei and several other Arab countries. The Muslim sultanates, governments or dynasties that have appeared throughout history such as the *Umayyad* and the *Abbasid* dynasties are generally regarded as very undemocratic because their future leaders are chosen by the present ones and usually from among family members, relatives and friends that are connected to the ruler or leader in power.

In numerous countries with a Muslim majority, various systems of government can be found. Some countries are monarchies which are a representation of the system of government based on inheritance in which power is given to the Crown Prince, and this power remains within the same family. Some Muslim countries are republics, in which the core of power is placed in the hands of the citizens who choose their ruler, and other countries practise federalism, which gives power/autonomy to the state but still unites them under a federal government [3]. Therefore, the difference in systems, concepts and practices makes it very difficult to find the formula for the ideal Islamic State.

While looking for a solution to the concept and form of a Islamic State, fundamentalists consider an Islamic government to be ideal and to guarantee justice to

all its citizens. However, how do we define the concept of the ideal Islamic State which is suitable to our era, as promoted by these fundamentalist groups? The first question that must be answered is; do the concepts of an Islamic State and Caliphate exist? Can we name countries in the world today that are Islamic countries? Of course, some Muslims will indicate Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Kuwait, Syria, Bahrain, Qatar, Sudan, Indonesia, Brunei and Malaysia as examples of Islamic countries.

It is interesting to note that the countries named above are either monarchies, autocratic systems ruled by a military regime, republics or secular democracies. Thus, from a legal perspective, can these countries all be regarded as Islamic countries? What are the criteria to certify that these countries are indeed Islamic States? Is it because Muslims form the majority of the population, because the ritualistic aspects of prayer, fasting, *zakat* and other acts of faith can be practised freely, or because some punishments and Islamic laws are implemented, that a country can be considered to be a Islamic State? This issue must be resolved in order to understand why fundamentalist groups aim to establish a *Daulah Islamiyah* or *Khilafah Islamiyah*. The understanding of the concept of Islamic State is essential because it involves different perspectives translated into goals for such fundamentalist groups as Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and *Al Jama'at Al Islamiyya* in Egypt, Islamic Front Salvation (FIS) in Algeria, National Islamic Front in Sudan, Hizbut Tahrir in Lebanon, *Jama'at al Islami* in Pakistan, and Darul Islam (DI) and *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* in Indonesia. In a more recent development, ISIS or ISIL or IS is championing the struggle to established and Islamic Caliphate.

WHO ARE CHARACTERISED AS FUNDAMENTALISTS?

A simple definition of fundamentalism is an aspiration to return to the sources of religion based on a literal interpretation of early religious texts. This can apply to different religions as well, such as Christianity, Judaism or Islam, since each of these religions has a fundamentalist minority. The term 'fundamentalism' appeared for the first time in *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* after the publication of twelve theological booklets entitled *The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth*, a study which their translator claimed was written by Protestant theologians who used a scientific-critical approach on articles about the Bible[4]. According to Marty and Appleby (1991), 'fundamentalism' and 'fundamentalist' revolve around the desire to fight, involving efforts to reject groups that threaten their identity or the status quo that represents their beliefs.

Fundamentalists struggle to establish a vision which encompasses general life issues that are inscribed within the framework of referential values and identities from past or contemporary generations. It is thus easy to understand that these fundamentalist groups oppose any groups that emerge as divergent forms from religious ideology and principles [5]. Moreover, these groups have their own logic and identity, and they regard themselves as exclusive, so as a result, they separate themselves from other groups. Marty and Appleby also conclude that fundamentalist groups are characterised by their struggle

in the name of God or other ideas, and these elements resemble the characteristics of radicalism.

According to its linguistic definition, ‘fundamentalist’ means going back to the fundamentals, namely the Qur’an and Sunnah. The term *ushul* (in Arabic), according to Muslim scholars, refers to ‘Qur’an and Sunnah’ [6]. Generally, the *ushuliyah*/fundamentalists understand Islamic doctrine in a *literal* manner [7], reject rational or contextual interpretation of the Qur’anic texts and hadiths, have little tolerance for currents of thoughts that differ from their practices, have exclusive characteristics, champion Islam in a totalist manner apart from urging the implementation of *sharia* in the government of the country. Their adherence to a literal understanding of the Qur’an and Sunnah translates into their commitment to support the application of Islamic law and the setting up of an Islamic State.

Another term related to fundamentalism is ‘Islamism’. Islamism can be interpreted as the use of Islam for social and political purposes. Thus, Islamists are a group of Muslims committed to the process of Islamisation (i.e. the process of establishing an Islamic State based on the *sharia* and applying religious values to society) in Muslim countries [8]. According to proper definition, fundamentalism actually does not involve any elements of violence, thus the use of this term is not suitable to describe the phenomenon of religiously oriented modern terrorists. In order to express clearly the phenomenon of violence in the name of religion, the term ‘Islamist militant’ or ‘radical’ is more accurate because the purpose of these groups is to change the whole system from top to bottom through the use of force. Therefore a distinction exists between fundamentalists and Islamist radicals in terms of aspirations and approaches.

According to Moghissi, ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamist’ refers to three categories of man. ‘Islamism’ refers to individuals or groups who focus only on religion without any political agenda. The second category refers to ‘Islamic liberal reformers’ whose purpose is to reform society according to the requirements of Islam, while at the same time adapting Islam to live in the modern era. The third category is called fundamentalists, and this group emerged as a response from society in the Middle East to colonial domination and competition among big powers [9].

In the history of the Islamic movement, fundamentalist groups started gaining momentum in the 20th century, led by three central movements [10], namely the Salafi Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood representing Sunni Muslims, and the Shiah Revolution representing Shiah Muslims [11]. According to Hamid Enayat, fundamentalists possess clear characteristics. First of all, fundamentalists abide by an anti-Western and anti-globalisation ideology [12]. This way of thinking is passed on to their followers, who believe that any symbol from the West will corrupt the Muslim community and must be eliminated in order to uphold Islamic teaching or Islamic lifestyle. The second characteristic of the fundamentalist group is their rejection of Western culture, in particular secularism and democracy. Fundamentalists try to avoid the cultural traps that

they regard as unsuitable to their own culture. They consider secularism and democracy as efforts by the West to dominate Muslim culture. Consequently, they must be rejected and eliminated.

Fundamentalists also craving to set up a *khilafah* (caliphate) system of government such as during the Companions' time, by taking as model the era of Islamic tradition instituted by the Prophet (pbuh) and his Companions. The *khilafah* system was based on *ijma'* or consensus of the Companions, which served as the basis for future generations as well. In addition, fundamentalists in general tend to be negative and pessimistic about a pluralist society formed by many different cultures, ethnic groups, languages and religions. They reject differences in religious norms and practices. As far as they are concerned, a Muslim community is one which applies the religious doctrines in a totalist manner because it is *hakimiyah* (God sovereignty). Societies that do not correspond to this pattern are regarded as *jahiliyah*. Moreover, fundamentalists tend to be rigid and refuse to compromise with groups that do not share their opinions [13]. On the other hand, in other aspects, fundamentalists show a keen interest in the proper practice of Islam and they aspire to rebuild a society similar to the one that existed during the time of the Prophet and his Companions, which they consider to be an ideal social model. Consequently, fundamentalists often embark on *jihad* campaigns to impose Allah's laws and try to build a society based on the Qur'an [14].

HOW FUNDAMENTALISTS UNDERSTAND RELIGIOUS LAWS

This article intend to discuss as how fundamentalists view religious laws. An understanding on how they apply religious laws will helps to explain how it is translated into the principle of their struggle. It is acknowledged that the fundamentalists' struggle to be *sharia*-minded, and that they regard Islamic law as their ultimate goal, both from the perspective of the ideology of their cause and as a solution to all the problems in this world. Fundamentalists consider that Islamic laws and principles form a *fiqh* (Islamic jurisprudence) based on a legal, formal and exclusive approach. Therefore, they want Islamic jurisprudence to be adopted as the country's legal system.

Fundamentalists understand Quranic texts as mere texts. They look at texts from neither a historical or sociological point of view, nor within the cultural context of those texts. Therefore, they interpret the Qur'an in a straightforward manner, which gives rise to a literal and rigid interpretation, and intolerance within society. At present, there is a concept introduced by some scholars who align themselves with *Salafus Soleh* (the early generation of Muslims). This concept is known as "translate only", whereby believers ought to obey without questioning; they must accept the message delivered by Allah SWT and His Prophet (pbuh) as well as the example shown by the *Salafus Soleh* and follow it as is based on the literal translation and meaning of the Qur'an and the hadiths, because the Qur'an was delivered in clear Arabic language. They based their argument on the verse of the Qur'an which means "in a clear Arabic language" [15].

Fundamentalists have a totalist interpretation in the context of *tawhid hakimiyah* (God Sovereignty), namely that Allah SWT and His laws rule this world, and man need only obey Him. This faith is based on the affirmation of *tawhid 'la ilaha illallah'*, which means that there is no god other than Allah SWT and there is no other law than His law [16]. In other words, there is no other law besides Islamic law, and they consider anyone who does not obey Allah's laws as *mushrik*, *kufur*, *fasik* and *zalim* (infidel, apostate, deviant and cruel). Evidently, this type of interpretation cannot accept or recognise democracy, secularism or nationalism. To fundamentalists, man-made laws do not apply.

Tawhid hakimiyah (fundamental concept that Allah alone is the only Lawgiver) is the concept that absolute political power belongs to Allah SWT. The argument used is that political sovereignty belongs only to Allah SWT; Allah's sovereignty should be demonstrated by incorporating His laws to organise the life and structure of society. Since Allah SWT is the Creator, He knows best the laws that apply to His creation and only He has the right to make laws for them. Therefore, any man who writes laws which oppose Islamic law is regarded as having usurped Allah's *hak tashri* (right to make laws) for His creation, and in other words he is *mushrik*. According to Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, the former *Amir* of the Indonesian Mujahidin Council - *Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia* (MMI), observance of Allah's *hak tashri* is quintessential. Ba'asyir consistently criticises the election process and the parliamentary democratic system[17]. Based on his interpretation of *tawhid hakimiyah* there is no such thing as a social contract among mankind since harmony and consensus are no longer required because they have already been determined by Allah through His laws.

According to Shepard, the fundamentalist point of view is a Manichaeic binary-dichotomy, whereby everything is divided into a binary system in this world - God against the Devil, black or white, good or bad. Fundamentalists deem men to be divided into two opposite camps and there is no 'neutral ground'[18]. This type of thinking was pioneered by Qutb who divided the world into two categories, God versus Satan. For Qutb there was only one God and one truth. There was only one law, namely Islamic law. All other laws were man's creations. There was only one system, Islam, and everything else belonged to *jahiliyah*. Ruling was Allah's right and any other practices were considered to be part of *jahiliyah* [19].

A manifestation of this thinking is the tendency to apply negative labels to anyone who does not agree with them, calling their enemies and anyone who does not agree with the concept of *tawhid hakimiyah* and the implementation of Islamic law *mushrik*, *kafir*, *zalim*, *thogut*, *munafik* and *jahiliyah*. Fundamentalists do not realise that this labelling is the result of their literal interpretation which is not supported by any valid *asbab al-nuzul* (occasions or circumstances of revelation, refers to the historical context in which Quranic verses were revealed)[20]. In this context, scholars like Lily Zubaidah conclude that the critical implication for contemporary Muslim society is the spreading of rigid, uncompromising and scripturalist ideas in daily life, propagating the idea of 'us versus them', 'good versus evil', 'right versus wrong' and '*halal* versus *haram*'. It is this

type of attitude which creates a binary dichotomy among some contemporary Muslim groups [21].

As a result of this literal understanding, fundamentalists want Islamic laws to be implemented formally in the country, to cover all aspects of Muslims' life. They believe that the rejection of religious ethics and the adoption of secularism and democracy are the reasons for the ruin of the Muslim community. Therefore, they consider that Islam is the solution. Their interpretation of being a Muslim in a *kaffah* manner is an injunction to embrace Islam comprehensively, which implies the thorough implementation of the *sharia*.

This type of thinking arises from the fundamentalists' understanding of the concept of *tawhid hakimiyah*. They believe that the texts of the Qur'an and the Sunnah must be applied literally. For them, man-made laws cannot bring justice and peace to society. The *sharia* is relevant at all times and they disagree with a contextual interpretation of religious laws. Fundamentalists strive to bring Muslim society back to the glory era of Islam, meaning back to the total implementation of the *sharia*. They believe that there is no true Islam without the *sharia*. They also interpret the concept of '*Islam rahmatan lil alamin*' as a concept that orders them to implement the *sharia*. Actually, Islam is about harmonious, blessing and peace for all mankind. For them, Islam is a blessing for Muslims, but only if Islamic laws can be implemented thoroughly.

DOES THE CONCEPT OF TAWHID HAKIMIYAH DEMAND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A DAULAH OR KHILAFAH?

According to Tibi Bassam, the Islamic political slogan often uttered by fundamentalists, namely *din wa'ad daulah* (the relationship between religion and country), is a creative invention based on texts and tradition. This formula, which is always related to Islam, does not actually appear in the Qur'an or the hadiths. Likewise the concept of *tawhid hakimiyah* and the concept of the Islamic State which were created by Islamic figures such as Qutb, Al Banna, Al Maududi and Al Nabhani. Both concepts of *tawhid hakimiyah* and of the Islamic State reveal fundamentalist characteristics [22]. According to Ali Syua'aibi, to define the Islamiyah belief based on the criterion of *tawhid hakimiyah* is a mistake. This term is a human invention and never appears in the Qur'an or the hadiths [23].

Actually, the branch *Tawhid Hakimiyah* (also known as *Tawhid Mulkiyah* during the Darul Islam era) forms part of *Tawhid Rubbubiyah* [24]. Therefore, it is a manipulation of terms or an addition of meaning to an existing term, when in fact these terms mean the exact same thing. According to Bassam, the concept of Islamic state and *tawhid hakimiyah* are recent discoveries which were incorporated into contemporary Islamic thought. Both clearly show fundamentalist characteristics [25]. The call to implement *din wa'ad daulah* (the unification of religion and state) which is supported and carried by

fundamentalist groups all around the world is a creation dating back to the golden age of Islam. This idea does not appear anywhere in the Qur'an or the hadiths, or in any other authoritative historical sources [26]. The introduction of these new terms were made in order to justify their actions while they were fighting the enemies of Islam, and even to justify the act of declaring other Muslims who do not subscribe to their ideology as *kufir*. This article finds that the interpretation and introduction of the new concepts of *tawhid* aim at justifying the actions of fundamentalist groups in the context of *jihad qital*, *irhabiyah*, *fa'i* [27] and *takfir*.

According to Azyumardi Azra, the concept of *khilafah* or *Daulah Islamiyah* is not found in large Islamic organisations in Indonesia such as Nahdatul Ulama and Muhamadiyah. This is attributed to the leaders of these organisations believe that these concepts were invented by Islamic thinkers in the past as a result of the Muslims' experience of having to face domination by Western society and its culture. Outside the context of Arab world, several fundamentalist groups followed the example of groups from the Middle East and were greatly influenced by them, and their appearance resembles that is happening there. From their religious affiliation point of view, fundamentalists follow the radical salafist ideology and in terms of religion, they believe in the concept of *khilafahism*, which is the belief in the necessity of building a *khilafah* for all the Muslims in this world [28].

The first item that needs to be clarified here is that there is no concept of Islamic State mentioned in the Qur'an or the hadiths [29]. In the Qur'an, the only concept mentioned is that of the *ummah* (society) which is based on two core elements, namely *adil* (justice) and *ihsan* (compassion). The *ummah* must be developed based on these two elements, and not on the concept of Islamic State. According to Munawir Syadzali, the former Indonesian Minister of Religion (1983-1993), Islam does not offer any choice of concepts or theories in forming a country or a government. Therefore, Islam does not specifically require its followers to form a country, much less a theocratic one. Instead of determining a rigid concept about a type of country, Islam advocates values or principles such as justice, working together and equality to govern a country [30]. According to Mahmood Zuhdi, the question of an Islamic government covers a wide area, including the basic concept of government itself, the philosophy and objectives of its creation, the factors that enable it to be founded, the institutions it requires, the rights and obligations of its ruler and of its people, as well as various other aspects. All these are based on numerous verses of the Qur'an and hadiths [31].

THE OPINIONS OF PAST ISLAMIC SCHOLARS ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF ISLAMIC STATE OR *KHILAFAH*

Islamic scholars themselves have different opinions about the concept of Islamic state or *khilafah*. For the purpose of discussion, this article will discuss the views of Al Qaradhwai, Sayyid Qutb, Abu A'la Al Maududi and Taqiyyudin an Nabhani only in order

to explain the principle of Islamic state which is supported by fundamentalists. According to Al Qaradhawi, although there are no verses of the Qur'an that make it compulsory to establish an Islamic state, the Islamic doctrine itself makes it possible to establish a *daulah* or a state in order to spread the teachings of Islam. This is because a *daulah* or state has the function of educating and realising Islamic faith, principles, thought and teachings [32]. Qaradhawi also states that the *sharia* should be the legal system of reference and that the implementation of Islamic law is the responsibility of powerful countries. He adds that it is possible to use Islam as an ideology based on the Qur'an and hadiths to provide the solution to the ruin of contemporary society. In order to enable the practice of Islamic theories, a country needs to be formed and it is the country's institutions that will play the role of protecting, upholding and implementing Allah's law [33].

Al Maududi holds a different opinion about the concept of the Islamic state, whereby he strictly opposes the idea of secularism which is conform to the Western concept of democracy. He rejects what he calls the sovereignty or power of the people and emphasises that the Islamic system is based on the sovereignty of God and the role of man as His *khalifah*. He claims the concept of Islamic state comprises three basic principles, namely that nobody can question Allah's Sovereignty as *Rabb* (the Creator) or *Malik* (the King); that the right to create laws (*hak tashri*) belongs only to Allah SWT because man is His servant; and that an Islamic state must be established based on the laws determined by Allah SWT [34]. A ruler who does not implement Allah's law need not be obeyed, and if that leader disregards Allah's laws, then Muslims are no longer bound by the laws of his government. The difference with Qaradhawi can be seen in the issue of obedience to the leader, with Qaradhawi stating that obedience to a ruler is supported as long as that ruler shows that he follows the *sharia*, but that obligation disappears if that ruler clearly and obviously does not follow the true path of Islam [35].

For Maududi, there is no room in an Islamic state for people to create their own laws because that right belongs to Allah SWT (*hak tashri*), and man's only right is to obey the laws determined by Allah SWT [36]. This facts was emphasised in an interview with Ba'asyir (the former *Amir* of the MMI, and the former *Amir Darurat Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*, Indonesia), who goes even to the extent of saying that the people involved in elections, namely the voters and the candidates, too usurp Allah's *hak tashri*. According to Ba'asyir, voters are people who choose other people (their representatives in parliament) who will enact man-made laws which will be used as the country's legal system.

Therefore, all the people involved in the electoral system have taken over Allah's right, when He is the only One who can rule the earth [37]. In the same interview, Ba'asyir clearly referred to Maududi as an icon and a model for establishing a *Daulah Islamiyah*. Al Maududi also stated that the concept of an Islamic state is not built on the basis of race, nationality or clan, and that nationalism, secularism and democracy are legacies from the West which have caused the ruin of contemporary Muslim society

[38]. Therefore, Al Maududi's concept of Islamic state resembles the concept of *Khilafah Islamiyah* which was later used as a model by most Islamic fundamentalist movements throughout the world.

However, the writings, thoughts and influence of Sayyid Qutb form the most influential thought regarding the use of the concept of Islamic state among fundamentalist groups. This is because Qutb's thoughts on the concepts of *jahiliyah*, *tawhid hakimiyah* and *jihad* are regarded as most influential and serve as a model by fundamentalist groups worldwide. In his work entitled *Maalim Fi al Thariq* (Milestone), Qutb discusses the concept of modern *jahiliyah*, explaining that Muslims who follow legal sources, ideas, cultures and traditions which are not rooted in the Qur'an are considered as modern *jahiliyah* [39]. According to him, societies who consider themselves to be Muslim can still be categorised as *jahiliyah* because although they acknowledge Allah's sovereign rule, they still make and obey man-made laws [40].). The question is, how can Allah's laws be implemented in a *jahiliyah* society such as mentioned by Qutb? This is where the concept of *jihad* emerges, in order to establish a *Daulah Islam*, with Qutb giving a more radical definition of *jihad* than Maududi. For Qutb, *jihad* is the only way to free man from the grip of the man-made law and rules in order eventually to be able to set up an Islamic State [41].

Another important figure that will be discussed in this article for his influence in the context of Islamic fundamentalist movements is Palestinian scholar Taqiyyudin an Nabhani. This scholar was the founder of the *Hizbut Tahrir* movement with its extremely radical doctrines about the setting up of a *Daulah Khilafah Islamiyah*. According to Nabhani, the creation of a *Daulah Khilafah* will incorporate the *muamalah* system, the implementation of *hudud*, the preservation of *akhlak* (good behaviour), upholding Islamic principles and acts of faith back in the era of glorifying Islam, as well as determining society's affairs according to Islamic principles [42]. In this context, Nabhani states that there are only two types of Islamic countries, namely; Islamic States (*Darul Islam*) where the laws of Islam are applied and the legal system is based on the *sharia*, and infidel states (*Darul Kufr*) where the laws does not conform to Islamic laws and its legal system is based on principles other than Islam [43]. For Nabhani, any ideology applied in a country which is not Islamic is considered *kufir*.

Ba'asyir agrees with Nabhani in this respect. For Ba'asyir, one of the factors that can cause a believer to become *mushrik* or *kufir* is the act of worshipping another person through the practice of democracy which is a *kufir* creation. According to him, democracy dictates that the sovereignty of making the laws that govern society lies entirely in the hands of the people represented by their elected representatives in parliament, without any reference to the *sharia* of Allah SWT. Whereas, in Islam the sovereignty of making laws is determined by what is permitted (*halal*) and what is forbidden (*haram*); and determining good from bad are solely in the hands of Allah SWT. Therefore, democracy is a religion in itself, in which sovereignty is held by the people. For Ba'asyir, it is clear that democracy is contrary to the teaching of Islam [44].

FUNDAMENTALISTS AND THEIR ILLUSION OF ISLAMIC STATE AND CALIPHATE

Islamic renaissance movements aiming at rebuilding *Khilafah Islamiyah* (Caliphate) have appeared in various parts of the world with different methods, approaches as well as platforms. *Khilafah Islamiyah*, otherwise known as *Jama'atul Muslimin*, refers to a government that covers the entire Islamic world. In the absence of *khilafah*, the small groups that exist now, such as *Ikhwanul Muslimin*, *Jama'at al Islami*, Islamic Socialist Front, *Hizbut Tahrir*, *Darul Islam* and *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah*, represent only *Jama'atul Minal Muslimin* or smaller parts of the Muslim community who strive to establish a *khilafah* or *Jama'atul Muslimin*. As a result, the emergence of a number of *Jama'atul Minal Muslimin* in many corners of the globe reflects a collective and concerted effort to establish that *khilafah*. For example, the *Al Jama'ah Al Islamiyah* movement that threatened South-East Asian countries in the late 1990s was one of those *Jama'atul Minal Muslimin* which aimed at establishing a *khilafah* (*jama'atul muslimin*) through the methods of spreading the religion and *jihad fi sabilillah* together with a number of other *jama'ah minal muslimin*. That is the basis of the struggle of ISIS in Iraq and Syria which is to establish a Caliphate across the continent managed to get supporters from every corners of the globe.

Most of fundamentalists argue, the emergence of an Islamic state can occur only after a State or Caliphate, that is a territory where Islamic law are implemented in all aspects of society and government. Therefore, for Nabhani, as long as those conditions are not present, there is only *Darul Kufr*. In order to establish a Caliphate, an Islamic States must be formed and if there are several Islamic States, this must be prevented by uniting them into one [45]. For Nabhani, a model of Islamic State is a unique state which is neither a republic, a monarchy, a dictatorship, a federalist or communist, but a country led by a *Khalifah* (who must be a man) to whom the people swear allegiance through an oath (*bai'ah*), and who implements the *sharia* in his government. The government of a caliphate is based on four main principles, namely; Islamic law is sovereign; its enforcement belongs to the people; it is compulsory to appoint a *Khalifah* for the entire Muslim community; and only the *Khalifah* has the right to determine the constitution and the law [46].

Based on this doctrine, we can understand how fundamentalists plan the goals of their struggle to establish an Islamic State (Daulah Islam) or a Caliphate (Khilafah Islamiyah). If we study the goals and ideology of most fundamentalist movements in the world, it is clear that they are influenced by the elements, concepts and philosophy expounded by Qutb, Maududi and Nabhani. Thus, we can conclude that the source of the ideas of Islamic State or Caliphate that are championed by fundamentalist groups is actually the concepts of *Daulah* or *Khilafah Islamiyah* described by Qutb, Maududi and Nabhani. It is clearly visible with the situation and development in Syria and Iraq today.

The polemic about Islamic State or Caliphate comes from the interpretation of the doctrine and the effort to relate it to the reality of contemporary Muslim society. Both

ideas have given rise to many concepts, views, approaches, goals and ideas which are carried by various groups who use Islam as the basis of their struggle. For some people, Islam is a religion which integrates all aspects of life including the political aspects. The concept or actual form of the Islamic State is not clearly defined in Islam (through the Qur'an and the Hadith), and in fact there is no injunction to set up an Islamic State or Caliphate.

Asghar Ali argues that the concept of Islamic state should refer to contemporary context and situation. For example, the Islamic State of Medina, which serves as a constant reference to fundamentalists is not an actual state described in reference to the Qur'an. The pre-Islamic Arab society did not have the concept of state [47]. It was divided into clans or *kabilah* which made no distinction between state and society. There were no written laws or constitutions, and no administrative bodies, either by lineage or by election, to manage society. However, there was a group known as *mala'* which comprised the leaders of the various *kabilah* in a region. All the decisions were made together and each leader carried out the decisions in the area under his control, and these decisions were regarded as a form of law. There were no organised taxes, police or army, and there was no regional government, defence or policies. Everything depended on the customs and traditions of each *kabilah*. The only law that existed was *Qisas*. The Muslim community in Mecca inherited this situation. When Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) and his Companions faced opposition from the inhabitants of Mecca at the beginning of Islam civilisation, they migrated to Medina (known as Yathrib) and continued to practise their religion there.

Like Mecca, Medina was a town inhabited by various clans (*kabilah*) and ruled by their leader. In fact, the situation in Medina was worse than in Mecca because the clans were constantly fighting with one another and it was for this reason that they invited the Prophet (pbuh) to spread Islam to their city. Owing to his great wisdom, the Prophet (pbuh) reconciled the clans and built a peaceful society in Medina. He introduced a treaty between the clans called *Mithaq-i-Madinah* (the Medina Charter) that gave equal rights to all the clans and the followers of the various religions (Islam, Judaism and other religions). Consequently, everyone was free to practise his own religion and traditions in peace and harmony. The Medina Charter then indirectly became the constitution for the 'state' of Medina, since it contained all the laws that had been practised until then by the clans of the various regions of Medina at the time.

For the very first time, the concept of territorial borders were applied, in order to enable the state to function and expand, replacing the concept of clan that existed before. Later, Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) abolished the concept of clan and introduced the concepts of ideological and geographical borders. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) did not emphasise a political community, but rather a religious community based on the Qur'an which upheld moral and ethical values. At the same time, the political doctrine of Islam indirectly developed, despite the fact that the Prophet's early purpose was to build a religious community, and not to spread a political doctrine. The Medina Charter and the concept of the Islamic State of Medina were constantly used as references by

fundamentalists to illustrate the concept of the ideal Islamic state, and beyond that, to establish a state (*daulah*) or Caliphate (*khilafah*).

Actually, the Medina Charter (signed among the clans) does not represent the constitution of an Islamic State as supported by the fundamentalists. If it was true, it would have been used by the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) himself in Mecca after his army conquered the city in 630 AD. Similarly, why did Khalifah Abu Bakar not use it to administer Mecca when he was appointed as the first *Khalifah* after the demise of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) in 632 AD? This clearly shows that the Medina Charter was merely an agreement between clans to be used only in Madinah, in that particular context and situation, a one-time contract [48].

WHAT IS AN IDEAL ISLAMIC STATE?

After studying the arguments put forward by contemporary Islamic scholars, this article is of the opinion that there is no precise model for an ideal Islamic State because Islam itself does not describe the form and model of an Islamic State in detail. Although the goal to set up an Islamic State based on the *sharia* and the Sunnah is indeed important, if we consider the examples of countries that are labelled Islamic, this can still be questioned. The label of an Islamic State bestowed on countries in the Middle East, Pakistan or several African countries such as Sudan, Algeria, Somalia and Nigeria does not correspond to the political practices of these countries, which show values that are contrary to the concept of Islam [49]. What is the use of claiming the status of Islamic country if there is no justice, the people do not enjoy their rights as citizens, the moral values, honesty, care, harmony, cooperation and power are passed on only within the elite or from one generation to another, instead of being shared by all as enjoined in Islam? If we study further, we realise that Islam is used as a tool by the elite in the government to retain their power, when Islam should serve as a guide for government and national issues.

According to Amien Rais, as long as a state implements the ethos of Islam, establishes social justice and builds a harmonious society where no individual takes advantage of others and no group exploits any other group, this can be considered as a good state. Although a states may not be labelled as an Islamic state, if its ruler implements the values of justice, honesty, trust and looks after the interests of the people, such a state can be categorised as an Islamic State [50]. One of the Indonesian contemporary Islamic scholar, Bakhtiar Effendi stressed that the polemic of the Islamic State need not be pursued because it is endless; what is important is that the Muslim community improves its status and condition in the fields of economics, education, social sciences and technology in which it is still lagging far behind, and that they do not focus all their efforts on spiritual aspects only. Spiritual aspects on their own will not improve the condition of Muslims in contemporary society; in addition, the struggle to set up an Islamic State is too ambitious although it remains important; efforts should focus on bringing back the glory of Muslim society in aspects that have been mentioned

above, because only an advantage in these domains can uphold the honour of the Muslim community [51].

Though Islam does not determine the exact form or model of an ideal Islamic State, this article concludes that the important thing is that a government should emphasise justice, compassion, honesty, equality, the preservation of peace and harmony for all its citizens, sincerity, strict adherence to the *sharia* and that all the forms of laws that are related to the *sharia* be based on the Qur'an and the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh). In other words, justice and the rights of the citizens are more important than the endless rhetoric of the foundation of a Islamic State or Caliphate, especially if we consider the examples that exist around the world nowadays. As a consequence, this article wishes to quote the opinion of Zainal Abidin Ahmad, who states that an Islamic country or government should have four main policies; first, trust and responsibility, honesty and sincerity; second, justice for all the citizens, including social justice; third, recognition of Allah S.W.T the One and Only, as per the order "obey Allah and His messenger"; and fourth, the sovereignty of the people united with the order of "*ulil Amri*" (government) [52].

CONCLUSION

This article has explained the position of fundamentalist groups in the championing of their Islamic agenda. Fundamentalists accept only a finite interpretation of the texts of the Qur'an and reject any contextual interpretation. They uphold the theocratic concept, that is the union of religion and state. Fundamentalists basically reject historical-rationalistic interpretations in favour of literal-scriptural interpretations. Fundamentalists are also seen as rejecting modern symbols and the West because they are regarded as man-made creations which tarnish the purity of Islam. Finally, fundamentalists desire to revive the concept of Caliphate, with the Muslim people united into one single community (*ummatul wahidah*), and the manifestation of these ideas is the existence of the Caliphate system. Fundamentalists openly reject ideas from the West such as nationalism, secularism and democracy.

Fundamentalists believe that they are an exclusive group of believers because they feel that the teachings of Islam that they practise are pure and not influenced by any outside elements that might harm their faith. Due to their exclusive nature, fundamentalists possess a very narrow vision of religion and believe that Islam is already complete and perfect and therefore they need not try to understand other religions. For fundamentalists, the door of *ijtihad* (reasoning) is already closed. This type of attitude makes them intolerant towards other religions, and they are very inflexible towards Muslims who do not share their views. A manifestation of this backward attitude is the emergence of the concept of *takfiri*, which means declaring other Muslims *kufr* in order to justify even more extreme actions. This article concludes that the concepts of Islamic States or Caliphate which form part of the agenda of fundamentalists are an illusion created by past Muslim scholars in order to bring the Muslim community back to its past

glory. Because of the belief and narrow understanding of fundamentalists, they strive to return to the Caliphate system and support a formal constitution based on the principles of Islam in the country's political arena.

Fundamentalists also believe that the nature of Islam is complete (*kaffah*) and perfect, that Islam is limited to not only ritualistic acts of faith, but that it is the foundation for all aspects of human life. All the forms of action and government, including political regulations borrowed from non-Islamic sources, are regarded as *bida'ah* or deviations from Islam. If we look at it from the perspective of its rationalism, the goal to return to the Caliphate system and build an exclusive Muslim society is impossible to achieve, but from the perspective of their beliefs and emotions, fundamentalists believe that it is possible. So they start choosing as an example the Iranian revolution, where an exiled imam was able to return and seize power from the ruler. For fundamentalist followers, if this could happen in Iran, it is not impossible that it might happen in other countries as well. They also believe that one day, all the Muslims in the world will forget their differences and unite under the concept of Caliphate.

REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES:

- [1] See Muhammad Abid Al Jabiri, *Agama Negara dan Penerapan Syariat Islam*, Yogyakarta: Fajar Pustaka Baru, p 57-58, 2001.
- [2] Esposito, John, *Islam and Politics*, Third Edition, New York: Syracuse University Press, p 96, 1991.
- [3] Even in the context of Malaysia, the polemic of the Islamic State continues to be debated. Is Malaysia an Islamic or a secular country? There has been no consensus ever since the country achieved independence in 1957. As we know, an Islamic State is defined as a country which implements the *sharia* and uses Islamic laws. Islamic laws are the highest laws, based on the Qur'an and hadiths. In the Malaysian constitution, Islam is mentioned only as the country's religion. Two former Prime Ministers of Malaysia (Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Hussein Onn) had said that Malaysia is a secular country. However, another former Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamad, declared that Malaysia is an Islamic country. The former minister in charge of the law, Nazri Aziz, says that Malaysia is not a secular country. For further comments, please see Salim Othman, *Is Malaysia a Secular or Islamic State?*, The Straits Time Singapore, 1 November 2012; see Nazri Aziz's statement: *Malaysia Not Founded or Endorsed as Secular State*, in www.malaysiakini.com/news/212349 accessed on 23 October 2012; and see Tunku Abdul Rahman's statement during his 80th birthday speech, *Don't Make Malaysia an Islamic State*, in The Star, 9 February 1983.
- [4] Patrick, Ryan, *Islamic Fundamentalism: A Questionable Category*, USA, p 437, 1984.

- [5] Marty, Martin E., and R. Scott Appleby (eds), *Fundamentalisms Observed*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, p 25,1991.
- [6] Ali Syu'aibi Gils Kibil, *Meluruskan Radikallisme Islam*, transl by Muhtarom, Pustaka Azahari , p 166, 2004.
- [7] According to Malay Dictionary, Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 2nd edition), *literal* means straightforward or without imagination; a literal translation is done word by word, which means that this approach to understanding religious texts is quite textual, literal, and follows the visible words only. They do not interpret the implied meanings of religious texts (the Qur'an and the hadiths), although the Prophet stated that the Qur'an contained an apparent and an implicit meaning.
- [8] Moghissi, Haideh, *Feminism and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Limits of Postmodern Analysis*, London: Zed Books, p 65-67,2002.
- [9] Moghissi, Haideh, p 70-72, 2002.
- [10] Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was founded by Hassan al Banna (1906-1949) in 1928 in Egypt. The movement started as a 'self-cleaning' movement but it later fully developed into a social and political movement which took part in political parties, workers' unions, demonstrations, building and own religious schools, hospitals, banks, social welfare and newspaper publishing. A scholar whose influence and importance cannot be denied who took over the direction of Ikhwan Muslimin was Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who popularised the call to perform *jihad* against corrupt and unIslamic leaders of Muslim countries. Before the 1980s, MB was not involved in activities designed to change Islamic doctrine and teachings, and it focused mainly on spiritual aspects, although it was considered to be a fundamentalist group (some followers even became leaders in countries like Sudan through the international network). However, after the 1980s, MB started to become influenced by *salafi wahhabi* elements and most followers of Ikhwan adopted the *salafi wahhabi* doctrine. Since 2000, the *salafi wahhabi* doctrine has become increasingly obvious in the Ikhwan movement albeit not officially, and it is pioneered by the second and third generations of leaders. This phenomenon can be witnessed through the actions of Abdullah Azzam, a follower of Ikhwan who spread the *salafi wahhabi* doctrine in Afghanistan from 1984 until 1999. The Shiah Revolution revolves around the doctrine of Ayatollah Khomeini in a book entitled *Vilayet i-faqih* which was published in the early 1960s. This doctrine is based on the belief that only *shiah ulama* should be obeyed and deserve to become leaders. Ayatollah Khomeini's success in seizing power in 1979 and founding the Islamic Republic of Iran made this doctrine successful, and marked the beginning of *shiah* fundamentalism.
- [11] Vincenzo, Oliveti, *Terror's Source, The Ideology of Wahhabi-Salafism and its Consequences*, Amadeus Books, UK, p 15, 2002.
- [12] Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, Austin: University of Texas, p 84, 1982.

- [13] A.M Waskito, (transl) *Bersikap Adil Kepada Wahabi*, Pustaka Al Kautsar, p 377, 2011.
- [14] Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, p 84, 1982.
- [15] Verse Ash-Shu'ara' [26]: 195.
- [16] See Sayyid Qutb, *Milestone* (Ma'alim fi al Tariq), English Trans, Indianapolis: American Trust Publication, p 10-11, 1990.
- [17] Author interview with Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Jakarta, 2012. His view is consistent with what he wrote in his book titled *Catatan Dari Penjara; Menegakkan Dienul Islam* (Notes from Prison: To Practise and Establish *Dienul Islam*).
- [18] Shepard, *Is There an Islamic Fundamentalism?*, 1987 Retrieved from <http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=980> on 13 July 2013.
- [19] Sayyid Qutb, *Milestone* (Ma'alim fi al Tariq), English Trans, Indianapolis: American Trust Publication, p101-102, 1990. See also Qutb, Sayyid, *Petunjuk Jalan*, original title *Ma'alim Fi al Tharieq* transl by A.Rahman Zainuddin, Bandung: PT Ma'arif, 1980.
- [20] Al-Naisaburi, *Asbab al-Nuzul*, Egypt: Musthofa Al-Babiy Al-Himbiy. Co. Press, p 112-113, 1968.
- [21] Lily Zubaidah Rahim, *The Road Less Travelled: Islamic Militancy in Southeast Asia*, Critical Asian Studies, Vol 35, No 2, p 216-217, 2003.
- [22] Tibi, Bassam, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and The New World Disorder*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, p 188, 1988.
- [23] Ali Syu'aibi Gils Kibil, *Meluruskan Radikallisme Islam*, tras Muhtarom, Pustaka Azahari, p 41, 2004.
- [24] Hersi Mohamad Hilole, *Wahabi: Sesatkah Mereka?* trans Mohamad Yusuf Khalid et al, PTS Millenia Sdn Bhd, p 69, 2012.
- [25] Bassam, Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and The New World Disorder*, p 156-158, 1998; See also Culvert, 2007, p 182.
- [26] Martinez A, Patricia, *Deconstructing Jihad: Southeast Asian Contexts* in After Bali, The Threat of Terrorism Southeast Asia, Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, IDSS, Nanyang Technology University, Singapore, p 69, 2003.
- [27] *Fa'i* is a form of deviation of Islamic law. People who hold this belief use the term *fail* to justify their actions. This is because *fa'i* means the spoils of war, which are obtained without war or armed conflict, unlike the term *gamma*, which also refers to the spoils of war, but obtained after a battle. In order to understand the term *fa'i* and other related notions such as *nafal*, prisoner, *jizyah* and *kharaj*, see Abdul Ramdhun, *Al Jihad Sabiluna: Jihad dan Perjuangan Kami*, Pustaka Al Alaq, Solo, p 313-325, 1994. See also Khairul Ghazali, *Aksi Perampokan Bukan Fai*, Grafindo, p 7-11, 2011.

- [28] Azyumardi Azra, *Bali and Southeast Asian Islam: Debunking the Myths*”, in *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, 2003.
- [29] See Effendy, Bahtiar, *Islam dan Negara: Transformasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia*, Paramadina, p 71, 1998; Bassam, Tibi, 1998: p 156; Tarek Fatah, 2008: p 38).
- [30] Syadzali, Munawir, *Islam dan Tata Negara; Ajaran, Sejarah dan Pemikiran*, Jakarta, UI Press. p 16, 1990.
- [31] Mahmood Zuhdi Abdul Majid, *Bagaimana Islam Memimpin Masyarakat Majmuk*, PTS Islamika Sdn Bhd, p 17, 2010.
- [32] Al-Qaradhwawi, Yusuf, (transl) *Fiqh Daulah*, Jakarta; Pustaka Al Kautsar, p 29-49,1997.
- [33] Al-Qaradhwawi, Yusuf, (transl) *Kerangka Ideologi Islam* , Bandung; Risalah. p 76-82, 1985.
- [34] Al-Maududi, Abu-l A`la:, (Transl), *Sistem Politik Islam: Hukum dan Konstitusi*, Bandung, Mizan, p 158-159, 1990.
- [35] Al-Qaradhwawi, Yusuf, (transl) *Fiqh Daulah*, Jakarta; Pustaka Al Kautsar, p 94, 1997.
- [36] Al-Maududi, Abu-l A`la:, (Transl), *Sistem Politik Islam: Hukum dan Konstitusi*, Bandung, Mizan, p 94,1990.
- [37] Abu Bakar Ba`asyir, *Catatan Dari Penjara, Untuk Mengamalkan dan Menegakkan Dinul Islam*, Mushaf, 2006.
- [38] Al Maududi, *Political Theory of Islam*. Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1976.
- [39] Qutb, 1980: p 103; Qutb, 1990: p 5-10.
- [40] Fadlullah, Mahdi, *Titik Temu Agama dan Politik: Analisa Pemikiran Sayyid Qutb*, Solo: Ramadhani, p: 81, 1991.
- [41] Qutb, Sayyid, 1980, *Petunjuk Jalan*, p 146; Sayyid Qutb, 1990, *Milestone* (Ma`alim fi al Tariq), p 101.
- [42] Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani, (transl) *Negara Islam*, Bogor: PTI, p 201, 2001.
- [43] Taqiyudin an Nabhani, (transl) *Piagam Umat Islam*, Bogor: PTI, 131, 2003.
- [44] The argument that only Allah SWT has the right to make laws for man is based on the following: Surah As Shura, verse 21; Surah Yunus, verse 59; Surah An Nahl, verse 116; Surah Al A`araf, verse 54; Surah Al An`am, verse 62; Surah Yusuf, verse 40; Surah As Shura, verse 10; Surah An Nisa, verse 59 and Surah Al Kahfi, verse 26. See Abu Bakar Ba`asyir, 2006, *Catatan Dari Penjara; Untuk Mengamalkan dan Menegakkan Dienul Islam* (Notes from Prison: To Practise and Establish Dienul Islam), under the title ‘Kemusyrikan Kerana Mempertuhankan Manusia dan Hukum Demokrasi’ (Becoming an Infidel Because of Deifying a Person and the Judgment on Democracy), p 19 and p 38.

- [45] Taqiyudin an Nabhani, 2003(a), (transl) *Piagam Umat Islam*, Bogor: PTI, p 26-31.
- [46] Taqiyudin an Nabhani, 2003 (b), (transl) *Peraturan Hidup Dalam Islam*, Bogor: PTI, p 135.
- [47] See Asghar Ali Engineer, *State in Islam*, Gurgaon, Hope India Publication, 2006.; Tarek Fatah, 2008, *Chasing a Mirage: The Tragic Illusion of an Islamic State*, John Wileys & Son, Canada, p 38.
- [48] Tarek Fatah, *Chasing a Mirage*., p 20, 2008.
- [49] Tarek Fatah, *Chasing a Mirage*., p 30-35, 2008.
- [50] Amien Rais, '*Tidak Ada Negara Islam*', dalam '*Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-surat Politik Nurcholis Madjid-Mohammad Roem*', Jakarta: Djambatan, 1997.
- [51] Author interview with Prof Dr Bakhtiar Effendy, Jakarta, 2012.
- [52] H. Zainal Abidin Ahmad, *Membangun Negara Islam*, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Iqra, p 31, 2001.

ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA: RATIONALE FOR TERRESTRIAL INCREASE, INCREMENTAL MARITIME JURISDICTIONAL CREEP AND MILITARY BASES

Vivian Louis Forbes

Visiting Research Fellow at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia

Email: vivian.forbes@uwa.edu.au

ABSTRACT

Islands are objects of interests in contemporary and historical geography. By mid-2015, they are the subject of discussion in legal, political and security narratives. Artificial and natural islands appear interesting because of their shape and design: the latter by nature; the former by imagination and initiative, if funding and resources are available, as witnessed in the recent phenomenon of iconic artificial islands. The rate at which they are being created and established is alarming, particularly in the South China Sea. The location and the size of an artificial island can be chosen which makes it much more interesting and challenging. The use and status of Artificial Installations and Structures (A.I.S.) is a concept that has been dealt with only barely by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. On the other hand, environmental and safety issues have been much more thoroughly elaborated at national and regional levels, but only as platforms for exploration and exploitation. The use of A.I.S., as a means of conserving territorial sovereignty over vanishing areas, is an interesting development, which is yet to be taken under consideration by the scientific community, legal fraternity and policy makers. Artificial islands as human habitats, military outposts, land reclamation projects, sovereignty indicators for submersing islands and islets, are some of the most noteworthy concepts. The lack of an integrated and coherent framework on their legal status acts as a hindrance for their adoption as an effective means against the problems that sea level rise poses on territorial sovereignty. In this article the focus is on refashioning geography for the purposes of terrestrial gain and territorial creep in the marine domain and creation of military bases.

Keywords: *Land reclamation, artificial islands, urbanisation of the sea, Article 121 of UNCLOS, micro-nations, maritime jurisdictional creep.*

INTRODUCTION

Exclusive of a major turn in the course of human events developing and developed coastal and island States are advancing (perhaps creeping) seaward and establishing ocean-based urban and/or industrial complexes of varying size as discussed later in this article. The growing awareness of the state of depletion of land-based resources, of pollution on land and in the rivers and seas, for example, in China; of over-population

in some island States, as in the instance of Hong Kong and Singapore; degradation of useable farming land and concerns of climate change, in many nations; emissions control and interlinked potential sea level rise, for the Maldives and other mid-ocean Island States, for example; collectively creates the need for new utilisation of the oceans which continual innovative and modern technology is making possible. Perhaps of greatest concern is that of the creation of artificial islands (re-fashioning geography) purely for the establishment of military bases and distant offshore airfields with extensive runways for large aircraft to land and take off and for the storage of ammunition, as being witnessed in the South China Sea if the electronic and print media are offering the readers accurate information.

The construction of artificial islands and installations for harvesting marine biotic resources in the water column and sea floor; exploring and exploiting of marine mineral resources on the seabed and within its substratum for industrial, scientific and many other purposes, and infrastructure for military bases and installations are notable examples of this new trend. New sources for food, energy and *terra firma* for housing and industries is in demand. The ocean, with its immense potential, is one of the possible answers to the imperative problems of current (estimated in 2015) world's population of over 7.32 billion of which 2.66 billion reside in China and India; and, about 713 million collectively within the grouping known as the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Reclamation, more precisely land reclamation, is the process of creating new land from the sea, swamp land or wetlands and riverbeds. Reclamation of marine space for terrestrial gain in essence, is refashioning geography for economic, environmental, legal, military and political advantages, broadly designed for the need of human activities. The land reclaimed is known as reclamation ground or landfill. Reclamation is the process of reclaiming something from loss or from a less useful condition[1] such a concept is generally used of water reclamation, which, a century ago meant damming streams and now has come to be used to describe wastewater reclamation.

Amongst various economic and environmental conditions, legal implications and social aspects, the issue of state sovereignty is one that needs to be considered when reclamation projects are undertaken especially in the context of narrow channels and semi-enclosed seas. Further complications arise in the legal context when States desire to create artificial islands and structures (AIS): for the purpose of land preservation and reclamation; as human habitats; and, as sovereignty markers in the event that a rise in sea level, as predicted, will submerge parts or even cover completely low-lying States, such as Kiribati, Maldives and Tuvalu; the numerous marine features that speckle the surface of the South China Sea; and, of course, the deltaic coastlines at the mouth of major rivers, for example, the Brahmaputra-Ganges Rivers, the Indus River and the Mekong River.[2] In 1974, an American satellite introduced the world to a previously undiscovered island, located in the Bay of Bengal. The island became the subject of an ownership dispute; it was known by more than one name: the Government of Bangladesh referred to it as South Talpatti (Talpatty) Island, while it was known as New Moore Island or *Purbasha* in India. By 2011, the island was submerged according to observations by sea patrol and satellite

imagery, perhaps as a direct result of the effects of climate change. The disappearance of the island paved an easier path towards resolving a maritime boundary alignment and delimitation by 2014.

The aim of this article is to examine the superfluity of reclamations undertaken – past and present – in the context of territorial gain, that is, expanding a coastal or island State's maritime jurisdictional zones through the processes of refashioning, solidifying and strengthening a marine feature – an island, islet, rock and reef complex. A few examples come to the fore, for instance: Japan's Okino-tori Shima in the Pacific Ocean; Malaysia's Pulau Layang Layang; China's Mischief and Johnston Reefs, Fiery Cross Reef and Hughes Reef (each of the four have individual Mandarin names) in the South China Sea; and, Singapore's Pulau Tekong in the eastern branch of the Johor Straits and Pulau Jurong in the western sector of the Straits of Singapore. These specific examples will be discussed below.

It is appropriate, however, to discuss in the first instance, some examples of reclamation work that has been undertaken for what may best be described as necessary for economic benefits and gains and social human activities. However, there is a school of thought that suggests such reclamation undertaken along the shore represents seaward maritime jurisdictional creep. The finest examples of reclamation were projects undertaken by Dutch engineers over many centuries. They reclaimed a considerable amount of low-lying land from the encroaching North Sea, particularly in the Zuider Zee. Land that was lost to the ocean had been drained and kept water free and now supports settlements and agricultural land use. The Dutch parliament, in 2007, requested a commission on coastal development to look into the idea of building islands in the North Sea that could be used for housing, farming or a nature reserve, while at the same time helping to protect the coast. One example envisaged, is that of an island in the shape of a tulip – a national icon – that would be created off the coast of Holland in the North Sea.

FORESHORE EXPANSION

Foreshore expansion and development can be witnessed at numerous cities established on the banks of rivers and ports. For example, in Perth, Western Australia, millions of cubic metres of sand was placed on the site in the Perth Waters of the Swan River for six years then carted away when the site was ready for constructing the Freeway Interchange which commenced in 1970.[3] The photograph of the reclaimed site in **Figure 1** depicts the spatial extent of sand used to compact the site. Here is a fine example of reclamation for the purpose of infrastructure development and the linking of the two opposing banks of the Swan River.



Figure 1: Filling in Mounts Bay for the Narrows Interchange, 1960s
Note: the white patch in the image is the sand used for the project.
(Source: http://www.cbcbg.org.au/projects/mounts_bay.htm)

The Rous Head Industrial Park (**Figure 2**) was an initiative of Fremantle Ports, using reclaimed land from the 1988-89 Inner Harbour deepening. Since that time, this prime industrial land has been in demand for port-related and other industrial activities. Companies providing ancillary services to the two main stevedoring operations located on North Quay have leased large areas and other marine-related businesses are located in this area. A further 27 hectares of land was created at Rous Head as a product of the 2010 deepening of the Inner Harbour Entrance Channel and Deep-water Channel.[4]

This new land, which is equivalent to about 20 per cent of the area of the existing North Quay/Rous Head precinct, represents a significant opportunity to improve trade efficiency and for future port growth. The Rous Head marina proposal reclaims a portion of the sea in response to the growing need for recreational boat pens and port development (expansion). An appreciation of the extent of reclaimed land can be gained by the inclusion of the red line in **Figure 2** to depict the approximate alignment of the original coast line.



Figure 2: Reclamation at Rous Head, Fremantle for Industrial park and marina.

Note: The red line superimposed on the image depicts the original coastline
(Source: <http://www.fremantleports.com.au/Planning/Marina/Pages/default.aspx>)

Other notable examples of foreshore reclamation are to be found at the port of Zeebrugge in Belgium; the polders of the Netherlands; parts of New Orleans that was once swamp area; a greater portion of Mexico City which is situated at the former site of Lake Texcoco; San Francisco's waterfront; at Cape Town, South Africa; the Manila Bay shoreline, the Philippines; the city of Helsinki; Monaco and the British territory of Gibraltar.

In the East Asia – Hong Kong, Macau, Japan, Shenzhen City, China, and the city-state of Singapore – where land is in short supply reclamation has been at a frantic pace – when sand and building material are available. One of the earliest and famous projects was the Praya Reclamation Scheme, which added 240,000 m² of land in 1890 during the second phase of construction,[5] was one of the most ambitious projects ever taken during the Colonial Hong Kong era. Some 20 per cent of land in the Tokyo Bay area has been reclaimed.

ARTIFICIAL ISLANDS

The creation of artificial islands is another example of land reclamation. Creating an artificial island is an expensive and risky undertaking. It is often considered in places with high population density and a scarcity of flat land. The International Airport of Hong Kong and Kansai International Airport, Osaka, Japan (**Figure 3**) are just two examples where this process was deemed necessary and proven to be beneficial to economic growth of the respective States.



Figure 3: Kansai International Airport, Osaka Bay, Japan
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kansai_International_Airport)

In the instance of the latter, a man-made island, 4 km long and 2.5 km wide, was proposed; however, engineers needed to overcome the extremely high risks of earthquakes and typhoons (with storm surges of up to 3 m) to create this island whose construction commenced in 1987. The sea wall, made of rock and 48,000 tetrahedral concrete blocks, was completed in 1989. Three hills in the vicinity were excavated for 21,000,000 m³ of landfill. In excess of 10,000 workers and 10 million work hours over three years, using eighty ships, were needed to complete the 30-metre layer of earth over the sea floor and inside the sea wall. In 1990, a three-kilometer bridge was completed to connect the island to the mainland at Rinku Town, at a cost of \$US1 billion. Completion of the artificial island increased the area of Osaka Prefecture. The 4,000 × 60 m second runway was opened on 2 August 2007. Kansai Airport has become an Asian hub, with weekly flights to many international destinations. Kansai International Airport is connected by the Sky Gate Bridge, a road/railroad bridge to Rinku Town and the mainland. The lower railroad level of the bridge is used by two railroad operators: West Japan Railway (JR West) and Nankai Electric Railway. No doubt, a wise investment which is profitable and serves many purposes.

URBANISATION OF THE SEA

A new phenomenon which is assuming global proportions is the planning and construction of artificial islands. Varying in size, shape, and purpose, these man-made islands are popping up on the horizons of an increasing number of aspiring port cities of the Persian Gulf and regions at the margins of global capitalism. Artificial islands are increasingly embraced as spectacular, technical symbols of global participation and urban economic progress. Appropriated in different contexts, island projects, however, can be

(and are) also re-signified. They thus change in form, meaning, and use. Urbanisation of the sea can be seen from examples of artificial islands designed for The Palm Islands, The World and Hotel Burj al-Arab off Dubai projects, in the United Arab Emirates in the Persian Gulf were constructed since the 1990s.[6]

Dubai (United Arab Emirates)

Dubai has been formed as a linear, coastal city, with most of its development taking place along the coastal zone and into the adjacent sea. However, the Emirate has a limited amount of coastline, the vast majority of which is already developed. Thus, Sheikh Mohammed's vision was to create islands offshore - using the natural resources of Dubai. By shaping these islands into beautiful, striking designs, the developments have captured the imagination of the international community and attracted some of the wealthy investors. An island destination within the close proximity of Dubai adds to the offering for the growing tourist population and real estate projects. The projects collectively add 520 km of beaches to the city of Dubai. Each island in the grand design of the operation is built of sand reclaimed from the sea floor being dredged locally while the breakwater barriers are built from rock armour from local quarries. It is the exact same process used to create The Palm, Jumeirah, (**Figure 4**) The Palm, Jebel Ali and The Palm, Deira. No artificial or chemical materials are used during the reclamation processes. The first two islands comprise approximately 100 million cubic meters of rock and sand. Palm Deira will be composed of approximately 1 billion cubic meters of rock and sand. The Palm Islands (Atlantis) are an artificial archipelago in Dubai, United Arab Emirates on which major commercial and residential infrastructures will be constructed.



Figure 4: The Palm Jumeirah seen from the International Space Station (ISS)
(Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:palmislandresort.jpg>)

Macau (Special Administrative Region of China)

Macau was the first European settlement in East Asia when it was colonised by the Portuguese in the 16th century. Pursuant to an agreement signed by China and Portugal on 13 April 1987, Macau became the Macau Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China

on 20 December 1999. China promised that, under its ‘one country, two systems’ formula, China’s socialist economic system will not be practiced in Macau, and that the SAR will enjoy a high degree of autonomy in all matters except foreign and defence affairs for the next 50 years. The relative position of Macau (comprising three natural parcels of land – islands of Macau, Taipa and Coloane) to the China mainland is evident in **Figure 5**.^[7]

The economic system appears to be the driving force for the present administration and in particular it is the establishment of casinos, horse and greyhound racing that attracts the tourists. To that end, the construction of the Sands Venetian Casino and Hotel necessitated the reclamation of the sea between two existing islands – Taipa and Coloane to the south of Macau’s CBD. Construction of The Venetian Macao Resort Hotel Casino commenced in November 2004, on the Cotai Strip, an area of reclaimed land between the islands of Taipa and Coloane in Macau. (See **Figure 5**) It is estimated that nearly 3,095,000 m³ of sand was used to reclaim more than 399,000 m² of land.



Figure 5: Reclaiming the sea area between two islands.

Note: the agglomeration of the three parcels of land.

(Source: http://www.geographyiq.com/countries/mc/Macau_map_flag_geography.htm)

The Cotai Strip is relatively close to Macau’s central business district. In anticipation of the growth of Macau’s tourism industry, numerous infrastructure improvements and expansions are already in place; or are at various stages of development, including: expansion of the Macau airport terminal; construction of a new airport ferry terminal directly linked to Hong Kong’s International Airport; opening of the third bridge connecting the islands of Macau and Taipa; proposed Hong Kong - Zhuhai - Macau Bridge that will reduce road travel time from Central Hong Kong to Macau from 4.5 hours to only 40 minutes; proposed Macau Light Rail Project that will link the ferry

terminal with key locations in Macau; and, the Guangzhou-Zhuhai High Speed Railway that will reduce travel times between these cities.

Monaco

Prince Albert II of Monaco planned to reclaim land from the sea with a ground-breaking scheme that would allow the country's tiny population to expand. He launched a drive to build into the Mediterranean to create an area around 5 hectares – roughly the size of five football pitches. It will extend from the Fontvieille district at the western foot of the 'rock', where Monaco's palace and historic centre are situated. The \$US20 billion plan was first floated in 2008 but dropped due to the financial crisis and the Prince's conservation and environmental concerns it would damage the marine environment. However, the Prince has decided the time is right to try again and is planning a smaller development that will include a mixture of luxury property, offices and industry and public buildings. The construction of the new spit of land continues the Principality's development and will increase Monaco's surface area again by an estimated 10 hectares. [8]

Monaco is the world's most densely populated country, with a current population of just over 32,000 living on an area of land of about 2 km². The land reclamation will be made complex by the eco-conscious Prince, as he has insisted the entire extension should be built on stilts like an oil rig in order not to disrupt the marine life beneath. The vast project would be an eco-showcase that would set an example to the world. The Prince has asked three groups of international environmental experts to study the oceanography and sedimentology, marine biodiversity and creating artificial reefs to support a wealth of marine life.



Figure 6: Map of Monaco

(Source: <http://geography.about.com/library/cia/blcmonaco.htm>)

Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region of China)

Hong Kong legislators passed the *Protection of the Harbour Ordinance* in 1996 in an effort to safeguard the increasingly threatened Victoria Harbour against encroaching land development. **Figure 7** illustrates the extent of land reclamation in Hong Kong: grey (built), red (proposed or under development). Most of the urban area of Hong Kong is on the reclaimed land.[9] In this instance, there is good reason, for increasing the available surface area of the land so to accommodate the densely populated island. In the case of Malacca, examined in the following section, it could be opened to discussion as to the need to reclaim the sea just off the coast.



Figure 7: Hong Kong's reclamation activities depicted in grey.
(Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Hong_Kong_reclamation.png)

Taman Pulau Melaka

Construction of Taman Pulau Melaka, Malaysia's first 'Twin Island City Centre', was undertaken by Pulau Kembar Sdn Bhd. This waterfront development project involved the reclamation of two islands, approximately 0.5 km off the coast of Malacca new town centre measuring 40ha and 50ha respectively. The reclamation of the first island of 40ha and a 30m bridge linking to the mainland is depicted in **Figure 8**. Melaka Island development comprises 4,387 units of residential and 4,180 units of mixed commercial development together with leisure-cum-tourism amenities such as marine theme park, marina, hotels and waterfront activities. With an estimated gross development value of \$US0.5 billion, the project has recorded sales of \$US65 million representing 1,419 units sold as at 31 January 2005.[10]



Figure 8: Taman Pulau Melaka (2011)

(Source: <http://maps.google.com.au/> (Terra Metrics Map data 2011 Map IT Tele Atlas)

Seychelles

The idea of reclamation of the shallow coral reef that dominates in the vicinity of the capital Victoria, east coast of Mahe Island, Seychelles, since 1999 the technical means and expansion necessity converged to make it viable. The first reclamations were done by the British colonial authorities in late-1960 for the purpose of port and airport extension. Between 1973 and 1999 the Seychelles government undertook four more reclamation works on the East Coast so that total area of land reclaimed amounts to 750 ha. The last reclamation, labelled East Coast III covered the area of 350 ha and was completed in 1999. A part of that last reclamation was Ile Perseverance (92 ha) with Ile du Port (54 ha) to the South and Ile Aurore (56 ha) to the North.[11]

The main rationale behind the decision to undertake such a huge reclamation project was to acquire sufficient land resources to support growing population and widen economic base on a sustainable basis. The proposed reclamation projects was an occasion to accurately plan for relocation and necessary development which would solve the existing spatial problems and provide land for future needs. It was expected that the proposed reclamation would have a very positive impact on the economy and the society in general for the future. Eden Island is a residential marina development located just a few hundred metres from Mahé. Measuring over 56 hectares in size, the island hosts exclusive freehold title homes that can be accessed via more than 16 hectares of private waterways. Access is made easy through the Eden Island Marina, which is a deep-water, international marina capable of handling super yachts of up to 100 metres in length. Residents of the island automatically qualify for a private mooring, while there is plenty of space in the marina for the craft of friends and guests. In addition, the international airport on Mahé is a short drive from the island. Acquiring land for a growing population in the Seychelles is the rationale employed in Singapore's development plans.

Singapore

Land reclamation has been undertaken in different parts of Singapore. This is necessary because of the relatively small size of the country (area of about 582km² prior to 1960) and the increasing demand for more land as the population increased. Reclamation projects include the Kallang River in the 1960s for industrial and housing purposes, Marine Parade in the 1970s for housing purposes, Changi Airport in the 1980s for infrastructure purposes, Jurong Island (joining seven islands in south-western part of Singapore) in the 1990s for industrial purposes, and Changi East in 1994-2002 for the expansion of Changi Airport, development of infrastructure and industrial purposes. The reclamation works carried out over the last forty-five years have enabled Singapore to increase its land area from 582 to 680 km². With continuing land reclamation, land area in Singapore will increase by about another 100 km² by the year 2030. There are, however, constraints as to how much more land the country can reclaim. Two limiting factors have to be considered.[12]

Land reclamation works within offshore waters, in the past, used to be carried out within depths of 5 to 10m. The present trend is for reclamation works to venture into deeper waters of 15m or so and this incurs much higher costs. It is also not so viable to pursue pushing reclamation further offshore in Singapore's case because there is the competing need to maintain the sea lanes and provide new and larger ports for the bigger ships to anchor in Singapore's limited sea space. For other coastal States a seaward extension of the coastline will naturally infer an extended Territorial Sea belt once the reclamation is completed. Territorial Sea base points can always be re-defined or defined, if they have not already been proclaimed!

Other than the land reclamation of the offshore islands of Pulau Bukum, Pulau Bukum Kechil, Pulau Ular and Pulau Ayer Chawan by two private oil companies, land reclamation is undertaken by three public agencies in Singapore. They are the Housing and Development Board (HDB); Jurong Town Corporation (JTC); and Port of Singapore Authority (PSA) Corporation. Among some of the future large-scale reclamation works are: a long island off the east coast the length of which will stretch from near Marina East to Changi for waterfront housing and recreational development and roads; Pulau Tekong (**Figure 9**) and Pulau Ubin for housing and some industrial development when Singapore's population exceeds four million; and Pulau Serangoon and Punggol Point which will be reclaimed for quality housing. According to the World Bank the estimated population in 2009 was nearly five million.

Land reclamation has modified the coastline of Singapore, extending it seawards, especially on the eastern, north-eastern and western parts of the island, and changing it quite beyond recognition. Large coastal areas have also been straightened by the building of dykes across estuaries, particularly in the west coast across the estuaries of Tengeh, Poyan, Murai and Sarimbun. Many offshore islands, for example, Pulau Jurong have become larger (**Figure 10**). Future reclamation will add more changes to the configuration of Singapore.

The landfill method was used to reclaim land from the coast and the swamps in Singapore. It is also used in reclamation works involving the amalgamation of islands. One such project is the amalgamation of Pulau Sakra and Pulau Bakau into one big island called Pulau Sakara, which is ten times the combined size of the two former islands. In the early years, materials excavated from the hills in Bedok, Siglap, Tampines and Jurong were used for filling the reclamation areas. In recent years, sea sand obtained from the seabed has been the main source of fill materials for reclamation. The reclamation contractors import the sea sand from the neighbouring countries such as Indonesia.

In 2002, Singapore's land reclamation works in Pulau Tekong and Tuas View Extension prompted complaints from the Government of Malaysia. It alleged that the reclamation works, *inter alia*, impinged on Malaysia's territorial waters, caused pollution and other adverse harm to the marine environment in the Straits of Johor. The case was taken to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Hamburg.[13]




Figure 9: Reclamation extent on Pulau Tekong

(Source: <http://maps.google.com.au/> (Terra Metrics Map data 2011 Map IT Tele Atlas)



Figure 10: The agglomeration of smaller islands into Pu. Jurong
(Source: <http://maps.google.com.au/>(Terra Metrics Map data 2011 Map IT Tele Atlas)

On 8 October 2003, ITLOS unanimously: (i) *directed* Singapore not to conduct its land reclamation in ways that might cause irreparable prejudice to the rights of Malaysia or serious harm to the marine environment, taking especially into account the reports of the group of independent experts; (ii) *decided* that Malaysia and Singapore shall each submit the initial report referred to in Article 95, paragraph 1, of the Rules, not later than 9 January 2004 to this Tribunal and to the Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal, unless the arbitral tribunal decides otherwise; and (iii) *decided* that each party shall bear its own costs.[14]

From the directives issued by ITLOS, as alluded to above, it is obvious that international law can be brought to play in the context of land reclamation by States in the event of a dispute with its neighbours and in seeking resolution to the problems that are actual or perceived to arise.

LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION OF 1982 AND ITS ARTICLE 121

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) deals with various forms of man-made works which may impact on territorial sea boundaries. Beyond that it does not deal specifically with land reclamation. Obviously research on international law address the issue of 'accretion', namely, the increase of land through new formations. While accretion is normally associated with natural phenomena, it can also result from human activity. However, in that case it must be carried out having due regard to the rights and interests of neighbouring states. Artificial islands have a distinct meaning in international law.

Thus, in Oppenheim's International Law it is stated with respect to artificial formations along the bank of a boundary river or the coastline of the sea:

'...no State is allowed to alter the natural condition of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural conditions of a neighbouring state territory, a state cannot build embankments and the like, without a previous agreement with the neighbouring state'.[15]

Part VIII of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 121 on the Regime of Islands states:

1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.

Paragraph 3 of Article 121 has brought about much debate relating to its interpretation especially in that the terms "rock", "human habitation", and "economic life of their own" are not defined in the Convention.[16]

With respect to resources in the exclusive economic and continental shelf zones, the regime of islands has quite an impact. An island which can maintain human habitation or an economic life of its own has the right to establish maritime jurisdictional zones under the provisions of UNCLOS: territorial sea (Art.3), contiguous zone (Art.33), Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (Arts. 55, 57), and continental shelf (Art. 76). A distinction must be made for rocks which cannot maintain human habitation or economic life of their own, they **do not** have an EEZ or a continental shelf; however, on the condition that they are above water at high tide (Art. 121:1) they may have a territorial sea and a contiguous zone (Art. 121:3). This corresponds to the criteria for determining the baseline of the territorial sea (Art. 7:4).

Artificial islands are not "a naturally formed area of land" (Art. 121:1). Consequently, such artificial islands and other installations and equipment do not have the status of islands or rocks (Arts. 11; 60:8; 147:2e; 259). State practice has provided precedence that helps develop the governing definition. However, some marine features, such as rocks and reefs when termed islands have created a legal dilemma in maritime boundary delimitation, for example, Batu Puteh/Pedra Branca (White Rock); Ashmore Reef (which has three islets in a reef complex); Dokdo Island (also called Take shima and Liancourt Rocks); and Okino-tori Shima whose original name was *Parece Vela* (Spanish for "looks like a sail" alluding to the original appearance of the reef).

The Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone Convention of 1958 made plain that artificial islands would not qualify as legal ‘islands’ by defining islands as ‘naturally formed’ formed features. The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea stresses this point although safety zones may be established around artificial islands. Japan claims sovereignty over islets in an atoll named as Okino-tori-shima. China and South Korea have submitted objections to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf arguing that these rocks do not generate a continental shelf. The Commission has decided to defer making recommendations about the maritime zone generated by this marine feature.

Okino-Tori Shima

Okino-tori Shima is located in the northern sector of the Philippine Sea at Lat. 20°25′N Lon. 136°05′E., about 20.417; 136.083534 km SE of Oki Daitō, Japan. [17] The complex has three tiny individual islets or are they rocks (?): Higashi-ko-jima (Eastern Islet); Kita-ko-jima (Northern Islet); and, Minami-ko-jima (Southern Islet). Minami-ko-jima is an artificial islet created in shallow water. The two original islets appear completely artificial presently, with little if any trace of the two natural rocks that appear on photographs of 1987. They are sometimes referred to as the southernmost islands of Japan. The island is considered part of Ogasawara village, Tokyo. In 1939, the construction of a naval base was started by Japan, but suspended in 1941, at the start of the World War II hostilities in the Pacific Ocean. Typhoons are constant threats to Okino-tori-shima’s existence. A few decades ago, there were about five or six visible protrusions, but by 1989, only two were visible.

In order to prevent the island from submersion caused by erosion and to maintain the claim to an EEZ, the Japanese government launched an embankment building project in 1987, and the two protrusions, Higashi-ko-jima and Kita-ko-jima, were encased with concrete. Such an operation cost \$280 million worth of concrete and covered the smaller one with a titanium net costing \$50-million to shield it from debris thrown up by the ocean’s waves. In fact, the Japanese government spent over \$600 million fortifying the reefs to prevent them from being completely washed away on the one hand; but more importantly, to enable a jurisdictional zone of 200-nautical mile radius.



Figure 11: map of Location of Okino-tori-Shima
(Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Okinotorishima2.png>)



Figure 12: Satellite image of the artificial island
(Source: <http://www.keihin.ktr.mlit.go.jp/english/okinotori/>)

RECENT FORTIFICATIONS IN THE SPRATLY GROUP

A combination of aerial and satellite imaging can provide timely, substantive information on ships, structures, and activities in the South China Sea. Specific political agreements covering the area may be verifiable if the provisions are tailored to the imaging capabilities and limitations. Vietnam has occupied 23 marine features in the Spratly Group. China and Malaysia have seven each, the Philippines nine, and Taiwan only one. A report of 19 March 2011 by the Armed Forces of the Philippine stated that its country is lagging behind China, Vietnam and Malaysia in developing fortifications in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.[18] The Armed Forces of the Philippines said claimant countries – except Taiwan and Brunei – have strengthened fortifications in the islets and shoals in the Spratly Group. For example, from one islet it began occupying in 1984 Malaysia now has allegedly troops stationed on five islets of the southern Spratly archipelago.

Pulau Layang-Layang

On the Malaysian-occupied Swallow Reef, there is now a 1,200-meter runway as well as a naval station and communication facilities in an island now known as Layang-Layang, constructed at a conservative cost of about US\$6.5 million which had been a dive resort for tourists. The runway (airfield) can allegedly accommodate heavy civilian and military transport planes. The airfield is only an hour's flight from Kota Kinabalu, Sabah and is considered vital to defending Malaysia's maritime claim and its national security. Malaysia's air bases, located at Kota Kinabalu and Labuan, could serve as staging points to launch their sophisticated F-18 and Russian-MIG 29 Fulcrum. This is not to mention that Malaysian destroyers have mid- and long-range surface-to-surface missile. The report also cited Malaysian's plan to procure new Sukhoi SU-35 aircraft from Russia.



Figure 13: Pulau Layang Layang
(Source: <http://www.google.com.au/imgres/layang-layang.jpg>)

The report also stated that surveillance photos taken during routine patrols over the Kalayaan Group showed China's steady military build-up in the area despite its being a signatory to the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Latest surveillance photographs taken in 2010 showed different machine gun emplacement as well as additional communications antennae. Naval vessels have also been anchored in Chigua Reef (**Figure 14**).




Figure 14: Chigua Reef with fortification
(Source: <http://www.google.com.au/imgres.../images/Chigua%2520reef.jpg>)

Amboyna Cay

Of the 23 Vietnamese occupied territories, six are located in the Kalayaan Island Group. These are Binago (or Namyt) Island, Sincowe East Island, Lagos (or Spratly) Island, Kalantiyaw (or Amboyna) Cay, Gitna (or Central) Reef and Hizon (or Pearson) Reef. A Philippine government briefing paper argues that Vietnam is at the forefront of construction activities, having built the most number of additional structures on its occupied territories since 1998.[19] The Vietnamese construction activities include renovation, remodelling and addition of single story buildings in the seven areas. The documents noted the increase in the number of solar panels and piers, indicative of an increased activity in its territories.



Figure 15: Amboyna Cay

(Source:<http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=689852&publicationSubCategoryId=63>)

The Vietnamese have given particular focus on stemming soil erosion by building seawalls at Namyit Island, Sincowe Island and Gitna (or Central) Reef. The documents also noted that Vietnam has been “the most active” in strengthening the defensive capabilities of its outposts. Gun emplacements and gun shelters are located on Kalantiyaw Cay, Gitna Reef, Binago Island, Hizon Reef, Sincowe East and Pugad Cay. It is widely believed that troops are stationed in the Vietnamese-held areas. Documents also showed that Vietnam has built or is planning to build extended gun emplacements on Collins Reef, Paredes (or Great Discovery) Reef, Ladd Reef and Len Dao Reef. It is also planning to rehabilitate an airstrip on Lagos (or Spratly) Island.

Apart from Vietnam, the Philippines Republic is known to maintain an airstrip in its territory. The briefing paper indicated that “China has not attempted” to build an airstrip in any of the territories it occupies. That was then! The document also stated Hanoi is using tourism to bolster its claim on the Spratly’s. Since 2004, Vietnam has increased the number of ship travels to the area. In April 2004, Vietnam sent a boatload of tourists to Kalantiyaw (or Amboyna) Cay as part of tourism promotions. From 2005 to mid-2015 building activity on the occupied islands and reclamation work on marine features that were considered as rocks and reefs and perhaps shoals is refashioning the geography of the South China Sea which will require the revision of geography text books.

Military developments were also monitored on Cuarteron Reef, while Fiery Cross Reef is serving as communications and oceanographic research centre. China has also intensified its military activities indicative of its improving military capabilities.

Vietnam has also made impressive improvements in their occupied islands, with new communication equipment in Sin Cowe (Rurok) Island installed during 2010. There are also single storey buildings in Allison Reef and in other sites such as Barque Canada Reef, Discovery Great Reef, Petley Reef, Pigeon Reef, and in East Reef. New buildings have also established on Namyit Island. Numerous structures – including bunkers – have also been detected in Central London Reef. The structures claimed by the Philippines still remain in a makeshift style with extremely depleted number of personnel according to the report.

This is the reason why the Philippines rely very much on the diplomatic approach, according to the report. The Western Command (Wescom) of the Philippines, which has operational jurisdiction over the Spratly Group, is urgently requesting immediate repairs of the runway on Pag-Asa Island, the biggest of several islands with Filipino troops. The airfield, since its establishment in the 1970s, has never undergone major repair. Wescom officials said repair and rehabilitation of Rancudo Air Field must be done as soon as possible so as not to allow soil erosion to inflict further damage on the runway. The report urged that repairs should be configured in such a way that it can accommodate heavy transport aircraft as well as fighter planes comparable to that in Lagos Island of the Vietnamese and Swallow Reef of Malaysia.

CHINA'S RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

On Thursday, 9 April 2015, the Government of China sketched out plans for the islands it is creating in the disputed South China Sea, saying they would be used for military defence as well as to provide civilian services that would benefit other countries. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying told a news briefing that the reclamation and building work in the Spratly archipelago of the South China Sea was needed partly because of the risk of typhoons in an area with a lot of shipping that is far from land. “We are building shelters, aids for navigation, search and rescue as well as marine meteorological forecasting services, fishery services and other administrative services” for China and neighbouring countries, Hua said. The islands and reefs, once reclaimed or refashioned would meet the demands for China’s military defence. These statements were rare in that they were relatively detailed considering the global attention and the regional concerns generated since January 2014. By late-June 2015, the phase of consolidating the marine features into islands was nearing completion based on satellite imagery, media reports and official statements issued by Chinese sources.

The pace and scope of China’s reclamation projects in contested areas of the South China Sea since early 2014 to 23 May 2015 is cause for concern by member of ASEAN especially those Littoral States of the semi-enclosed that have territorial disputes with China. It is estimated that more than 800 hectares of land has been reclaimed by China since January 2014. Satellite imagery captures images of the construction work at regular intervals and these images appear in the electronic and print media daily.[20] However, Concern is mounting among some scientists that China’s reclamation work in the

disputed Spratly archipelago of the South China Sea has done severe harm to one of the most important coral reef systems in Southeast Asia.

ASEAN in its 5 May 2015 statement noted that it was “...seriously concerned” about China’s artificial island growth and that such actions not only eroded the trust and confidence but also undermined the peace, security and stability between the Association and its northern neighbour. In response, a statement from the Government of China noted that it was “severely concerned” about the ASEAN comment and that creation of the artificial islands were entirely legal and as such should not be queried.[21] In any case, China was just protecting its territorial rights and fishing fleets in “our waters”. The official retort from the Government of China is that other claimant states have also taken to creating islands out of reefs and enlarging the marine features such as rocks, sand cays and islets.

Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr Wang Yi, commented in Beijing, on 16 May 2015, that the determination of the Chinese side to safeguard our own sovereignty and territorial integrity is as firm as a rock and it is unshakeable and that it fell within the scope of Chinese sovereignty.[22] Chinese dredgers operating within the Spratly Archipelago have refashioned reefs into islands of a collective surface area of nearly 800 hectares, or 8 square km, of land since reconstruction began in late-2013. Such is the ‘terra firming’ –refashioning of geography – that Fiery Cross Reef can now boast it has an airfield of over 3,000m length. Other artificial islands – formerly designated reefs – in the Spratly Archipelago, for example, South Luconia Reef and Swallow Reef, allegedly refashioned to appear as an island are now the focus of attention in a territorial dispute between China and Malaysia.

The Chinese PLA(N) Navy on 22 May 2015, according to a CNN reporter who was on board the flight,[23] warned at least eight times, a US surveillance plane flying over the artificial islands in the South China Sea that China is creating to leave the area eight times. At one stage, after the American pilots responded by saying the plane was flying through international air space, a Chinese radio operator said with exasperation: “This is the Chinese navy ... You go!” The P8-A Poseidon, the US military’s most advanced surveillance aircraft, flew at 4,500 metres at its lowest point, noted the CNN reporter. The incident, along with recent Chinese warnings to Philippine military aircraft to leave areas around the Spratly archipelago in the South China Sea, suggests that China may be trying to enforce a military exclusion zone above its new islands. Some security experts worry about the risk of confrontation, especially after a US official said last week the Pentagon was considering sending military aircraft and ships to assert freedom of navigation around the Chinese-made islands.



Figure 16: Construction work by China on Hughes Reef in the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. This photograph allegedly was taken on 13 May 2015. (Provided by Tuoi Tre (Youth) correspondent). (Source: <http://www.talkvietnam.com/2015/05/china-illegally-constructing-nine-story-building-in-vietnams-truong-sa-spratlys/>)

Micronations

Structures at sea which are described by the term “artificial islands” have, notwithstanding great diversity in form and three characteristics in common. They are exclusively the work of human kind, surrounded by water and used for work on a fixed place.[24] As such they “occupy” more or less permanently a certain part of the sea. One can interpret the term more narrowly and understand it only as structures made by humans from natural sources to form a piece of land, surrounded by water which is elevated above the waterline at high tide. Artificially shaped elevations of the sea bed have an essentially island character as against permanent, bottom-based installations. The first group is territory and attached may be entitled to a territorial sea zone, which the second group does not have.

The 1960s and 1970s witnessed the foundation of a number of territorial micronations. The first of these, *Sealand*, was established in 1967 on an abandoned World War II gun platform in the North Sea and just off the East Anglian coast of England, and has survived into the present day South China Sea. Others were founded on libertarian principles and involved schemes to construct artificial islands, but only three are known to have had even limited success in realising that goal. The *Republic of Rose Island* was a 400 m² platform built in 1968 in Italian territorial waters in the Adriatic Sea, 11 km off the Italian town of Rimini. It is known to have issued stamps, and to have declared Esperanto to be its official language. Shortly after completion, however, it was seized and destroyed by the Italian Navy for failing to pay state taxes.

CONCLUSION

The notion of living full-time on the sea is nothing new. However, there are amazing award-winning designs from the recent urbanisation of the sea contest of possibilities for the future of life on the sea unlike any artificial islands ever seen. Artificial island projects portray a refashioning of geography and as a result relationships with people and nature. They evidence globalising fears materialising themselves in varying degrees of alienation and exclusion: from the natural worlds of capital and economic markets and resource availabilities, to fears of rising ocean levels. Military fortresses have been turned into pirate radio stations and abandoned oil platforms converted into micro-nations. The facilities placed on the newly created islands of the Paracel and Spratly Groups in the South China Sea, according to official Chinese sources, would help environmental preservation along with search and rescue operations and weather observations. Scientists argue that the rapid rate of permanent loss of coral reef area is being witnessed in this semi-enclosed sea.

In the few examples alluded to in this article, taken from a global perspective, it is evident that most land reclamation projects in countries that have limited *terra firma* are genuinely designed to increase living space, development of infrastructure and to attract tourists. However, the refashioning developments in the Spratly Archipelago infer that territoriality and sovereignty concerns are to the fore, and in particular, the dispute between China and its South China Sea neighbours.

International law recognises only naturally formed islands as islands in the legal sense. Until recently the distinction was in practice not important because the building of islands in this narrower sense was not undertaken and academic opinion did not regard such construction as probable. Events, however, have changed this. New man-made islands are more than platforms for commodity transfer such as docks, oil platforms, airports and observation decks for scientific research. The issues raised prior to, during and post-operations of land reclamation were examined in this article. What human kind can do, however, nature can undo with tsunamis, hurricanes or downpours of torrential rain.

REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES

- [1] To reclaim wasteland generally requires expenditure in excess of the immediate value of the land when reclaimed was suggested in Report by Sir Daniel Hall to the Reconstruction Committee, England in 1921. Cited in *Nature*, Vol. 106 (2675) p. 743.
- [2] For a fuller description of the problem see Tsaltas, Grigoris and others, 'Artificial islands and structures as a means of safeguarding State Sovereignty against Sea level rise: A Law of the Sea Perspective'. Paper presented at a conference, available at: <http://www.gmat.unsw.edu.au/ablos/ABLOS10Folder/S2P3-A.pdf>

- [3] Marsh, JG and Parsons, MW. Narrows Interchange Bridges, Perth, W.A. [online]. In: Engineering Conference (1973 : Perth, W.A.). Annual Engineering Conference 1973. Sydney, NSW: Institution of Engineers, Australia, 1973: 173-185. Availability: <<http://search.informit.com.au/documentSummary;dn=555019722081169;res=IELENG>> [cited 14 Jun 11].
- [4] For a description of the methods used and future plans for the reclaimed land see: FREMANTLE PORTS website: <http://www.fremantleports.com.au/Planning/Marina/Pages/Background-Information.aspx>
- [5] Chater, Sir Catchick Paul, “The Praya Reclamation Scheme [microform] : As proposed to the Hongkong Government and the Marine lot-holders by the Hon. C.P. Chater. With plan of the city of Victoria showing the intended reclamation ... Reprinted from *The Hongkong Telegraph*, Pedder’s Hill, Hongkong, [1888].
- [6] For a detail account of the construction of this artificial island see: <http://eng.archinform.net/projekte/2660.htm>
- [7] Conway, McKinley, ‘The Case for Micronations and Artificial Islands’, *The Futurist*, World Future Society, May-June 2009, p.31.
- [8] ‘Land reclamation plans continue to develop’, 17 October 2008 <http://www.monaco-iq.com/node/157> Samuel, Henry (2009) ‘Monaco to build into the sea to create more space’, *The Telegraph* <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/monaco/6894991/Monaco-to-build-into-the-sea-to-create-more-space.html> <accessed 24 May 2011>
- [9] Glaser, R. Haberzettl, P. ; Walsh, R. P. D. ‘Land Reclamation in Singapore, Hong Kong and Macau’, *GeoJournal*, 1991, Vol.24(4), p.365-373.
- [10] Richmond, Simon, ‘Melaka’ in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei, Ch 7, *Lonely Planet*, p. 227.
- [11] For comprehensive studies of the reclamation project see: http://www.virtualeseychelles.sc/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141%3Anew-land-for-new-projects-&catid=55&Itemid=117 and the IMF publication SEYCHELLES: EAST COAST RECLAMATION PROJECT, IMF Staff report 00/162, Dec. 2000; and, Zoran Vuksanovic, ‘Ile Perseverance, new town in Seychelles – Innovative way of avoiding urban sprawl’, 44th ISOCARP Congress 2008
- [12] Chia, Lin Sien, *Singapore’s Urban Coastal Area: Strategies for Management*, Association of Southeast Asian Nations/United States Coastal Resources Management Project, 1992.
- [13] See for example, Trish Saywell, and S Jayasankaran, ‘Dire Straits’, *Far Eastern Economic Review*. Hong Kong: 18 April 2002. Vol. 165, Iss. 15; pp. 22-23
- [14] *The Case between Malaysia and Singapore concerning Dredging and land Reclamation in the Straits of Johor*, presented to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Hamburg.

- [15] Oppenheim's International Law, 9th ed., edited by Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, 1992, vol. I, London: Longmans, Green and Co., pp. 696-697.
- [16] The UN law of the Sea Convention, 1982 in particular Article 121; and, Papadakis, N., *The International Legal Regime of Artificial islands*; Kolb, Robert Case Law on Equitable maritime delimitation: digest and commentaries
- [17] L. Yamamoto and M. Esteban, 'Vanishing Island States and Sovereignty', *Ocean and Coastal Management*, Vol. 53, pp. 1-9.
- [18] Laude, Jaime, 'AFP lagging in developing fortifications in Spratlys', A Report by the Philippines Military as cited in *The Philippine Star*, online, 19 March 2011.
- [19] David Jude Sta Ana, 'Vietnam beefs up military garrisons in Spratlys', *News 5, The Philippine Star*, Updated May 26, 2011
- [20] Sasaki, Manabu 'Vietnam says China putting up large buildings on Spratly Reefs', 20 May 2015
- [21] ASEAN Meeting of 5 May 2015 demonstrates concerns about Chinese's activities in the South China Sea.
- [22] Joint Press Availability with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and US Secretary of State, John Kerry at Beijing, PRC 16 May 2015. US Department of State Webpage
- [23] 'Chinese Navy warns US Spy plane to leave area', *CNN Report* via, *ABC News* and *Los Angeles Times*, 22 May 2015 (Both sources are Online Editions, accessed 22 May 2015)
- [24] A.M.J. Heijmans 'Artificial Islands and the law of Nations' *Netherlands International Law Review* (1974), 21: 139-161

THE DETERMINANTS TO THE OUTCOMES OF THE UNITED NATIONS HYBRID MISSION IN DARFUR CONFLICT

T.Azharan bin T. Putra

Malaysian Armed Forces Staff College (MAFSC)

Email: azharanputra@yahoo.com

ABSTRACT

This article is about the humanitarian issues faced by the people of Darfur that considered to be the world's worst humanitarian crisis in the history of the United Nations Organization. The crisis saw involvement of two peace and security organizations, the African Union and the United Nations. African Union involvement is through the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). However, AMIS does not seem capable of resolving the conflict, thus requiring the intervention of the United Nations. Consolidation of the United Nations and the African Union formed a team known as UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). Hybrid force is the latest generation of peacekeeping force established by the United Nations. The objectives of this study, first, to expose the outcomes of UNAMID in this conflict. In this context, the discussion centers around evolution of the security forces, the principles and the requirements for the success of an operation including achievement of UNAMID. The study found that the establishment of UNAMID is a good initiative towards shared responsibility in maintaining peace and security in the African continent and UNAMID proof effective in improving the security threat level. However, its ultimate effectiveness depends on factors beyond the control of the UN. Secondly, identify the determinants to the effectiveness of UNAMID. In this context, the problems faced by UNAMID refined and identified factors that contributes to the effectiveness of the mission. UNAMID at the beginning of the mission facing problems ever faced by AMIS and most of these problems solved. However, UNAMID still faces major challenges, namely freedom of movement within the mission and lack of equipment by the team to operate in the mission. The study found that this was due to the refusal of the Government of Sudan to co-operate in facilitating UNAMID implementing the mandate. The results of this study confirm that the peace efforts to manage the conflict in Darfur through hybrid force not be effective if the major challenges surrounding peace efforts are not adequately addressed by international or regional security.

Keywords: *Darfur, hybrid force, humanitarian crisis, conflict management, Neo-liberal institutionalism.*

INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping effort in Darfur was known as the world's worst humanitarian crisis in the history of the United Nations (UN). Under the pretext of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the UN to intervene with the course of R2P. This conflict saw two types of

peacekeeping namely traditional peacekeeping mission and later hybrid type of mission formed by the African Union (AU) and the UN.

The AU contributes its responsibility by providing a force and operating under the name of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). As the conflict worsens, the mission needs larger and robust forces which displayed the UN collaborate with the AU to form UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) which was the first ever hybrid type of peacekeeping mission in the history of the UN. Heretofore, traditional peacekeeping mission portrayed mixed result of success and failures. For hybrid type of peacekeeping, Darfur was the test ground and mission is still ongoing, thus no result as yet. This article will expose the effectiveness of the conflict management adopted by UNAMID particularly in the aspect of protection of civilian (POC). Nonetheless, to compare the security threat level on both missions AMIS and UNAMID indicated the outcomes of the mission. It also identifies the challenges and the factors that contributed to those challenges to the mission that hampered the force to POC effectively. Finally, the determinants factors that contribute to the outcomes of hybrid mission revealed. Thus the potential of hybrid force in managing future conflict revealed.

History of the Conflict

Darfur conflict seems intractable as the warring parties seem to avoid the resolution. The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU deployed its standby force known as AMIS to respond the call for more promising solution as claimed towards any conflict through African way with African images. However, these troops lacked of 'appropriate' material and logistic and lacks of funding among other perceived to neither lack of robust posture to portray to warring parties nor to instill confidence to civilian in the area of operations. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issues a resolution to form UNAMID by absorbing existing force to form hybrid force.

Cause of the Conflict

There were lots of works done on the cause of conflict and to highlight some of the research finding where the hunt for economic interest to finance the rebel armed groups. Others reason were the inequality of wealth distribution, political representation at central government; ethnic polarization explained the cause of the conflict.

Scholars such as Thu [1] and Bob Zaremba[2] stated about marginalization of power and wealth of Khartoum. Claudio and Jérôme [3] as well as Jair [4] stated poor governance of government, economic and cultural issues. Ethnic hatred, environment issues such as desertification, scarce resource such as grazing land, water, and ethnicity was amongst others reason.

The UN Hybrid Mission

Under Article 52 of Chapter VIII of UN charter clearly stated that ‘SC encouraged such efforts that initiated by regional peace body to settle any disputes but with consent of the SC’. Murithi [5] stated that hybrid legality to embedded UN staff within the AU through uniformed and non-uniformed with civilian in control on the mission management.

UNAMID demonstrates joint effort that merged resources and expert including cost sharing. It is a way of ornamental performance provides common goal through joint responsibility on pool resources collectively. The partnership provides comparative advantages to organization, communities as well as the individual.

Theoretical

Sudan, the UN and AU’s states are actors in Darfur and interdependence which the neoliberal institution theory orientation fit well that about cooperation’s. David [6] stated neo-liberalism agrees realist argument where states are the major actors and are unitary rational agents in international politics with main goal for absolute gains. Darfur was the Government of Sudan (GOS) internal interest because of natural resources. Neo-liberal institutionalism revived the theory of international organizations such as the UN. That is not restricted only on collaboration, but to make possible to impose punishments on states that failed to comply with certain liberal norms [7]. Devitt [8], stated international organizations able to get states to cooperate and respond to regional and international security issues. Co-operation between member states in the African continent will make them have better prospect to instill peace and security between neighbors and economically developed.

PRINCIPLE OF PEACEKEEPING

The principle of peacekeeping as stated by the UN Secretary General Hammarskjold and the President of the UN General Assembly while developing UNEF 1 in 1990, was (1) must have consent from the parties in the conflict, (2) none use of force excluding self-defense, and (3) legitimacy, neutrality, and political impartiality [not taking sides].

Since the role of peacekeeping is not compulsory or only volunteer basis, Zacarias [9] stated that deployment of the peacekeeping forces to the conflict area subjected to four basic circumstances namely (1) agreement by the members of SC and followed by the international community agreement, (2) the need to established mission’s and agreed by the countries in war or the actors that involves in it provided that the conflict occurs within boundaries of the warring states, (3) the readiness of the UN member countries providing contingents for the mission, and (4) there were grounds of a peace to kept.

In the case of Darfur, the test ground of the AU manifestation to experiments the “African Solution to African Problem” in which AMIS was birth to restore peace which commensurate the limited mandate observing the cease-fire. The AMIS is a traditional peacekeeping operation involves not the validity of ceasefire, withdrawing, buffer zone, related agreement, with unarmed or contingent equipped with light armed and conduct the monitors and supervise tasks.

Contrary to AMIS, Gareth [10] stated that the UNAMID is an expanded peacekeeping operation where the task is over and above the AMIS through more peace related deeds, namely organization to monitor the election, protection of human rights, reconstruction, public information, gender affairs, or assisting the civilian administration functions during the transition period toward an independent state or to transform from non-democracy to democracy state.

THE AMIS AND THE UNAMID CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN DARFUR

The AU recognizes and appreciates the tendency and preferences of the SC to accept to Africa’s regional peace and security bodies to uphold the slogan of “African solutions to African problems” and welcomes the continent to take responsibility for its own destiny using their own solution and believe that they must manage their own continent with UNSC support in term of resources and funding. Darfur viewed as an important experimental case for the regional body attempts to keep the peace for future peace advocate in the African continent.

African Standby Force (ASF) deployment under AMIS

The AMIS heavily active in Darfur since 2004 to late 2007 with the mandate to name the important substance is protecting civilians. With unclear mandate, the AMIS commanders, seen to act more passively than allowed by the mandate. The AMIS supposed to act in preventing murder and displacement, however, with its limited resources, violence which leads to displacement still continues. The AMIS could not do much nor did not much impact to support the Darfur peace process. Throughout the mission, the AMIS received mixed reviews and criticism such as a small number of troops, lack of equipment and the limitations of the mandate. AMIS operation was then expanded as AMIS II. After a while, the AMIS II revised, became AMIS IIE (expanded). However, peace is not possible and this is evidence that the efforts of the series of AMIS have not been adequate to fulfill the mandate which later the UN intervene. The UN established a two-pronged program to beef up AMIS where the first pronged is Light Support Package (LSP) formed up as technical assistance in shaping the force military personnel, police and civilian advisers. Second pronged is a Heavy Support Package (HSP) consists of supplementary troops with more device and capabilities from countries outside African region.

UNAMID deployment under UN/AU Hybrid Mission

In late 2007, the SC debated in length on collaboration with regional organizations, where the focus on the AU as the strategic partner in maintaining international peace and security. It authorized a joint contribution of the AU and the UN peacekeepers in Darfur. The UNAMID is a more robust peacekeeping force by design being the largest UN mission ever since its creation.

The UNAMID absorbed the existing AU troops, and, supplementary troops brought in from outside. Under the SC Resolution 1769, UNAMID are operating with the breakdown of elements as in **Figure 1** as follows:

Type	Number	Units
Military	19,555	18 Infantry Battalions 4 Company (Force Reserve) 1 Signals Company 3 Engineer Company 1 Tactical Helicopter Company 1 Heavy Transport Company 2 Well Drilling Unit Company 2 Level II Field Hospital 1 Military Police Company
Police Personal	3,772	
Formed Police Unit (FPU)	6,432	19 FPU unit

Figure 1: UNAMID Force Structure (2008)[11]

Source: United Nations Facts Sheet

However, due to the budget constraint after 5 years of the intervention, the UN reduced the troops. The UNAMID experienced the downsizing of the military forces from 19,555 to 16,200 personal. The breakdowns of the composition are as in **Figure 2** as follows:

Type	Number	Units
Military	16,200	16 Infantry Battalions 3 Company (Force Reserve) 1 Signals Company (minus) 3 Engineer Company 1 Heavy Transport Company 1 Well Drilling Unit Company 1 Level II Field Hospital 1 Level III Hospital 1 Military Police Company
Police Personal	3,403	
Formed Police Unit (FPU)	1,583	13 FPU unit

Figure 2: UNAMID Force Structure (2012)[12]
Source: United Nations Facts Sheet

DENIAL OF INTERNATIONAL TROOPS BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT

Unlike Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the AU after re-branding more aspired and responsible in maintaining peace and security in the region, more optimism in its human right and peacekeeping activities. The AU portrayed significant improvement compared to the OAU. Though, Bashir insisted, the AU mission successful exercising the pretext “African solution to an African problem” [13]. Bashir rejected the entry of the UN peacekeepers into Darfur and keeps saying that UN troops are like the West’s re-colonizing Sudan. Aspiration of the AU was the reason on why the UN not involved from the beginning.

THE MISSION DILEMMAS

The AMIS and UNAMID encountered several dilemmas that hampered their performance to fulfil the mandate given to them. Four conditions required for successful mission but Darfur complied three out of four. The pressure put on Khartoum by the UN and China being the only countries behind Sudan leaving no choice but to persuade Khartoum for military intervention. However, though this decision comply to the second condition for a mission to success which are ‘the need to establishes mission’s and

agreement of the warring countries or the parties to the conflict if it's lies within state boundaries', being the host nation, Bashir with its government instrument such as the SAF and NISS observed of giving hardship to the mission.

In term of agreement by the members of the SC, after long finally all members of the SC agreed that there is a need to sanction the resolution on Darfur conflict. International communities via the representative in the UNGA agreed that the UN should intervene in Darfur where Khartoum accepted later.

China on the other hand, backed Sudan primarily because of her interest in resources, particularly oil and trade partner, finally agreed to persuade Sudan to accept the UN intervention. In term of the readiness of the UN member countries providing contingents for the mission, there were a problem especially in term of troop's mobility.

Finally, in order for the peace keeping to success, there must have ground for a peace to be kept. This is the most problematic in Darfur as there was no ground for peace to keep. There were a lot of factors contributed to it. The first three conditions addressed by the UN and the AU and within the control of the peace body. However, the fourth condition is where the problem lies and severely affected the mission and the factors contributed to it that both missions experiencing discussed in the later part of this article.

CHALLENGES OF PEACE EFFORT IN DARFUR CONFLICT

Author identified factors contributed to the existence of the ground of peace to keep as (1) freedom of movement by the participating troops in their area of operation, (2) mobility capabilities of the participating troops and (3) host nation's willingness to ease movement of personal and other logistic resources in and out of the mission area.

Jibril [14] stated that the UNAMID faces difficulties thus reduced its ability to discharge its functions effectively, particularly the POC and the UNAMID was left without a choice but to collaborate with unwilling local stakeholders. However, deployment of UNAMID in Darfur played positive role in creating relatively improved life conditions in areas of their presence. Yet the effect of the UNAMID's presence limited and the situation in many parts remains precarious because of the UNAMID's weak capabilities and inability to cover the vast region. Obstacles placed by the GOS caused the UNAMID losing precious time, enthusiasm and momentum during the early stage of its deployment [15].

All the challenges that the author identified were in tandem with Secretary General special report to the SC that stated three key challenges to effective operation were (1) the co-operation and partnership of the Government in mandate implementation, (2) major shortfalls in several troop and police contingent capabilities and (3) the need for improved co-ordination and integration structures within the Mission and between the Mission and the United Nations country team.

From the discussion above, it is clear that lack of cooperation by host nation was the main factors contributed too little progress that the UNAMID made. The UNAMID forced to operate with the local stakeholder who merely did not cooperate and did not want the mission over. Hence, without freedom of movement, adequate personal and equipment deployed in Darfur, the UNAMID not able to engaged those in needs effectively.

LEVEL OF SECURITY THREATS AFTER UNAMID INTERVENE

In defining the security level, the mission adopted a model known as the UN Security Risk Management (UNSMS) model as shown in **Figure 3**. This model is the management tool to analyse the safety and security threats that may affect its personal, assets and operations. This model work based on the risk assessment and the formulation. Each sub-process undergo a lengthy process before arrived to the outcomes of each sub-process. Risk defined as the mixture of the impact and likelihood for harm, loss or damage to the UN system from any threats and categorized in levels from Very Low to Very High for their prioritization [16].




Figure 3: Risk Management Model

Source: United Nations Department of Security and Service

These models have two phases which are preparation phase and execution phase. In Preparation phase, there were five sub-process known as Programme Assessment, Threat Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment, Risk Analysis and finally mitigate measures. Each process is important before embarking to the next process. Once all this done, then the execution Phase commenced whereby the sub-process were to make up the decision, implementation and from time to time reviewed and update the level. As the substances of each sub-process identified, the risk analysis level and its impact will develop. Through this model, the UNSMS established the following **Table 1** for evaluation of “Risks Levels”.

		IMPACT				
RISK ANALYSIS TABLE		Negligible	Minor	Moderate	Severe	Critical
L I K E L Y H O O D	Very Likely/ Imminent					
	Likely					
	Moderately Likely					
	Unlikely					
	Very Likely					

Table 1: Security Risk Analysis Table
Source: United Nations Department of Security and Service

According to the UN Department of Security and Services [17] and UN Security Management System [18] stated that security levels in mission area categorized by phase i.e. Phase I until Phase VI. Phase I indicated security level as ‘Minimal’, meaning threat is minimal. Phase II indicates ‘Low’, Phase III indicates ‘Moderate’, Phase IV indicates ‘Substantial’, Phase V indicates ‘High’ and finally, Phase VI indicates ‘Extreme’, the highest security threat levels.

With regards to security threats and security in Darfur after insertion of the UNAMID in 2008, this article referred to the UNAMID annual report by the Secretary General to UNSC. The report extracted covers from 2008 until 2014 including one special report by the Secretary General on February 2014. This report gave some idea on how the security level and threats were after the UNAMID intervene, thus indicated the effect of the UNAMID. **Figure 4** below described the overall security threat level in Sudan.



Figure 4: Sudan Security Threat Level System
Source: The United Nation Department of Security and Service

Viewing annual report by the Secretary-General on deployment of the UNAMID, security threats level throughout Darfur relatively unchanged since UNAMID insertion in 2008. Situation largely remains unpredictable and fragile and most of the times were on alert under Phase IV – ‘Substantial’. Security threat level of UNAMID are better than AMIS, whereby during AMIS early deployment in 2004, the level was at Phase V – ‘High’ and slowly lowered to Phase IV – ‘Substantial’ in 2007, before UNAMID took over. Since UNAMID took over in 2008, security threat level remained unchanged. Therefore, the level of threats and security after UNAMID intervene was clearly be seen that UNAMID make improvement of one level from Phase V- ‘High’ to Phase IV - ‘Substantial’, however this level remained unchanged at Phase IV – ‘Substantial’.

THEORY VERSUS PRACTICAL

The establishment of institutions such as the UN not restricted only on co-operation, but to make possible to impose punishments on states that failed to comply with certain liberal norms [19]. The UN in this case punished the GOS through economic sanction. Members of the SC have long debates to impose sanctions. Mixed opinion rose within the SC. China consistently against any action in term of economic as it worsens the conflict. By developing Sudan, poverty could be reduces. China viewed poverty was the main reason for the uprising of armed groups. Others members of the SC believed that the GOS had own interest in Darfur particularly natural resources.

Neo-liberalism institution subscribed it is rational to focus on long-term profits than short-term goals [20]. China behaviour was towards focusing on long-term profits. Through development, Sudan will prosper. China intention in Sudan is more towards her energy security for her domestic consumption. Access to natural resources and energy is a key objective in China's policies towards Africa. Oil and gas production expected to increase in the next decades, thus, great interest to China. By providing enough energy with lower prices, public in China mainland will less concerned on the political agenda in China. Thus, the regime will stay in power and will sustain as long as the needs of the public fulfilled.

Neo-liberalism also recognizes that no harmony in collaboration. Co-operation between the UN and the AU saw the existence of harmony since the conflict started. Both elites, the GOS and Mission Headquarters were only harmony on papers, meeting, conference and forum, but in reality it does not reflect the truth. The GOS behaviour is more towards ensuring mission to prolong rather to solve it. Much evidence on this discussed earlier such as extreme bureaucratic towards the UNAMID requirements that hampered mission to exercise their responsibility.

Jennifer [21] pointed out that in some parts of the world, regional capacity to handle conflict is embryonic or non-existent, and where the UN does not have an eager and enthusiastic partner with whom it can cooperates in fulfilling R2P. When UNAMID formed, the AU and especially the GOS reluctant to accept this force, though, main bulk of the force were from AMIS their own standby forces. Though, day-to-day operation of UNAMID runs by AU Military Commander, but directions of mission comes from the UN and not the AU.

Co-operation theoretically brings positive values rather negative. The UNAMID happened to be the case that values has mixed results. Positive values instilled through merging resources and expertise. Negative aspects were with whom co-operation was. Unwilling partner hampered all positives values that the UN intends to bring in. Host nations are not the only unwilling partners but also the AU that inspired to portray to the world that they could solve own continent problem. The AU supposedly did want to fail as it remembered by the international community's as un-reliable in preserving peace and security.

PROSPECT OF UNAMID IN PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN

Peace effort in Darfur saw two types of missions, namely the AMIS traditional and UNAMID hybrid type of peacekeeping. Both missions face challenges that restricted their presence as peace keeping forces. The main contributors to all challenges were lack of co-operation from host nation and still exist to date. This cause domino effect to other challenges such as freedom of movement, intelligence gathering capabilities, lack of capacity and others unnecessary restrained related to the mission needs by the GOS.

The UNAMID since insertion has little improvement compared to the AMIS. However, ever since the security threats level remain unchanged as Phase IV – ‘Substantial’ due to lack of co-operation by the host nation that contributes to the little progress the UNAMID portrayed after the AMIS. With this, the situation in Darfur will remain unfold, thus, no ground of peace be kept in Darfur for the year to come and the UNAMID will not have good prospect in this conflict.

CONCLUSION

The UNAMID made some progress in implementing its mandate. New revised strategies introduced focusing on the shortfalls of mission and improve co-ordination intra and inter mission including the UN and contributing countries. With new strategies, the UN country team and humanitarian actors have clear direction to exercise rapid action in responding to humanitarian needs. Author viewed the most important strategy is to improved co-operation between the UN and host country. China could play crucial roles persuading the GOS to adhere to implementation of the mandate. Way that China views on assisting on development rather sanction is the way forward to improve the overall situation in Darfur. Rebel armed group will not get their demand for autonomy region of Darfur and more representatives in central government if central need the natural resources for the regime to survive. Through development, capacity of the GOS in term of development enhanced.

Despite the challenges that the UNAMID faces, access restriction, freedom of movement in affected areas and lack of capabilities especially on mobility and firepower affected security threat level, mission continues providing escorts and logistical support in facilitating provision of humanitarian assistance to those in need. Nonetheless, mission contributed to area security and ensuring the safety and security of aid personal and their property.

This article exposed the prospect of UNAMID in POC in Darfur. Lack of collaboration imposed by the host nation, contributes to the little progress that UNAMID able to portray after AMIS. With this, the situation in Darfur will remain unfold, thus, no ground of a peace be kept in Darfur for the year to comes and the UNAMID will not have good prospect in this conflict. This article concluded that no matter what type of forces involves either hybrid or non-hybrid in nature the mission can only achieved its mandate in POC if the key challenges to effective operations addressed.

Finally, determinant factors to the outcomes of UNAMID in POC were identified as lacked of host nation co-operation were the main determinant besides freedom of movement and capacities of participating troops. Without co-operation, the key challenges to mandate implementation still exist and hampered mission mandate. Unless otherwise, UNAMID would have better potential to improve across the full spectrum of its work if key challenges addressed, thus, the UNAMID will have better prospects to fulfill the mandates.

REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES

- [1] Thu Thi Quach, *The Crisis in Darfur: An Analysis of its Origins and Storylines*. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Virginia, 2004 at <http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/theses/unrestricted/tquachmajorpaper.pdf> retrieved on 26 Feb 2014.
- [2] Bob Zaremba, *Conflict In Darfur: Calculation and Inadequate International Response*, Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology, 2011 available at <http://www.jtpcrim.org/>.
- [3] Claudio and Jérôme, *Sudan: Forgotten Darfur - Old Tactics and New Players*. Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 2012 available at <http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/>.
- [4] Brosche. Jair, *Darfur – Dimension and Dilemmas of a Complex Situation*, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2008 at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se> retrieved at 22 July 2014.
- [5] Tim Murithi, *The African Union's Foray into Peacekeeping: Lessons from the Hybrid Mission in Darfur*, 2009 available at <http://www.researchgate.net/>.
- [6] David A. Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1993.
- [7] Anom, *United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur. Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*, 2014 available at <http://unamid.unmissions.org> retrieved on 01 October 2014.
- [8] Devitt. R, *Liberal Institutionalism: An Alternative IR Theory or Just Maintaining the Status Quo*. E- International Relation, 2011 available at <http://www.e-ir.info/liberal-institutionalism-an-alternative-ir-theory-just-maintaining-the-status-quo/> retrieved on 25 April 2014.
- [9] Zacarias. A, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping*, 1996 available at <http://www.amazon.fr/United-Nations-International-Peacekeeping/dp/>, retrieved on 15 July 2014.
- [10] Gareth. E, *Cooperating for Peace. The Global Agenda for the 1990s and Beyond*, Boulder USA: Allen & Unwin, 1993.
- [11] UNAMID Force Structure (2008), United Nations Facts Sheet.
- [12] UNAMID Force Structure (2012), United Nations Facts Sheet.
- [13] Arieff, *The African Union in Darfur - African Solution to a Global Problem* available at <http://www.academia.edu/>, 2006.
- [14] Abdelbagi Jibril, *Past and Future of UNAMID: Tragic Failure or Glorious Success*, ©Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre, Geneva (Switzerland) at <http://migs.concordia.ca/>, 2010.

- [15] Abdelbagi Jibril, *Past and Future of UNAMID: Tragic Failure or Glorious Success*, ©Darfur Relief and Documentation Centre, Geneva (Switzerland) at <http://migs.concordia.ca/>, 2010.
- [16] United Nations Department of Security and Service (UNDSS) 2013.
- [17] United Nations Department of Security and Service (UNDSS) 2013.
- [18] UN Security Management System.
- [19] Anom, *United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur. Doha Document for Peace in Darfur*, 2014 available at <http://unamid.unmissions.org> retrieved on 01 October 2014.
- [20] Karen A. Mingst, *Essentials of International Relations*. 5th Edition. New York. Norton: W.W. & Company, Inc, 2010.
- [21] Jennifer , *Implementing the Responsibility to Protect*, Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict, University of Oxford, 2009.

JAPAN: LOOKING FOR A ROLE, BUT WHITHER SOUTHEAST ASIA IN JAPAN'S OUTREACH?

Ruhanas Harun

Professor at Department of Strategic Studies

National Defence University of Malaysia

Email: ruhanas10@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

A defeated power in 1945, Japan rose from the ashes of World War Two to become an economic power, but without the corresponding political influence that Japan desired. This mismatch has led Japan to be sometimes referred to as “an economic giant, but a political dwarf. In Southeast Asia, Japanese economic predominance was evident in the 1970s and the 1980s but as of 1990s, its presence in the region seemed to have waned, caused partly by the rise of China and the decline in Japanese economy. Recently, the Japanese government under Prime Minister Abe has put forward a policy of pro-active engagement in East Asia, a region it occupied during the WWII. While Japan's relations with its Northeast Asian neighbours have been unpredictable due to historical, political and cultural reasons, its relations with Southeast Asia (now ASEAN) region remained stable. With Japan again trying to find a role and position internationally, the question of Japan ‘pivoting’ towards Southeast Asia is on the agenda. Can Japan repeat the success of its economic diplomacy in the region before, and what are the challenges facing Japan in regaining a foothold it once had? In view of the many changes that had taken place since the end of the Cold War, Japan will have to make adjustments to achieve its objectives regionally and globally.

Keywords: *Japan's economic predominance, international role, constraints, relations with Southeast Asia.*

INTRODUCTION

In the more than half a century since its defeat in the Second World War, Japan has successfully moved on from wartime devastation to economic affluence. But this focus on one dimensional goal of economic recovery has also left them uncertain about their country's wider mission [1]. The success of its economic recovery has been attributed to, among others, its cohesiveness, its concentration of domestic development and its reliance upon those aspects of its traditional culture that served the purposes of modernization [2]. But it has also been argued that they also represent obstacles to Japan's assumption of regional or global leadership. Japan's World War Two negative legacies and the changed regional and international environment since the end of the Cold War have also complicated Japan's search for a ‘meaningful’ global role. From time to time, Japanese governments came out with strategies and policies which could serve as

the 'way forward' for Japan in this quest for a "more defined and autonomous role" in world affairs [3]. This has not been easy.

By the 1970s, Japan's economic influence spread to many regions of the world. Its efforts in 'seeking to find a political role' have mainly been directed towards the Third World, and more particularly with reference to East Asia [4]. Countries in Southeast Asia welcomed Japanese economic presence in the region even though memories of Japanese occupation during World War Two still lingered on. Japan's foreign policy has been characterised as 'check-book diplomacy', a derisive term to describe Japan's use of economic interaction, especially the use of Official Development Assistance (ODA) in Japan's foreign policy. As it continued to seek to find a political role suited to its capacities and compatible with the views of its citizenry, Japan became actively involved in many regional issues and in the peacekeeping role. Tokyo also became more political and joined in the condemnation of Beijing following the repression of the Tiananmen demonstration and agreed to the imposition of an economic embargo covering loans. This surprised many because Japanese foreign policy Japan did not "place a high premium upon human rights as a criterion for foreign policy decisions." This aroused suspicion of many that the Japanese government did that in order to conform to Western governments' decision [5].

Following its remarkable economic recovery from the disasters of World War Two (WWII) and the political stability it enjoyed, many predicted that Japan would inevitably rise to become a political giant in the international arena. According to Brezezinski, in the 1990s, predictions of Japan's imminent appearance as the world's 'super state' poised not only to dethrone America but also to impose some sort of 'Pax Nipponica' were a veritable cottage industry among US commentators and politicians. Even the Japanese themselves soon became eager imitators with a series of best-sellers in Japan propounding the thesis that Japan was destined to prevail in its high-tech rivalry with the US and that Japan would become the centre of global information empire. But it turned out to be a 'false alarm'. Japan did not 'dethrone' the US, and a 'pax Nipponica' is yet to emerge. The end of the Cold War in 1990s did not lead to Japan's relationship with the US being questioned. In fact it was reaffirmed since it symbolised stability in an environment of unclear changes [6]. These changes added to the challenges Japan will have to face in its search for a role.

THE CONSTRAINTS

A major factor that constrained Japan in its quest for a status reflecting its economic and political power is geopolitics. Japan is isolated from the rest of Asia by geography and the uniqueness of its culture. It is surrounded by neighbours with whom Japan has unpredictable relationship. Japan's relations with the countries of Northeast Asia had been for most part shaped by negative legacies of history and political tensions which did not provide for Japan the best possible conditions for establishing stable and enduring relationship. The winds of the past history often caused 'frost' in the relationship between

Japan and its neighbours, namely China and Korea. Issues causing tension include the publication of junior high school history textbooks approved by the Japanese government, but disputed by South Korea and China as containing distortions of history, the issue of so-called comfort women and Japan's refusal to utter the apology over the war atrocities committed by Japan. Both South Korea and China felt 'disparaged' by Japan's attempt to ignore issues surrounding WWII [7]. Besides these issues, visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Japanese officials, including by former Prime Ministers of Japan Yasuhiro Nakasone and Koizumi triggered large scale demonstrations against Japan in many Chinese cities. These issues combined with the disputes over rights to subterranean resources under the East China Sea complicated Japan's campaign to become a permanent member of the U.N Security Council. The situation is different from Germany in Europe where not only reconciliation efforts between Germany and European countries affected by WWII had long begun, but Germany had also acknowledged its responsibility for its WWII wrongs.

THE DILEMMA OF JAPAN

The rise of China placed Japan in a difficult situation. Despite the delicate and sensitive issues of the past in their relationship, and contrary to the general perception in China that Japan wants to keep China down, it is not in Japan's best interest to have a weak China. Such condition will create instability in the region and will only bring problems to Japan. But it is also weary of an assertive China; its strong economic and military power as well as the combined political influence that may accompany such strength. Asked who Japan should fear most, a Japanese political scientist remarked "number one China, number two China, number three China, others come after that." Although this maybe a humorous exaggeration of Japan's preoccupation with the China threat, it reflects a concern that China is Japan's main worry in the region. In Asia, there is no common institution such as in the EU to regulate the actions and control the behaviour of any of its members from harming others. Japan's vulnerability can only be assuaged through the US protection and support, despite the desire of some in Japan to free the country from the American 'tutelage'. On its own, a restricted, uncertain and unrecognised power such as Japan is no match for an assertive and confident China.

Conditions in Asia did not provide for Japan to emerge the way Germany did in Europe in the post war era. Japan does not have what Germany in Europe has. Germany, by joining NATO is placed at par with other principle European allies. Japan has no equivalent of France—to Germany—that is a genuine and more or less an equal partner [8]. In Europe, France and Germany have become the pillars of European unity and integration. In Asia, there is no organisation such as the European Union that can accommodate the desires of the two Asian powers and where they would be together building up regional structure that would depend on their cooperation. Given the mistrust of Japan's Northeast Asian neighbours, especially China, it is difficult for Japan to lead a regional organisation that would unite all countries in the region and where Japan's leadership is acceptable to all.

Japan it seems also suffers from an identity crisis. Some analysts have pointed out to the fact that “many Asians view Japan as nationally selfish and overly imitative of the West, and reluctant to join them in questioning the West’s views on human rights and on the importance of individualism.” The West also occasionally wonders to what degree has Japan truly become Western. The result of this ‘neither truly Asian nor truly Western’ is to greatly limit Japan’s strategic option [9]. Obviously Japan is not comfortable with China’s predominance in the region. Japan’s close alliance with the US and the lack of an independent foreign policy reduce its prestige and erode the confidence that regional countries may have on its ability to act independently. What then is the choice for Japan? If Japan wants to move away from the American protection and be independent, Japan will have to strengthen itself, a move that will scare many in the region given the past history of Japanese ambition over the region. As argued by Brzezinski, for Japan to undertake a massive program of military rearmament is not only costly, but also very dangerous. It seems that for Japan, the situation is between a hard rock and a difficult place.

WHICH WAY TO GO?

Several Prime Ministers of Japan has attempted to rectify the situation in the hope that Japan would be able to achieve its ambition of being politically recognised. Current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe recently produced a doctrine of “proactive pacifism” that seeks to establish a more robust defence posture. This doctrine “has been used to justify everything from selling arms to allies –until recently strictly forbidden- to beefing up maritime defence around islands disputed with China [10]. Mr Abe is also doing something that is being viewed uncomfortably not only outside Japan, but even among Japan’s own citizens. This is in reference to Mr Abe’s wish to scrap article 9 of the 1947 constitution, in which forever Japan renounces the right to wage war. Even in Southeast Asia where memories of Japanese occupation are fading away, some still shudders at the thought of such an idea.

Mr Abe has also declared defence assistance a new “pillar” of Japan’s overseas development aid in countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines, two ASEAN countries which share Tokyo’s wariness of Chinese power [11]. Although it is possible to assume that the aim of such ‘network’ of defence cooperation is not aimed at containing China, there is nothing to stop some from assuming this idea. Most ASEAN countries have good relations with China and are not likely to welcome the idea of an uncomfortable network. Even Vietnam, which together with the Philippines has been vocal in protesting Chinese actions in the South China Sea, is unlikely to allow its relations with China to deteriorate on any account. Geopolitical imperatives require Vietnam to maintain good relations with China as a condition for its political stability and survival. Establishing defence or security network between Japan and ASEAN countries at a time when regional tension over maritime issues continues may be construed as containing China’s influence. Such initiative can only serve to erode confidence in Japan’s ability to exercise good judgement and will complicate Japan’s quest for influence in the region.

WHITHER SOUTHEAST ASIA IN JAPAN'S SCHEME OF THINGS?

Japan's predominance in Southeast Asia during the 1970s and 1980s was essentially economic in nature. Its relations with Southeast Asia before the 70s evolved in the framework set by the Yoshida Doctrine that encompassed the following points: i- reliance on the alliance with the US to ensure Japan's security; ii- emphasis on economic relations; iii- low profile in international politics [12]. Japan had also agreed to provide reparations to countries in Southeast Asia such as Burma, Indonesia, Philippines, and Vietnam. After the mid-1970s, this was discontinued and Japan was allowed to make reparations in kinds which turned out to pave the way for future export of Japanese goods and services. Also by the 1970s, the changing regional environment necessitated a new approach in Japan's relations with Southeast Asia, hence the introduction of the Fukuda doctrine. Several events became catalysts to the introduction of this doctrine.

While there are those who believe that there still exist "lingering animosity" towards Japan over WWII, such harbouring has not produced anti-Japanese sentiment seen in Korea or China. More often than not, among the older and younger generations of Southeast Asians Japan is remembered rather amusingly for its failed plan to create "greater Asia" during the WWII. But because of its economic predominance, Japan's image in Southeast Asia in the 1970s was that of "an ugly imperialist." In January 1974, Prime Minister Tanaka made an official visit to several countries in Southeast Asia including the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia. Tanaka was met with thousands of students who took to the street of Jakarta and Bangkok to protest Japan's policies in Southeast Asia. According to the 1974 Japanese "Diplomatic Bluebook", *"criticism of Japan has increased in various Southeast Asian countries in recent years against its sharply increased enormous economic presence, the business methods of Japanese enterprises and also the behaviour of Japanese residents in those countries. On the occasion of the Prime Minister's visit, local students staged anti-Japanese demonstrations and riots in Bangkok and Jakarta. Protests also occurred in Malaysia and elsewhere"*.

The end of the Vietnam War in 1975 also brought changes in the region. All the three Indochina countries—Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam- fell to the communists' forces. The United States withdrew from Vietnam and pursued a policy of quiet disengagement from the region. At the same time it wished for Japan to increase its political role in the region. By that time too ASEAN, with whom Japan have always had good relations, grew to become a significant actor in regional politics. So, the scope for Japan to play its role expanded. In August 1977, during a visit to Manila, Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda announced a new set of principles that would guide Japanese diplomacy in Southeast Asia. According to the Fukuda Doctrine, these principles are : i- Japan is committed to peace and rejects the role of a military power; ii-Japan will do its best to consolidate the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on heart-to-heart understanding with the nations of Southeast Asia; iii- Japan will cooperate positively with ASEAN while aiming at fostering a relationship based on mutual understanding with the

countries of Indochina and thus will contribute to the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia.

Prime Minister Fukuda, in his speech in Manila recognised the ‘flaw’ in Japanese economic diplomacy in Southeast Asia. According to him, Japan’s *“diplomacy toward Southeast Asia until now was contact through money and goods. It was not contact based on the policy of good friends acting for mutual benefit. Even when viewed from our country there was an impression of economic aggression and arrogant manners, and it was a situation which was symbolized by the expression of economic animal”* [13]. To correct the image of Japan in Southeast Asia, the Japanese government, based on the Fukuda doctrine focussed on three areas: bridging the gap between ASEAN countries and the three communist states of Indochina; helping ASEAN economies through ODA and FDI; and promoting Japanese soft power. Japan made huge contributions to Vietnam for the post war reconstruction of the country. This assistance was also given to Laos. But the funds given were also for the purchase of Japanese equipment and materials needed for the reconstruction. But after 1978, Japan, acting in concert with other members of the international community, notably so with ASEAN, China and the US, froze its assistance to Vietnam as a sign of protest against Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978.

The Fukuda Doctrine also wanted to make Japan an economic model for the Southeast Asia countries and to increase FDI and ODA in the region. Japan would also transfer its labour –intensive industries to Southeast Asia and increased its FDI and ODA to the region. By the 1980s, over 30% of total Japanese ODA was directed to Southeast Asian countries. Indonesia was the main recipient of Japanese ODA at that period, followed by Thailand and the Philippines. Malaysia only occupied a distant fourth. However, Malaysia went further than just receiving Japanese ODA and FDI. In 1981 when Dr Mahathir became Prime Minister of Malaysia, he introduced the “Look East Policy” which was to have an impact of bringing closer Malaysia-Japan relations. Under this program, many Malaysian students were sent to Japan to study, mainly in technical subjects. The policy also increased Japanese economic activities and investments in Malaysia. This was accompanied by increasing interactions between the peoples of the two countries through academic, social exchanges and tourism. However, after Dr Mahathir left office in 2003, the Look East policy seemed to have eclipsed, and even if it still there, it has lost its lustre. But Malaysia-Japan relations continue to be on good footing. The visits of Malaysian Prime Minister to Japan and visits by Japanese Prime Minister to Malaysia recently underline the fact that in Malaysia, Japan is seen as a friend. It is a relationship free of historical baggage and political thorns and therefore could continue to flourish if they so decide. Perhaps what Malaysia hopes for is for Japan to be more pro-active in cultivating this friendship in the socio-cultural sphere, taking advantage of the cordial political relationship.

Promoting Japan’s soft power in Southeast Asia was another aim of the Fukuda doctrine. Despite the close economic relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia, it lacked the closeness and feeling of mutual understanding in socio-cultural matters. There

was a lack of understanding by Japanese about Southeast Asian cultures and societies, and there was also little interest about Japan in Southeast Asians. To help improve the situation, the Japanese government carried out series of activities to promote socio-cultural exchanges between Japan and Southeast Asian countries. These include the setting up of ASEAN Cultural Fund, Southeast Asia Youth Invitation Program and Japan-ASEAN Research Cooperation Fund and many others. Japan –ASEAN academic exchange helped bridge the gap between Southeast Asian scholars and their Japanese counterparts. But as Japanese economic presence seemed to wane in the region after the 1990s, so did these socio-cultural interactions. The success of economic diplomacy of Japan in Southeast Asia somehow did not produce a long lasting impact in socio-cultural sphere.

JAPAN'S INCREASING POLITICAL ROLE

Asia continued to evolve in the new millennium. Again Japan saw it due to review its strategy and policy on how best to secure Japan's interests in the region. It is evident that Japan is not contented with just being an economic giant without the commensurate political power and influence, not just in Southeast Asia, but globally. How does Southeast Asia fit into the Japanese scheme of things?

Japan has shown great interest in Southeast Asia since WWII. Japan's close relationship with the US and being its ally to a large extent facilitated Japanese presence in Southeast Asia. The US has been a strong supporter of ASEAN, remains a traditional and old friend of many ASEAN members. Politically, there is a convergence of interests between the US and Japan in Southeast Asia. For Japan, cultivating close relationship and cooperation with ASEAN countries would be killing two birds with one stone: strengthening its foothold and supporting American presence in the region. Today, there are ample opportunities and framework with which Japan could realise these aims. Since the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has expanded its membership and widen its scope of activities in political, security, economic and socio-cultural spheres. Japan participates actively in many of these. The ASEAN Plus process is a clear example of the positive engagement of Japan in regional issues. In fact, according to Miguel, it was the Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama who first suggested in 1991 at the General Session of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference in Kuala Lumpur of a possible model for a regional architecture in Asia-Pacific, which could be used to address regional peace and security issues.

Despite the perception of a 'waning' Japanese presence in the region, Japan still has significant economic interests in Southeast Asia. Maintaining these interests and re-invigorating its presence here have also become important for Japan. A peaceful and stable Southeast Asia is necessary to secure these economic interests. China's rise is another factor to consider when discussing Japanese and American interests in the region. China since the 1990s has been actively engaged economically, politically and

socio-culturally in the ASEAN region. This did not go unnoticed by Japan or the US. The US is not at ease with Chinese assertiveness and its influence, but would not mind Japan's active role in the region. Despite the perception of many non-Southeast Asian analysts about the "misgivings" about Japan among Southeast Asian countries stemming from the Japanese occupation in the WWII, Southeast Asian countries do not harbour the same degree of suspicion and animosity towards Japan with regards to that period in their history, unlike China and Korea. Japan's enhanced presence in the region would also serve to strengthen US position in Southeast Asia and would provide a challenge to China's ambition.

Although it may be politically incorrect to say so, it is quite right to say that most ASEAN countries are politically less suspicious of Japan than of China with regards to certain aspects of their presence in Southeast Asia. China has emerged as important trading partners of ASEAN nations, but in security matters, they have not yet learned to trust China. Although the Cold War is long over, the lingering suspicion about China shaped during this period is not totally gone. In addition, some ASEAN members are involved in territorial disputes with China. Japan does not have such entanglement with ASEAN countries. Also Japan is geographically more removed from Southeast Asia, thus the impact of the 'tyranny of geography' such as experienced by Vietnam in its relations with China, does not exist. But this is not to say that it will be all smooth sailing for Japan to regain its "lost decade" of the 1990s in the region.

COOPERATION WITH 'DEMOCRACIES' OR LOOKING TO CONTAIN CHINA?

In his effort to enhance Japan's regional role and presence, Mr Abe has put forward a strategy of establish a network of cooperation with 'democracies'. In Southeast Asia, Japan turned to the Philippines, another close ally of the US in the region. Besides being close allies of the US, both countries share similar apprehensions about China. Both have territorial disputes with China. ASEAN countries differ in varying degrees in their attitudes towards China, but in general they agree that close economic relations with China brought them many benefits which they are not willing to forgo. Japan and the Philippines have pointed out that their close relationship is also based on cooperation among 'democracies', but this may also be viewed as an attempt to constraint or contain China. In this context, Japan is treading an uncomfortable path and may unnecessarily clutter its efforts to enhance its role in Southeast Asia. But Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is also looking to Southeast Asia's "economic stars" namely Vietnam, Indonesia and Thailand to increase its presence in the region. Japanese companies are already eyeing Southeast Asia as an alternative to investment in China after a long –simmering feud over disputed islands in the East China Sea flared up in 2012, sparking protests in China and hurting trade [14].

CULTIVATING A NEW IMAGE

One of the reasons for the introduction of the Fukuda Doctrine was to correct the image of Japan in Southeast Asia. It was in essence an initiative designed to change the perception of Japan from an ‘economic animal’ to a worthy and respectable partner. In general, Japan’s diplomacy towards the region has been successful in changing that image, although it has not erased the perception about Japan’s lack of independence in foreign policy. Why does Japan seem to be ‘obsessed’ with finding a political role commensurate with its economic power?

Japan is already in the ‘club of the greats’, a member of the G8. In Southeast Asia, Japan has been actively involved in regional issues and responsibilities. It has played a significant role in peace, security and development in Southeast Asia, such as in attempt to resolve the Cambodian conflict, peace-building in Timor Leste and South Philippines. Japan’s assistance to Vietnam for its post war reconstruction and development made Japan one of the most popular and highly regarded countries in Vietnam. The normalisation and enhancement of Vietnam-US ties eliminated a source of dilemma for Japanese-Vietnam relations. In fact Vietnam itself has been cultivating close relations with the US, including security cooperation. Indonesia, ASEAN’s largest country too has long-standing political and close socio-cultural relations with Japan. Today Indonesia looks to Japan as a partner to assist in its economic and infrastructure development. Japan has also been involved in peace keeping missions abroad. All these have helped to modify Japan’s image as a nation concerned only with its own national economic interest.

The Fukuda Doctrine was also concerned with rectifying the unfavourable image of Japan in Southeast Asia as evident in the anti-Japanese sentiment of the 1970s. Since then Japan had taken steps to enhance the socio-cultural aspects of its soft power in the region. Relatively speaking, Japan is behind other major powers in promoting soft power through constructive and enduring socio-cultural relations. In this matter, Japan does not have the advantage that other powers have in the region. China’s presence has been facilitated by the presence of a large number of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, but Japan lacks such support. Some argued that the success of China’s soft power in Southeast Asia is due to its “hedging behaviour”. The reasons for this include “reducing the risk of China’s growing comprehensive national power” [15]. The US and European powers have been in the region for a long time and remained traditional friends of Southeast Asia where they still maintain significant soft-power influence in the region. So the task of promoting soft power in socio-cultural spheres may be a daunting task for Japan but it is not an impossible task. Japan had initiated many policies and actions towards this end in the 1970s and 1980s, but somehow they ran out of steam and didn’t survive to the new century. Maybe the time is opportune for Japan to start a new “charm offensive” in Southeast Asia.

CONCLUSION

Japan is an economic power with considerable importance in Asia. In the 1980s, that golden age of Japan's economy, it had become clear that Japan was not playing an international role commensurate with its economic stature [16]. Geopolitics and history became obstacles to Japan's desire and ambition to become a political giant. But today Japan's international role and activities have expanded ranging from economic development aid to participation in peace-keeping all over the globe. It has not yet achieved its aim to be included as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, a symbol of recognition of a major political power. Japan has not moved out of the American shadow. In Southeast Asia, Japan is respected as an economic power and is seen as a power, in concert with the US that can provide a counter balance to China. The spirit of the Fukuda Doctrine continues to become an important guide for Japan's diplomacy in Southeast Asia. Without major issues to cause tension in their relations with Japan, Southeast Asian countries are well disposed towards Japan, unlike its neighbours in Northeast Asia. To have earned the respect of ten countries in the region is no small feat. ASEAN's planned integration in 2015 will create a bloc with combined economies worth 2 trillion USD and a combined population of 600 million is a significant lure for a Japanese economy. Despite the many challenges, Japan could still capture Southeast Asia through its soft power enhancement in areas hitherto less explored. The Japanese lead goose may have disappeared, but Japan's leadership and responsibility in the region can reincarnate in other forms.

REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES:

- [1] Brzezinski , Zbignew, *The Grand Chessboard*. Basic Books, New York pp173-74, 1997.
- [2] Robert Scalapino 'The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan' in Roy ' , *Foreign Policy in World Politics*, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, p186, 1992 (ed.)
- [3] Brzezinski , Zbignew, *The Grand Chessboard*, p173.1997.
- [4] Robert Scalapino 'The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan' in Roy Macridis pp209, 1992.
- [5] Robert Scalapino 'The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan' in Roy Macridis pp209, 1992.
- [6] Drifte, Reinhard, *Japan's Quest for the Security Council*, St Martin's Press, New York p53, 2000.
- [7] Corrado G.M.Letta, *South Korea-Japan relations*. AEI, Kuala Lumpur. Pp286, 2007.
- [8] Brzezinski , Zbignew, *The Grand Chessboard*. Basic Books, New York p176, 1997.
- [9] Brzezinski, Zbignew, *The Grand Chessboard*. Basic Books, New York p 177, 1997.

- [10] David Pilling, 'A Tipping Point for Japan's Foreign Policy' *Financial Times*, January 28, 2015.
- [11] Daniel Twinning, 'Is Japan's Grand Security Strategy the Key to Preserving US Power in Asia?' <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/09/02/is-japansgrand-security-strategy-the-key-to-preserving-u-s-power-in-asia/> September 2, 2014.
- [12] Emilio de Miguel, 'Japan and Southeast Asia: From the Fukuda doctrine to Abe's Five Principles', UNISCI Discussion papers, no. 32 May 2013.
- [13] Emilio de Miguel, 'Japan and Southeast Asia: From the Fukuda doctrine to Abe's Five Principles', UNISCI Discussion papers, no. 32 May 2013.
- [14] Reuters, 'Japan's Abe Turns to Southeast Asia to Counter China'. 16 Jan 2013.
- [15] Rommel C. I Banlaoi, *Jebat* Volume 37, p 60, 2010.
- [16] Emilio de Miguel, 'Japan and Southeast Asia: From the Fukuda doctrine to Abe's Five Principles', UNISCI Discussion papers, no. 32 May 2013.

A REVIEW OF SECURITY THREATS OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND MITIGATION STEPS

Dinesh Sathyamoorthy

Science & Technology Research Institute for Defence (STRIDE),

Ministry of Defence, Malaysia

E-mail: dinesh.sathyamoorthy@stride.gov.my

ABSTRACT

The use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has increased exponentially over the last decade for a broad range of applications. The recent commercial availability of a new generation of small UAVs has emphasised the growing threat posed by these machines. This article is aimed at reviewing the security threats posed by UAVs in areas such as terrorist attacks, illegal surveillance and reconnaissance, smuggling, electronic snooping, and mid-air collisions, in addition to discussing on the categories of UAV intrusions in terms of intention and level of sophistication of the operators. Mitigation steps for UAV intrusions are also discussed, focusing on geofencing, detections systems (radar, and acoustic, radio frequency (RF) emission and electro-optical (EO) sensing), electronic defences (command link jamming and appropriation, and Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) jamming and spoofing), and kinetic defences (shooting down UAVs and net capture using interceptor UAVs).

Keywords: *Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); security threats; geofencing, detection systems; electronic and kinetic defences.*

INTRODUCTION

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, are aircrafts that do not carry any crew, but rather, are operated remotely by human operators, or autonomously via preprogrammed software or robots. UAVs vary widely in size and capacity, and have become increasingly prevalent. Their use has increased exponentially over the last decade for a broad range of applications, including cartography and mapping, inspection of remote power lines and pipelines, delivery services, telecommunications relay, police surveillance, traffic monitoring, border patrol and reconnaissance, and emergency and disaster monitoring [1, 2].

From a military perspective, UAVs, which can be recoverable or expendable, are generally used to operate in dangerous or hostile territories, without endangering the operators. It is employed for surveillance and reconnaissance, information collection, detection of mines, and for combat purposes. UAVs hold many attractions for the military. They are generally smaller, lighter and cheaper as compared to manned aerial vehicles as they do not need equipment to support a crew. UAVs can also be used for many hours in a stretch, while switching operators [1, 2].

The recent commercial availability of a new generation of small UAVs, often quadcopters or some other form of rotorcraft, has emphasised the growing threat posed by these machines. These UAVs can be easily purchased over the internet and can carry a payload of up to a few kilogrammes. They are cheap, easy to fly and small enough to evade traditional security surveillance. A recreational UAV costing a few hundred dollars can be turned into an aerial equivalent of an improvised explosive device (IED), or be equipped with a camera and data downlink to become a spy UAV [3-7].

This article is aimed at reviewing the security threats posed by UAVs, in addition to discussing on the categories of UAV intrusions in terms of intention and level of sophistication of the operators. Mitigation steps for UAV intrusions are also discussed, focusing on geofencing, detections systems, and electronic and kinetic defences.

SECURITY THREATS

A few recent incidents have highlighted potential dangers posed by UAVs. In September 2013, a UAV flew over a crowd and crash-landed right in front of the German Chancellor during a campaign rally, which turned out to be a stunt staged by a protester (Figure 1(a)) [8]. In January 2015, a UAV accidentally crashed into the compound of the White House, after evading the White House's radar that was calibrated to warn of much bigger threats, such as airplanes and missiles [9]. Four months later, in May 2015, a man was arrested by the US Secret Service for flying a UAV close the White House [10]. In March 2015, a UAV was illegally flown in the vicinity of Malaysia's Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA), taking photographs of an airplane landing [11]. In April 2015, a protester landed a UAV on the roof of the Japanese Prime Minister's office. It carried a container of sand with traces of non-harmful radioactive isotopes (Figure 1(b)) [12].

These incidents, while harmless, are alarming and serve as a warning of the potential threats of UAVs at the hands of terrorists. Miasnikov [13] summarised a set of advantages that make UAVs attractive to terrorists:



(a)



(b)

Figure 1: UAV intrusions: (a) The UAV that crash-landed in front of the German Chancellor in September 2013 [8]. (b) The UAV that landed on the roof of the Japanese Prime Minister's office [12].

- Possibility to attack targets that are difficult to reach by land
- Possibility of carrying out a wide-scale attack aimed at inflicting a maximum death rate on a population
- Covertness of attack preparation and flexibility in choice of a UAV launch site
- Possibility of achieving a long range and acceptable accuracy with relatively inexpensive and increasingly available technology
- Poor effectiveness of existing air defences against targets such as low-flying UAVs
- Relative cost effectiveness of UAVs as compared with ballistic missiles and manned airplanes
- Possibility of achieving a strong psychological effect by scaring people and putting pressure on politicians.

An attacker could strap guns or explosives to a drone, and fly it into people or structures to inflict physical damage or loss of life. The targets of these attacks may be individuals, buildings or transportation infrastructure such as commercial airliners [3, 5, 7, 14]. In September 2011, a model hobbyist was arrested and accused of planning to build explosive-laden UAVs to attack the Pentagon and US Capitol [15]. In February 2014, a Moroccan national was caught in Connecticut, US for plotting to fly UAVs with bombs into a school and a government building [16]. At a conference hosted by the US Department of Homeland Security in January 2015, counterterrorism officials displayed several models of drones that were fitted with explosives (**Figure 2**) [17]. Furthermore, an attacker could use a drone to spray a weaponised chemical or biological agent over a crowd of people or in a urban area [3, 7, 13, 14].



Figure 2: A UAV equipped with 3 lbs of mock explosive.
(Source: Poulsen) [17]

In addition to the threats posed by terrorists, defence forces are being offered ever more capable UAVs in the micro and mini sectors [5]. For example, Aeronautics developed a UAV bomb, known as Orbiter IK (Figure 3). It is a loitering mini-UAV with a wingspan of 2.2m and can carry up to 2kg of explosives in its fuselage. It can be controlled by an operator, or is capable of being given a waypoint and independently scanning the area to detect and destroy a stationary or moving target [18].



Figure 3: Aeronautics' Orbiter IK UAV, which can carry up to 2 kg of explosives in its fuselage.

(Source: Air Recognition) [18]

An operator could also use a UAV to reconnoitre targets for attack, or monitor the actions of individuals or law enforcement (**Figure 4**) [3, 4, 14]. Off-the-shelf UAVs are being used by both sides of the Ukrainian civil war for intelligence gathering missions [19]. The rapid spread of hobbyist UAVs makes this scenario both the most likely threat involving UAVs and the most difficult to identify. In the past few years, there have been many cases in which it was difficult to determine whether the UAV was being used for recreational use, newsgathering, activism, or for an activity that could result in harming public safety [3, 4, 14].



Figure 4: A UAV fitted with a camera for illegal surveillance.

(Source: Yutim) [11]

There have also been a number of cases where criminal organisations or individuals have used UAVs to smuggle illicit material, usually across borders or into prisons [4, 14]. UAVs were spotted flying over the walls of prisons in Quebec, Canada [20] and Melbourne, Australia [21] in November 2013 and March 2014 respectively, while staff at a prison in Bedfordshire, UK discovered a crashed UAV that appeared to be delivering contraband [4]. In January 2015, a smuggler's UAV flying from Mexico crash-landed just south of the US border city of San Ysidro, California in a failed drug delivery (**Figure 5**) [22].



Figure 5: The UAV carrying small packages of drugs that crashed near the US-Mexico border.

(Source: Valencia & Martinez) [22]

UAVs could also be used for electronic snooping. At the Black Hat security conference held in Singapore in March 2014, SensePost unveiled its Snoopy UAV, which can steal data from unsuspecting smartphone users. The UAV uses the company's software, which is installed on a computer attached to a UAV. The code can be used to hack smartphones and steal personal data without the user's knowledge. This method could be used to particular effect in a crowded environment where many people have their cell phones automatically searching for WiFi networks [14, 23]. In February 2015, it was revealed that AdNear, a Singapore-based marketing firm, was using UAVs to determine the locations and movements of mobile phones by collecting signal strengths and other wireless data from passersby below. With this data in hand, AdNear could then deliver hyper-targeted advertisements and other promotions to potential customers as they are walking past a storefront in the hopes of incentivising a customer to enter the store [24].

Pilots have expressed concern regarding the proliferation of commercially available small UAVs. For example, if a UAV got into the engine of an aeroplane, it could stop the engine. Furthermore, as UAVs get larger and more capable, the potential and consequences of mid-air collisions increase [4, 11]. Helicopter pilots have reported several near-miss incidents with UAVs [25], while there have cases of near-misses between commercial passenger jets and UAVs [26, 27]. In July 2015, it was reported

that hobbyist UAVs that were flown in into forest fires areas, allegedly to capture images of the fires, were forcing firefighting helicopters to be grounded until the UAVs could be removed from the area (**Figure 6**) [28].



Figure 6: Warnings about flying UAVs in forest fire areas issued by the US Forest Service.
(Source: BBC) [28]

Humphreys [6] divided the threat of UAVs into three categories based on the operators' intention and level of sophistication:

- Category 1: Accidental intrusions, whether the UAV operators are sophisticated or not
- Category 2: Intentional intrusions by unsophisticated operators
- Category 3: Intentional intrusions by sophisticated operators, those who can assemble a UAV from components, and modify its hardware and software.

Mitigation of the first two categories of intrusions can be done using geofencing, and detection systems such as radar, and acoustic, radio frequency (RF) emission and electro-optical (EO) sensing. However, the third category of UAV intrusions is much more difficult to counter. A sophisticated attacker could mount a kamikaze-style attack against a sensitive target using a fixed-wing powered glider with an explosive lightweight payload. The UAV glider could be launched from a significant distance from the target. It could cut its engine on the final approach to evade acoustic detectors, and could be built of poorly-radar-reflective material (e.g., styrofoam) to evade radar detection. The UAV could be configured to operate under radio silence, ignoring external RF control commands and emitting no RF signals of its own. The UAV would thus be difficult to detect and would be impervious to command link jamming or hijacking. Moreover, the attacker could configure the autopilot to ignore Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals during the final approach to the target, relying instead on an inexpensive magnetometer-disciplined inertial navigation system (INS). Such a modification would render GNSS jamming or spoofing useless during the final approach [6].

Another risk factor with the commercialisation of UAVs is the potential for attackers to intercept the signals of a legitimate UAV and then take control of the UAV. In 2009, Iraqi militants used a Russian software developed to steal satellite television signals to intercept real-time video feed from US surveillance UAVs flying over Iraq. In 2011, a keylogging computer virus infected the ground stations of US Predator and Reaper UAVs [3, 29]. While there is a large technological leap between either intercepting video feeds or infecting a computer with a virus, and being able to take over a UAV's command link, there is certainly a potential risk that attackers will develop this capability. This threat may be small for the US UAV fleet of Predators and Reapers because their command links are encrypted [30]. However, the unencrypted command links of commercial UAVs could easily be hacked by attackers. Moreover, Shephard *et al.* [31] demonstrated that GNSS spoofing can be used to hijack UAVs. With increasing proliferation of commercial UAVs, UAV hacking and hijacking is a real threat to consider [3, 32].

MITIGATION STEPS

1. Geofencing

Commercial UAV manufacturers can play a key role by implementing GNSS-enforced geofences within their systems that prevent their UAVs from being flown within exclusion zones around airports, sports stadiums, government buildings, military bases and other security-sensitive sites [6, 14]. For example, DJI, one of the biggest UAV manufacturers, has embedded geofencing software in its UAVs that prevents them from flying over thousands of sites worldwide where UAV operation is illegal [33] (**Figure 7**). This would be an effective mitigation step for UAV intrusions from unsophisticated operators. However, sophisticated operators could hack the software to disable the geofencing [6, 14].



Figure 7: Exclusion zones for Malaysia set in DJI's geofencing software.
(Source: DJI) [14]

2. Detection Systems

2.1 Radar

Existing air surveillance radar systems are ineffective against small UAVs as they are developed to detect large aerial platforms moving at high speeds. As UAVs fly at similar speeds and altitudes to birds, the two could be indistinguishable from each other [3, 6, 34]. For high-risk events and known appearances of high-risk personnel, it may be necessary to bring in radars that have the fidelity to detect such small objects, such as the Blighter system developed by Plextek (**Figure 8**), and operators trained to distinguish between birds and UAVs [3, 35]. Further complicating matters, to avoid radar detection, UAVs may be built using poorly-radar-reflective materials and fly below the altitude of 100 ft [6].



Figure 8: The Blighter radar system developed by Plextek for detection of UAVs.
(Source: Baker) [35]

2.2 Acoustic Sensing

Acoustic sensors operate by identifying the distinct noise made by the motors that drive the propellers of UAVs [4, 6]. DroneShield's acoustic sensor (**Figure 9**) was designed to provide high detection rates with low false alarms. It contains a database of common UAV acoustic signatures so that false alarms are reduced (e.g., lawn mowers and leaf blowers) and in many cases the type of UAV is also included in the alert [36]. This system is being used by law enforcement officers in the US to enforce "no UAV zones" [4]. A significant advantage of acoustic sensing is that it has low cost, even when implemented as a network of sensing devices placed around the protection perimeter [6]. However, it is incapable of detecting fixed-wing UAVs operating as gliders or rotorcraft UAVs in free fall. Sophisticated operators could change the sound signature of a UAV by buying different propellers or making other modifications. It is unlikely to offer reliable detection at more than a 500 m standoff range and is ineffective in urban areas with a lot of ambient noise [6, 37]. Furthermore, it can be spoofed through playback of an audio recording of a UAV [6].




Figure 9: The acoustic sensor developed by DroneShield for detection of UAVs.
(Source: DroneShield) [36]

2.3 Radio Frequency (RF) Emission Sensing

UAVs typically send data back to their controller through a wireless data link. Using a directional antenna or a network of synchronised ground stations, such RF emissions can be detected and located (**Figure 10**). In order to be economical and offer rapid detection, the system must have some knowledge of the emission centre frequency and bandwidth, which are regulated for commercial UAVs [3, 6, 7]. Drone Labs' DD610AR UAV detection system employs RF emission sensing of a UAV's command and data links to identify the coordinates of the UAV and its operator, and the unique identifier of the UAV, which can be used to prove that a particular incursion was done using a specific UAV (**Figure 11**) [37, 38]. However, RF emission sensing can be easily evaded by sophisticated operators by maintaining radio silence [6].




Figure 10: Detection of a UAV via RF emission sensing.
(Source: Wiesback) [7]



Figure 11: Drone Labs' DD610AR RF emission sensing system for detection of UAVs.
(Source: Drone Labs) [38]

2.4 Electro-Optical (EO) Sensing

EO sensors in the form of optical and thermal cameras can be quite effective at detecting UAVs [6]. Dedrone's DroneTracker (**Figure 12**), which combines optical and thermal cameras, can be used to form an EO sensing network to increase the chances of detecting a UAV [39]. However, optical cameras would have a difficult time distinguishing birds from UAVs. By utilising computer algorithms that look at flight patterns, it is expected that a bird will fly a more random pattern than a UAV would. However, this notion fails in a place where birds glide, such as seagulls, which ride wind currents and stay at a steady level, and this fools optical systems. Furthermore, hobbyist UAVs are mostly made of plastic and use electric motors, and thus, do not produce a lot of heat. Thermal cameras would more likely detect a bird a UAV in most cases [37].



Figure 12: Dedrone's DroneTracker can be used to form an EO sensing network.
(Source: Dedrone) (2015))

3. Electronic Defence

3.1 Command Link Jamming and Appropriation

Modern commercial UAVs are controlled by one or more wireless links to the operator's control equipment. Traditional radio control (RC) controllers are still used as a backup means of control even for UAVs capable of a high degree of autonomy. These controllers send low-level commands to the autopilot system, or directly to the UAV's motors or servos that actuate the UAV's control surfaces [6]. Jamming a UAV's command link could effectively eliminate the ability of the UAV operator to conduct accurate targeting within the denied area [3, 6, 14].

Figure 13 shows how a jammer operates by raising the RF noise level in the vicinity of the area to be defended. The further the UAV travels from the controller, the signal from the controller becomes weaker; while the closer the UAV moves towards the jammer, the RF noise level from the jammer becomes stronger. This makes it harder for the controller to overcome the RF noise of the jammer. Once the signal from the controller falls below the RF noise level, the operator would no longer be able to control the UAV. In order to overcome the jammer, the operator would have to increase the transmission power or get closer to the target area, both of which increases the chances of detection [3, 40].

To avoid the effects of command link jamming, the UAV can simply transition to an autonomous operational mode soon after takeoff, accepting no further external commands [6, 14]. Furthermore, command link jamming could also disrupt other communication devices, such as mobile phones and mobile wireless devices. To help mitigate the interference, jamming could be used with detection systems so that the jammer is only switched on if UAVs are detected [3].




Figure 13: Simplified RF jamming effect.
Source: Card [3]

Command link appropriation could be used to take control of a UAV. However, to appropriate the command link, the defender would need first need to determine the communications protocol, channel (from a potentially large number of channels (e.g., 100)) and code being used [6, 7]. Furthermore, the command link could be encrypted [6].

3.2 Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Jamming and Spoofing

Virtually all modern commercial UAVs capable of autonomous flight are navigated using GNSS satellites. Civilian GNSS signals are weak, rendering them susceptible to jamming [41], and unencrypted and unauthenticated, rendering them susceptible to spoofing [42]. The defender could take advantage of the weak security of GNSS to confuse or commandeer the UAV (Gettinger, 2015; Humphreys, 2015). Shephard *et al.* [31] demonstrated that GNSS spoofing could be used to take over a UAV by transmitting a series of false coordinates (Figure 14).

GNSS jamming would force attackers to operate either using line-of-sight (LOS) RC control, or non-GNSS autonomous navigation. LOS control exposes the operator to visual detection and recognition, and can be denied by command link jamming. Non-GNSS autonomous navigation in an unmapped environment is either expensive (e.g., a navigation- or tactical-grade INS initialised with GNSS) or can only be applied accurately over short time intervals (e.g., a microelectromechanical systems (MEMs)-grade magnetometer-disciplined INS) [6].



Figure 14: Global Positioning System (GPS) spoofing conducted by Shephard *et al.* [31].

However, GNSS jamming would cause substantial collateral damage, denying the use of civilian GNSS signals in a wide area around the protected site. For example,

automobile commuters would be denied use of their in-car navigation systems, cell towers could no longer be synchronised by GNSS, and approaches to airports could no longer benefit from GNSS for safety and efficiency. GNSS spoofing would potentially be even more damaging to surrounding civil systems [6, 43, 44]. Furthermore, an attacking UAV can simply disregard GNSS signals during the final approach to the target, relying on a low-cost MEMS-grade magnetometer-disciplined INS, which over a 60 s interval may only exhibit a 5 m drift in perceived location [6].

4. Kinetic Defence

Commercial UAVs are in general fragile in the face of hard-contact kinetic attacks, such as small guided missiles, cannon-fired smart munitions, lasers and firearms [5, 6]. However, in urban environments, where attacks are more likely, law enforcement and military will be averse to shooting UAVs down because any projectile used may cause collateral damage when it returns to the ground [3, 6, 14]. Furthermore, a kinetic model for defending a target in an urban environment could require several systems with trained operators to be in place along likely air avenues of approach in order to adequately defend the area. This would increase the cost of defending against UAV threats [3].

Net capture of UAVs by interceptor UAVs has been demonstrated (**Figure 15**), though it not yet considered as a mature technology. Net capture has the additional benefit of enabling eviction of the intruder UAV from the vicinity of the site to be protected [6, 45].




Figure 15: A Malou Tech MP200 interceptor UAV catching an intruder UAV with a net.
(Source: Gayle) [6]

CONCLUSION

This article provided a review of the security threats of UAVs and mitigation steps. UAV intrusions can be divided into three categories based on the operators' intention and level of sophistication: accidental intrusions, whether the UAV operators are sophisticated or not; intentional intrusions by unsophisticated operators; and intentional intrusions by sophisticated operators. Mitigation steps for UAV intrusions include geofencing by UAV manufacturers, detection systems (radar, and acoustic, RF emission and EO sensing),

electronic defences (command link jamming and appropriation, and GNSS jamming and spoofing), and kinetic defences (shooting down UAVs and net capture using interceptor UAVs).

REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES:

- [1] Dinesh, S., Key defence R&D fields to develop the national defence industry: Focus on C4ISR in support of network centric operations and unmanned vehicles. *Defence S&T Tech. Bull.*, 3: 43-60, 2010.
- [2] Bhattacharjee, D., *Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Counter Terrorism Operations*. Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi, 2015.
- [3] Card, B., *The Commercialization of UAVs: How Terrorists Will Be Able to Utilize UAVs to Attack the United States*. University of Texas at El Paso, El Paso, Texas, 2014.
- [4] Baraniuk, C., No drone zone. *New Scientist*, 2 May 2015, 22, 2015.
- [5] Chuter, A., Mini drones spark heightened interest in countering threat. *Defense News*, 22 June 2015.
- [6] Humphreys, T., *Statement on the Security Threat Posed by Unmanned Aerial Systems and Possible Countermeasures*. Statement to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency of the House Committee on Homeland Security, 18 March 2015, Washington D.C., 2015.
- [7] Wiesback, W., Unmanned aerial vehicles – UAV, drones detection, tracking, control. *20th LS Summit*, 10 June 2015, Lichtenau, Germany, 2015.
- [8] Gallagher, S., *German Chancellor's Drone "Attack" Shows the Threat of Weaponized UAVs*. Available online at: <http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/09/german-chancellors-drone-attack-shows-the-threat-of-weaponized-uavs> (Last access date: 14 July 2015).
- [9] Shear, M.D. & Schmidt, M.S., *A Drone, Too Small for Radar to Detect, Rattles the White House*. Available online at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/white-house-drone.html?_r=0 (Last access date: 14 July 2015).
- [10] Schmidht, M.S., *Secret Service Arrests Man After Drone Flies Near White House*. Available online at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/us/white-house-drone-secret-service.html> (Last access date: 14 July 2015).
- [11] Yutim, H., *DCA Lodges Police Report Over Prohibited Flying Drone Near KLIA*. Available online at: <http://english.astroawani.com/malaysia-news/dca-lodges-police-report-over-prohibited-flying-drone-near-klia-54955> (Last access date: 14 July 2015).
- [12] Ripley, W., *Drone With Radioactive Material Found on Japanese Prime Minister's Roof*. Available online at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/22/asia/japan-prime-minister-rooftop-drone> (Last access date: 14 July 2015).

- [13] Miasnikov, E., *Threat of Terrorism Using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Technical Aspects*. Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Moscow, 2015.
- [14] Gettinger, D., *Domestic Drone Threats*. Available online at: <http://dronecenter.bard.edu/what-you-need-to-know-about-domestic-drone-threats> (Last access date: 14 July 2015).
- [15] Brandon, A., *FBI: Man Plotted to Fly Drone-Like Toy Planes With Bombs Into School*. Available online at: <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-man-in-connecticut-plotted-to-fly-drone-like-toy-planes-with-bombs-into-school> (Last access date: 15 July 2015).
- [16] Finn, P., *Mass. Man Accused of Plotting to Hit Pentagon and Capitol With Drone Aircraft*. Available online at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/mass-man-accused-of-plotting-to-hit-pentagon-and-capitol-with-drone-aircraft/2011/09/28/gIAWdpk5K_story.html (Last access date: 15 July 2015).
- [17] Poulsen, K., *Why the US Government Is Terrified of Hobbyist Drones*. Available online at: <http://www.wired.com/2015/02/white-house-drone> (Last access date: 25 July 2015).
- [18] Air Recognition, *Aeronautics' New Orbiter 1K Kingfisher MUAS to be Unveiled at Paris Air Show 2015*. Available online at: http://www.airrecognition.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1792 (Last access date: 14 July 2015).
- [19] Tucker, P., *In Ukraine, Tomorrow's Drone War Is Alive Today*. Available online at: <http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/03/ukraine-tomorrows-drone-war-alive-today/107085> (Last access date: 9 March 2015).
- [20] Aubry, M., *Drone Drug Drops Common at Quebec Jails: Guards*. Available online at: <http://www.winnipegssun.com/2013/11/27/drone-drug-drops-common-at-quebec-jails-guards> (Last access date: 15 July 2015).
- [21] Anderson, B., *How Drones Help Smuggle Drugs Into Prison*. Available online at: <http://motherboard.vice.com/read/how-drones-help-smuggle-drugs-into-prison> (Last access date: 15 July 2015).
- [22] Valencia, N. & Martinez, M., *Drone Carrying Drugs Crashes South of U.S. Border*. Available online at: <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/01/22/world/drug-drone-crashes-us-mexico-border> (Last access date: 15 July 2015).
- [23] Gittleston, K., *Data-Stealing Snoopy Drone Unveiled at Black Hat*. Available online at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-26762198> (Last access date: 15 July 2015).
- [24] Bi, F., *Drones Are Intercepting Cell Phone Signals in L.A.* Available online at: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/frankbi/2015/02/23/drones-are-already-intercepting-cell-phone-signals-in-l-a/> (Last access date: 15 July 2015).
- [25] Chip, *Drones a danger for helicopters*. *Chip*, July 2015, 35.

- [26] BBC, Lufthansa Plane in Near Miss With Drone on Warsaw Approach. Available online at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33605869> (Last access date: 22 July 2015).
- [27] BBC, Drone Pilots Warned After Close Call With Passenger Jet. Available online at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33612631> (Last access date: 22 July 2015).
- [28] BBC, *Drones Hamper US Firefighting Efforts*. Available online at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33593981> (Last access date: 22 July 2015).
- [29] Goodman, M., *Criminals and Terrorists Can Fly Drones Too: Remote-Controlled Aircraft and Robot Technology Can be Used for Bad Just As Easily As for Good*. Available online at: <http://ideas.time.com/2013/01/31/criminals-and-terrorists-can-fly-drones-too> (Last access date: 15 July 2015).
- [30] Shachtman, N. & Axe, D., *Most U.S. Drones Openly Broadcast Secret Video Feeds*. Available online at: <http://www.wired.com/2012/10/hack-proof-drone> (Last access date: 15 July 2015).
- [31] Shepard, D.P. & Humphreys, T.E., Characterization of receiver response to spoofing attacks. *ION GNSS 2011*, 19-23 September 2011, Portland.
- [32] Coward, J., *UAV Cyber Security: What Does It Take to Hack a Drone?* Available online at: <http://www.totallyunmanned.com/2014/10/27/uav-cyber-security> (Last access date: 15 July 2015).
- [33] DJI, *No Fly Zones*. Available online at: <http://flysafe.dji.com/no-fly> (Last access date: 14 July 2015).
- [34] Lele, A. & Mishra, A., Aerial terrorism and the threat from unmanned aerial vehicles. *J. Defence Stud.*, 3: 54-65, 2009.
- [35] Baker, B., *When Drones Go Rogue - Plextek takes on Small Enemy UAVs*. Available online at: <http://www.army-technology.com/features/feature-when-drones-go-rogue-plextek-small-enemy-uavs> (Last access date: 14 July 2015).
- [36] DroneShield, *DroneShield: Drone Detection and Response*. Available online at: <http://www.droneshield.org/products> (Last access date: 14 July 2015).
- [37] Naboulsi, Z., *Drone Detection: What Works and What Doesn't*. Available online at: <http://www.net-security.org/article.php?id=2297> (Last access date: 14 July 2015).
- [38] Drone Labs, *Drone Detector*. Available online at: <http://www.dronedetector.com> (Last access date: 14 July 2015).
- [39] Dedrone, *Dedrone*. Available online at: <http://www.dedrone.com> (Last access date: 14 July 2015).
- [40] Adamy, D.L., *EW 104: Electronic Warfare Against a New Generation of Threats*. Artech House, Norwood, Massachusetts.

- [41] Dinesh, S., Mohd Faudzi., M. & Zainal Fitry, M.A., Evaluation of the effect of radio frequency interference (RFI) on Global Positioning System (GPS) accuracy via GPS simulation. *Defence Sci. J.*, 62: 338-347., 2012.
- [42] Dinesh, S., Mohd Faudzi., M., Nor Irza Shakhira, B., Siti Robiah, A., Shalini, S., Jamilah, J., Aliah, I., Lim, B.T., Zainal Fitry, M.A., Mohd. Rizal, A.K., & Mohd Hasrol, H.M.Y., Evaluation of Global Positioning System (GPS) performance during simplistic GPS spoofing attacks. *Defence S&T Tech. Bull.*, 5: 99-113, 2012.
- [43] Dinesh, S., Vulnerabilities of civilian Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) signals: A review. *Defence S&T Tech. Bull.*, 2: 100-114, 2009.
- [44] Dinesh, S., Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing: A review of growing risks and mitigation steps. *Defence S&T Tech. Bull.*, 6: 42-61, 2013.
- [45] Gayle, D., *The Drone Catcher: Flying Net Is Designed to Stop Terrorists from Flying Bomb-Laden Gadgets Into Nuclear Power Stations*. Available online at: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2948062/The-drone-catcher-France-reveals-flying-net-stop-terrorists-flying-bomb-laden-gadgets-nuclear-power-stations-following-spate-sightings.html> (Last access date: 14 July 2015).

NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT: IS MALAYSIA READY?

Shasshi Kunjunie Narayanan ^{1*}, Rosmini Omar²

¹92 Park Squadron, Royal Engineer Regiment, Batu Kentonmen Camp, Kuala Lumpur

²International Business School, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur

*E-mail: shasshipriya@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Study on crisis management is a must in view of increasing number of non-traditional security threats posed to organisations and even towards the nation as a whole. Realising its important, the viability of existing practice and models in place leaves a big query and doubts for either the practitioners, academicians or even the society at large. Thus, the distinctions exist between traditional- and modern approach to crisis management need to be integrated in a strategic means embedding the aspects of threat and security response for an effective outcome. The proposing of a non-linear framework construct could help to identify the connectivity between two variable and they are: (1) traditional- and modern approach to crisis management; and (2) threat and security response. Thus, the current approach on crisis management needs a relook especially focusing more on facing the new level of non-traditional security threats through innovative ways. By having the integrated crisis management framework, organisation would be able to identify types of threats and its security response measures towards a better crisis prevention as well effective crisis management.

Keywords: *Crisis management, crisis response, event-based approach, integrated crisis management approach, non-traditional security threats, non-state actors, national resilience, process-based approach, threat and security response.*

INTRODUCTION

In recent times, the importance of crisis management has been the agenda around the globe in light of numerous cases and incidents taking place threatening the existence of an organisation and even to the national security. Some of the high event crisis are such as the terrorist attack on World Trade Centre known as the 9/11 attack in 2001, H1N1 pandemic outbreaks in 2009 and SARS in 2003, Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and Earthquake in eastern Japan in which the tsunami caused the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 [1]. The recent one is the tragedy of Malaysian commercial aircraft “flight MH370” goes missing off the radar and finally concluded as ended in the southern Indian Ocean while the fate of the other “flight MH17” crashed in the eastern Ukraine.

The trust and confidence of business community, as well community at large could be vulnerable to unprecedented crisis. The unanticipated crisis either small or large in scale,

natural or human induced have a significant impact on individuals and organisation [2]. Thus, managing crisis effectively is crucial in order to protect one's reputation and value across the entities requires a resilience strategy as a whole. The price of ineffective crisis management also can be extremely costly such as business disruption, economic knock-off, and loss of lives. The current trend of crisis is even trans-border and often consists of new threats leaving the individual, organisation and government accounted for how efficiently they react to such situation.

Besides the breakdowns of information and lack of integrated communication, the best approaches in dealing with the crises have challenged risk managers and political leadership as a whole. As such, the new level of crises significantly differs from the past especially in facing the non-traditional threats. The non-traditional security threats issues are the main concerns in the current global and regional security architecture. With the levels of different kind of new threats surfacing, the current approach on crisis management by the organisation or government agencies needs a revamp which will be more focused in facing the new level of threats through innovative ways.

Handling of new threats is no easy tasks and requires effective crisis management which encompasses the basis of identifying the emerging threat, establish efforts to mitigate and finally re-establish the state of normalcy. A strategic approach is seemed to be crucial in dealing with ever changing level of crisis. The current challenge in crisis management focuses on how competent the crisis is handled in assuring the effectiveness and efficiency of crisis response. Thus, the decision of the leaders at strategic level seems to have a high impact on economic, public trust, business continuity, investors' confidence level and also reflecting the government role as a whole. When crisis is handled well, eventually it safeguards the image and reputation of a particular organisation and country as a whole. The growing interest on the importance of effective crisis management shows the importance of strategic approach in dealing with emergence of new paradigm in threat and security response.

Understanding the nature of emerging threat should never be ignored as it very much relates on individual or organisations capacity to respond to a particular crisis with the appropriate strategy or approach. Wang [3] asserts "the consequence of crisis on individual and organisation has been stronger than ever". The complexity of the new threats requires people at strategic level to be competent to enable them to prepare, manage and seek best platform in dealing with crisis. We should not be living in the pre-crises world with the post-crisis strategies which may be less effective in today's ever threatening and challenging environment.

It will be very meaningful to emphasise on an integrated crisis management approach rather as a continuum than using the linear process. While facing the unprecedented new threats, following the linear process or sequential activities is perceived as conventional approach. The shape of today's threat is moving into a non-linear process thus requiring us to focus on approaches that could counter them in a similar way. In fact, it will be more useful to follow the path that can reflect the intensity and diversity of current

values which carries the notion of stakeholders to enhance the current practices in crisis management.

Enhancing the existing approach in crisis management may help to counter the possible threats generated from the non-traditional areas for the benefits of various stakeholders especially the government, public authorities, relevant agencies and also organisation either profit or non-profit based. This would strengthen the current policy, practices and capacity to anticipate any possible crisis even though the dynamic of the threat may be multifaceted. By looking at the nature of new-form crises, the aspect of threat and security should be given thorough emphasise.

NEW FORM AND FUTURE CRISES

The 21st century will be witnessing what is called “global shock” with the likelihood of escalated damages and costly shocks through the posing of different characteristics in new form crisis. This increase the vulnerabilities of modern societies to be exposed to the new threats that emerge and spread faster than one could imagine. Surprisingly organisation, government and communities at large seems to take very few steps to prevent crises from happening in the first place even after knowing that crisis can cause serious damage to reputation and value. Crisis after crisis is a sign that should not be taken for granted by fully relying on traditional approach and compromising mind-set.

The future crises will become endemic features of modern society as they reproduce themselves in mutating forms [4]. It shows that the future crisis will be increasingly complex in nature, will not respect national, cultural, or temporal boundaries, and will easily intertwine with other issues and developments. The new form of crises is calling for new and innovative crisis management responses [1]. Baubion argues, recent crises have challenged political leadership and risk managers in many countries, often due to unexpected or unforeseen circumstances, but also due to weak links and breakdowns in information flow. The unanticipated crisis either small or large in scale, natural or human induced, have a significant impact on individuals and organisation within [2]. This very clearly defines that there is a need to relook into the current practices of handling new form of crises.

From the contemporary management perspective, the aspect of integrated crisis management approach is very much needed in dealing with emergence of new threats and vulnerabilities. Eventually the new crises differs from the past in few aspects such as the unexpected crises are in large scale; they evolves in multifaceted in nature and are new or unprecedented in view of human or crisis managers’ memories as well their unusual combination [5]; and their trans-boundary in nature which spreads across geographic borders [6]. As far as the threat and security response is concerned, these crises carries deep uncertainties as well challenges the existing government structures besides raising the tensions between many stakeholders in the public or even the private sectors. The

trans-boundary aspect is viewed as the most critical one in dealing with non-traditional threats.

Rosenthal, Boin, & Bos [7] argue that, the impact of new form of crises is harder to predict or even comprehend. It will be harder to come to terms with these crises as they are constantly redefined and reinterpreted. Thus, the impact of crisis to the organisation, its stakeholders, staff members, general public, government as well the investors leaves a bigger question to be pondered. Similarly, Tschirhart [8] argues that besides threatening the stability of the organisations, a crisis also endangers the organisations reputation. Subsequently the reputation of an organisation can influence the public choice of whether or not to proceed with using the organisation's products and services, or accepting its partnership.

Similarly, Coombs [9] defines crisis as "the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders and can seriously impact an organisation's performance and generate negative outcomes. Therefore it is important to anticipate the impacts much earlier in order to minimise the damage or even to have the ability to repair the organisations image during and after crisis to regain the public trust.

THREAT AND SECURITY RESPONSE

Is the organization scanning the environment for potential threats? One of the major event that changed the landscape of threat would be the wake of 9/11 incident. Rosenthal, Boin, & Comfort [10] identifies that the 9/11 events underline a strong belief among crisis researchers that the very nature of crises is changing as a result of critical developments that occur on a worldwide scale. The characteristics of threats are changing intensively requires the risk managers and stakeholders to keep enhancing the current practice of handling the new form crises. Thus, it is suggested that crises are seen and perceived as a situation that needs urgent decision making. In believing this, it leads to a cornerstone of possible threat identification much earlier while looking for means and ways from the security perspective such as the counter measures in dealing with new form crises.

By looking into the threat and security response, it is advisable to expand the view of security to the national level to get a clearer understanding of why it is very pertinent to embed them with crisis management. Threats to security in the past were more to a result of politics, failed diplomacy and military action. The current shift of paradigm in threats shows the new class of threat that includes those generated by none-state actors while hazards arising from non-human sources. In the literatures, these are often referred as "non-traditional security issues, or sometimes as transnational security threats [11].

However, threat and security issues are no longer limited by territoriality and political boundaries. The level and range of those potential threats has changed over time. They have a much broader focus and include non-traditional security threats arising from actions by none state actors, failed or failing states, and extremist ideologist [12]. This

suggests that government, risk managers and stakeholders are required to adopt a broader stance to protect their economic independence and societal well-being from a different range of perceived threat.

It is strongly believed that when threat identification/addressing process is integrated in the overall crisis management process, the crisis prediction and prevention capability is noticeably enhanced. Darryl [13] suggests, identifying and evaluating as many as possible threats and issues are always the first steps. He adds on, yet it is the management and communication of these threats and issues that is critical and most challenging for all organisations. The facts is not all crises are predictable or preventable, but with effective threat identification process embedded in the crisis management planning would allow the management potentially foresee, plan scenarios, exercise them, be proactive and then decide to take, treat, transfer or eliminate the threat.

Looking back on the concept of security is very vital in identifying or dealing with possible threats especially the non-traditional. The concept of security is essentially a contested term, while the characteristics are its ambiguous nature. There may be no authoritative definition for non-traditional security, yet exists common themes and characteristics within the definition of non-traditional security threats. The common characteristics found in non-traditional security are generally non-military in nature; they are transnational or cross-boundary; and they are rapidly transmitted [14]. As they are originate from non-state actors, they likely to be unpredictable in nature. Similarly, a comprehensive definition of the concept of non-traditional security was coined by Ullman [15] defines a threat to national security as, an action or sequence of events that threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or threatens significantly to narrow the choices available to the government of a state or to private, non-governmental entities within the state.

Consequently, the response mechanisms towards non-traditional threats are perceived to be limited or not been incorporated at national agenda or within the private entities (person, groups, and corporations). These threats require a different way of thinking which ultimately reflects on the needs to enhance the existing structures and processes involved in crisis management. A strategic integration between threat and security response within the crisis management perspective could be a novelty compared to traditional way of dealing with crisis management. Thus, the identified important elements of threats and security response mechanism could be incorporated within the integrated conceptual framework which may rationalised at national level vis-à-vis followed and practised by any organisation.

TRADITIONAL AND MODERN APPROACH TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The traditional event-based approach to crisis management typically refers on the positioning of crisis management on technical or operational basis with functions such

as emergency or security response, public relations or public affairs tactically in support, as well the public or community relations throughout the crisis handling [16]. This approach is known to be simple and effective in a limited way. The approach also helps the organisation to respond as effectively as possible to minimise the damage in the event of crisis occur.

The recent developments in crisis management field have seen distinct tendency for crisis management to evolve beyond this functional or operationalized response by bringing in the awareness of avoiding a crisis happening in the first place [17]. It suggests that the strategic approach should not view crisis so much as an event, but as a process which begins long before the crisis, continues through preparedness and prevention, works through managing the event itself, and then addresses the organisational risks that develops after the event. This is called the process-based approach coined by Jaques [18]. The process-based approach is more towards a strategic crisis management approach as opposed to tactical crisis response.

The evolution of the event- and process approach to crisis management has been complementing each other respectively [19]. However, finding ways and means to represent the process approach in which translates them into structural design, utilizing the continuum of established management terminology and activity would be a real challenge [20]. Jaques argues that having a best practise model seems to be a lack among the existing divestiture of organisational literature. Roux-Dufort [20] argues that, the crisis management literature still mostly develops the event approach despite increasing acceptance of the process approach, while the process approach has been less used and developed, both theoretically and in practice. The growing trend and recognition on process approach shows how important the element of crisis prevention in total crisis management.

Jaques [16] precisely distinguish traditional- and modern approach of crisis preparedness by giving examples. The key activities involves in conventional crisis preparedness that are vital includes such as team selection and training, crisis management manuals, pre-prepared contact lists, variety of simulations and training and written materials. Nevertheless, the researcher finds that these activities does not helps to reduce the possibilities of crisis occurring in the first place and presumes that it acts just like an insurance policy. It merely provides some protection with a lesser chance or does not guarantee the likelihood of accidents, burglary or fire hazards from taking place. However, a responsible person does more than just taking insurance. For an instance, installing additional protection such as fire alarms, smoke detectors, intruder alarms and close circuit television (CCTV). The additional protection installed is an example of going beyond crisis preparedness to add proactive steps in order to reduce the likelihood of disaster happening in the first place and subsequently encourage crisis prevention.

The process approach to crisis management not only needs the traditional crisis preparedness to be in place but also calls for organisations to implement a wide range of proven activities to prevent the likelihood of the crisis occurring. This is where the threat

and security response is possibly embedded throughout the phases in crisis management to mitigate between the event- and process based approach. The areas identified as relevant might include risk analysis, environmental scanning, media monitoring, preventive maintenance, issue management, and as well as effective emergency response.

As far as threat and security response is concerned, what could be explicitly new is the positioning of the activities or areas identified in the context of crisis prevention as part of a continuum of organisational activities. This will act as a comprehensive and effective crisis management in a more integrated approach. It also encourages the integration of other important areas such as stakeholders, government, and public affairs. Subsequently, this current research bolsters the value of strategic crisis management as opposed to tactical crisis response.

The process-based approach to crisis management also emphasises on the post-crisis stage by viewing the crisis risk as not over when business resumes. The period called “crisis after the crisis” can represent even greater risk than the crisis itself, particularly the risk to reputation [16]. The downfall of senior managers and even entire organisations are questionable during this stage and crucial enough to be given a priority. The threat and security response can also mitigate in this stage especially in the areas of controlling and enforcement. The integral functions may act as a control measure in perspective of damage control and business continuity.

INTEGRATION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT

During the past decades, many scholars have conducted conceptual and empirical studies on the topic of large-scale organizational crises [21]. Understandably, as with many new areas of research, these studies lack adequate integration with one another [22]. Some researches, in their studies, explicitly embrace a multidisciplinary approach while the others focus on the causes, consequences, and management of organizational crises from a single disciplinary frame [22]. It shows that crisis management could be assessed from various disciplinary, including enhancing of the current practices and the possibilities of having an integrated approach is more crucial than ever.

Nevertheless, there are contrary approaches which support presents crisis management to be viewed as an integrated continuum of management activities. Thus it signifies the potential crisis identification and prevention long before the event response and long term post-crisis management [16]. It suggests that, the best crisis management is to prevent a crisis occurring in the first place, or that it is much better to anticipate crises than to manage crises [23]. If stakeholders are able to effectively handle a crisis, it is possible for the organisations to move towards a better future [24]. It is therefore suggested, crisis be viewed more as an opportunity rather than a threat whereby the stakeholders are able to anticipate and control such a crisis with the right integration made available.

Most of the crisis management frameworks have been complimenting the previous researchers work on the integral aspect. The earlier one underlines types of crises while others often viewed as a three-stage process: pre-crisis; crisis; and post-crisis [25]. Similar to that statement, Coombs & Holladay [26] also highlights that crisis management process can be separated into 3 parts: pre, during and post crisis as shown in **Figure 1**. There are numbers of frameworks emerges in the 1990s followed a three-, four- and five-stage approaches to analyse the life of a crisis. The evolution of these frameworks provides more input for the synthesis purpose of continuous research as shown in **Table 1**.




Figure 1: Crisis Management Phases
(Source: Crises Phases, The Handbook of Crisis Communication, Coombs and Holladay, 2010)

3-Stage Framework:	3-Stage Framework:	3-Stage Framework	4-Stage Framework	4-Stage Framework:	5-Stage Framework:
General	Smith, 1990	Richardson, 1994	Myers, 1993	Fink, 1996	Pearson & Mitroff, 1993
Before the Crisis →	Crisis of management	Precrisis/disaster phase	Normal operations	Prodromal crisis stage	Signal detection Preparation/Prevention
During the Crisis →	Operational crisis	Crisis impact/rescue phase	Emergency response Interim Processing	Acute crisis stage Chronic crisis stage	Containment/Damage limitation
After the Crisis →	Crisis of legitimization	Recovery/demise phase	Restoration	Crisis resolution stage	Recovery Learning

Table 1: Evolution of Crisis Management Framework
(Source: Framework of Crisis Management, Crisis Management in the New Strategy Landscape, by Crandall, Parnell, & Spillan, 2009)

In addition, John Penrose [27] argues a similar view of crisis management as a holistic and integrated process: “In the past, pre- and post-crisis actions have not been consolidated as one integrated unit. These activities do cluster together and should be considered in aggregate rather than as separate sets of activities.” The prominent 5 stages framework by Pearson & Mitroff [28] provides an even more comprehensive approach in understanding the stages of a crisis as shown in **Figure 2**. Mitroff argues that even though crises are similar in nature, it is still necessary to check for any signs of breakage in systems before any crisis unveils. It shows the important of risk mitigation at all stages of the crisis management framework.




Figure 2: The Five Phases of Crisis Management

(Source: From *Crisis Prone to Crisis Prepared, A Framework for Crisis Management*, by Pearson & Mitroff, 1993)

The combination of two important frameworks which are “Issues and Crisis Management Relational Model” by Jaques [17] and the “5 Phases of Crisis Management Framework” by Pearson & Mitroff’s [28] used as a guide provides essential input on the development of a much innovative conceptual framework that emphasizes the aspects of integral process including underlining the elements of threat and security response. Roux-Dufort [22] argues, the process-based approach are less used and developed both theoretically and in practice compared to the traditional practice of event-based approach, yet it is increasingly accepted by many bodies of authorities. Thus, the emerging conceptual framework gives priority on crisis prevention phase being part of process-based approach as well highlights the important of the other three phases in crisis management.

The cyclical construct model by Jaques [19] shown in **Figure 3** provides a better platform to identify the elements involves on each phases of crisis management as an integrated activities which may overlap or occur simultaneously. The model highlights that issues and crises are rarely resolved in a conventional way with a short time frame. It is also impossible to resolve especially without a proper crisis management system in place to manage the long term impacts while the need of feedback learnings to assist the organization to be well prepared to tackle future problems. The model is divided into two divisions and they are the pre-crisis phase and crisis management phase. The two divisions have two crisis phases comprises of clusters or activities as part of pro-active crisis prevention and reactive crisis response in dealing and mitigating a crisis.




Figure 3: Issue and Crisis Management Relational Model

(Source: Issue Management and Crisis Management, An Integrated, Non-linear, Relational Construct, by Jaques (2007))

EMERGING CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: INTEGRATED CRISIS MANAGEMENT APPROACH

Looking on the complexities of today's threat especially in dealing with the non-traditional security threats, the foundation in the integral aspects between crisis management incorporating threats and security response could be a novelty. The integrated crisis management approach highlights on the integration between traditional- and modern approach to crisis management incorporating the perspective of threat and security response as shown in **Figure 4**. The relook on the traditional and modern approach to crisis management enables to distinguish the similarities and differences exist in the previous models and frameworks on crisis management approach.

The emerging conceptual framework remarkably synthesizes those similarities and differences exist in order to generate a comprehensive approach while giving utmost priorities towards the process-based approach and include the importance of event-based approach. Subsequently it allows the mechanism of non-traditional security threats identification and prevention process in place together with the proper counter response measures made available. The amalgam of traditional- and modern approach to crisis management are further enhanced with the embedment of threat and security elements in the framework. Eventually it works as an interdisciplinary connection aims towards effective management of a crisis as well countering non-traditional security threats.

The framework comprises of eight major themes reflecting the combination of traditional and modern approach to crisis management. These includes four major themes identified as important phases in crisis management discussed much earlier (crisis prevention; crisis preparedness; crisis event management; and post crisis management) while the other four themes acts as advocating or supporting themes (learning; knowledge & information management; leadership & decision making; and communication). Finally, the other six major themes identified from the perspectives of threat and security response are aligned with all the phases of crisis management showing the interconnectivity among them discussed further herein.




Figure 4: Integrated Crisis Management Approach
(Source: Strategic Analysis of Threat and Security Response through Integrated Crisis Management Approach, by Shasshi Kunjunie Narayanan, 2015 [29])

Develop Security Architecture and Resilience Policies through Regional Multilateralism

While government and non-governments entities need to adapt its capacities to the characteristics of new-forms of crises, the needs to develop new doctrines and tools are seen as crucial and robust execution is a must. Thus, the aspects of threat and security response should be consolidated at national level together with the respective government agencies, private entities and the relevant NGOs. Despite the fact, the public relations aspects are also important to be included in developing such policies and reviewing security architecture. A more holistic way to do this would be through the conduct of regional multilateralism towards collective ideas and findings upon studies and brainstorming.

Non-Traditional Threat Identification and Counter Measures/Response

The benefit of identifying or detecting threats earlier provides a better platform to prevent and prepare in the event of crises. Thus, it requires the enhancing and building capabilities in terms of people, infrastructure, technology and strategy as well. One of the possible ways to do this is by organising a multi-disciplinary expertise corridor for sense-making before and during crises. Thus, it allows threat identification and aligning of counter measures at strategic-, operational-, and tactical levels. An approach towards digital crisis management is also encouraged in dealing with novelty rather than traditional way.

Identification and Managing of Major Stakeholders

As emphasised on the needs of resilience policies earlier, the key values for all the stakeholders engages in crisis management should be addressed clearly thus enable commitments at all levels of crisis management implementation. The identification process brings in more values and input in terms of planning, resource allocation, development of system and capabilities as a whole. Subsequently, it reflects the aspects of corporate governance in preserving reputations and business continuity. It is perceives that a common tools, efficient communication and training mechanism enables the network of stakeholders to function better prior, during and after crisis.

Consideration on Level of Transparency

Transparency is seen as one of the intangible assets in preserving the good reputation and driving business continuity of an organisation. Restoring public trust requires responsibilities of relevant stakeholders and at the same time reflects on the leadership functions at strategic, operational and tactical levels. Thus, it requires a combination of process with the appropriate tools, skills and training to dignify the level formal and informal transparency in effective crisis management. The increase demand in transparency by various parties including the public reflects on the additional responsibility of

organisation and governments to react almost instantly or risk a political backlash amid criticism of unresponsiveness.

Strategic Integration among Government Agencies and Private Entities

The strategic integration among agencies or inter-agency consolidation allows international cooperation and possibilities of handling or managing of large-response networks for better crises response. Subsequently, it encourages consideration of effort among internal and external agencies in an effective way. The inter-connectivity among agencies, private, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and public could help to counter new-forms of threats especially the non-traditional threats.

Build International co-operation and partnerships with Local and International Agencies including Affiliation with Academic and Non-Academic Institution

International and regional co-operation signifies the exchange of good practices and defines common standards for inter-agency cooperation. The possible areas for cooperation include: (1) developing of security architecture and resilience policies; (2) shared network on early threats identification; (3) the interoperability of emergency response forces; (4) sharing of findings or inputs through regional and international studies; (5) develop CMTs capacities through joint programs; and (6) resource sharing at transnational level. These are the identified cooperation that could enhance the capability and capacities of an effective crisis management.

DISCUSSION

The emergence of an “Integrated Crisis Management Approach” framework presents as a guide for the use of organisation, practitioners and academician as well. The creative yet innovative conceptual framework shows the connectivity between variables in a holistic way for easier understanding. Nevertheless, the integral aspect suggests that the reactive processes of crisis management are extremely important and relates with the impact of crisis prevention. Thus, reactive management is good for normal days but however, in today’s view of threat poses to the society, business, security, economy and people calls more for pro-active management which is to prevent the crisis from occurring.

In viewing the framework, the integrated phases of crisis management connects with the threat and response variables which signifies the importance of threat and security response to be embedded within the crisis management framework. Thus, the connectivity of both variables is a must in view of the complexity of today’s threat posed to the organisation especially the adversaries of the non-traditional security threats. Apart from that, the importance of advocating themes/components/activities is also crucial in assuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall crisis management process.

Furthermore, identifying both variables including the advocating components are inter-related and should be viewed as equally important towards dealing with the imminent or real crisis. The framework goes on concluding that there are connections between both; traditional- and modern approach of crisis management with threat and security response. All in all, the importance of major stakeholders' participation in the overall crisis management process dictating their role before, during and after crisis management assures the effectiveness of crisis management.

The framework shows the integration between the traditional and modern approach to crisis management embedding the threat and security response reflecting a much systematic, creative and innovative approach in dealing with non-traditional security threats. Subsequently, this helps various stakeholders to understand the important of threat and security response in dealing with uncertainties within the application of crisis management. Besides, it also emphasises on the important roles of government in fostering the effectiveness of integrated crisis management as a holistic approach.

CONCLUSION

While a crisis reflects as a threat, the counter effect would be having an effective crisis management which can minimize the causal effects. Besides, in some cases there are possibilities for an organization to emerge stronger than before the crisis. However, this is perceived as not the ideal way to improve an organization. As organisation not immune to any crisis, it must prepare in advance for one. There is real value in viewing crisis management in the context of a broader perspective of management processes.

This emergence of integrated crisis management approach presents as part of a cluster oriented approach on preventing and managing a crisis with emphasis on threat and security response as its main focus. Furthermore, it also intends to identify the weaknesses in the previous theoretical models, especially the limitations exist in the purely definitional or linear approach. The conceptual framework brings a broader understanding and encourages the important of different context of approach for the different processes. In another word, the framework aims to promote an improved theoretical understanding of the different disciplines while at the same time helps to deliver real bottom line impact which is to minimise the loss of human, economies, business, long-term share value and as well the reputation. This could be an approach towards novelty in facing the complicity of non-traditional threats.

REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES:

- [1] Baubion, C., OECD Risk Management: Strategic Crisis Management, *OECD Working Papers on Public Governance*, No. 23, OECD Publishing, Paris, 2013.
- [2] Pearson, C. M., & Clair, J., Reframing crisis management, *The Academy of Management Review*, 23(1), 59-76, 1998.
- [3] Wang, J., Developing organizational learning capacity in crisis management, *Advances in Developing Human Resources*, 20(10), 1-21, 2008.
- [4] Boin, Arjen & Lagadec, Preparing for the Future: Critical challenges in crisis management, *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2000.
- [5] Leonard, D., Rethinking the Management of Large-scale National Risks, Presentation, First OECD/Swiss Federal Chancellery Workshop on Strategic Crisis Management, Geneva, June, 2012.
- [6] Ansell, Boin, & Keller, Managing Transboundary Crises: Identifying the building blocks of an effective response system, *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 18 (4), 195-207, 2010.
- [7] Rosenthal, U., Boin, R. A., & Bos, C. J., Shifting identities: The reconstructive mode of the Bijlmer plane crash. In U. Rosenthal, R. A. Boin, & L. K. Comfort (Eds), *Managing crises: Threats, dilemmas, opportunities*, Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Pub Ltd, USA, 2001.
- [8] Tschirhart, M., Maintaining legitimacy and reputation through impression management, *New Directions for Philanthropic Fundraising*, 12, 75-86, 1996.
- [9] Coombs, W. Timothy, *Crisis management and communications*, Institute for Public Relations, Page.1-17, 2011.
- [10] Rosenthal, U., Boin, R. A., & Comfort, L. K., The changing world of crisis management. In U. Rosenthal, R. A. Boin, & L. K. Comfort (Eds), *Managing crises: Threats, dilemmas, opportunities*, Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Pub Ltd, USA, 2001.
- [11] Parker R., Non-traditional threats and security policy response, *The Journal of Defence and Security*, Vol.3, No. 1:1-11, 2012.
- [12] Kicingier, International Migration As A Non-Traditional Security Threat And The EU Responses To This Phenomenon, CEFMR Working Paper 2/2004, Central European Forum For Migration Research, © Copyright by Central European Forum for Migration Research Warsaw, October, 2004.
- [13] Darryl, Crisis management must be integrated with a holistic approach, Available from <http://community.iaclca.org/browse/blogs/blogviewer?BlogKey=fedcaf23-0276-4f4a-8b3c-48b52230c60b> (Accessed on 25 April 2015).

- [14] Caballero-Anthony, Non-traditional security and infectious diseases in ASEAN: Going beyond the rhetoric of securitisation to deeper institutionalisation. *The Pacific Review* 12, 4:509-27, 2008.
- [15] Ullman H. Richard, *Redefining Security*, International Security, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 129-153, The MIT Press, 1983.
- [16] Jaques, T., Preventing and surviving crises: The modern approach. *Public Relations Review*, 2014.
- [17] Jaques, T., Issue management and crisis management: An integrated, non-linear, relational construct, *Public Relations Review*, 33(2), pp 147-157, 2007.
- [18] Jaques, T., Reshaping crisis management: the challenge for organizational design, *Organizational Development Journal*, 28 (1), 9-17, 2010.
- [19] Jaques, T., Embedding issue management as a strategic element of crisis prevention disaster prevention and management, *Public Relations Review*. 19 (4), pp 469-482, 2010.
- [20] Roux-Dufort C., Is crisis management (only) a management of exceptions? *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, Volume 15, Issue 2, pages 105–114, 2007.
- [21] Pearson C. M. & Clair J. A., Reframing crisis management, *The Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 59-76, 1998.
- [22] Shrivastava, Dr. P., Crisis Theory/Practice: Towards a sustainable future, *Organisation & Environment*, Vol. 7, Issue 1, 23-42, 1993.
- [23] Brown, A., Avoiding unwelcome surprises, *The Futurist*, Vol. 36, No. 5, pp. 21- 23, 2002.
- [24] Brockner J. & James E. H., Toward an understanding of when executives see crisis as opportunity, *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, Sage Publications, Inc, 2008.
- [25] Crandall, Parnell, & Spillan, *Crisis management in the new strategy landscape*, 1st ed. London: Sage Publications, Inc, 2009.
- [26] Coombs, W. T., Holladay S. J., *The Handbook of Crisis Communication*: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
- [27] Penrose J. M., The role of perception in crisis planning. *Public Relations Review*, Vol. 26, Issue 2, 2000.
- [28] Pearson, C. M., & Mitroff, I. I., From crisis prone to crisis prepared: A framework for crisis management. *Academy of Management Executive*, 7(1), 1993.
- [29] Shashi K. Narayanan (2015). Strategic Analysis of Threat and Security Response through Integrated Crisis Management Approach, International Business School, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, June 2015.

ISLAMIC PRACTICE AMONG THE MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL

Burhanuddin Jalal

National Defence University of Malaysia

Email: burhanuddin@upnm.edu.my

ABSTRACT

The Malaysian Armed Forces, through the Armed Forces Religious Corps formed in 1985, has strived to enhance the internalisation of Islam among its personnel to strengthen them spiritually and mentally so that they can be a solid combat force to defend religion, race and nation. This study examines the extent of internalisation of Islam among Malaysian Armed Forces personnel base on the Religious Corps through the Malaysian Armed Forces Islamic Mental and Spiritual Development programmed. Data was obtained through library research, questionnaire, interviews and observation. The survey method was used as an instrument for the field study to assess their internalisation of Islam through faith, acts of religious devotion as well as morals. A study involved of 383 Malaysian Armed Forces random sampling was employed. The overall results were analyzed using SPSS software. In general, the results showed a noticeable high internalisation of Islam among the Malaysian Armed Forces personnel and conclude the efforts of the Armed Forces Religious Corps in promoting internalisation of Islam among the Malaysian Armed Forces personnel have been successful.

Keywords: *Islamic understanding, spirituality, dakwah, religiosity*

INTRODUCTION

The term Islamic understanding or religiosity refers to the religious lifestyle or pious life especially referring to religion in the West. In the context of Islam, religious life is connected to Islam as a way of life, or *ad-din*. Religiosity or pious life is essential in human life as religiosity exudes a great influence towards the behaviour, personality, emotional peace, human's self-confidence, also life happiness [1].

Muslims who practice Islam as their *al-Din* are said to appreciate Islam in their everyday lives. This is consistent with the decree of Allah (s.w.t.) in the verse of *Al-Baqarah* (2:208) [2]: which means: "*Oh you believers! Enter perfectly in Islam (by obeying all the rules and regulations of the Islamic religion) and follow not the footsteps of Shaitan (Satan). Verily! He is to you a plain enemy*".

Other terms that would be appropriate to replace the term 'religiosity' include *hayyah muttadayyinah* or religious life [3], faith and awareness and Islamic appreciation [4]. In this study, religiosity from the Islamic perspective refers to the Islamic appreciation

as a way of life that encapsulates aspects of faith, worship and moral as seen in the comprehensive and integrative scope of Islam.

Based on the meaning stated, the appreciation of Islam involves appreciating Islam in the truest sense of the word, so much so that it permeates into one's soul. This definition is harmonious with the view put forth by [5] who mentions that religion is an internal urge to affirm that everything that they are and that are around him has their own Superior, which is the Most Divine and Supreme to whom they succumb and surrender to with full of respect, hope, fear and helplessness. Therefore, those who fulfill these internal urges will be granted peace and the sweetness of faith. In this matter, Muslims who are denied these urges of faith will not be granted the sweetness of *iman* (faith) from their souls.

In terms of the measurement, most scholars agree that Islamic appreciation can be measured and the basis for the measurement is purely on the surface as faith must be proven by way of practice. The whole appreciation can be detected through knowledge, understanding, thought, practice, personality and culture.

Based on this premise, the military field is one aspect that is integral in Islam. This field is inextricably linked with national defence and furthermore, the formidability of ummah. A country known to be strong and respected is one that is equipped with strong military forces and high technology, particularly in terms of its weaponry. This justifies why the main thing that the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) did as he was upholding the first Islamic government in Medina was forming its defence machinery or establishing a military front that was able to stand strong for the country and the Muslims, in particular.

The preparation for a strong team of soldiers, who are both professional and credible is not habitual, in itself. It does not imply that there are enemies or threats that have propelled a country to have to form a body of army which may seen as the answer to issues pertaining to national security and defence. In actual fact, the formation of a military force in a particular country especially in countries dominated by Muslims, is something that has been decreed by Allah SWT. He has dictated this in the Quran, in al-Anfal verse 60 which means: "And make ready against them all you can of power, including steeds of war (tanks, planes, missiles, artillery, etc.) to threaten the enemy of Allah and your enemy, and others besides whom, you may not know but whom Allah does know. And whatever you shall spend in the Cause of Allah shall be repaid unto you, and you shall not be treated unjustly".

Based on the verse above, Islamic enemies will prevail whether they are within our knowledge or outside our knowledge. This is why Allah commands Muslims to get prepared and to be careful as to face any possibilities so that they will not be in shock when uninvited enemies come to attack. The importance of the Malaysian Military Force as a highly mandated organisation when it comes to defending the country has been affirmed by the then Prime Ministers of Malaysia, Tun Mahathir Mohammad [6] in the recruits' end-of-training speech on 31 December 2001 where he stated, "*The country*

owes it to the military forces who have fulfilled their duties in full loyalty and are willing to sacrifice to ensure that the country is safe and free from any form of threats since the World War 2. Thus, as the citizens we must stay united with the soldiers in sustaining peace so that we will not become slaves to the colonisers once again”.

In the effort to form a formidable and intimidating military front, we should know how to choose a really capable formula in producing members who are efficient and have credibility. Some training aspects like disciplining the members, training members to develop weapon-handling skills, forming morality among them so that they will obey the rules and commands, working hard and staying away from any form of abuse are things that should be given the priority. However, the success of these aspects cannot be fully anticipated without one more important element in the members’ self-development and formation. The element would be the element of ‘spirituality’ that is related to faith, belief, and piety towards the religion.

The importance of the consolidation of these spiritual values should further be stimulated to ensure that the servants of the Malaysian Military Force are able to perform their duties efficiently and effectively. General Tan Sri Dato’ Seri Zulkifli Zainal Abidin, the then Malaysian Chief of Army, in his first command speech in his appointment as Malaysian Army Chief asserted “*In the context of training in the Army Force, and to build human professionalism and development, spiritual-oriented training must be prioritised. This aspect is important to strengthen the platform of the training to be more effective*”. To ensure that the whole organisation can be formed and educated, an ongoing construction process through a systematic training is vital. According to Muhammad Ahmad Bashil (1989) [7] in his book, *Politics and military – the Hudaibiyah Agreement*, he explained that, the efforts to form soldiers who can understand their duties effectively, and at the same time who become the loyal servants of Allah, require continuous efforts of dakwah and proper education.

Statements clearly demonstrate that the knowledge of aqidah, shari’a and moral is important to each and every member of the Malaysian Armed Forces, in eliminating the negative influence of secularism and to help them become pious Caliphs of Allah. Therefore, the Armed Forces’ Religious Corps or KAGAT has been given the duty, role and responsibility to build the religious appreciation and spirituality among the members of the Malaysian Armed Forces.

OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH

Among the research objectives intended to be achieved are as follows:

- a. Identify the concept of appreciation of Islam required by every Muslim, including members of the Malaysian Armed Forces.

- b. Identify the background of *dakwah* (preaching of Islam) program conducted by Armed Forces Religious Corps in an effort to increase religious practice among members of the armed forces as well as raising the *syiar* (symbols) of Islam in the Malaysian Armed Forces.
- c. Analyse the level of appreciation of Islam among the Malaysian Armed Forces in terms of faith, *ibadah* (worship) and morality.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research has been carried out among the Malaysian Armed Forces personnel from September 2010 to December 2012. The instrument used in this study was questionnaire. Questionnaires were constructed containing 102 questions. The questionnaire consisted of the instruments were built by Azma Mahmud (2006) [8], which has a Cronbach alpha reliability of 0.97. However these instruments have made modifications and reconstruction based on the needs and goals of the study respondents.

It should be mentioned also that the research that has been done is a descriptive research using both qualitative and quantitative research approaches. According to Delbert C. Miller and Neil J. Salkind (2002) [9] study is a study that combines the best characteristics of both quantitative and qualitative, and so on Neuman (1991) [10] stated drawbacks can be accommodated with quantitative and qualitative vice versa. In addition, the instrument for obtaining data is through library research, field studies, interviews, observations and questionnaires. The population for this study was about 102,398. According Krejcie and Morgan (1970) [11] population exceeding 100,000 require a sample size of at least 383 respondents connection with that set the number of researchers in this study were a total of 383 respondents. Selection of sampling randomly divided into three services within the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) which consists of Army, Navy and Air Force. In the area of data analysis, the data obtained were analysed using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Science), and the method of data analysis is divided into two, namely descriptive analysis and inferential analysis.

FINDINGS

In this study, a total of 102 questions related to the appreciation of Islam encompassing the aspect of faith, *ibadah* (worship) and morality were presented to the respondents. Basically, questions posed were of basic level, in accordance to respondents' ability and their level of appreciation on Islamic teaching, based on the MAF's Islamic Mental and Spiritual Development objectives which focus on developing an Islamic oriented Army towards achieving a true Muslim, *Mukmin* (believers) and *muhsin* (a good muslim). This study applies a holistic approach to the aspect of Islamic appreciation which includes faith, *ibadah* (worship) and morality, and in terms of Islamic appreciation among MAF personnel, it was found that no respondents were at low level, whereas 25

respondents (6.5%) at intermediate level and a total of 358 respondents (93.5%) at high level with overall mean of 411.48 in terms of (Min =411.48). This is summarized in **Table 1**.

Level	Score	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Low	102-238	0	0
Moderate	239-374	25	6.5
High	375-510	263	93.5
Total		383	100.0

Table 1: Score for level of Islamic appreciation among respondents
(Source: 2012 Survey)

DISCUSSIONS

Generally, in determining the level of appreciation of Islam, this study meets three basic criteria to gauge the level of appreciation norms, namely representativeness, relevance and recent as proposed by Wiersma (1986) [12]. A sample size of 383 was chosen via random sampling technique based on the zoning system, team, rank, type of service and gender with a reasonable fraction. With the small number of respondents, namely 383 within a population of 102,000 people, it is acknowledged that the results of this study may not reflect the level of appreciation of Islam among the MAF personnel as a whole, but at least it could reflect the reality or the current level of appreciation of Islam among them.

Although basically the study found that the level of appreciation of Islam as a whole is high, there are some aspects of Islam that are generally imbalanced. There are few aspects in faith, *ibadah* (worship) and morality among respondents that need to be improved and the study shows that there are defects in *tasawwur* (worldview), feelings and behaviour in faith, *ibadah* (worship), and morality which could affect one’s faith. Weaknesses in terms of the appreciation of religions obtained from this study are described below.

Table 2 demonstrates the aspect of respondents’ weaknesses in appreciating Islam, there are some significant weaknesses in terms of the appreciation of Islam among Malaysian Armed Forces personnel.

No	Weaknesses	Total	Percentage
1.	Does not show any fear after being reminded that the messengers record all their deeds in detail.	25	6.5%

2.	Refuse to remind myself that <i>Raqib</i> (name of angel) and <i>Atid</i> (name of angel) record all the deeds that I performed.	10	2.6%
3.	Rejecting Prophets sent to uphold Allah's religion.	6	1.6%
4.	Disputing the fact that Sunnah of the Prophet is appropriate to be practiced till the end of time	6	1.6%
5.	Do not felt horrified and regret when being told about torments in the grave.	30	7.8%
6.	State that human is free to embrace any religion as long as believing Allah (s.w.t.).	43	11.2%
7	Do not feel unease whenever late in performing prayers.	318	83.0%
8	Being lazy to perform prayer especially <i>fajr</i> . (morning prayer)	321	83.8%
9.	Sometimes failing to complete the obligation of praying five times daily.	330	86.2%
10	Do not perform additional <i>sunat</i> prayers (<i>nawafil</i>).	361	94.2%
11	Not making savings for haj preparation.	213	55.6%
12	Do not make any effort in memorizing the <i>hadith</i> of the Prophet.	352	91.9%
13	Do not attend <i>tafsir</i> (commentary) lecture to acquire the knowledge of al-Quran in greater depth.	361	94.2%
14	Do not learn <i>tajwid</i> to improve the quality of al-Quran recitation.	364	95.0%
15	Always performing work hastily	305	79.6%
16	Felt satisfied when finding other's fault.	224	58.5%
17	Take other's belongings without permission when in desperation or when the owner is not around.	295	77%
18.	Prefer to say 'hai' rather than <i>Assalamualaikum</i> .	112	29.2%
19	Rarely go to the mosque or <i>surau</i> to mix with the outside community	300	78.3%

20	Admitting of using foul language when speaking.	296	77.3%
----	---	-----	-------

Table 2: The Aspect Of Weaknesses in Appreciating Islam

(Source: 2012 Survey.)

One of the significant findings revolves around the aspect of faith, specifically matters pertaining to the belief on the existence of angels. In this aspect there are 25 respondents or 6.5 percent who were not aware that the angels record all deeds that we perform, and another 10 (2.6%) rejected the fact that Raqib and Atid record all deeds performed by mankind. The same can be said with the aspect of the effort to seek knowledge and readiness to go to the mosque to acquire knowledge. Verily, a lot of respondents were still reluctant to go to the mosque for that purpose. This study also found that most of the respondents still did not appreciate prayers. It was found that a large portion of the respondents or approximately 80 to 86 percent of the respondents admitted that they had frequently missed their prayers and did not feel unease whenever performing it late, especially the *fajr* prayer. *Solat* or prayers are indeed a very important *ibadah* (worship) for all Muslims who are *mukalaf* (accountable person) and are considered as obligatory (*fardu ain*). This statement is reinforced by a hadith of the Prophet which means: "Prayer is a pillar of the religion (Islam). Whoever establishes it, establishes religion; and whoever destroys it, destroys religion."

Based on findings from this study, specifically in the aspect of prayer, a similarity can be observed to the study and report by Mohd Fadzilah Kamsah [13], who states that 80 percent of Muslims in Malaysia have yet to complete their obligatory five time daily prayers. Based on his study, Dr. Mohd Fadzilah reports that only 17 to 20 percent of respondents performed their obligatory daily prayers in a complete manner, whereas for students in secondary schools, only 15 percent admitted that they perform such thing and this fact is parallel with what found in this study where a total of 86.2% respondents admitted that they frequently skipped their prayers. Meanwhile, a small percentage of respondent admitted that they had performed it completely.

Besides that, the low rate of prayer completion among respondents in this study might be attributed to their level of knowledge and proficiency in performing this kind of *ibadah* (worship). What factors that cause a large number of respondents to fail in performing their daily prayers? This particular question will not be answered by just focusing on the facts or methods to perform prayer. Indeed, it involves many other factors including the motivation to perform *solat* and *ibadah*. According to Sulaiman al-Kumayi (2009) [14], there are three constraints in performing *ibadah*, namely:

- Laziness (*kasal*) in performing *ibadah* (worship) for Allah, while everyone else is willing and able to perform it.
- Weak mind (*futur*) or not having a strong determination as a result of being influenced by the worldly matters.

- c. Boredom (*malal*) or easily getting bored in performing *ibadah*,(*worship*) although goals are yet to be achieved.

Another interesting fact that can be observed here is the relationship between the habit of completing job hurriedly and what it has to do with the habit of performing *solat* (the prayer) This study found that a large portion of the respondents admitted they had the tendency to hastily complete their job and this had made them tend to take their prayers for granted. For those who are patient, they will perform it meticulously and for those who are impatient, they belong to those who failed to perform *solat* (the prayer) perfectly. Allah said in the Holy Quran: (al-Baqarah 2: 45), which means: “*And seek help through patience and prayer, and indeed, it is difficult except for the humbly submissive*”.

From this study, particularly in the aspect of low moral appreciation among respondents, it reflects that there exists a close relationship between all aspects of Islamic appreciation. According to Prof. Dr. Hassan Langgulung (1987) [15], Islamic values that exist in a person have two functions which are mutually dependent on each other, namely as a result of learning process and also part of that learning process. At the same time, the appreciation of Islam in a particular aspect also affects the appreciation of Islam in other aspects.

Findings of this study also confirm the view proposed by prominent Islamic scholars such as Imam al-Ghazali, Hassan al-Banna [16], Muhammad al-Ghazali [17] and Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas [4] who state that the basis for appreciation of Islam must be initiated from the appreciation of *tauhid* (the oneness of God), *ibadah*, morality and the *shari'a* (Islamic laws) in the life of a Muslim. In contrast, the spread of moral decadence, bad morals and behavior are essentially due to the low level of *iman* (belief/faith) and the appreciation of Islam in a person [18].

It should be noted also that the items or statements being questioned are generally related to knowledge, *tasawur* (characteristics of Islam), feelings and the practice of Islam which are fundamental in every Muslim which have to be properly known. Dr. Salah al Sawi (1995)[19] in his book entitled, “*Ma la yasuhu al- Muslim jahluhu*’ (ignorant Muslim) states that there are few things in which Muslims were not given the leniency from not knowing, and such things are related to *aqidah* (faith) and *ibadah*. Clearly, the appreciation of Islam should encompass all aspects as ordered by Allah SWT in Al Quran, Al-Baqarah 2: 208, which means: “*O you who have believed, enter into Islam completely [and perfectly] and do not follow the footsteps of Satan. Indeed, he is to you a clear enemy*”.

Indeed, the appreciation of Islam among military personnel in Malaysian Armed Forces is crucially important since history had proven that military personnel under the command of Commander Tariq bin Ziyad had successfully opened Andalusia and the army under the leadership of Salahuddin Al-Ayubi managed to set Al-Quds free whilst the army led by Sultan Muhammad Al-Fatih had successfully conquered Constantinople. This is in line with the *hadith* of Prophet narrated by Ahmad bin Hanbal al-Musnad which

means, *“Verily, Constantinople shall be conquered, its commander shall be the best commander ever and his army shall be the best army ever”*. (Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, 1999) [20].

In this context, especially in developing a good military personnel, Umar bin Khattab had once reminded, upon releasing his army for war, *“Fear your sins more than you fear the enemy as your sins are more dangerous to you than your enemy. We Muslims are only victorious over our enemy because their sins outnumber ours, not for any other reason. If our sins were equal to those of our enemy, then they would defeat us due to their superior numbers and resources”*. (Ibn Jarir at-Tabari, 1996) [21]

Based on this study, it is clear that members of Malaysian Armed Forces already have a good foundation in appreciating Islam and this must continue to be maintained and further enhanced. *Dakwah* (invitation) efforts by Armed Forces Religious Corps should continue to be strengthened and reinforced. The aspect of the strength of *doa* (prayer) and the practice of *ibadah* (worship) should be established in accordance with the sophistication of weapons and the strength of the soul and the heart so that a perfect balance can be achieved with mental and physical strength. Allah SWT decrees in Al Quran *Surah Al-Anfal* verse 45 which provides guidance towards achieving success while facing the enemy. Allah said, (Al-Anfal 8: 45), which means: *“O you who have believed, when you encounter a company [from the enemy forces], stand firm and remember Allah much that you may be successful.”*

According to Ibn Kathir (1988) [22], while giving his interpretation for this verse, Allah ordered five things to those performing *jihad* in the name of Islam including soldiers who fight to defend their religion, race and homeland; firstly, regarding one's resolve while fighting and Allah will bestow courage accordingly, secondly, always remember Allah via *zikr* and prayers, thirdly, be a loyal servant of Allah and his mighty Messenger, next, foster unity and avoid division and fifth, able to maintain all four things previously highlighted. If these can be fulfilled by members of Malaysian Armed Forces, surely Allah will always bestow His mercy in fulfilling duties and in their noble cause.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, this article discusses the aspect of appreciation of Islam among members of the Malaysian Armed Forces. Based on the results of the study, the level of appreciation of Islam as a whole is high but there are areas of weaknesses that need to be improved. This is due to the fact that thorough appreciation of Islam requires the fulfilment of all aspects including *tasawur* (characteristics of Islam), feelings and behaviour. In this matter, Mustaffa Masyhur (1995) [23] explains that the act of appreciating Islam requires the achievement of certain level, starting from understanding Islam in its true manner, precise as being delivered by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), to the extent that all teachings are practiced correctly and perfectly, similar to the level achieved by *amilin* (good doers) and *Solihin* (good muslim). The peak of one's appreciation of Islam among the most

ordinary Muslim individuals (general mass) is to be a *soleh* (true muslim) individual who understands and embraces the principles of Islam, demonstrates obedience in practicing the *syara'* (Islamic law) humbly for Allah SWT, in terms of following His orders, as well as avoids His prohibitions in all aspects of life, in both secular and religious contexts.

REFERENCES AND ENDNOTES:

- [1] Mawdudi, Abu al-A'la. *Let us be Muslim*. Leicester, U. K: Dacwah Publication, 1981.
- [2] Al-Qur'an
- [3] Zakaria Stapa. *Akidah dan akhlak dalam kehidupan Muslim*. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publication & Distribution. Pte Ltd, 1999.
- [4] Al-Attas, Syed Muhammad Naquib. *Risalah untuk kaum Muslimin*. Kuala Lumpur: International Thought and Islamic Civilization Institute (ISTAC), 2002.
- [5] Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. *Ibadah dalam Islam*. Terj. Hassan Idris. Kuala Lumpur: Yayasan Dakwah Islamiah Malaysia, 1988.
- [6] Malaysian Army Headquarters, Ministry of Defence. *Berita Tentera Darat Malaysia*, 2002.
- [7] Muhammad Ahmad Bashil. *Politik dan ketenteraan – perjanjian Hudaibiyyah*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Pustaka Fajar, 1989.
- [8] Azma Mahmud. Pengukuran tahap penghayatan pendidikan Islam pelajar-pelajar sekolah menengah di Malaysia. Tesis Doktor Falsafah. Fakulti Pendidikan, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. Bangi: Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2006.
- [9] Miller, Delbert C. & Salkind, Neil J. *Handbook of research design and social measurement*. London. Sage Publication, 2002.
- [10] Neuman, William Lawrence. *Social research methods: qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1991.
- [11] Krejcie, R. V & Morgan, D. W. Determining size for research activities. *Educational and psychological measurement* 30: 607-610, 1970.
- [12] William, Wiersma. *Research method in education: an introduction*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1986.
- [13] Mohd. Fadzilah Kamsah. Solat dalam kalangan remaja. *Utusan Malaysia*. pp. 6, June 23, 2008.
- [14] Sulaiman al-Kumayi. *99 kecerdasan berasaskan asmaul husna*. Kuala Lumpur: PTS Publication and Distribution Pte Ltd, 2009.
- [15] Hassan Langgulung. *Pendidikan Islam menghadapi abad 21*. Shah Alam: Hizbi Publication, 1987.

- [16] Al-Banna, Hassan. *Hadith al-thulasa': Hassan al-Banna yatahaddath ila shabab al-'alam al-Islami*. Damsyik: Dar al-'Ilm, 1974.
- [17] Al-Ghazali, Muhammad. *Turathuna al-fikri fi mizan al-shar'i wa al-'aqli*. Herndon: al-Maahad al-Alammiy li al-Fikr al-Islamiy (IIIT), 1996.
- [18] Zakaria Stapa. *Akidah dan akhlak dalam kehidupan Muslim*. Kuala Lumpur: Utusan Publication & Distribution. Pte Ltd, 1999.
- [19] Al-Sawi, Salah. *Ma la yasuhu al-Muslim jahluhu'*. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1995.
- [20] Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani. *Fath al Bari*. Beirut: Dar al-Manar, 1999.
- [21] Ibn Jarir at-Tabari. *Jami' al-Bayan*. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1996.
- [22] Ibn Kathir. *Mukhtasar tafsir Ibn Kathir*. Terjemahan. Kuala Lumpur: Victory Agency, 1988.
- [23] Mashhur, Mustafa. *Min fiqh al-da'wah: tariq al-da'wah*. Jil. 1. al-Qahirah: Dar al-Tawzi'wan al-Nasyr al-Islamiyyah, 1995.

THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Volume 1 Number 1 / 2010

ISSN 2180-284X

CONTENTS

- Combating and Reducing the Risk of Biological Threats 1
Zalini binti Yunus
- From Paper Map to Digitised Battlefield 17
Mohd Zambri bin Mohamad Rabab
- Scale Based Uncertainty Modelling 24
Dinesh Sathyamoorthy
- Australia's National Interest in East Asia: Engaging China 42
Badrul Hisham bin Suda
- ASEAN Security Cooperation: Challenges and the Way Ahead 52
Redha @ Redo Abduh bin Abd Hamid
- Body Mass Index and Body Composition Among Royal
Malaysian Navy (RMN) Personnel 65
Razalee bin Sedek, Poh Bee Koon and Ismail bin Mohd Noor
- Key Combat Performance: The Linkages between Leadership
and Morale 83
Kenali bin Basiron
- Evaluating the Role of Offsets in Creating a Sustainable
Defence Industrial Base: The Case of Malaysia 96
Kogila Balakrishnan

THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Volume 1 Number 2 / 2010

ISSN 2180-284X

CONTENTS

ASEAN Defence Industry Collaboration; Potential, Challenges and Way Forward <i>Ahmad Zahid Hamidi</i>	119
Transformational Leadership: Characteristics and Specific Practices Among Military Officers <i>William Stevenson</i>	129
Security Challenges Beyond 2010: Building Resilience <i>Rita Parker</i>	145
The OIC: Overcoming Challenges and Reinventing in an Age of Global Terrorism <i>Karminder Singh Dhillon</i>	154
Security Planning and Technological Application for Homeland Security The Italian G8 Summit: Experiences and Conclusions <i>Roberto Mugavero</i>	167
Advanced Electromagnetic in Defence and Security Applications <i>Chung Boon Kuan and Chuah Hean Teik</i>	190
Suicide Terrorism: Development, Identification, Modus Operandi, Potential Threat and Response – Sri Lankan Perspective <i>Tuan Suresh Sallay</i>	204
Morphological Spatial Pattern Analysis of Mountains Extracted from Multiscale Digital Elevation Models <i>Dinesh Sathyamoorthy</i>	220
Development of Blast Resistance Concrete <i>Mohammed Alias Yusof, Norazman Mohamad Nor, Ariffin Ismail, Risby Mohd Sohaimi, Muhamad Fauzi Muhamad Zain, Nik Ghazali Nik Daud and Ng Choy Peng</i>	238
Development of Arsenic Detection Test Kit for Military Field Drinking Water <i>Ong Keat Khim, Neza Ismail, Siti Hasnawati Jamal, Mohd Lip Jabit and Nurul Afiqah Azmi</i>	251
An Evaluation of Indoor Air Quality in a Machinery Room of a Floating Vessel <i>Mahdi Che Isa and Zalini Yunus</i>	258

THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Volume 2 Number 1 / 2011

ISSN 2180-284X

CONTENTS

Future of Asian Space Powers <i>Ajei Lele</i>	1
Defence Research and Development: National Industrialization Towards Achieving Self Reliance <i>Mohd Yunus Masjuki</i>	24
Military Forecasting and Planning (F & P): An Overview <i>Norliza Husein, Norazman Mohamad Nor, Nooh Abu Bakar</i>	35
Post - 2002 Development in South China Sea: Seeking Confidence Building & Regional Cooperation <i>Nong Hong</i>	54
Fostering Security Cooperation in Overlapping Maritime Areas <i>Victor Prescott</i>	70
Maritime Human Trafficking in Malaysia: Scope of the Problem and Role of Enforcement Agencies <i>Pooja Theresa Stanlas</i>	84
Review of the Armour Protection Technology for the Future Light Armoured Vehicles <i>Shohaimi Abdullah, Khairul Hasni, Norazman Mohamad Nor, Ahmad Mujahid Ahmad Zaidi, Zulkifli Abd Kadir, Risby Mohd Suhaimi</i>	105
Numerical Simulation Study in Early Scabbing Occurrence On A Concrete Target Subjected to Local Impact Loading <i>Ahmad Mujahid Ahmad Zaidi, Qing Ming Le, Norazman Mohd Noor, Shohaimi Abdullah, Zulkifli Abd Kadir, Khalid Jalil, Khairul Hasni Kamaruddin</i>	131
A Review of The Effects of Environmental Parameters on Polymer Composite Materials <i>Roslan Abd Aziz</i>	142
The Relationship Between Training Assignment, Feel Importance And Training Motivation: A Study In Military Training Academy <i>Azman Ismail*, Nurhana Mohamad Rafiuddin, Shohaimi Abdullah and Muhammad Zulfadhilizam Ghazali</i>	150

THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Volume 2 Number 2 / 2011

ISSN 2180-284X

CONTENTS

- Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: Consolidating Current Efforts and Fostering New Ones 163
Ahmad Zahid Hamidi
- Possible Mechanisms on Managing the Impacts of the Impeccable Incidents 171
Jian Wei
- China's Economic Security Interest in 21st Century in Asia Pacific: the Australia-Indonesia Security Relations 197
Kasah Hj Mohd Shah
- Evolution of Guerilla Warfare Strategy from Ancient Period to Contemporary Era: an Over View 209
Zaini Salleh, Ahmad Zaidi Sulaiman
- Japan's Security Roles in East Asia: Key Determinants and Challenges 225
Muhammad Anwar Abdullah
- The Australia-Indonesia Security Relations 236
Johnny Lim Eng Seng
- The Symbiotic Bilateral Relationship Between Malaysia and Indonesia: An Analytical Perspective on Issues and Remedy for the Way Forward 252
Inderjit Singh
- Human Trafficking in Malaysian Water: Tackling its Menace through Migration Reforms 265
Pooja Teresha Stanslas
- Modeling and PID Based Feedback Control of Gun Control System for Improving Eight-Wheeled Armored Vehicle (8WAV) Dynamics Performance in Roll and Pitch Motions during firing 281
Zulkifli Abd Kadir, Khisbullah Huda, Shohaimi Abdullah, Mohd Fazli Mohd Yusoff, Khalid Abdul Jalil, Ahmad Mujahid Ahmad Zaidi, Khairul Hasni Kamaruddin, Mohd Azzeri Md Naleem
- Work Stress, Coworker's Social Support and Work Interference with Family Conflict: Perceptions of Employees in Defence Based Public Higher Institution 293
Azman Ismail, Aniza Wamin, Ummu Fahri Abd Rauf, Mohamad Nasir Saludin, Shohaimi Abdullah

THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Volume 3 Number 1 / 2012

ISSN 2180-284X

CONTENTS

- Non-Traditional Threats and Security Policy Response 1
Rita Parker
- Consideration of the Maritime Boundaries in the Eastern end of Malacca Strait 13
Victor Prescott
- Preventive Diplomacy in the South China Sea: Malaysia's Perspective 16
Sumathy Permal
- Symbiosis of Civil-Military Relations in Determining Security and Economic Cohesion of People's Republic of China 45
Mohd Zaini Salleh, Sharizan Wan Chik
- Reinforced Team Dynamics Through Followership 63
Azlyn Ahmad Zawawi, Nur Zafifa Kamaruzaman, Kenali Baston
- Evaluation of the Effect of Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) on Global Positioning System (GPS) Signals: Comparison of Field Evaluations and GPS Simulation 71
Dinesh Sathyamoorthy, Mohd Faudzi Muhammad, Zainal Fitri M Amin
- Quantitative Evaluation of Camouflage Patterns on Textile Materials using Fractal Analysis 87
Abdul Ghaffar Ramli, Mohamad Asri Abd Ghani, Dinesh Sathyamoorthy
- Leadership Styles of Military Commanders in the Malaysian Infantry 100
A. Endry Nixon

THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Volume 3 Number 2 / 2012

ISSN 2180-284X

CONTENTS

Cyberplanning and Cyber Defense: A Malaysian Perspective <i>William R. Stevenson</i>	117
Malaysia's Strategies and Approaches to Major Powers <i>Ruhanas Harun</i>	122
Transnational Security Threats and Non-traditional Security Challenges <i>Rita Parker</i>	130
Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism and South Asia <i>Ajeay Lele</i>	139
Extended Continental Shelf Claims in East Asia: Intension for Legal Clarity, Political Dilemma in Reality <i>WU Shicun, HONG Nong</i>	151
Cooperation Within the Asean Plus Three Context: Incidental or Coincidence? <i>Mohd Hafizzuddin Md Damiri</i>	170
Analysis of Influence Zones of Mountains Extracted from Multiscale Digital Elevation Models <i>Dinesh Sathyamoorthy</i>	180
Computation of Reattachment Length of the Main Recirculation Region of a Backward-facing Step: A Review <i>Yogeswaran Sinnasamy, Dinesh Sathyamoorthy, Abdul Aziz Jaafar, Azmin Shakrine Mohd Rafie</i>	195

THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Volume 4 Number 1 / 2013

ISSN 2180-284X

CONTENTS

- The Majority of Potential Maritime Boundaries Worldwide and the South China Sea Remain Undelimited. Does it Matter? *I*
Abdul Aziz Jaafar
- U.S Attitudes and Policies Towards Asia Regionalism in the Post-Cold War Era *11*
K.S. Nathan
- ASEAN's Quest for Political-Security Community in 2015: An Analysis *29*
BA Hamzah
- Role-Playing Games (RPG) and New-Age Terrorism: A Psychological Overview *38*
Mohd Hafizzuddin Md Damiri
- The Triangular Tension of Taiwan Strait - The Korean Peninsular - Japan: Challenges in the Shadow of Cold War and Post Cold War Era *49*
Mohd Zaini Salleh, Sharizan Wan Chik
- The Risk Management and Its Key Elements: Risk Assessment and Contingency and Emergency Planning *68*
Valentino Sabato, Roberto Mugavero, Daniele Carbini
- Motivating Non-Commissioned Officers in the Malaysian Infantry *80*
A. Endry Nixon
- Book Review - The Dark Sides of The Internet: On Cyber Threats and Information Warfare *108*
Dinesh Sathyamoorthy

THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Volume 4 Number 2 / 2013

ISSN 2180-284X

CONTENTS

- Managing Complex Security Challenges: Historical Perspectives, Traditional Sovereignty, Nation Building And Collective Approaches 111
Hishammuddin Tun Hussein
- The Global Shift of Power: Challenges, Opportunities and Security Implications for the United States of America, Europe and the World: A Perspective from South East Asia 119
Hj Zulkifli bin Hj Zainal Abidin
- Future Air Force Cooperation in the Asean Region 137
Rodzali bin Daud
- Asean Centrality in a Rising Asia 143
Benjamin Ho Tze Ern
- The Balance of Leadership Change and Challenges Between Civil Democracies and Military Rule in Pakistan 160
Inderjit, Ananthan
- Realism, Liberalism, "Sabah Claim" and Malaysia 177
Raja Saifuddin bin Raja Azman, Nordin bin Rijaludin
- Evaluation of Vulnerabilities of Global Positioning System (GPS) Signals: A Review of Research Conducted in Stride Using Fields Evaluations and GPS Simulation 189
Dinesh Sathyamoorthy, Mohd Faudzi Muhammad, Shalini Shaft, Mohd Jalis Md Jelas
- A Review on Motivational Factors in the Military 212
A. Endry Nixon

THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Volume 5 Number 1 / 2014

ISSN 2180-284X

CONTENTS

- Terrorism Trends and Challenges: Undersanding the Emergence of
'Al Qaeda Galaxy' 1
Kumar Ramakrishna
- "Trans-Border Migration: A Challenge to Regional Stability?" 8
Andrew Bruce, Christopher Foulkes
- Cooperative Mechanism on the Management of the Straits of Malacca:
An Analysis 13
Zahid bin Abd Aziz RMN
- The Role of the United Nations in the Kashmir Conflict: An Analysis 25
Mohamad Noorlizam bin Shamsuddin
- The Affective Commitment as a Mediator in Relationship Between Military
Commanders Transformational and Transactional Leadership with
Subordinates Job Satisfaction in Malaysian Royal Signals Corp 44
Zolkifli bin Osman, Jegak Uli
- Decision Making in Organisational Behaviour: A Review of Models,
Factors and Environment Types, and Proposal of AHP 62
Nor Hafizah Mohamed, Dinesh Sathiyamoorthy
- Maritime Cooperation with United States and China: Examination on the
Contemporary Issues and Challenges for Malaysia 74
Sumathy Permal
- Vietnam and China: The Stress and Strains of an Unpredictable Relationship 89
Ruhamas Harun

THE JOURNAL OF DEFENCE AND SECURITY

Volume 5 Number 2 / 2015

ISSN 2180-284X

CONTENTS

- The Decline of US Helmed Global Hegemony: The Emergence of a More Equitable Pattern of International Relation? 101
Chandra Muzaffar
- The Human Dimensions of Soldiering: A Perspective on Future Requirements in the Complex Operational Environment 120
Hj Zulkifli bin Hj Zainal Abidin
- China's Military Modernisation: The Growth of Domestic Defence Industries 141
Samir Abas
- Navigating Maritime Disputes: Commonality of Security Interest 165
Ramli H. Nik
- Iran's Nuclear Program: The United States Response 173
Mohd Saifulisham bin Hj Baharun
- United States - India Strategic Partnership: Implications for Asian Security 185
Mohd Mansor bin Hj Mohd Sharip
- Planning an Arabic Language Syllabus for Military Religious Corps (KAGAT) Personnel Deployed in Arabic Speaking Countries 197
Najjah Salwa Abd Razak, Zulkarnain Mohamed, Ezzad Azraai Jamsari, Maheram Ahmad
- Knowledge Management Strategy in the Malaysian Armed Forces: Towards Next-Generation Knowledge-Centric Organization 216
Ismail Manuri

Preparation of Manuscript and Online Submission

General

All manuscripts must be in English which should generally consist of title, author affiliation, abstract, introduction, body, conclusions and references. A manuscript may also include an acknowledgement. For the review process, manuscripts should be prepared in A4 with single spacing. Each manuscript, including tables, figures, and appendixes, shall not exceed 30 pages. Online submission should be via e-mail to the Editor-In-Chief. The text should be Times New Roman font size 11 (except if required within tables where size 10 may be used). All graphics and figure should be in good quality attached directly in the body of paper. For Greek letters and symbols, the font 'symbol' should be used. Upon acceptance, a formatted version will be sent to corresponding author for proofreading. Consult recent issues for examples of journal style.

Title

Titles provide a self-explanatory brief summary and create interest in a manuscript. The title of the manuscript, name and affiliation of the author should appear on this section. The complete e-mail address of corresponding author should be provided.

Abstract

The abstract provides an overview of the manuscript, highlighting the major findings and conclusions of the work. Abstracts of not more than 200 words each are required for full articles and communications. No abbreviations should appear in the abstract.

Equations

These must be clearly typed, triple-spaced and should be identified by numbers in square brackets placed flush with the right margin. In numbering, no distinction is made between mathematical and chemical equations. Routine structural formulae can be typeset and need not be submitted as figures for direct reproduction but they must be clearly depicted.

Tables

Tables should be numbered with Arabic numerals, have a brief title, and be referred to in the text. Column headings and descriptive matter in tables should be brief. Vertical rules should not be used. Footnotes in tables should be designated by symbols or superscripts small italic letters. Descriptive materials not designated by a footnote may be placed under a table as a *note*.

Figures

Figures, including diagrams, graphs and photographs, are to be referred to in the text as 'figures' and numbered consecutively in Arabic numerals.

Unit of Measure

Metric units must be used for all measurements.

Citations and References

All bibliographical references should be listed at the end of the manuscript. When referenced in the text, the citation number should be enclosed in square brackets, for example [1]. The citations should be arranged according to the order of appearance in the text.

Authors are responsible for the accuracy of the References. Published articles and those in press (state the journal which has accepted them) may be included. The abbreviation for The Journal of Defence and Security is *J. Defence Secur.*

The following reference style is to be adhered to:

Books

Tucker, J.B., *In Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1999.

Chapter in Book

Kadlec, R.P., Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Weapon. *In Battlefield of the Future: 21st Century Weapon Issues*, (Schneider, B.R. and Grinter, L.E., eds), Maxwell AFB, AL, Air University Press, 1995.

Journals /Serials

Henderson, D.A., The looming threat of bioterrorism, *Sci.*, **283** : 1279-1283, 1999.

Online sources

Hurlbert, R.E., Chapter XV, Addendum: Biological Weapons, Malignant Biology, Available from <http://www.wsu.edu/~hurlbert/pages/101biologicalweapons.html>. (Accessed on 30 January 2010).

Unpublished Materials (e.g. theses, reports and documents)

Carus, W.S., Bioterrorism and Biocrimes: The Illicit Use of Biological Agents in the 20th Century, Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University, August 1998.

Submission

Manuscripts should be submitted to:

Editor-in-Chief

The Journal of Defence and Security
Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security (MiDAS)
Aras G, Blok A Mindef 2, Bangunan ZETRO Jalan 9/27C,
Seksyen 5, Wangsa Maju 53300 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Tel: +603 40274547; Fax: +603 40274081
Email: midas@mod.gov.my
<http://midas.mod.gov.my>

Listed In Index Copernicus International