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Aim and Scope

The Journal of Defence and Security is a publication of the Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security (MiDAS). The journal publishes original papers and reviews covering all aspects of defence and security. It is a platform to promote awareness on the capabilities and requirements of modern defence & security technologies and policies, covering topics in the areas of, but not limited to, Evolution of Military Information & Communication Systems, Smart Weapons, Military Engineering, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance, Biological & Chemical Terrorism Countermeasures, Personnel Protection & Performance, Military Medicine, Emergent Naval Technology, Defence & Security and Strategic Management.

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Online sources

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THE MAJORITY OF POTENTIAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES WORLDWIDE AND THE SOUTH CHINA SEA REMAIN UNDELIMITED. DOES IT MATTER?

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ABSTRACT

The task of providing a clear overview of maritime boundaries around the world is well known as a complex, highly technical and debatable issue. Against this backdrop, it is intended in this paper to discuss the need for maritime boundaries' delimitation. In doing so, it will first highlight the two related meaning of maritime boundary delimitation and its emphasis on "What to delimit?" vis-à-vis the various maritime zones. It will then relate to the complexities of South China Sea maritime boundary dispute. Secondly, it will discuss the benefit of which could be gained by states that lead to the substance of "Why delimitation is relevant?" Thirdly, this paper will also present the disputes settlement mechanism in resolving maritime boundaries dispute under Part XV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other alternative means of functional-oriented approach. Last but not least, the paper will sum up the discussion by considering all constraints in boundary settlement as future challenges and maritime boundaries' delimitation continues to be utmost relevance in promoting sustainable growth in ocean management.

Keywords: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), maritime boundaries, continental shelf, contiguous zone, territorial sea, Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

INTRODUCTION

The task of providing a clear overview of maritime boundaries around the world is well known as a complex, highly technical and debatable issue. It is regarded as a main source of disputes in the law of the sea, maritime boundaries, by their nature, is broadly considered as those relating to the delimitations of the sea areas over which the coastal states can exercise jurisdiction in conformity with international law in general and the law of the sea in particular. As the national jurisdiction of coastal States over maritime space has been expanded in parallel with the evolution [1] of the law of the sea, maritime boundary disputes can be seen as an unavoidable consequence of this extension of jurisdiction [2]. It is a major advance in the Law of the Sea where sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal states have been extended to cover as far as 350 nm offshore or more [3]. It is estimated that only 39% out of 427 potential maritime boundaries are

formally agreed and many of these partially agreed [4]. Undoubtedly, maritime boundary disputes have also contributed to the growing tension in relations among states and are likely to lead to military hostilities when they are not settled amicably [5].

Against this backdrop, it is intended in this paper to discuss the need for maritime boundaries' delimitation. In doing so, it will first highlight the two related meaning of maritime boundary delimitation and its emphasis on "What to delimit?" vis-à-vis the various maritime zones. It will then relate to the complexities of South China Sea maritime boundary dispute. Secondly, it will discuss the benefit of which could be gained by states that lead to the substance of "Why delimitation is relevant?" Thirdly, this paper will also present the disputes settlement mechanism in resolving maritime boundaries dispute under Part XV of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other alternative means of functional-oriented approach. Last but not least, the paper will sum up the discussion by considering all constraints in boundary settlement as future challenges and maritime boundaries' delimitation continues to be utmost relevance in promoting sustainable growth in ocean management.

WHAT TO DELIMIT?

Delimitation of sea areas always has an international aspect and it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal States as expressed in their domestic laws [6]. Although the establishment of limits at sea is a unilateral act as only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of these limits depends upon other States' recognition and on international law [6]. Hence, delimitation of maritime boundary takes on two related meanings. In the first instance, delimitation as it relates to the "establishment and definition of maritime zones" to which States are entitled under the provisions of the UNCLOS and secondly, delimitation as it relates to maritime zones between neighbours in areas where claims overlap [7].

The UNCLOS permits a coastal State to establish the maritime jurisdiction in several areas, namely, the Territorial Sea up to 12 nm, the Contiguous Zone up to 24 nm, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) up to 200 nm, and the Continental Shelf up to 350 nm [8]. The breadth of the said areas is measured from the baselines which can be either normal baselines or straight baselines, depending on the coastal State's geographical features [9]. With the extension of the EEZ and the the Continental Shelf areas, it is estimated that more than one-third of world oceans which was traditionally considered as the high seas would be placed under coastal state jurisdiction [10]. Consequently, it has created the inevitable event of "creeping jurisdiction." As a result, every coastal state in the world will eventually have to negotiate at least one maritime boundary with at least one neighbour and delimitation process is an important path for the extension of their jurisdiction encompassing the coastal states' sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction over economic activities at sea [10]. In defining the limit, issues on interpretation and technicalities lead to the complexities in reaching an "equitable solution" as articulated by virtue of Article 74(1) and 83(1) of UNCLOS [11]. Obviously, this has and will always

be the point of contention in the negotiations process. Therefore, the next paragraph will subsequently outline some difficulties faced in a boundary making process.

THE DIFFICULTIES

Undoubtedly, maritime delimitation process is often time consuming. There are two main aspects, namely, baseline and impact of an island that always being subjected to further scrutiny in terms of its criteria of the law. As regards to baselines, UNCLOS has clearly provided, among others, the two characteristics which could be employed as a reference point to demarcate the maritime zones, namely, normal baseline and straight baseline concept [12]. Unlike the former, the latter concept seems to be of greater interest amongst coastal states. This concept is open to wide interpretation and most states have employed a more “liberal or even excessive straight baseline system” to extend their offshore zone to secure maximum area as possible [13]. The criteria such as “*deeply indented*,” “*cut into*,” “*highly unstable*,” and “*sufficiently closed*” are some of the provision that has been utilized to their advantages [13]. Moreover, Article 14 of UNCLOS provides liberty for states to determine whether to use normal baseline or straight baseline or both [14]. Further to that, matters pertaining to low water line, use of geodetic datum, low tide elevation, reefs, river mouths and bays to determine the base point also have the potential to complicate the boundaries’ delimitation [13].

Another significant feature in boundary delimitation is the role of an island. Island disputes focus on two factors; in that, it deals with sovereignty issue and subsequent maritime zone that can be generated from it [15]. In any case, to begin with the maritime delimitation process, the sovereignty of an island first need to be determined [16]. As an island, it is capable of generating full maritime zones if it fulfills the criteria set forth by Article 121(1) [17]. Nonetheless, the regime of an island does provide a discount on the capacity of rock not to generate EEZ or Continental Shelf Zone [18]. Coastal States, therefore, encounter serious conflict of interests arising from the ownership as well as the legal status of the island [19] since it serves to project exclusive claims of jurisdiction over water and resources in it [19]. States’ practice and decisions of international tribunals have clearly demonstrated the different roles of islands in maritime delimitation, ranging from an island being ignored, an island being given partial effect and an island being given full effect [20]. Such treatment of islands in maritime delimitation depends on a number of elements such as size, location, capacity to sustain habitation, and economic importance. In essence, the UNCLOS has motivated claimant States to put a higher priority on protecting their claimed sovereignty over offshore islands and their rights to marine resources [20].

THE DISPUTE IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Applying the above-mentioned issue within the context of South China Sea boundary dispute, there are four possible main difficulties in getting a pledge towards boundary settlement:

- a. **Issue One**. The first issue is a combination of a sovereignty dispute over an island, rock, and feature and a dispute over the legal status of the island, rock, or feature under Article 121 of the UNCLOS, or a dispute over the maritime area surrounding those features. The disputes over Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and its surrounding waters is a clear example of this situation. The crux of the matter will be to decide how big a maritime area that the disputed islands deserve under the UNCLOS. The occupation and control of those features by the claimant states make it more difficult to resolve the limit of the maritime zone. Obviously, claimant states would have different argument in giving effect to the features unless a consensus can be made through negotiation.
- b. **Issue Two**. This issue occurs when two or more states have a sovereignty dispute over an island or a group of islands whose capability to generate an EEZ or continental shelf is not disputed. This situation changed to a significant degree in 2009 as a result of submissions made to Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) particularly between Malaysia and the Vietnam. Under the rules of procedure adopted by the CLCS, this was the date by which the claimant States in Southeast Asia had to submit information to the CLCS if they intended to make a claim for a continental shelf beyond 200 nm pursuant to Article 76 (8) of the UNCLOS. Although the measures taken by Malaysia and Vietnam with respect to an extended continental shelf brought further clarifications to the dispute, it was then objected by People's Republic of China (PRC) and Philippines.
- c. **Issue Three**. This issue occurs where there is a dispute over the capability of a small island, rock, or feature in generating maritime zones under the UNCLOS, but no sovereignty dispute exists. Again, the core issue depends on how these features are defined under Article 121 of UNCLOS. While the sovereignty of these features is disputed, the tendencies for claimants are to maximize the size of the maritime area surrounding the island couple with the presence of naval forces. The more effective such forces are, the greater the controversial zone will complicate the matters.
- d. **Issue Four**. The final issue is the simple overlapping of maritime areas claimed. It covers the dispute's areas among all the claimants, especially to the effect of PRC's claim of historic waters through the Southern part of South China Sea.

WHY DELIMITATION IS OF RELEVANCE?

Having understood the vast impact and difficulties on boundary making process ever since the inception of UNCLOS, this section will address exactly to the above problem statement, i.e., "Does it matter?" In essence, the substance of the following arguments as to "Why Delimitation is of Relevance?" will take the case of islands dispute and overlapping claims in South China Sea. As Higgins pointed out, the task of determining whose claim is well founded is only the preliminary to the *real task* of allocating resources between claimants [21]. Therefore, delimitation denotes more than

just an intrinsic political dimension. More so, the relevancy to have definite maritime boundaries under national jurisdiction goes with the growing concern over offshore resources, the obligation to maintain law and order, preservation of marine environment, the sustainable management of living resources, marine scientific research and to deal with other complex security issues [21]. Essentially, in the case of East Asia region, the same concern is placed on existing boundaries dispute. With regards to Spratly island dispute and overlapping claims in the South China Sea, it demands the most urgent task for the claimants [22] to resolve boundaries issue in order to gain a stable and secure maritime regime [23]. While this possibility is still blurring, some findings have illustrated the reality of problems caused by this uncertainties in South China Sea, inter alia, unsustainable fishery practices and marine environmental degradation [24]. Given the fact that five hundred million people [24] live in the coastal zone of South China Sea depend on these living resources, one would argue that the question of “Does it matter?” seems to be ill founded and the longer it becomes, the more disastrous effect it will be. Furthermore, in a wider security context, SLOC’s protection and trades security within South China Sea certainly require all parties to the dispute to come to an equitable solution. The increased importance of the East Asia trade means a remarkable growth in sea borne trades that traverse the South China Sea [23]. However, the trend of naval arm build-ups today, in particular China, seems to add to the list of uncertainties and volatile condition in the region [25]. Driven by narrowed political minded and lack of trust would possibly create unnecessary tension between states. More dangerously, there will be more navies and an increased risk of incidents between maritime forces, thus resulting in a potentially unstable maritime environment. Of particular concern is disruption of SLOCs with conflicts involving actions by China or others to strengthen their claims using military force.

As such, having its potential chaotic events, parties to the dispute must not consider the delimitation process as trivial and let it be perpetually unresolved as this will do more harm than good. As Anderson rightly mentioned, boundary is something that, once settled would “last for an indefinite length of time [4].” The benefits of having defined boundaries certainly outweigh the political scepticism amongst claimants in South China Sea. Thus, maritime boundaries’ delimitation in Spratly islands shall not be endured as another episode of rhetorical debate and myth. Obviously, comprehensive delimitation of boundaries would facilitate a better framework for a more holistic approach on ocean’s policies and integrated management to address all transnational issues effectively through a well coordinated arrangement. The recent International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) decision on sovereignty of Pedra Branca is another example of that nature.

More interestingly to note is that, both countries have established the Joint Committee to continue the delimitation of maritime boundary within the area while having specific interim arrangements for fishing activities and maritime accidents and subcommittee to deal with maritime and air space management and fishery’s issues [26]. Had it not been the case of ICJ or any form of compulsory settlement for that matter, such superb arrangements would not have been materialised at this point of time for sure. Being the most critical choke point at the entrance and exit of the busiest strait in the

world, any neglect of some sort would be totally unacceptable. Though it is premature at this moment to judge the real outcome of its boundary delimitation, the existing frameworks do serve a preliminary purpose for future clarity.

No doubt, the relevancy of arguments above led to another issue. The real question now is “Whether parties would be willing to compromise their boundaries’ claims that have been regarded by many as excessive?” Therefore, next following section will explain the mechanisms in place for parties to reach to a point of “breaking the impasse” in dispute settlement under international law and UNCLOS.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION

As clearly articulated in the Preamble of UNCLOS, Paragraph 1, that all parties to the convention must settle their grievances “...in a spirit of mutual understanding and co-operation, all issues relating to the sea...” The system of dispute resolution under Part XV of UNCLOS was built on the fundamental principle that the parties would be able freely to select by agreement any dispute settlement procedure they desired [27]. Such settlement must, however, be peaceful. Article 279 of UNCLOS urges all parties to seek solutions as stipulated under Article 33 of UN Charter. As provided in Article 33 of UN Charter, international disputes are typically settled through either negotiation or through recourse to a third party procedure. The third party procedures produce different results, ranging from binding to non binding decisions, depending on the type of third party mechanism chosen. Traditionally, third party procedures can be classified into adjudicative and non-adjudicative procedures. The adjudicative procedures always lead to binding results and take the form of arbitration and tribunals [27].

On the other hand, the non-adjudicative are not necessarily binding and may take the form of good offices, mediation, enquiry, fact-finding or conciliation [27]. Under the UNCLOS, both informal and formal procedures are available to State’s parties. If a settlement cannot be reached through negotiation, parties to UNCLOS should submit their dispute to one of the several procedures for binding arbitration, as per Part XV, including the ICJ, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) or an ad-hoc arbitral tribunal to be created under Annex VII [28]. However, with regards to ITLOS, up to now it is still questionable whether it has jurisdiction to rule on issues relating to territorial dispute [27].

What matters most in this dispute resolution is to get to a point of “breaking the impasse” be it through informal or formal ways. It follows therefore; basic jurisprudence of international law dictates the achievement of an “equitable solution.” In the case of delimiting maritime boundaries, Articles 15 of UNCLOS specifies that in the absence of historic title or “special circumstances” maritime boundary between the territorial seas of two states will follow the equidistance line [29]. However, the equidistance line is not referred to in either Article 74 or 83 of UNCLOS relating to delimitation of EEZ and Continental Shelf boundaries, which simply state that delimitation, should be “affected

by agreement on the basis of international law...in order to achieve an equitable solution [30]”.

What may be an equitable solution varies according to circumstances of the case. In many cases, boundaries have been adjusted from the equidistance line in order to achieve an equitable solution [31]. Given the same principle applied in South China Sea dispute, one would imagine how troublesome it will be in considering each and every individual state's claims to justify the best option of equitable solution under the UNCLOS. Be that as it may, one thing for sure is to fix a limit to what being called mysterious and blunt disregard of international law. In the negotiation therefore, the basic tenet of honouring the convention in its strict sense is the only premise for true equity and not of whim and fancies. In this regard, for instance, artificial islands what have been developed from reefs shall not be claimed and mislead as an island.

Another means of resolution under the UNCLOS is to encourage settlement pending any agreements, by means of “provisional arrangements of practical nature.” This will in some ways benefits the parties concerned as economic activities can be advanced through an agreement. The Joint Development Area between Australia and East Timor is an example of provisional arrangements. Under the agreements, the benefits of the exploitation of the petroleum resources are divided based on mutual consensus [32]. The advantage of having such an avenue is that, it provides an alternative to dispute resolution or an additional mechanism in solving partial disagreement over boundaries. It also improved relation between parties as “claims unaltered in principal,” offshore economic activities can be advanced and promoting a broader based functional-oriented and comprehensive approach to ocean management [11].

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it has to be admitted that by having absolute boundary and maritime areas, the development over living and non-living resources of such area can be advanced, concerted ocean governance could be placed and overall maintenance of law and order at sea would promote sustainable growth. The stability will, by any means be translated to the prosperity of coastal states and neighbouring countries. As the saying goes “good fences made good neighbours [3]”. Importantly, the process of delimitation in maritime space would uphold the spirit of UNCLOS and the only best option for States to “promote the peaceful uses of the seas and oceans, the equitable and efficient utilization of their resources, the conservation of their living resources, and the study, protection and preservation of the marine environment [33]”.

Maritime delimitations process certainly will evolve and continue to be of relevance in the international politics and law. The uncertainties of settlement coupled with sense of political distrust would obviously open for confrontation and disrupt the maintenance of world peace. No doubt, due to the complexities of maritime boundaries' delimitation and its technical nature to delimit maritime zones, some countries would prefer it

to be maintained as a status quo. Nonetheless, the Law of the Sea has more rights and responsibilities to be performed than just rights and immunities. Indeed, significant numbers of maritime boundaries dispute, in particular East Asia, already being considered under stress and are waiting to emerge [33]. If international law is to have its meaning at all, all parties to the dispute should respect the convention and use all available means to resolve the issues amicably. Failing which, countries should also consider the compulsory settlement for binding judgment, thus releasing its responsibilities from the “strain” issue by “depoliticising a dispute” and to get the government “off the hook [11]”. By far, the challenges of resolving the undelimited maritime boundaries is not by default of the meaning of the words of UNCLOS itself but more to give its right consciousness and fair treatments. The issue of delimitation shall not be treated in isolation. The fact that it reflects the statehood principle of United Nation, it should then be determined by way of “package” associates with other economic interests since that seems to be the motivational factors. Looking at the contemporary issues of the Law of the Sea today, what equitable solution would ask is just another fair distribution of wealth *from* the sea and likewise, fair treatments *to* the sea on the other.

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U.S. ATTITUDES AND POLICIES TOWARDS ASIAN REGIONALISM IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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ABSTRACT

The engagement of the United States in Asia during the Cold War was largely driven by ideological and strategic considerations, especially the desire to contain the expansion of international communism in the region. U.S. attitudes and approaches were underscored by the Containment Doctrine, targeting mainly China in Asia and North Vietnam in Southeast Asia. In the Cold War context of bipolarity, the U.S. was suspicious of the trend of neutralism and non-alignment expressed by Asian states especially India. However, in the post-Cold War context issuing from the demise of international communism and the rise of globalization, American attitudes and policies towards Asia are apparently undergoing a fundamental transformation. The concept of “Pax Americana” is itself being diluted by the rise of Asian powers especially China and India, and also the growing role and political/diplomatic influence of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The changing character of Asia’s political economy is also an important factor affecting American perceptions, attitudes, and role in Asia. The focus of this article is on regionalism in East Asia (Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia). It argues that U.S. attitudes and policies are being obliged to adjust to the changing strategic scenario of East Asian regionalism with the rising economic power and influence of Asian powers, China and India, in the early 21st century as manifested by the inauguration of the East Asia Summit (EAS), and increasing pressures for security multilateralism with a more important role for the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The article also argues that while APEC’s influence may be declining (a forum in which the U.S. has greater leverage), the Obama Administration has attempted to rebalance its Asia policy by endorsing ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) and launching the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agenda to ensure America’s continued participation and relevance in Asia’s changing economic and security architecture.

Keywords: Cold war, neutralism, non-alignment, ASEAN, globalization, security regionalism, Free Trade Agreements

INTRODUCTION

The United States (U.S.) as the world’s only superpower in a military-strategic sense, entered the Post-Cold War era of Globalization from the early 1990s marked by

increasing political and economic challenges to its hitherto leading role in world Affairs [1]. During the Cold War (1947-1991), the U.S. possessed the economic, political as well as diplomatic clout to shape strategic trends in Asia with the cooperation of its numerous allies and friends through a string of anti-communist security pacts. The U.S.-Japan Alliance has thus far proven to be the bedrock of Asia-Pacific stability and security. American-led security cooperation in turn spawned bilateral and multilateral arrangements for economic cooperation – the more important of them being the APEC forum established almost at the end of the Cold War in 1989. During the Cold War era, American attitudes and policies clearly reflected Washington's dominance of the political economy of the Asia-Pacific region. In that same period, the Pax Americana furnished the politico-security framework for the rise of Japan as an economic superpower. The Northeast Asian economies of South Korea and Taiwan also experienced growth under American tutelage as did the Southeast Asian economies grouped under the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Economic cooperation and integration via ASEAN, viewed generally as U.S.-friendly, was encouraged by Washington to counter Asian communism led by China. In sum, the political economy of Asia, and especially East Asia posed no significant threat to the Pax Americana; indeed the outcome was to shore up the Pax in which the United States enjoyed political, economic and military dominance.

The Vietnam War (1954-1975) arguably marked the peak of American military engagement in Asia – an ideological conflict that spurred the formation of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the wake of the massive defeat of America's NATO ally, France in Indochina at Dien Bien Phu on 8th May 1954, which in turn eventually led to the dispatch of over half a million U.S. troops to Vietnam. Thus in the 1950s up to the mid-sixties, U.S. attitudes towards Asian regionalism were largely influenced by the effort to contain international communism sponsored by Moscow and Beijing. With the character and contours of Asian regionalism being shaped largely by Cold War perceptions and misperceptions, neutralism, even if genuine, was abhorred by Washington as an expression of support for its ideological adversaries in Moscow and Beijing. Indeed, what Asia seemed to have been allowed was "security regionalism" with the levers of regional power firmly in American hands, i.e a "hub and spokes" system essentially managed by Washington. America's Containment Doctrine afforded little or no room for maneuver by Asian states (with the possible exception of India and Sukarno's Indonesia) to choose a more independent but not necessarily anti-American path in foreign policy during those critical years of the Cold War.

THE COLD WAR ERA: U.S. ATTITUDES TOWARDS ASIAN REGIONALISM

American attitudes toward regionalism in Southeast Asia were strongly influenced by Cold War considerations. Any collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia invariably could not be seen to counter the "hub and spokes" system initiated by Washington in the context of superpower rivalry. It also should not conflict with the role

of the U.S.-Japan Alliance formed in 1951 to reintegrate a friendly and non-militarist Japan into the post-WWII Asian balance of power. In the wake of the Maoist revolution in 1949 obliging the U.S. to support an anti-communist regime on Taiwan, and the collapse of French colonialism in Indochina at Dien Bien Phu (8th May 1954), Washington moved quickly to establish the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) exactly four months later. Although the Manila Treaty creating SEATO as a collective defence pact included only three Asian members (Thailand, Philippines and Pakistan), it nevertheless created a platform and consciousness for regional states to move from “security regionalism” to “economic and political regionalism”. Arguably, America’s military role in stimulating this regional consciousness could not be ignored in the eventual formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Bangkok on 8th August 1967.

The U.S. was quite prepared to allow Japan to be the primary sponsor i.e. financier of ASEAN regionalism by supporting ASEAN’s developmental goals, to secure technical assistance for regional cooperation projects, promote trade and economic relations, and strengthen political relations. To the extent that regional expressions and formations were of the anti-communist variety, Washington was not opposed to such efforts even if it did not come out openly to initially endorse ASEAN’s formation and nourish it given the more strategic and ideological priorities governing the Vietnam War in the 1960s and early 70s. Given these parameters of anti-communist political and economic regionalism of ASEAN, the U.S. was among the first wave of ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners together with the European Union (earlier, EC), and Japan, with all three entities being also ASEAN’s major trading partners [2].

In the post-Vietnam era of the late 1970s and eighties, two major events impacted upon Washington’s approach to regional economic and security arrangements for Asia: Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, with both events occurring in 1979. American war-fatigue clearly played a role in what might be termed as U.S. disinterest in Southeast Asia after the Vietnam debacle. The power vacuum created by the U.S. military withdrawal from Southeast Asia apparently afforded room for ASEAN’s political rise. The regional grouping endorsed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) at its first ever summit in Bali (24, 1976), and charted out a course of political and economic cooperation under the framework of Bali Concord I. Washington was rather ambivalent of ASEAN’s drive towards regional integration as the U.S. is more inclined towards “product regionalism” while being wary of “process regionalism” which it views as merely a “talk shop”.

Strategic considerations also led to U.S. rejection of another regional security proposal put forward by Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev at Vladivostok in 1986, and for a region-wide collective security organization at Krasnoyarsk in 1988. Moscow’s backing for Hanoi’s Cambodian invasion, and Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, in Washington’s perspective, re-ignited the Cold War while affirming the death of détente initiated by U.S. President Nixon and Soviet President Brezhnev in 1972. The U.S. viewed Gorbachev’s proposal as a Soviet attempt to undercut American-led security and economic arrangements that have governed Asia-Pacific stability over the past four

decades. Moscow's suggestion to withdraw its forces from Vietnam in exchange for the removal of U.S. bases in the Philippines only seemed to confirm Washington's suspicions that the Soviet Union was attempting to dilute the American-sponsored security system (bilateral as well as multilateral alliances) that was already in place.

THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: THE U.S. AND ASIAN REGIONALISM

Major political transformations in the international system at the global level are bound to impact upon postures, strategies, policies and actions at the regional level. Just as the collapse of the Soviet Union and empire would invariably impact upon regional trends in East Europe and the trajectory of regionalism in Europe as a whole, so too would similar impulses inform the Asian region. To be sure, fundamental strategic transformations in the balance of power are bound to create uncertainty among regional players. Pre-existing regional organizations, alliances and orders managed in a particular way are obliged to undergo review, if for no other reason except to ensure relevance to new demands, aspirations and priorities. The dawn of a new era, divested of ideological rationale and justification, may be assuring for some but could also be met with apprehension by other actors of the international system. Would the United States be as pro-active as it was, in promoting "security regionalism" through its "hub and spokes" strategy during the Cold War? Or are newer and alternative schemes of regional political, economic and security order impelling the U.S. to merely react or respond to events and initiatives taken by others? Until recently, Washington has harboured suspicions over any attempts to create regional economic structures that could supplant APEC and efforts towards further trade liberalization. The 1990 proposal by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to form an East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG) that apparently excluded the United States was strongly opposed by the U.S. out of concern that it would undermine APEC's agenda of trade liberalization. From Mahathir's perspective, regional community formation and empowerment in a transformed world order cannot, and should not be predicated on U.S. initiatives or leadership alone. Mahathir was conscious of the downside of American unipolarity for medium and small powers in East Asia. He recognized that what was good for the United States cannot necessarily be good for Asia. National and regional interests are moving in the direction of accommodating Asia's rise driven by its two major civilization anchors, China and India. Initially, the Malaysian leader did not pay much attention to India as China's rise by 1990 had already become evident while India had not yet embarked upon economic reforms and market-opening measures until 1991 when the former finance minister (now prime Minister) Manmohan Singh initiated a major departure from India's economic and political policies of the Cold War era.

The Asian Financial Crisis of mid-1997 exposed certain structural weaknesses in several East Asian countries, especially in their banking, financial, and infrastructure development sectors—weaknesses that resulted in currency attacks that shattered their economies, resulting also in political and social chaos. Whether this was a result of their over-exposure to free-market capitalism in the era of post-Cold war globalization remains

a subject of debate. However, what was certain was the urgent need to collectivize regional efforts to prevent a similar financial meltdown. The offshoot of this realization was the Chiang Mai Initiative in 2000. The ASEAN states together with China, Japan and Korea agreed to establish a basket of currencies that would permit currency swap arrangements to prevent the recurrence of a similar crisis. More importantly, the CMI reflected collective Asian commitment to set up a regional surveillance mechanism, thereby acknowledging the inadequacy of existing international financial structures and mechanisms to address a crisis of such proportions. This was a new development in regional financial cooperation in response to a major financial debacle with potential to inject political and social instability into the region. While the U.S. welcomed such regional initiatives as generally constructive, it also expressed pessimism as to whether such schemes were effective at the operational level [3].

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC) was formed in 1989 at a time when superpower ideological rivalry was clearly on the wane, while the Soviet empire itself was facing imminent collapse. Although Soviet demise could not be viewed as a factor directly affecting Asian regional integration efforts, perceptions by regional states of economic and political uncertainties accompanying a major shift in the global and regional balance of power could not be ignored. For the U.S., APEC was a critical vehicle to not only promote trade liberalization, but a platform to maintain U.S. influence through the U.S.-led system of alliances in a new era. President Clinton was pivotal in creating the Leaders' Meeting at APEC, and his role at the Seattle Summit in 1993 was instrumental in boosting APEC's economic role in the post-Cold War era.

APEC's vision at the Bogor Summit a year later closely mirrored American interests and priorities on trade liberalization as well as American concerns that many obstacles lie in the way of full trade liberalization. At the APEC meeting held in Bogor, Indonesia in 1994, the Bogor Declaration was announced, with the industrialized economies committed to achieving free and open trade and investment by 2010 and developing economies by 2020. The Declaration urged APEC members to further reduce barriers to trade and investment and promote the free flow of goods, services and capital in order to attain the "Bogor Goals". The Goals refer to the ambitious but hard-to-reach commitment made by leaders of APEC economies 17 years ago to eventually achieve free and open trade and investment in the region. In principle, free and open trade means the complete elimination of all tariffs, quantitative restrictions and policies considered as measures to protect domestic producers against international competition. Although, over the years, many barriers to trade in manufactured goods and services have been eliminated or reduced, regional trade is far from being a "free and open" one. A host of industrialized economies are being criticized for their reluctance either to slash domestic farm subsidies or to cut high tariffs imposed on agricultural imports.

Washington has therefore been always mindful of competing schemes as alternatives to APEC that can better promote regional trade liberalization. Hence, the U.S. vetoed the Asian Monetary Fund proposed by Japan as the IMF, in which the U.S. is a key player, was already capable of providing rescue packages for economies stricken by

financial crisis. Washington also countered attempts by China to create a China-Japan FTA, and Tokyo's interest in establishing an East Asian Economic Partnership Agreement (ASEAN-10 plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand) by proposing its own scheme: a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) at the APEC Summit in 2006. Evidently, this regional blueprint would strengthen APEC's relevance and arguably increase America's economic role and influence in Asia as a whole.

Nevertheless, events unfolding in 2001 seem to have overtaken Washington's focus on APEC as the most appropriate instrument of trade liberalization. The terrorist attacks on the icons of power, the World Trade Centre on 11th September 2001, had the dramatic effect of re-orienting President George W. Bush's APEC agenda away from economic goals and towards security goals requiring urgent attention by the world community. The American leader was instrumental in producing the final text of the APEC Summit in Shanghai on 21st October 2001. The APEC Leaders Statement on Counter-terrorism unequivocally condemned in the strongest terms the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, adding that this scourge was also a direct challenge to APEC's vision of free, open and prosperous economies, and to the fundamental values that APEC members hold. The Leaders deemed it imperative to strengthen international cooperation at all levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive manner and affirmed that the UN should play a major role in this regard, especially taking into account the importance of all relevant UN resolutions. They committed themselves to prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts in the future in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and other international law, and pledged to (a) implement the UN Security Council Resolution 1368 and 1373 faithfully and immediately, (b) strongly support all efforts to strengthen the international anti-terrorism regime, (c) call for increased cooperation to bring perpetrators to justice, and (d) also call for early signing and ratification of all basic universal anti-terrorist conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The Leaders also pledged "to cooperate fully to ensure that international terrorism does not disrupt economies and markets, through close communication and cooperation among economic policy and financial authorities [4]. This enmeshing of economic and security multilateralism was further reflected at the APEC Summit in Mexico City in 2002 where the U.S. pushed through a Plan of Action to secure the transport of cargo under the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) initiative.

The U.S. was convinced that in the post-911 era, APEC had an equally important role to play in assuring the security of trade and travel, while improving the efficient flow of legitimate goods and travellers. The Secure Trade in the APEC Region Initiative could help accomplish that role in two ways: (1) Leaders can use the STAR Initiative to express their commitment to specific goals to achieve secure and efficient trade consistent with global standards being developed in international organizations such as the WCO, IMO, and ICAO; (2) APEC fora can help implement that commitment by exchanging information on best practices, helping build support for new standards that can be adopted in specialized multilateral organizations, and undertaking concrete demonstration projects [5].

Besides engineering APEC towards American security concerns, the U.S. also moved steadfastly in getting ASEAN on board in supporting its Global War on Terror (GWOT). At the Bandar Seri Begawan ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and ASEAN Regional Forum discussions, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell steered through a U.S.-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism signed on 1st August 2002. According to Thayer, *“this was the first time an entire region had committed itself to counter-terrorism cooperation with the United States”*[6]. Thayer further notes that since 9-11, the United States has pursued a multidimensional approach towards Southeast Asia providing huge amounts of military aid to the Philippines, financial support to Indonesia and other forms of financial and technical assistance to enhance regional and individual state law enforcement capabilities including the police, customs, and financial officials [6]. The APEC Leaders Bangkok Summit in 2003 focused on customs security, while the 2004 Summit in Chile produced a roadmap to move forward on the ambitious counter-terrorism commitments on MANPADS (portable anti-aircraft missiles), and the adoption of strategies to curb terrorist finance [7]. Indeed, the impact of 9/11 on U.S. Asian policy was to over-focus multilateral efforts on security matters at the expense of economic priorities that could have moved forward APEC’s agenda of trade liberalization.

THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: THE UNITED STATES AND THE ASEAN

The end of the Cold War impacted significantly on U.S. perceptions of East Asian security and regionalism. The waning of ideology and the rise of pragmatism especially in economics meant that previous notions and conceptions of Asian security were obliged to undergo change. Washington had to take note that the hitherto anti-communist regional grouping of ASEAN was already adjusting to the new strategic context by expanding political and economic relations with China, and increasingly also with India—two Asian giants that were rather dormant during the Cold War but are stamping their imprint in the post-Cold War era of globalization.

Following 9/11, apart from security considerations, the U.S. became concerned with the rising tide of bilateral Free Trade Agreements signed by ASEAN as well as its individual members with external partners. This trend was also indicative that Asian states were either unwilling or unable to meet the APEC schedule of trade liberalization and were, in the interim, contemplating alternative vehicles to promote national and regional interests—with Singapore, although a regional member of ASEAN but with global economic clout, taking the lead. Singapore signed the first ever FTA by an Asian country with the United States, which the U.S. government called “the largest we currently have outside of NAFTA”, the North American Free Trade Agreement that also includes Canada and Mexico. Total U.S. investment in Singapore (2003) amounted to US\$23 billion, and two-way trade between the U.S. and Singapore in 2002 totalled US\$32 billion, slightly lower than the US\$34.4 billion trade between the U.S. and Malaysia in 2002. Instructively, the U.S. called the FTA with Singapore a step “to anchor the US in Southeast Asia in terms of business, economics and security”[8]. Washington was undoubtedly becoming increasingly aware of being out-competed by ASEAN’s

trading partners China, South Korea and Japan who together with the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) will be trading in a market whose gross domestic product (GDP) in 2003 would be more than US\$2 trillion with a possible trade value of US\$1.23 trillion, according to the World Bank's assessment of the market size of this region [8].

The U.S. responded to the rising FTA movement in ASEAN by launching the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) which essentially created a framework for ASEAN countries to pursue FTAs with the United States. The EAI which was announced on 26 October 2002 was designed to strengthen ties with the 10-member ASEAN. The rising economic significance of ASEAN to the United States was becoming more apparent as, in terms of commodity trade patterns, ASEAN countries have achieved remarkable success in increasing their respective shares of manufactured goods in total exports – and the United States has been a major catalyst in this process [9]. With two-way trade of nearly US\$168.5 billion in 2006, the 10-member ASEAN group was the U.S.' fifth largest trading partner collectively. In 2012, U.S. goods trade was US\$198 billion, up from US\$145 billion in 2009, making ASEAN the fourth largest U.S. export market and fifth largest overall trading partner. In 2011, U.S. trade in services with ASEAN countries totalled US\$30 billion, with exports of US\$19 billion and imports of US\$11 billion, giving the United States a services trade surplus of US\$8 billion with the ASEAN countries. U.S. foreign direct investment in the ASEAN countries exceeded \$159 billion in 2011, led by investments in manufacturing, finance and insurance, and non-bank holding companies [10]. The ASEAN region represents over 6000 million people with a combined gross domestic product of nearly US\$3 trillion.

In Washington's view, the EAI offers the prospect of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between the United States and ASEAN countries that are committed to economic reforms and openness. EAI is expected to create a network of bilateral FTAs, which will increase trade and investment, tying more closely together U.S.-ASEAN economies and futures. The EAI is expected to encourage both bilateral and regional liberalization and help APEC promote the Bogor goals for achieving free and open trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region. The major push towards greater economic integration in ASEAN over the past decade and a half from the ASEAN Free Trade Area, or AFTA, to the decision in October 2003 to create an ASEAN Economic Community--a commitment which was reiterated at the November 2004 Summit--makes it an even more attractive region. It is likely that economic integration along the lines of the ASEAN+3 will continue, particularly since the gains to the member-states would be large (although, obviously, negotiations will continue to be difficult in sensitive sectors).

The United States is aware that it will still suffer from a loss of competitiveness in these markets if it is locked out of the ASEAN-3 accords. Arguably, therefore, it is in the U.S. interest, as well as those of the EAI countries, to keep the United States actively engaged in the region. An equally important factor for the U.S. is the "Chinese threat" which strengthens the case for the EAI. The ASEAN countries have the incentive to obtain a competitive edge over China in the U.S. market, and the United States needs to avoid being locked out of the East Asian integration process in which China will

ultimately be a key protagonist [9]. Politically, obstacles such as Myanmar's resistance to democratization could negate the full impact of EAI for the participating countries.

In terms of regional integration efforts by ASEAN, Washington generally welcomed the formation of the ASEAN Community announced in Bali in 2003. Such regional cooperation efforts, even if they do not lead to full economic integration, carried the potential of strengthening a regional security architecture in which the U.S. still remained paramount. Critical factors affecting U.S. perceptions of East Asian regionalism and community formation are the continued role and relevance, as perceived by Washington and also its friends and allies in Asia, of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and a host of U.S.-led bilateral alliances that were spawned during the Cold War. Given the persistence of security threats emanating from North Korea (nuclear threat), the South China Sea (contending territorial claims), political instability arising from undemocratic regimes that can impact upon regional stability, and transnational terrorism which can rear its ugly head through the activities of religious fanatics determined to change the present regional order using violence, it is obvious that the U.S.-designed Asia-Pacific security architecture is still viewed as the primary source of regional security.

The rise of "Chindia" and the strategic implications for American power in Asia did not go unnoticed in Washington circles. As more and more external powers signed on to TAC (from India, China, Russia and Japan all the way to Australia and New Zealand), the U.S. could no longer resist the temptation to "go it alone" in its Asian diplomacy as it increasingly faced the risk of being sidelined as a consultant on key political, economic and security issues. The impasse was broken with the demise of the Republican Bush era and the dawn of a Democratic Administration led by Barrack Obama. The new U.S. Administration affected a tactical shift in America's approach to international terrorism by dropping the "Global War on Terror" (GWOT) label of the Bush presidency and substituting that with "counter-insurgency operations (COIN). To underscore Washington's fresh approach to Asian regionalism and multilateralism, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), a key regional agreement on peaceful coexistence and mutual cooperation in Phuket, Thailand on 22 July 2009. In the view of Dr. Surin Pitsuwan, the Secretary-General of ASEAN, this represents in concrete terms, a shift of strategy on the part of the new U.S. administration towards ASEAN, and he added that "the region appreciates the fact that the decision to accede to TAC has been in the making for the last few months".

With the accession, the U.S. becomes the 16th non-Southeast Asian country and the 27th signatory to accede to TAC. American recognition of TAC now denotes a growing, albeit limited, appreciation of the uniqueness of ASEAN's strategic culture and approach to regionalism as well as multilateralism. ASEAN-style "process regionalism" contrasted sharply with American and western notions and conceptions of regional integration anchored more in "product regionalism", i.e the setting up of an implementation schedule based on agreed targets. As noted by a renowned American scholar on Southeast Asia, "the most consistently voiced American criticism of ASEAN-style regionalism has been that it substitutes confidence-building 'talk-shops' for action-focused workshops" [11].

However, he also adds that “comparably recurrent over the years has been this Southeast Asian charge: that the US government’s less than perfect record of attending those ASEAN meetings to which it *has* been invited betrays American indifference toward the region” [11].

Nevertheless, from the perspective of Southeast Asian leaders, regional integration efforts and processes should not depart from the foundational goals of ASEAN strongly anchored in traditional realist notions of sovereignty while also becoming increasingly cognizant of the constructivist impulse towards community formation in the post-Cold War era of globalization. In this context it is pertinent to re-state ASEAN’s ideological approach to regional cooperation and integration expressed in Bali Concord I. The ASEAN-5 has always remained mindful of their national sovereignty and the need to jealously guard their independence and freedom of action especially in managing domestic issues. Article 2 of the 1976 Bali Treaty outlined the TAC principles of political cooperation:- (a) Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; (b) The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion; (c) Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; (d) Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means; (e) Renunciation of the threat or use of force; and (f) Effective cooperation among themselves [12]. To be sure, these principles evolved out of genuine concerns that accelerating the pace of regional integration beyond ASEAN are political will and economic capacity could eventually produce harmful effects on national economic development. Therefore, maintaining trade and economic links with the outside world was seen as more important to developing ASEAN economies than regional integration measures which could discriminate against more efficient non-regional producers and thus undermine ASEAN’s competitiveness in world markets [13].

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers, in a Joint Communique of the 42nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, observed that the U.S. accession to TAC would send a strong signal of its commitment to peace and security in the region. The TAC protocol commits signatories to basic principles, including the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-recourse to the use of force and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Indeed, it is arguable that towards the end of the Bush presidency the U.S. had already begun reading futuristic trends by appointing Scott Marciel as its Ambassador to ASEAN in April 2008. Despite earlier misgivings about the trajectory of Asian regionalism which in Washington’s perspective resembled more rhetoric than substance, U.S. endorsement of TAC signals America’s interest in being actively engaged in Southeast Asia at a time when China’s and also India’s stakes are rising in ASEAN. U.S. Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton believes that with American accession to the treaty, the U.S. will continue to have a strong relationship with Southeast Asia as well as an enduring presence based on mutuality and partnership [14]. Indeed, ASEAN’s determination to pursue regional integration and multilateralism the “ASEAN Way”, while viewed with ambivalence by Washington, could not be ignored under pressures arising from the region’s rapidly changing political economy.

In the security dimension, even after the Cold War, U.S.-ASEAN security cooperation -- a form of security-oriented regionalism -- has been maintained and expanded to include joint training such as: (a) Cobra Gold exercises hosted annually by Thailand, and participated by two other ASEAN members (Singapore, and Indonesia), the United States, and Japan since 1981, [15] (b) participation by ASEAN personnel in the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs in U.S. military academies, [16] and (c) since 9/11, counter-terrorism cooperation through the framework of the US-ASEAN Anti-Terrorism Pact (2002), and American support for the Kuala Lumpur-based Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism, which was established in 2003.

U.S. PERCEPTIONS AND ROLE IN ARF AND EAS

ASEAN's concept of expanded regionalism in the post-Cold War era found expression in the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005. The inauguration of these two regional processes are indicative of the trend towards security and economic multilateralism besides reflecting power shifts at the global level hitherto characterized by the *Pax Americana*. Among the new intervening factors in the global economy impacting upon regional perceptions and structures was the phenomenal growth of trans-Pacific trade by 2000 superseding in volume and value that of trans-Atlantic trade. While the U.S. still remained pre-eminent as the main security provider for the Asia-Pacific region, its economic dominance was relatively declining in the wake of the rise of Asia. The ARF and EAS are institutional expressions of Asian aspirations for regional empowerment in the changing strategic environment of the 21st century – a development in Asian multilateralism that is gradually albeit grudgingly being recognized by Washington.

The inaugural meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok on 25 July 1994. The objectives of the ASEAN Regional Forum [17] were outlined in the First ARF Chairman's Statement (1994), namely: (1) to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern; and (2) to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. The 27th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (1994) stated that "The ARF could become an effective consultative Asia-Pacific Forum for promoting open dialogue on political and security cooperation in the region. In this context, ASEAN should work with its ARF partners to bring about a more predictable and constructive pattern of relations in the Asia Pacific" [18].

Ten years later, in 2003, the ARF Meeting in Phnom Penh declared that "despite the great diversity of its membership, the forum had attained a record of achievements that have contributed to the maintenance of peace, security and cooperation in the region", citing in particular, the apparent success of the "ASEAN Way" of promoting peace, stability, development and prosperity in cooperation with its major external partners.

To the extent that the ARF system of security multilateralism, although weak in institutionalization, did not pose a threat to the time-tested U.S. system of bilateral alliances, and in particular the U.S.-Japan alliance, Washington was quite prepared to participate in the multilateral process. ASEAN's concept of "cooperative security" as the key driver of post-Cold War Asian multilateralism was designed to co-opt all regional states into its regional scheme by rejecting any form of threat identification that potentially resembled the character of Cold War alliances. Significantly, U.S. satisfaction with ARF goals was evidenced by its endorsement on 23rd July 2009 of the ARF Work Plan for Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime. It would be also noteworthy that ARF discussions on key Non-Traditional Security issues such as combating transnational crime and functional cooperation on many other such as disaster relief and capacity building can produce more substantive results in the context of an overall security framework provided by the U.S.-Japan alliance that has remained intact, and continues to be relevant to post-Cold War security concerns in Asia.

The East Asia Summit (EAS) was created as a forum for dialogue on broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interest and concern with the aim of promoting peace, stability and economic prosperity in East Asia. It claims to be an open, inclusive, transparent and outward-looking forum, which strives to strengthen global norms and universally recognised values with ASEAN as the driving force working in partnership with the other participants of the East Asia Summit. The First East Asia Summit was held on 14 December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and attended by the Heads of State/Government of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Australia, and People's Republic of China, Republic of India, Japan, Republic of Korea and New Zealand. Its apparent "inclusivity" stands out in contrast to an earlier "exclusive" version (EAEG) proposed by Dr. Mahathir who felt that Asian empowerment is the responsibility and prerogative of Asians alone and should not be dictated by outsiders (i.e. the West) whose motives and priorities invariably conflict with Asian interests. In the end, pressure from the U.S., Japan, and Indonesia in particular eventuated in a more "inclusivist" profile, and more in line with American interest in a post-Cold War regional political and economic order that does not exclude Washington's role *as primus inter pares*.

The First East Asia Summit Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 14 December 2005, stated that the key objectives of the forum are:-

- a. Fostering strategic dialogue and promoting cooperation in political and security issues to ensure that our countries can live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment;
- b. Promoting development, financial stability, energy security, economic integration and growth, eradicating poverty and narrowing the development gap in East Asia, through technology transfer and infrastructure development, capacity building, good governance and humanitarian assistance and promoting financial links, trade and investment expansion and liberalisation; and

- c. Promoting deeper cultural understanding, people-to-people contact and enhanced cooperation in uplifting the lives and well-being of our peoples in order to foster mutual trust and solidarity as well as promoting fields such as environmental protection, prevention of infectious diseases and natural disaster mitigation [19].

From Washington's perspective, support for and readiness to participate in the EAS process was underscored by clear strategic motives: (a) to ensure that the EAS grouping does not assume a racial or geographic expression that can eventually gravitate towards political and economic polarization; (2) to prevent the emergence of a trade bloc that discriminates against the United States while providing a counterbalance to China; and (c) to ensure participation by other actors, such as Australia, New Zealand, India and perhaps also Russia – all of whom “can help cultivate cross-oceanic networks of cooperation that can serve peace and enhance life on both sides of the Pacific Rim” [11].

WASHINGTON AND THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

Indeed the above-mentioned perceptions of EAS strongly influenced the American idea of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The APEC agenda of trade liberalization was moving too slowly for Washington given the rise of FTAs in goods in which China clearly had an advantage in the Asian region. The U.S. therefore had to pitch its regional economic agenda at a much higher level to remain competitive as well as influential in the regional economic order. The idea of a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) builds on an earlier formulation – the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership in 2006 comprising Brunei, Chile, Singapore and New Zealand, also known as the P4, with the aim of liberalizing the economies of the Asia-Pacific region. In 2008 the United States, Australia, Peru and Vietnam joined the P4, Malaysia joined in 2010, followed by Canada and Mexico in 2012, and finally Japan became the 12th member to join the massive Asia-Pacific free trade bloc in April 2013.

The Obama Administration's objectives for spearheading the TPP are largely focused on boosting global growth through smaller multilateral trade arrangements given the hitherto failure of the WTO-based Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations since the 1990s. For Washington, the TPP represents a “comprehensive and high-standard” FTA that aims to liberalize trade in nearly all goods and services and includes commitments beyond those currently established in the World Trade Organization (WTO). Consequently, it views the TPP “as an opportunity to support more American jobs through increased trade, as well as to deepen economic integration with our partners across the Asia-Pacific” [20]. The Obama Administration views the TPP as a valid mechanism to establish rules to curtail or eliminate domestic barriers to trade in such areas as services, competition with state-owned enterprises, health and safety, and government procurement. If successful, Washington is confident that the TPP could serve as a template for a future trade pact among APEC members and potentially other countries. However, it should be noted that for some ASEAN countries, the above-mentioned issues are seen as sovereignty-sensitive and hence the complexity involved in

finding mutually acceptable solutions. Admittedly, President Obama's interest in TPP has stemmed from the impact on the debilitating impact on the U.S. economy of the 2008 global financial crisis, the military troop withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan, and the political, economic, diplomatic assertiveness of a rising China in Asia. As one analyst observes:

“the TPP fits in the evolution of American strategic policy toward East Asia. Since the late 1980s, the U.S. government has embraced economic policy engagement with East Asia as a means of fending off narrower East Asian-only groupings that would be detrimental to American strategic and economic interests in the region [21].

In this sense, the TPP was conceived by Washington to neutralize if not negate what it considers to be Beijing-oriented narrower agendas of East Asian regionalism that could marginalize U.S. engagement with Asia.

In the context of what appears to be competing regional agendas marked by the ongoing U.S.-China rivalry for regional economic leadership, ASEAN might well be facing new challenges to its own program of building the ASEAN Community and realizing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), launched at the East Asia Summit in Phnom Penh in November 2012. As noted by an Indonesian analyst, ASEAN's centrality in the regional political and economic architecture can only be maintained by focusing on the creation of RCEP and consolidation of the ASEAN Community; failing to do so might well erode its pivotal role in influencing regional political and economic arrangements in East and Southeast Asia [22].

CONCLUSION

The U.S. and Asian Regionalism – Challenges and Prospects

In the early stages of the Cold War, the United States viewed Asia and Southeast Asia in particular as fertile ground for Communist expansion absent its active involvement in support of anti-communist nationalism. Regionalism in Asia has been a relatively new phenomenon, and can be traced to the post-World War II era when the former colonial empires collapsed and spawned new, independent states. A major challenge faced by Asian states was how to translate post-independence nationalism into a broader regional consciousness that preserved their newly-won independence, promoted national and regional identity, and that which enabled constructive engagement with external actors. The Cold War zeitgeist clearly obliged the United States to prioritize strategic objectives by supporting anti-communist regionalism as expressed by ASEAN. However, as the Vietnam War waned and American military withdrawal followed suit, the regional grouping gradually moved towards “equidistance” and neutrality as enunciated in the ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and neutrality) Declaration of 1971. The Vietnam debacle led to isolationist pressures in the United States resulting in minimal involvement with Asian regionalism in the remaining years of the Cold War.

However, the post-Cold War era of globalization and American unipolarity created renewed interest in ensuring American pre-eminence in regional economic, political and security schemes and structures. APEC's relevance was constantly proclaimed in the wake of competing schemes to organize regional political and economic order following the demise of the Cold War. In the event, the United States found itself responding, if not reacting to what it considered as economic regionalism conceived on a selective basis that intentionally or potentially excluded the United States, and which could threaten the "hub and spokes" security system in place in Asia for over five decades. Eventually, the U.S., which initially opposed endorsing ASEAN's TAC out of fear that it could restrict flexibility in the deployment of American military power in an emergency, signed on to the "ASEAN Way" of managing regionalism via the ARF and promoting regional security via the Bali principles. The U.S. has now been admitted to EAS as it has fulfilled all the three criteria set by ASEAN, namely, that the external power must (a) be a Dialogue Partner of ASEAN, (b) show proof of substantial economic relations with the regional entity, and (c) sign ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.

Nevertheless, America's approach to Asian regionalism and multilateralism is still characterized by ambivalence despite President Obama's declared policy of active re-engagement with Asia and support for Asian forms of multilateralism. As Green and Gill appropriately put it, Washington views its relations with Asia and the changes in the Asian region as influenced by three debates, (a) the debate between the Asia-Pacific (or trans-Pacific) regionalism and Asian regionalism and how (or if) the two can coexist; (b) the future role of Washington's traditional alliance-oriented strategy in Asia and how it coincides or conflicts with Asian multilateralism; and (c) the debate between institutionalized versus ad hoc multilateralism. These three debates interrelate and influence the discussions not only in Washington but in other regional capitals as well [23]. These three debates also capture ongoing misgivings about the role and relevance of additional regional structures such as the EAS in meeting Asia's security and economic demands in a changing, perhaps uncertain era. In this context, Vogel claims that the United States remains the country with the greatest capacity to resolve security and environmental emergencies. The United States recognizes the importance of the Asia-Pacific and can be expected to take an active role in the region. Pointedly, he notes that the security balance in Asia is the single biggest issue confronting regionalism in the Asia-Pacific, referring to China's rise, America's relative global economic decline, the vital need for U.S.-China cooperation, and the role of existing, not additional or new regional institutions in promoting peace and security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region [24].

In sum, despite the Obama Administration's professions to the contrary, Vogel's observation tends to confirm the still prevailing ambivalence in American perceptions of, and commitment to Asian regionalism in the years ahead. New developments and political crises in other parts of the world such as Europe and Latin America, the nuclear problem in Iran and North Korea, the military drawdown in Afghanistan as well as the current political impasse in the Middle East where American interests are more directly

involved, could well lead to a dilution of Washington's focus on engaging with Asian regionalism, and in particular, ASEAN's preference for 'soft regionalism'. Nevertheless, Obama in his second term is committed to promote and complete the TPP negotiations to underscore America's own approach to Asia-Pacific regionalism as an integral element of his "pivot to Asia" i.e. to rebalance U.S. foreign policy in Asia [25]. His agenda, if successful, could well undercut China's efforts to consolidate a massive East Asian trade bloc under ASEAN+3. In the final analysis, there is little doubt that both Washington and Beijing are concerned over the emergence of a new economic balance of power in Asia with political, security and strategic implications for their capacity to dominate if not influence outcomes in support of their national interests.

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ASEAN'S QUEST FOR POLITICAL- SECURITY COMMUNITY IN 2015: AN ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

The failure of a Joint Communiqué has not undermined the ASEAN regional spirit and that the security community a.k.a political and security agenda of ASEAN is on track. In addition this paper recognises a fact that although the failure to bring about a consensus at Phnom Penh was a blip on the organisation, it was, nevertheless, a minor aberration. Any analysis of ASEAN of security community concept must account for the viability of the other two pillars: the economic and social- cultural agenda. The three programmes are interrelated and interconnected. While they are not separate parts of the ASEAN community fraternity, the political-security component is the overarching structure- the glue that binds the other two.

Keywords: ASEAN, international law, non use of force, international relations, collective security

INTRODUCTION

The sceptics of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had a field day chastising the organisation after it failed to adopt a Joint Communiqué at its 44th Foreign Ministers Meeting in July 2012 at Phnom Penh, Cambodia. A few wrongly believed that the seed for the break-up of organisation has been sown ; some have suggested that the “ASEAN house” has become a divided “state”, and that its aspiration to become a political security community by 2015 has been buried at sea, at the Scarborough Shoal, following the stand-off between the Philippines and China.

This paper [1] argues that the failure of a Joint Communiqué has not undermined the ASEAN regional spirit and that the security community a.k.a political and security agenda of ASEAN is on track. This paper recognises a fact that although the failure to bring about a consensus at Phnom Penh was a blip on the organisation, it was, nevertheless, a minor aberration.

Any analysis of ASEAN of security community concept must account for the viability of the other two pillars: the economic and social- cultural agenda. The three programmes are interrelated and interconnected. While they are not separate parts of the ASEAN community fraternity, the political-security component is the overarching structure- the glue that binds the other two.

Considering past setbacks to form a regional organisation in Southeast Asia like Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) in 1961 and Malaysia-Philippines and Indonesia (MAPHILINDO) in 1963, ASEAN has survived the bitter Cold War era. Barring any untoward geo-political tsunamis in this Century, ASEAN is set to play a key role in the region. The role will become more potent with the institutionalisation of the political-cum- security blueprint or agenda by end of 2015. [2]

Forty-five years is a long period in the lifetime of any organisation. During this period (1967-2012), the ASEAN countries have been respectful of each other's territorial integrity and political independence. Faced with seemingly intractable crisis, which they could not solve themselves, for example, in determining the ownership and sovereignty of disputed territories, four member states sought judgment from the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

Another important aspect of ASEAN culture is its commitment to resolve differences through international law. Of course, there are still unresolved border disputes between the neighbours that can undermine ASEAN political unity. During its lifetime, ASEAN has not used force against each other except in two border skirmishes in 2001 between Thailand and Burma and in 2011 between Thailand and Cambodia over the disputed land around the Temple Vihear Preah. To their credit, diplomatic relations between the parties remained intact during the border skirmishes.

WORRISOME AS THEY WERE, THESE INCIDENTS WERE BRIEF, LOCALISED, FEW AND FAR IN BETWEEN.

Although non-interference in the internal affairs of member states was the preferred option, there were anguish moments when some criticised human rights violations in member countries. Such criticisms are not always welcome as they could open the Pandora's Box. It would indeed be difficult to close the lid once the genie is out. However, the issue of human right violations cannot be ignored or swept under the carpet as more states subscribe to the United Nations (UN) sponsored concept of on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Squaring the latter with the practice on non-interference is to be a challenge in the future of ASEAN.

The seed of a security community/security regime for ASEAN was planted formally in August 1967 at Bangkok, a decade after Karl Deutch published his treatise: Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in light of Historical Experience (1957) [3]. In essence, Karl Deutch has asserted that a pluralistic security community requires a sense of belonging, a common purpose and collective resolve to settle disputes within the community of states by peaceful means.

Karl Deutch did not speak of the absence of disputes as a pre-requisite for a security community. On the contrary, the emphasis is the **non-use of force** in regional/bilateral relations.

The Bangkok Declaration is unambiguous with its purpose to promote regional peace and stability. In 1967 at Bangkok, five states, which founded ASEAN, agreed, “To bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity”. They agreed to do this by adopting the principles of consensus in decision-making and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states as the basic premise of regional order. The founding fathers also agreed that they would conduct relations among themselves by adhering to the principles enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter. Non-use of force as a state policy is one of them (Article 2.4 of the UN Charter). The other is respect for territorial integrity and political independence of member states.

In hindsight, the ASEAN leaders did not label their regional enterprise as ‘security community/regime’ as we know today. However, the objective of getting together remains the same: to establish a mechanism to promote regional cooperation and regional peace following the unfortunate incident of *Konfrontasi* (1963-1965) between Indonesia and Malaysia. The five founding ASEAN leaders met at Bangkok in 1967 to establish an inter-governmental organisation to promote regional cooperation in security, cultural and economic matters.

The political elites have realised that without cooperation there would no security or peace in the region. While this state- centric mechanism has been successful in laying down the institutional infrastructure to facilitate regional trade, for example, the organisation must be more open to private sector involvement and participation. In a capitalist economic system, while the private sector is always motivated by, the profit margins and they are not always beholden to the states for their well-being; the states have a responsibility to facilitate the process of co-operation. For example, to ensure that tariffs are kept at an acceptable level to promote trade between the member countries.

Academics have called this state- centric enterprise to establish a regional community to promote peace by different names: security community, security regime and most recently, Kei Koga used a less flattery- term of a Third World security-oriented-institution (SOI). Labels aside, the author views the ASEAN enterprise as a variant of security community, a political community that strives to provide security to its members by agreeing to eschew the use of force against each other and to resolve bilateral political disputes by peaceful means.

There is very little evidence to suggest that the ASEAN leaders read Karl Deutch and were aware of the intellectual discourse on the utility of a regional security community. The ASEAN leaders were guided by their own intellect, wisdom and understanding of the complexity of world politics as evident by the references to the work of the United Nations and its principles in the Bangkok Declaration. The UN Charter speaks of the desire to maintain peace and security and to that end “to take effective collective measures” to remove the threats to peace. Members of the UN are required to settle their differences by peaceful means and not to resort to the use of force in international relations.

The concept of collective security ought in theory works. In practice, however, in an anarchical international system, states (especially stronger states) would *unilaterally* assert their national interests, sometime by force. In many cases, however, states would cooperate with each other to promote the common goods via established institutional mechanisms.

The United Nations' experiment with collective security has preceded the Deutchian classical notion of security community by a few decades. One can even go back to 1918 when the League of Nations (LON) experimented with a system of collective security as a means to prevent wars.

Here, a caveat is in order: this paper does not suggest any similarity between the collective security concept under the UN or LON with the political security community idea under ASEAN. Although the LON and the UN have provisions to prohibit the use of force (except in self -defence) in international relations, both Institutions failed to stop member states from using force as a national policy.

The real test of implementing the security community/security regime concept in ASEAN will be similar to the dilemma faced in the LON and the UN, which is to prevent the outbreak of war between the ASEAN States.

What the five ASEAN political masters first put in the Bangkok Declaration (1967) [2] and in 1976 Treaty of Amity at Bali were similar with the earlier experiments of limiting the use of force as the LON and the UN did as a national policy in international relations. A sequence of fundamental agreements/declarations/instruments, beginning with the 1967 Bangkok Declaration, which included the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, the 2003 Bali Declaration of Concord 11, and the 2007 ASEAN Charter ASEAN that have been agreed to have helped to institutionalise the political security mechanism in ASEAN [2]. This region -wide institutions have, in the authors view, secured international legitimacy for ASEAN.

STATE OF PLAY

The purpose of this short survey is also to put to rest thoughts in certain quarters that the quest for a security community system in ASEAN is a recent by-product of regionalism. Contrary to some opinions, the idea of a security community was revisited in 1997 following the asian financial crisis. Credit for reenergising the idea must go to diplomats from Indonesia who saw the need to give the concept more coherence.

Anyone who has studied the *travaux preparatoires* in ASEAN would know that all along the paramount purpose of ASEAN has been political. More importantly, the political elites are determined to create norms and rules that would in the long- run precipitate into a security community mind-set vide the institutions, which they have established in ASEAN. Some have argued that the top-down approach to security

community is inadequate; an endurable security community or regime needs to be supplemented and reinforced by bottom-up approach, which essentially means it has to have the support (or buy-in) of the citizens.

Alan Collins [3], for example, takes the view that that ASEAN needs to develop *“new socialising norms...to include the active involvement of regional civil society organisations in order to bring plurality to ASEAN decision making”* for the people to take the ownership of the “community building process.” Others like Johan Savaramuttu [4] have also expressed the same view.

WHAT IS THE STATE OF PLAY OF THE ASEAN SECURITY COMMUNITY ENTERPRISE NOW?

If we adopt a constructivist approach in our analysis of ASEAN, there is no doubt that the paramount purpose of ASEAN as a security community (or a variant of it) has seen some daylight. The fact we are now at peace with each other and more respectful of the sanctity of borders provides further evidence that the ASEAN experiment in establishing a political community has not been a futile exercise.

A realist who views state as a rational actor in international relations may be more sceptical of ASEAN's progress towards a security community. Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi [5] explain this approach as a process in decision making whereby... *“the Governmental decision-makers select the alternative that maximises utility (maximising benefit or minimising cost associated with attaining the objectives sought) or at least achieve an acceptable outcome. The result is a rank ordering of policy preferences among viable alternatives.”* In other words, the likelihood of attaining a sustainable position of a common good depends very much on the national interest of each state within the ASEAN organisation.

In 1987, the Group of 14 [6] on ASEAN Economic Cooperation and Integration, which was set up to re-energise the commercial linkages in ASEAN concluded that the organisation has been successful as a political experiment. The Report notes with pride that “it is a measure of the success of ASEAN experiment that many have now forgotten that ours was once an area of turmoil, of mutual suspicion, of mutual hostility, of mutual dislike, even of mutual disinterest.”

The Group of 14 Report was candid in its recommendation for greater integration in all sectors: political security, economic and social cultural; it warned that sustaining the political unity has to be a constant struggle to achieve peace and security in the region. Since 1987, the ASEAN family has grown to ten states, marking another milestone in its political integration. It is difficult to ignore this achievement. Persuading some enemy states [7] like Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997) and Cambodia (1999) to join ASEAN was not an easy task. Of course, many resisted the membership of Burma in ASEAN in 1997.

ASEAN has strengthened its institutions and worked hard to reinvent itself since the Group of 14 Report (1987). After the Asian financial crisis in 1997, ASEAN

launched a number of initiatives to enhance regional security. Various instruments like the ASEAN Vision 2020 (1998), the Bali Concord 11 (2003), Hanoi Action of Plan and Vientiane Action Programme (2004) and the ASEAN Charter (2007) were introduced [8]. Institutions like the ASEAN Regional Forum (1993) with members from the Asia-Pacific Region and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (2006) and the ADMMM-Plus (2010) became important platforms to discuss issues on common security. The latter two institutions were designed for military officers; hitherto, they have no formal regional platform (beyond bilateral mechanisms) to discuss their common security concerns.

Notwithstanding criticisms from some scholars in all the three areas: political-security, economic -integration and socio-cultural, ASEAN has succeeded to establish a framework for an endurable security community to take place. If we view the security community as a process toward a greater form of political integration that should result in a more pluralistic security system, not necessarily in the classical Deutschian notion of a security community, ASEAN is today politically, economically and culturally much more integrated. According to Acharya, ASEAN has established a strong identity based on a confidence-building infrastructure structure that is moving towards a nascent, *de facto*, if not *de jure*, security community.

The provocative question remains. Can this nascent, *de facto* security community or security regime, SOI, or a security -state- of- mind among the member states of ASEAN endure? As a firm believer in the resilience of ASEAN, the author believes ASEAN can endure and it is capable of sustaining its political security community programme, if it does not expect too much from its diverse members with different levels of economic and political development. Along its journey, ASEAN will encounter some challenges.

THE CHALLENGES

Predicting the future is always difficult. This is the first challenge. ASEAN has to deal with uncertainties and discontinuities along the journey; especially history never travels in a straight line.

The second challenge is the challenge of uncertainties. How the region will deal the unexpected turn of geo-political events and other challenges? The author have never doubted the good intention of ASEAN political masters to establish a security community system; the challenge is how to implement the notion of a security community in a diverse regional community without a single coherent political ideology that binds us like secular humanism in Europe, for example. Yet despite this drawback, no one can deny its achievements; if the leaders continue to co-operate with each other in the spirit of give and take, ASEAN can achieve more. The alternative is likely to return to a state of turmoil, war and hostilities of the past, the pre ASEAN period.

The third challenge is to think of ideas how to bring on board of ASEAN, the non-state actors including members of the civil communities, interest groups and the private

sector. As a process, the state-sponsored security community agenda is novel, possible and practical. Given time and generational commitment as well as conviction, it is also plausible to develop new socialising norms to engage the civil societies and those in the private sector, especially the non-state actors, for them to have a strong say and stake in the security enterprise. In three years' time i.e., by December 2015, the region's quest for a security community system is not likely to be substantially more different from the present state of play. Nonetheless, in the author's view, it is not an elusive quest anymore with more participation from the civil societies and the private sector.

The fourth challenge is how to create a bottom- up momentum that supports the ASEAN political security community agenda.

Like some, it is sceptical, that by early 2016 ASEAN can achieve all the purposes contained in its 2007 Charter, for example, creating a single market, the protection of human rights, arms control, alleviate poverty, etc. These objectives are much more difficult to achieve given the economic asymmetries in the region and the level of political culture in some states. It is hope that the finished product should be a regional security architecture that accommodates a more civilised political system, a more predictable and friendly regional institution that promotes peace since peace matters.

The fifth challenge is how to convert policy deficits into policy credits. The author would consider the unresolved boundary problems between some ASEAN states as a policy deficit that needs resolution. We saw the spill-over from the Scarborough Shoal incident in April 2011 that has undermined regional unity.

Disputing states must summon enough moral courage to resolve their boundary problems. The record of ASEAN states on this topic is mixed. Since 1967, all ASEAN countries have negotiated their boundaries. When they were not able to resolve through negotiations, they went for judicial settlement as in the case between Indonesia and Malaysia over *Ligitan and Sipadan* (2002) and between Singapore and Malaysia over *Pedra Branca* (2008). Besides this, to maintain civility in bilateral relations, the leaders of Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia have agreed to shelve their boundary disputes in the Gulf of Thailand in favour of joint development. Since 1979, Thailand and Malaysia have agreed to undertake joint development of a disputed area through the Malaysia-Thailand Joint Authority, which oversees the development over an area of 7,250 square kilometres in the Gulf of Thailand.

In July 1982, Vietnam and Cambodia agreed to place an area in the Gulf of Thailand under a "joint utilisation scheme."

In June 1992, Malaysia and Vietnam agreed to establish a joint exploitation scheme in a "defined area" in the Gulf of Thailand. In 1999, Vietnam, Thailand and Malaysia agreed to jointly develop a small overlapping area in the Gulf of Thailand.

Not all the bilateral maritime boundary disputes in ASEAN waters have been resolved, though. They are mainly in the Gulf of Thailand in the Spratlys. For example, despite years of negotiations, Indonesia and Malaysia have not resolved their boundaries in the Celebes Sea (popularly known as Ambalat); the maritime area off Tg Datu, Sarawak and two areas in the Strait of Malacca.

There are two grey maritime areas to be resolved between Singapore and Malaysia including the area off Pedra Branca and an area at the western entrance to the Strait of Singapore, which also involves Indonesia.

The sixth challenge is how to encourage ASEAN countries to settle the remaining territorial disputes amicably. The Europeans have the European Court of Justice. ASEAN member states have not made use of the dispute mechanisms under the 1976 of Amity. There were four occasions where the disputing states have referred their territorial disputes to the ICJ. There is an impression among many, that the present dispute settlement mechanisms in ASEAN are not popular with some states because they are political in nature. They lack legal credibility. Besides, their decisions can split the organisation as member states will have to “take sides” in any decision. This may not augur well with our culture. This also explains the preference for established third party mechanisms like the ICJ or and ITLOS (International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea). This paper takes the view that the forum is not important so long as states agree to settle their disputes by peaceful means and agree to abide by the decision as final as in ICJ and ITLOS.

The seventh challenge deals with mitigating the adverse impact arising from the external power rivalries/competitions in the region. China, India and the US are likely to play important roles in ASEAN regional security. Their competing interests may put some ASEAN countries in awkward geo-political position as some may align with different rival powers. The US-Sino competition in the South China Sea is one example that can be a game changer testing ASEAN unity and its political –security- community regime.

CONCLUSION

One can view the performance of ASEAN security community from many prisms. The realists, the liberals and the constructivists have their own supporters and distracters. Evidently, all the three schools of thought in international relations or perspectives have their own strengths and weaknesses; nonetheless, they are separately and severally useful in analysing the behaviour of states in the international system especially with regard to the purpose of having a security community regime/security community/a security-state-of - mind as a means of mitigating conflict.

In the last forty- five years of its existence, ASEAN has made remarkable progress in establishing the institutions (including a Charter) and norms for a security regime/ community to endure. Of course, as a living organisation, ASEAN states need to do

more to strengthen the web of bilateral relationship in all the three pillars of the ASEAN community especially getting the buy-in from the civil societies of the enterprise. It is in this sense, it is believe the ASEAN quest for a security community regime, the first seed of it was sown in Bangkok. It is no longer an elusive concept.

We should take note of the conflicting observations and commentaries from some quarters that ASEAN has not become a security community; only a security regime or at best a security oriented institution. Nevertheless, we should also take note that ASEAN today is a much safer and secured region than in the 1960s. To me, despite our diversity in economic, socio-cultural and political terms, ASEAN can be proud of its achievements in the last forty-five years in forging a political security community.

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ROLE-PLAYING GAMES (RPG) AND NEW-AGE TERRORISM: A PSYCHOLOGICAL OVERVIEW

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ABSTRACT

The emergence of Role-Playing Games or RPGs in the market, be it online or at home, have provided mankind a chance to experience things that can never be done in reality. Tabletop, live action and electronic formats of RPGs have transformed normal human beings into characters of their dreams: pilot, knight, soldier, tycoon, and so forth. But with the advent of technology developments, RPGs have taken a new toll: online terrorism. Terrorist are looking for new ways to plan for attacks, training, developing counter-strategies and to dispel any efforts by anti-terrorist agencies worldwide. This paper will look at the role of RPGs and the birth of new-age terrorism, through psychology aspects and analyze the connection to further provide scenarios of probable incidents, for anti-terrorist agencies to respond accordingly.

Keywords: role-playing games, massive multiplayer online role-playing game, terrorism, digital warfare, law enforcement, cyber terrorism, virtual reality, cyber planning

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has been described variously as both a tactic and strategy; a crime and a holy duty; a justified reaction to oppression and an inexcusable abomination. Obviously, a lot depends on whose point of view is being represented. Terrorism has often been an effective tactic for the weaker side in a conflict. As an asymmetric form of conflict, it confers coercive power with many of the advantages of military force at a fraction of the cost. Due to the secretive nature and small size of terrorist organizations, they often offer opponents no clear organization to defend against or to deter.

In this new-age of technological advancement, terrorist are finding new ways to plan their next attack, modes of attack, possible scenarios and environments of outcomes and much more. With the help of role-playing games (RPG), their efforts can be materialized, in a much more detailed, carefully planned and controlled environment, where “practice makes perfect” comes in handy. An RPG will make planning and executing such strategies comes into effect; possible end-game scenarios can be predicted and computed to their needs and requirements. This is where terrorists and would-be terrorists assume the roles of their digital characters and collaboratively create possible scenarios. They will determine the actions of their characters based on their characterization and the

actions succeed or fail according to a system of rules and guidelines set by them. Within the rules, they may improvise freely; make their own choices to shape the direction and outcome of the scenarios.

Bearing safety and security issues in mind, this paper will provide possible scenarios and environments that could assist anti-terrorist agencies to replan and rethink their strategies to neutralize the possible acts of terror.

HISTORY OF RPGs

Role-playing games or RPGs began in the 16th century, performed by actors in a form of improvisational theatre, with stock situations, stock characters and improvised dialogue. It evolved in the 19th and 20th centuries where board games and parlor games included the elements of role-playing, in which players took on the roles of characters and improvised, but without formalized rules.

Unlike modern RPGs, earlier RPGs were based on books, mock trials, model legislatures and theatre games, where imagination play an important role in visualizing and realizing their characters. Modern RPGs are based on alternate and virtual reality characters; players can develop their own characters based to their liking: sportsmen, businessmen, traveler, explorer, soldier or even assassins. They can also shape the outcome of such RPGs and create scenarios winnable to them, as and when they venture into different end-games environment.

Board game RPGs evolved into book game RPGs, which then evolved into computer-based RPGs. The first was Dungeons and Dragons (1980), a fantasy RPG with an estimated 20 million people having played the game, evolving from a board game RPG to massive multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG). Another popular MMORPG is Counter-Strike (better known as CS), developed by Valve Corporation in 2000. The game was an offshoot modification from Half-Life, a science fiction, first-person shooter video game, developed by Valve Corporation in 1997.

Modern RPGs, such as online and console RPGs, requires the player to perform tasks and puzzle solving to advance through the game. Some online and console RPGs may require combat tasks and puzzles involve using the environment to kill the enemy, like first-person shooter RPG games. Through this service, terrorist or would-be terrorist could plan their mock attacks, before proceeding it to reality.

ONLINE GAMING: RENEWED FORM OF TERROR TRAINING

As authorities are keeping tabs and monitoring phone calls, emails and online messages, terrorists are turning to online war games to plot attacks without being

monitored. Games such as *Counter-Strike*, *Call of Duty*, *Medal of Honor* and *Halo* are examples of shoot-'em-up games, suspected of being targeted by terrorists through PlayStation, Wii and Xbox, which require a high-speed internet connection and secured gaming sites. Online games will require gamers to log on in groups to play against each other and crucially, to chat in private. Once signed in to a “lobby” or preparation area within the game’s console, gamers or would-be terrorist could “communicate securely” to conspirators on the same site. This is a terrifying reality when terrorists waste no time in finding a secured method of communicating.

By logging up into group games over the internet through such medium like PlayStation and Xbox, terrorists or would-be terrorists could discuss possible terror plots, and at the same time be online with worldwide gamers who are playing the games. To think fanatics use them for their own ends is a real worry. Terror plotters could choose realistic conflict games so they can mask their deadly discussion as harmless web chat.

There has even been evidence would-be terrorists treat war games as training tools, a bit like a pilot might use a flight simulator. The terrorists would choose incredibly realistic “first person shooter (FPS) games” where the controller works through a complex simulation of war scenarios, carrying out missions and battling enemy fighters. Gamers could chose different styles of play and missions, from planting bombs to fighting one-on-one.

Online games use a password-protected log-on to keep users’ identities secret. The system was designed so players anywhere on the globe can get together for harmless fantasy battles. But now, fears are looming as plotters are set to turn those fantasy battles into a reality.

GAME FORMAT: FANTASY INTO REALITY

Terror training camps are a day of the past. As the booming of technology comes at its peak, online gamers could connect borderlessly. So do terrorists.

For example, the game *Counter-Strike* is a first-person shooter in which players join either the terrorist team, the counter-terrorist team, or become spectators. Each team attempts to complete their mission objective and/or eliminate the opposing team. Each round starts with the two teams spawning simultaneously.

In *Call of Duty*, the game simulates the infantry and combined arms warfare of World War II. The game is experienced through the perspectives of the soldiers of the American paratroopers, British paratroopers and the Red army. Before a player could begin the game (or mission), a training level should be completed before the game unlocks its first mission. Therefore, players are “trained” in a boot-camp, with multiple types of weapons, ranging from combat knife, choices of side arms, assortment of rifles, shotguns and even demolition charges (most common in RPGs or FPS games).

This is possible with accessories available for both Personal Computers (PCs) and consoles, creating an “augmented reality” setting for the players. Augmented reality (AR) is a live, direct or indirect, view of a physical, real-world environment whose elements are *augmented* by computer-generated sensory input such as sound, video, graphics or GPS data. It is related to a more general concept called mediated reality, in which a view of reality is modified (possibly even diminished rather than augmented), by a computer. As a result, the technology functions by enhancing one’s current perception of reality. By contrast, virtual reality replaces the real world with a simulated one.

Although there has been considerable research conducted into how AR techniques can be used in industrial, medical and scientific applications, there has been less work on its applications in an entertainment setting. Attributes of AR technology makes it ideal for terrorists and would-be terrorists to use fantasy scenarios in real world environment. By adding the player’s imagination as a third source of content, a player’s experience will come from the establishment of an atmosphere of the game itself, where a large part of the perception of this atmosphere emerges from the player’s imagination in response to other stimuli. Therefore, experts in AR suggested that the best path to creating an interactive and immersive experience is to create games that use both real and virtual world content to stimulate the player, such their imagination fills in the gaps and they become truly immersed.

Immersion is the only way for players to enjoy a game. So would terrorist plotters. For the purposes of examining the possibilities of AR in gaming, we could characterize the experience of playing games as four aspects: physical, emotional, social and mental. In computerized war games, most of these aspects do not exist. The game is precisely modeled so as to eliminate ambiguities and the rules complexity is only limited by the dedication of the game developer. Therefore, the motivation for terrorists or would-be terrorist is the desire to replicate historical and possible scenarios with realistic looking units and terrain, with realistically simulated rules of combat.

Since AR allows the integration of virtual content with the real world at minimal cost to natural face to face communication, it is ideally placed to extend the use of support software to further alleviate these problems. Therefore, terror training camps are no longer feasible, as they are detectable and compromised. Plans on would-be targets for terror efforts could now be done in game modules, incorporating features of the real world and situation to AR scenario. Plotters can now focus on tactical combat, improving and improvising on levels that they are stuck on, before engaging the real setup.

NEW MOTIVATIONS FOR TERRORISTS AND THINKING ONE-STEP AHEAD

Real world and computer games have their own distinct strengths. By allowing law enforcements to combine these strengths, they can use AR to improve existing or would-be terror plots and styles, thus producing preemptive solutions to possible terror threats.

As mentioned earlier, RPGs and FPS serves the purpose beyond improvement of gaming styles and development of gaming environments. Law enforcements should examine the strengths of the real world and computer game scenarios, and develop strategies through terrorists' and would-be terrorists' point of view: physical, social, mental and emotional.

Physically, computer games are limited in their physical aspect to the player's use of interface hardware to play the game. While this does not prevent games focusing on physical skill, the range of physical interactions possible is limited. Further, computer games normally have no real way of affecting the player's environment so as to give physical feedback. Ideally, AR games could be physical to the same extent as real world games, with the added advantage that game content can be injected seamlessly into the real world. In today's AR hardware, for consoles such as PlayStation, Wii or Xbox, it will not affect players physically but there may be solutions in haptic feedback and other emerging technologies. Technology advancements have helped terrorists and would-be terrorists experience real life scenarios in a virtual environment, bringing them closer to dangers ahead and away from harm of the law enforcements.

The mental aspect of a game concerns problem solving, deductive thought and reason. Computer games support complex game models, simulation of real world systems and large amounts of data, allowing much more sophisticated game scenarios. Artificial Intelligence (AI) allows for solitary play against interesting opponents and the creation of agents that can assist a player in learning and dealing with complex simulations.

RPGS, THE INTERNET AND TERRORISM: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REALITY

Role-Playing Games (RPGs), either through personal consumption or massive multiplayer online role-playing game (MMORPG) will create a different persona of individuals, implying that alternate or virtual reality (in other words, fantasy) is reality. With the help of the Internet, which would be the most important terrorist tool today, recruiters can extend their coverage through available MMORPGs, favored by online gamers via PCs, laptops and other gaming consoles. As internet access is made available throughout the globe, it can be utilized by terror groups to spread their influence or cause, which is perfect for an underfunded group to explain its actions or to offset both internal and international condemnation. Unsuspecting audiences would definitely be inclined to believe such "truths".

As the internet represents anonymity, chat rooms or game preparation rooms as the medium and MMORPGs provide the platform, terror groups can spread their influences or causes easily, without the fear of being traced or monitored. As conversations during the games can be seen as "normal" to us, but to those playing the game, it is basically a tactical conversation on how to approach, evade and attack the targets acquired or required in the environmental setup.

Such example would lead to the Lucifer Effect, a theory by Zimbardo that was based on the “*assumption on why good people do awful things is due to situational influences and power given from authority*” [1]. He added that “*good people can be induced, seduced and initiated into behaving in evil ways, that can also be led to act in irrational, stupid, self-destruct, antisocial and mindless ways when they are immersed in total situations that impact human nature in ways that challenge our sense of the stability and consistency of individual personality, of character and of morality*” [2].

Therefore, the Internet’s access can be controlled or its use directed according to the server configuration, thus creating a true ideological weapon. It cannot be controlled like printed media and allows an uncensored and unfiltered version of information and knowledge. This climate is perfect for an underfunded group to explain its actions or to offset both internal and international condemnation, especially when using specific servers. The Internet can also target fence-sitters as well as true believers with different messages, oriented to the target audience.

For example, taking a scenario or environment of a simple, small town, converted into a training area for a terrorist target, with an excellent plot written to make the game more stimulating. Everything about the mocked-up town can be computed into a game software program, play it for a trial run and then fine-tune it before distributing as a shareware or freeware online MMORPG on the net or chat rooms. Coupled in with some comments which are “good” or “exciting” to play with, spread by word-of-mouth and writing up “enticing” reviews about the game, definitely downloads of such will be at least 30 percent targeted for players online. By one week, at least 100 teenagers or computer game freaks will be playing it. In a month, at least 1000 people will be playing it, giving comments on how to enhance the game play, plot or storyline, and many more. The terrorist programmer would have all this “tacit” information, which they could improve and improvise not only the game, but the tactics of artificial intelligence counter-terrorists.

In addition, researches [3], [4] revealed that RPG and MMORPG players have better hand-eye coordination and visuo-motor skills, such as their resistance to distraction, their sensitivity to information in the peripheral vision and their ability to count briefly presented objects, than non-players. With this, the terrorist or cyber terrorist would have a great weapon of all: human itself. Using social engineering, they are able to trick or confuse innocent targets into divulging sensitive information. The average gamer wants to be helpful, and has a certain degree of tolerance, and would therefore will to give out information to a properly skilled person: in this case, the terrorist or cyber terrorist.

PROBABLE SCENARIOS AND COUNTERING IT

As people are afraid of things that are invisible and things that they do not understand, the virtual threat of computer attacks appears to be one of those. The Internet, indirectly, produces an atmosphere or environment of virtual fear or virtual life. As

such, terrorist may introduce new scenarios to specific, important targets. Therefore, it is important for us, as law enforcers and agencies to be steps ahead of this terror shell game.

Cyberfear is generated by the fact that what a computer attack could do, is too often associated with what will happen. Thus, to dismiss the threat of Cyberfear, law enforcers and agencies should take necessary steps to mitigate the problems. Fear, in the context of literal psychology, is an emotion induced by a perceived threat that causes humans to move quickly away from the location of the perceived threat. In short, fear is the ability to recognize danger, leading to an urge to confront it or flee from it, but in extreme cases of fear, a freeze or paralysis response is possible [5].

Therefore, law enforcers and agencies should be more effective in combating these unknown fears, through active and successful approaches in confronting or overcoming such fears, by suppressing or creating an image or environment that is “safe, protected and secured”.

Most games available online or in-store are already given ratings, used by the authorities governing the producers, for the classification of video games into suitability-related groups. Most of these systems are associated with and/or sponsored by a government, and are sometimes part of the local motion picture rating system [6]. But to the extent of how effective these rating systems are, would be more questionable than required. The utility of such ratings has been called into question by studies that published findings on content ratings, where such inaccurate game rating system would lead to game localization and realization of virtual reality such as graphic violence, virtual sex, violent and gory scenes, partial or full nudity, drug use, portrayal of criminal behavior or other provocative and objectionable material.

Thus law enforcers and agencies should take into consideration the effects these RPGs towards abuse, addiction and aggression. Terrorist will take this opportunity to further “explore” the potential effects of video games on aspects of social and cognitive development and psychological well-being.

ANALYSIS

As online gamers may inject the notion of “fantasy is better than reality, nothing can go wrong and it’s the way you want it” [7], it is psychologically safe to say that online gamers will put much effort in the games itself (fantasy) instead of the current scenario (reality). As studies show that MMORPG or online games have psychological side-effects on the mind of the individual (in this case, serial gamer), there may be a tormented soul inside of these individuals, either they are bullied, picked-upon or even mental-tortured by their peers or superiors.

Terrorist may change the scenario of thinking for these individuals, making them the underdogs for online games and becoming the hero at the end of the “situation”. It

has also become apparent that terrorists or potentials may always portray themselves as the “victim”, and a character that had never had a break from such “tortures”. Through online games, individuals could portray themselves superior above the rest, and no longer a “victim of circumstances” in the real environment.

Technically, online gamers are “strategists”. According to the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), those who have “*moderate preference of introversion over extraversion, distinct preference of intuition over sensing, distinct preference of thinking over feeling, and moderate preference of judging over perceiving*” [8] can be considered as “strategist”. Being reserved, these “strategists” prefer to stay in the background while leading. They are also “*strategic, knowledgeable and adaptable and are talented in bringing ideas from conception to reality*” [9].

The next point that should be stressed is that potential terrorists are also “strategist” at their best. It is a common misconception that the “strategist” does all the important work and everyone else does grunt work; actually the “strategist” makes decisions based on incomplete information. This meaning that such person identified as “strategist” makes and takes the intellectual leaps of faith that could derail other school of thought and doing it with confidence and finesse. Thus, such profiling of potential terrorist or terrorist would likely to include professionals or remotely-induced individuals, as such these personas will have the tendency to think the bigger picture (impact) and also ahead in time (effect).

According to Post, contrary to the stereotype that the terrorist is a psychopath or otherwise mentally disturbed, the terrorist is actually quite sane, although deluded by an ideological or religious way of viewing the world [10]

Most analyses of terrorists and terrorism, according to Taylor, have attempted to address what motivates terrorists or to describe personal characteristics of terrorists, on the assumption that terrorists can be identified by these attributes [11]. However, with the anonymity of the internet, such efforts to identify them would be a needle in a haystack. Indeed, there appears to be a general agreement among researchers who have studied the subject that there is no one terrorist mindset [12]. This view, however, needs to be clarified further, through conducting in-depth studies and researches on this subject.

A member who exhibits traits of psychopathy or any noticeable degree of mental illness would only be a liability for the group, whatever his or her skills. That individual could not be depended on to carry out the assigned mission. On the contrary, such an individual would be more likely to sabotage the group by, for example, botching an operation or revealing group secrets if captured. Nor would a psychotic member be likely to enhance group solidarity.

Thus, the highly selective terrorist recruitment process explains why most terrorist groups have only a few pathological members. Candidates who exhibit signs of psychopathy or other mental illness are deselected in the interest of group survival. Terrorist groups need members whose behavior appears to be normal and who would not

arouse suspicion, and that is why terrorists have turned to the internet and online gaming sites for “recruitment and help”.

CONCLUSION

Within this field, the personality dynamics of individual terrorist, including the causes and motivations behind the decision to join a terrorist group and to commit violent acts should assert the importance of a terrorist’s decision-making patterns, problems of leadership and authority, target selection and group mindset as a pressure tool on the individual.

The techniques used by MMORPG creators to entice and maintain players into their virtual world certainly seem to be deeply rooted psychology. From a personal experience, it could be said that the creators of such games have mastered the science of conditioning which is evident by the number of players logging on and making these virtual worlds their “home away from home” on a daily basis. Psychology aside, if we were to ask any MMORPG player why they play, most likely the response would linger around on the beauty of the graphics, many more that could be done beyond the physical world, or even simply, the game itself is much more interesting and fun.

MMORPG and other online games have contributed to the deliberate incidents of mass massacre of innocent persons in public places, including the acts of saboteur and terrorism. In addition to drawing on political science and sociology, this study draws on the attempt to explain terrorist motivation and to answer question such as who become terrorists and what kind of individuals join terrorist groups and commit public acts of shocking violence.

Goals of a long-range counterterrorism policy should also include deterring alienated youth from joining a terrorist group in the first place. This may seem an impractical goal, for how does one recognize a potential terrorist, let alone deter him or her from joining a terrorist group? Actually, this is not so impractical in the cases of guerrilla organizations, which conscript all the young people in their rural areas of operation who can be rounded up. A counter strategy could be approached within the framework of advertising and civic-action campaigns.

A government-sponsored mass media propaganda campaign, tailor-made to fit the local culture and society, could probably help to discredit hard-liners in the guerrilla or terrorist groups and may sufficiently have a serious negative impact on their recruitment efforts. Not only should all young people could be educated on the realities of guerrilla or terrorist life, but a counterterrorism policy should be in place to inhibit them from joining in the first place. If they are inducted, they should be helped or encouraged to leave the group.

The effectiveness of such a campaign would depend in part on how sensitive the campaign is culturally, socially, politically, and economically. It could not succeed,

however, without being supplemented by civic-action and rural security programs, especially a program to establish armed self-defense civil patrols among the peasantry. The government would then be able to defeat terrorists operating in the region through creating an armed self-defense civil patrols that can become its eyes and ears. These patrols would not only provide crucial intelligence on the movements of the terrorists, but would also enable the rural population to take a stand against them.

Without a measure of popular support, a terrorist group cannot survive. Moreover, if it fails to recruit new members to renew itself by supporting or replacing an aging membership or members who have been killed or captured, it is likely to disintegrate.

How the government should approach this, would be the next best question that needs to be answered by the policy makers. As terrorists are getting smarter in recruiting and influencing, governments should even be smarter in detecting and preventing the “manipulative and deceptive” web of the Internet. By having proper measures and/or implementing strict laws or regulations.

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THE TRIANGULAR TENSION OF TAIWAN STRAIT – THE KOREAN PENINSULAR – JAPAN: CHALLENGES IN THE SHADOW OF COLD WAR AND POST COLD WAR ERA

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ABSTRACT

The challenges to ensure security and stability overwhelmed Northeast Asian Region. Security issues revolve in a triangular dimension that involves countries such Taiwan, North and South Korea, The PRC and Japan. The Taiwan Straits issue are flashpoints in Northeast Asian Region which involves Taiwan, the PRC, the Korean Peninsula and Japan. Conflicting notions of sovereignty, deeply rooted in Taipei and Beijing, preclude a diplomatic breakthrough under present conditions. With cross-Strait tensions likely to persist in the twenty-first century, Taiwan faces the daunting challenge of maintaining its de facto autonomy in the shadow of growing Chinese economic and military power. The Korean Peninsula situation quite often reminds one of a pendulum swinging from a recurrent crisis to negotiation. The Six-Party Talks was intended to reduce nuclear capabilities but nonetheless did not manage to achieved its desired aim hence did not reduce the hostility between North and South Korea. On the other hand, North Korea's post-World War II policy toward Japan was mainly aimed at minimizing cooperation between South Korea and Japan, and at deterring Japan's rearmament while striving for closer diplomatic and commercial ties with Japan.

Keywords: International relations, diplomacy, security architecture, alliances, balance of power

INTRODUCTION

The end of Cold War and bipolar [1] world in 1989 did not ended the tension in Taiwan Strait and the issue of Korean Peninsula. Main actors in Northeast Asia region i.e. the United States (U.S), China, Japan, Taiwan and both Koreans are still in struggle pursuing their national interests, and at the same time upholding and defending their sovereignty as well as legitimacy by own-doing. The differences in responding the issues have caused the different formulation and direction of key players towards their foreign policies, and defence policies as well. Presently, a new international structure is evolving,

which multi-polarity has created a far less predictable policy situation.

'Past ideological enemies may become allies and past allies, potential enemies. Allegiances formed may be temporary or subject to regular reviews. New alliances may quickly be formed. A nation may side with one nation as its adversary on another. Nations will display a greater degree of opportunism based on nation's self-interest' [2].

The statement postulate a situation of complex formulation of Northeast Asian region order and relationship among actors involved during the Cold War period or the Post-Cold War era.



Figure 1: Northeast Asian Countries

Source: <http://www.pmel.noaa.gov>

From Japanese colonisation, Korean War and Long March experienced until today, the boundaries in Northeast Asia were clearly drawn at the 38th parallel in the Korean Peninsula and in the strait between China and Taiwan. Nevertheless, within the same time of crucial periods, Japan has succeeded crawling up to gain economic prosperity despite World War II (WW II) mass destruction and stigma, but still having proportionate challenges dealing with the Korea Peninsular and the Taiwan Strait. All these unresolved issues have become an uncertainty conflict, which has a complexity character in manner.

In contemporary period, some scholars in the field of International Security and Conflict, i.e. Mearsheimer suggest that;

'The evolution of the power structure in Northeast Asia, meanwhile, will depend on whether China's rise continues. If China does not become a potential hegemon, the United States likely to pull its troops out of the area, thereby encouraging Japan to build up its military capability and become a great power once again. The regional system would remain multipolar and balanced, but security competition would be somewhat more intense than it is today' [3].

Yet, in fact, the question of China hegemony is not the most crucial issue when we analyse issues in the Korean Peninsula, particularly the nuclear crisis. North Korean nuclear crisis does not only involve China security policy but many parties which concluded in the Six-party talks. Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo put their analysis by saying that; *'North Korea's test explosion of a nuclear bomb on October 9, 2006 sent a shockwave throughout the world and totally changed the strategic equation in the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. With that, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) declared itself a nuclear power, and the international community led by the US scrambled to impose sanctions against North Korea [4].* In relations to Japan, the issues are more than the nuclear crisis, it involves historical colonialisation issues, World War II issues, economic assistance issues, and overlapping claims issue [5].

Meanwhile, the issue of Taiwan is a turning point and a new description of present and future patterns in China-Japan power race relations due to the status of Taiwan and their intent to remain engaged with Taiwan despite the growing importance of China as an economic and military power in the region [6]. In order to show a strong interest of Japan over Taiwan in political ties, two high profile events took place in December 2003 [7]. In year 2000, Japan also was beginning to show heightened awareness of security concerns in its security policy by attempting to clarify where Japanese national interests in the cross-Strait issue really lay [8]. Consequently, China-Korea relations played an important part in determining the stability possession in the region even though some analysts like Snyder poses the pattern of relationships between China- North Korea, and China-South Korea are different.

The above mentioned articulated and speculated issues of triangle tensions of Taiwan Strait, Korean Peninsula and Japan of which will be highlighted and analysed by considering some significance issues since the end of Cold War era.

NORTHEAST ASIA DURING THE COLD WAR PERIOD

Tension in the Taiwan Straits

Historically, tensions in the Taiwan Strait were originated prior and during the Cold War period when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) overthrown the ruling government Kuomintang (KMT) in the Revolution of 1949. The KMT government under Chiang Kai

Shek withdrew from mainland to Taiwan and established a new nationalist government, and founded the 1947 constitution which drawn up for the entire of China, and Taipei as its new capital. Since the threat from mainland was very obvious, Chiang Kai Shek had sought protection from the US. In 1953, the U.S. interest in the region became obvious and emerged with regards toward the two major sources of tension in Korea and China [9]. It did not only involve these two nations but also the Soviet Union and Japan. Soviet Union struggled for its hegemonic among communist states, which has caused confrontation with China. The biggest blow to Taiwan came when the U.S. government decided to restore normalisation relations with China. The People's Republic of China (PRC) was given a seat in the United Nations (UN), including the veto power in the Security Council, and had full diplomatic relations with most of the countries in the world in 1971.

Since the threat appeared in 1972, China opened relation with the West out of fear of a Soviet military threat and in pursuit of its own ambitious domestic modernization programme. The act replaced the bloc confrontation model with the U.S.-China-Soviet Union 'strategic triangle' in Northeast Asia [10]. By signing the 1972 Shanghai communiqué with the United States and the 1978 Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japan containing the anti-hegemony clause directed against the Soviet Union, China dropped even the pretence of fraternal relations with the Soviets, won the removal of American security commitments to Taiwan, and normalized relations with the United States and Japan. This security posture also involved the signing of the Foreign Military Sales in 1984, followed by the four agreements in 1987, totalling US\$ 592 million [11]. It means, during Cold War period, China and the United States were able to reduce quarrel over Taiwan and relations across the Taiwan Strait [12].

The normalisation relations between China and the U.S. to curb the expansion of Soviet Union influences have given a great impact to Taiwan reputation as a member in the international politics. Taiwan lost all those international privileges when most countries transferred diplomatic recognition to the Communist government in Beijing as a legitimate government of China. The U.S. did so in 1979, recognizing it as the One China of which Taiwan was a part [12]. Most important, Taiwan lost its bilateral security treaty with the U.S. Nevertheless, the U.S. did not 'leave' Taiwan alone without any support when the super power passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. According to the Act, it asserts that the U.S. would maintain her capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security and social or economic systems of the people of Taiwan [12]. The act also requires the U.S. to supply Taiwan with such defensive weapons as are necessary to maintain a balance of power in the Taiwan Strait [13]. What that means is that the peace and security in Taiwan Strait was prolong-dragged into an ambiguous condition until the present day.

On the other hand, economic relations between China and Taiwan, the U.S. and Japan were not so crucial, except for the struggle of China to enter WTO's as a member. The 1980s saw an unprecedented economic growth in China, whereby the gross domestic product increased by double-digit percentages nearly every year. The country became a

heaven of foreign investors, many of them from Taiwan. These 'Taiwanese compatriots' as the official Chinese media regularly referred to them, poured billions of dollars into the mainland's economy. From the perspective of U.S. foreign policy, the development was positive for both side to promote and foster mutual understanding, and economic growth on the mainland would result in democratisation. It also hopes that the economies of Taiwan and mainland would intertwine, and economic integration would lead to political integration [13].

Simultaneously, the role played by the Japanese government during the Cold War era was to promote economic prosperity by supporting or strengthening the U.S. foreign policy in the region, particularly through improvisation of Japan-Taiwan ties [6]. Via its foreign policy, Japan managed to reduce tension with China through cautious and defensive manner:

'Japan sees its own national interests best served by preserving the status quo in the cross-Strait standoff. Japan does not wish to see Taiwan declare independence, which could draw Japan into a major power war via its alliance with the United States. An independent Taiwan might also make stronger sovereignty claims on neighbouring islands that Japan sees as its own. On the other hand, Japan does not wish to see Taiwan absorbed into the PRC, which could give China dominion over vital shipping lanes and the South China Sea. This second scenario could enhance China's influence over Southeast Asia at the expense of Japan's relations in the region. Japan will therefore continue to uphold its One China policy while seeking to upgrade security coordination with the United States and Taiwan [6].'

It essence, the Japanese foreign policy which dealt on the Taiwan Strait during the Cold War era was heavily influenced by the mode of U.S.-Taiwan-PRC relations as a part of Containment policy to curb the dominion of Soviet ideology expansion in East Asian region. In that condition, both Japan and the U.S. place great emphasis on their defence relationship or alliances by established its forward bases in Okinawa and economic association. The issue of Taiwan Strait during this era was not the main focal point in the eyes of Japanese government, but became strategically important to the U.S. and PRC. It involved in a series of normalisation U.S.-PRC ties, and sometimes had been boiled up with issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan in 1980s.

TENSION IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA

The tension in the Korean Peninsula is more complex and unpredictable. It involves direct foreign and defence policy among Northeast Asian nations i.e. the both the North and South Korea, Japan, China, the U.S. and Soviet Union as permanent key players. It became worst when North Korea was involved in the nuclear weapons proliferation issue. The roots of tensions could be divided into two periods; the experiences of Korean Peninsula under the Japanese occupation up to the end of WWII and the tension in 1950s with the broke out of the Korean War. After the bombing of the Hiroshima and

Nagasaki in 1945, the U.S. had pursuit to liberate Korean Peninsula from Japanese occupation. During that period, the Korean Peninsula was considered as one entity without differences in ideologies and territories. The Yalta System Agreements that were signed by four dominant powers, Great Britain, the U.S., Soviet Union and China in February 1945 began the demarcation [14]. However, after the liberation of the Korean Peninsula which ended in August 1945, the U.S. and Soviet Union entered the peninsula on separates approaches in which the 38th parallel demarcation line agreed as the border to force the Japanese surrender to both superpowers. But the agreement between the U.S. and Soviet Union has changed into the hostile power races among each other, which caused the failure of the Korean unification. In the North, the Soviet Union had succeeded to establish the People's Committee under directive of the Satellite Government of Moscow in 12 August 1945, which Kim II Sung was the first leader.

On the other hand, the U.S. has not recognised the de facto government in North Korea, and brought that matter to the UN on 17 September 1947 with the proposal of United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) to supervise the general election, which was to be held on 31 March 1948. The proposal was refused by the Soviet Union. Later on, the general election on 15 August 1948 only involved the southern part of Korea and Republic of Korea (ROK) officially established under Syngman Rhee. In contrast, the Soviet Union only recognised the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as the legitimate government for the whole peninsula on 8th September 1948.



Figure 2: The Korean Peninsula
Source: <http://www.pmel.noaa.gov>

The UN and other 30 nations gave recognition to the Republic of Korea (ROK), and on the other hand the Soviet Union with her allied gave recognition to the DPRK. As a result, in June 1949 the U.S. had withdrawn its 10,000 military troops from South Korea in which was giving opportunity for a North Korean invasion on 25th Jun 1950 and caused the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, [15] whereby the U.S. responses by redeploying its military capabilities. The involvement of China in the Korean issue started when it began to pour across the Yalu River in north to give assistance for the North Korean troops. By 27 July 1953 both sides were able to establish cease-fire, but without a formal treaty as a mark to end the war until the present day [16]. Tensions in Korean Peninsula gave impact to the U.S. foreign policy in 1953 and onwards.

The U.S. was committed to defend South Korea under a security treaty, as well as the Soviet Union committed to defend North Korea, and China to be hegemonic over North Korea internal and foreign affairs. After WW II, and by the defeat of Japanese Imperial Army, the U.S. restored a new people-democratic choice on Japanese political system, which then the U.S. was on its Mutual Security Treaty with Japan, [12] as part of its strategic alliances in East Asian region. Tensions between Japan and South Korea appeared since both countries do not have any defence arrangements between each other. This is because of the nationalism factors aroused in Korean Peninsula to reject any political or security cooperation with the Japanese due to the historical colonisation factor. In a different circumstance, under the U.S.-Japan defence treaty, the U.S. had used the Japanese position as an important regional staging and logistics forward area for operations during Korean War and also to safeguard the Taiwan Strait. At the time, the U.S. had stationed her military bases in South Korea to contain the influence of North Korea downwards.

In fact, tensions between Korean Peninsula and Japan became obvious in 1978 when the U.S. and Japan drew up guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation, particularly in response towards development in North Korea [12]. Some events soon after have showed the incremental of conflict including the kidnapping incident of 13 Japanese citizens which were never resolved until the present day. David Kang postulates that:

'The issue of abductees remains as important as ever in Japanese domestic politics. With North Korea being accused of falsifying remains, the Japanese are insistent that the abductees issue be resolved before any moves toward normalisation occur [18].

Thus, by the mid -1980's the crux of renewed Cold War in Northeast Asia was back at 38th parallel where it had begun in 1950, has prolonged into a more uncertainty complex when the nuclear-armed states i.e. the U.S., China, and Soviet Union could fall into direct conflict due to circumstances beyond their ability to predict or control, especially when dealing with the convoluted North Korean nuclear issue. Significantly, issue on nuclear proliferation is the most determination factor that caused the unstable relationship situation among North Korea-South Korea, Japan-North Korea, the U.S.-North Korea, China-U.S., and the U.S.-Soviet Union.

THE END OF COLD WAR

New leadership in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev arrived in 1985 bent on radical programme of domestic reform required a peaceful environment and unobstructed access to the global economy. What it meant was that under the new leadership, Soviet policy towards Northeast Asia region has shown major changes to reduce risks of war along the Chinese border and in the Korean Peninsula in order to turn Soviet territory in Asia from a liability into an asset by engaging the countries of the economically and dynamic Asia-Pacific region in new economic and political co-operation. In 1987 Soviet Union laid out its intentions to negotiate compromise agreements to remove obstacles to normalise relations with China and the other Asian nations, and she promised to contribute to the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts.

By the end of 1980s, indications that the Cold War in Northeast Asia was leading towards the end were preceded by events such as the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) agreement which, banned modernised Soviet intermediate-range nuclear ballistic missile from the Soviet Far east and Siberia; the withdrawal troops from Afghanistan in 1988, which removed one of China's so-called 'three obstacle' to normalise relations with the Soviet Union's; and the 1988 Olympic Games held in Seoul, which saw the participation of both China and the Soviet Union despite the call for a boycott made by North Korea.

A successful official visit to Beijing by Gorbachev in May 1989 put Sino-Soviet relations on a peaceful course and at the Malta Summit on December 1989 U.S. and Soviet Union pronounced the Cold War was ended. In June 1990 informal meeting took place between South Korean President, Roh Tae Woo and Soviet President Gorbachev, on American soil in San Francisco, symbolised the end of the Cold War in the Northeast Asia Region. Furthermore, after 43 years in bad hostility, on 17th September 1991, it was agreed that both North and South Korea has been recognised as two different entities membership in the UN [19].

CHALLENGES IN THE SHADOW OF THE COLD WAR AND POST COLD WAR ERA

The 'symbolic ritual' in San Francisco in real sense did not end up the Cold War trauma and various old issues in Northeast Asia region. Some changes only occurred in terms of economic interests by all parties involved, human rights issues and also minor changes of security partnerships, but it still convoluted in hegemonic conflict rather than ideologies struggle. In strategic studies, particularly when we discuss on power inter-play in international relations, there is no permanent friendship but only remains permanent interest. A nation may side with one nation as its adversary on another due to the permanent interest of the nation. Nations will display a greater degree of opportunism based on nation's self-interest in order to ensure its survivability in the international anarchical system. Multi-polarity world and uncertainties condition have replaced the

bipolarity world with the end of Cold War era. Certain circumstances particularly to show off the hegemonic wise and security doctrines are still very strong bounding and overshadowing these two theatres of conflict.

TENSIONS IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Hegemonic Conflict

Presently, the issue of Taiwan Strait is potentially the most serious conflict in the U.S.-Japan-China relations. According to June Teufel Dreyer, 'Taiwan is a 'ticking time bomb' that was apt to explode between 2004 and 2007 [13]. Nevertheless, it was able to be avoided by trickery triangle relation, and it still refrained as a status quo until today. Taiwan in this situation strongly relies on the U.S. foreign and defence policies to engage, to enlarge and to contain China threats in this region. The tension tide due to the peculiar dramatic events as follow:

1. **Issue of Independence, Legitimacy and One China.** During the Cold War era these issues were not very obvious since both Taiwan and mainland were facing the same threats, Soviet Union expansionism policy. In 1988 Taiwan-born Lee Teng-hui succeeded Taiwan's President from Chiang Ching-kuo, [20] which gained 90 percent mass support of Taiwanese, together with his new ideas and perspective of Taiwan going to be in future. In early 1990s the possibility of the Republic of China (ROC, which refers to Taiwan entity) being readmitted to the United Nations began to be discussed seriously, and legislators and government officials began lobbying [13] by Taiwan government and other countries to support Taiwan's membership. Some of the important points such as Taiwan's willingness to participate in multinational organizations despite the PRC present have been highlighted, where PRC strongly objected them. From 1991 to 1994, several series of official meeting have been conducted between both governments to propose a compromise to resolve the issue of One China but failed to achieve agreement.

The tension increased when in June 1995 President Lee Teng-hui visited the U.S. when giving a speech, he implied for a separate, sovereign status or legitimacy for Taiwan. The visit caused a serious objection from China, and one month aftermath a series of missile tests and war games were conducted and continued until Taiwan's presidential elections in the following year of 1996 to warned Taiwan on the issue of independence. In short, the idiosyncratic of Lee Teng-hui has played an important possession in determining the tide of the conflict, as Michael Swaine and James Mulvenon have argued:

'a combination of two trends, one domestic and the other international, spurred Taiwan's move toward "pragmatic diplomacy" under President Lee Teng-hui during the 1990s' [6].

In fact, prior to the visit of President Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. in 1995, he exploited this new space in the early 1990's just after Cold War ended to strengthen relations with both the U.S. and Japan. In 1992 Japan began to allow its economic officials to meet with their counterparts from Taiwan and permitted Taiwan to change the name of its representative office from the Council of East Asian Relations (CEAR) to the more distinctive Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan (TECRO) [6]. In 1994 saw Japan's first major controversy over Taiwan when PRC objected to President Lee attending the Asian Games held in Hiroshima, which followed by the Beijing strongly protested Tokyo's decision on the grounds that the expansion of Taiwan's political space through diplomacy of this sort was a step towards independence [6]. Within the same year another political visit by a Japanese delegation took place to strengthen the Japan-Taiwan relationship during the Taipei celebration of the 1911 founding of the Chinese republic [6].

The year 1996 marked the first controversial issue over the Taiwan Strait after Cold War era. The tensions escalated after PRC took over Hong Kong in 1997 to show that China has succeeded to adopt 'One China Two Political Systems', as stated by Peter Lewis Young, 'the politico-economic formula devised by the late Deng Xiaoping for Hong Kong was originally intended as China's model for Taiwan' [21]. It would be true that the new development in Hong Kong would strengthen Chinese ambition towards Taiwan, and has caused a reciprocal action by the two parties; the U.S. and Japan to revise Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defence Cooperation which were announced in 1997 [6]. Nevertheless, issue in the Taiwan Strait has caught Japan in a dilemma due to a heavy pressure from Beijing, and Prime Minister Obuchi refused to sign on to the "three no's" policy (no Taiwan independence, no Two China policy and no to Taipei's membership in international bodies based on statehood) adopted by the Clinton administration in 1998 [6]. It caused a reduce tension in PRC-Japan relations for a temporary period before year 2000.

In the year 2000 just before the general election in March, PRC has released a 'white paper' about her relations with Taiwan regarding the 'One China and Two Political Systems', which also included the use of force if the Taiwanese manifest separatism promotes formulating a new constitution, amending the previous constitution, explaining the constitution or passing the legislation that would have the effect of changing the formal status of the ROC [13]. It was a very obvious response to Taiwan's 2000 presidential election brought about the first change of ruling party in Taiwan's political history. It also brought about a new approach to Taiwan's Japan diplomacy [6]. On the other hand, Taiwan accused the mainland of moving away from the 1992 consensus view that each side be allowed to define one China in its own way, and argued that the ROC had been a sovereign state continuously since its establishment in 1911 [22]. Taiwan's new President, Chen Shui-bian, was back up by the majority of pro-independence people and facing the same dilemma as the previous president to accept the one China state. Compared to the previous President Lee, Chen Shui-bian would like to see the basis of Taiwan-Japan relations moving from

being based on personal ties and the colonial legacy toward a broader relationship based upon mutual economic, political and security interests [6]. According to Denny Roy, Taiwan under President Chen postulated a preponderant independence movement which caused triangle relations of US-China-Japan in fumble, uncertainty, and tensions since the year 2004 until April 2008 [23]. When Ma Ying-Jeou comes in power as the new president in May 2008, he tried to make a balance and reduce the tensions with all parties involved in the Taiwan Strait, but the policy was still ambiguous in manner which maintained the issue of Taiwan Strait as status quo. He renewed his pledge not to seek formal independence for the island and to work towards improving ties with former rival China:

`at this present stage any radical political choice, whether it be unification or independence, would trigger serious confrontation and turbulence I insist on maintaining the situation of `no unification, no independence, no use of force' to promote cross-strait exchanges and cooperation for peaceful developments in the Taiwan Strait [24].

2. Military Enhancement and Security Posture. Post-Cold War relations indicated Japan security and military tie has no broad-range strategic framework for cooperation with Taiwan. Japan's relations with Taiwan have been largely a byproduct of the requisites of the U.S.-Japan alliance [6]. Generally, the cross-Strait conflict marked a low point in Japanese public sentiment towards China. Nevertheless this statement is already obsolete due to development in year 1995-96 and 2000. In year 1996, reports of China test firing M-9 missiles in the direction of Taiwan in order to discourage the election of a pro-independence candidate alarmed many Japanese about China's intentions in the region [6]. The tension dragged both China to enhance their military capabilities of which PLA planners have been exploring new technologies and concepts of operation. Some of the military actions taken by the PRC during this period were as follows:

- a. PRC missiles (M-9s and M-11s) pointed towards Taiwan's territories were numerous and capable than ever to strike Taiwan's air defence installations, airfields, naval bases, and logistics facilities. *`The PRC is generally believed to have some 200 missiles already pointed across the Taiwan Strait' [13].*
- b. Upgrading China's new surveillance planes and AEW (airborne early warning) aircraft (Su-27s, Su-30s, and Phalcons) [13].
- c. Upgrading naval capabilities with nuclear warhead etc [13].

On the other hand, Taiwan has also upgraded its military capabilities, which involved:

- a. Upgrading air defence capabilities such as; modernization of aircraft (F-16 and MIRAGE 2000-5) and anti-aircraft forces (Israel technology), Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and ground based radar [13].

b. Upgrading sea defence including submarines, and coastal missile defence, which includes anti-ship missile [13].

c. Upgrading and enhancement of the ground forces to be develop into a highly mobile and have more fire power capabilities. Focus of the army is to equip them with the armour and anti-armour capabilities supported from the U.S. [13].

During Chen's presidential period (2000-2008), there was that Japanese thinking towards Taiwan's issue started to change. The pro-independence movement led by Chen sharpened Japan's security concerns over Taiwan since stability (or the status quo) in the Taiwan Straits was on a fragile foundation:

'Japan is beginning to think seriously about its role in a future contingency. Track two levels trilateral security dialogue among Taiwan, the United States, and Japan is reported to be making "smooth progress", while a number of Japanese lawmakers have voiced their support for greater security cooperation between Taiwan and Japan on a bilateral basis [6].

Some events within the period have shown how the Japanese shift of paradigm towards the issue of Taiwan Straits. For example in January 2003, a retired senior Japanese Self Defence Force (JSDF) was posted to Taipei, the first time the Japanese Government had posted a former JSDF official to Taiwan since it severed diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 1972 [6]. It was followed by strengthening the U.S.-Japan defence cooperation after the electoral 2005 and the beginning of the National Defence Programme Guideline (NDPG), stating new development to rectify Article 9 constitution 1951 [25]. The shift of paradigm in the Japanese lawmakers were respond to the PRC Defence White Paper which was produced in 2004 to monitor closely the increased of complicated security factors in Asia-Pacific region [25]. For the Japanese, the PRC Defence White Paper revealed that the latest potential threat to Japanese security is the incursion of Chinese into Japanese waters, and Japan's reaction s towards the new threats forced it to take into account vulnerabilities resulting from limited strategic depth; long coast lines and numerous small islands which able to reach Taiwan coastal lines [25].

As a result, the guideline and the new treaty of U.S.-Japan defence cooperation caused displeasure to the PRC. China therefore pressured Japan to explicitly exclude Taiwan from the geographic scope of the new guidelines of Japanese security policy, but Japan responded by refusing to exclude it from the security considerations [26].

'The Chinese latest strategic calculation on Taiwan to response the Japanese security guideline is by; modernizing its nuclear, missile and conventional capabilities as well as naval and air forces. Its deployment of missiles against Taiwan in particular is being viewed with concern as having the potential to tilt the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait, a region of strategic interest to Japan' [27].

TENSIONS IN THE KOREAN PENINSULAR

Hegemonic Conflict

Issues in the Korean Peninsula are more complex, but strongly shadowed by two major events; Japanese occupation and colonialisation from 1910 to 1945, and the Cold War period. Some of the important issues involved namely were: nuclear issue of North Korea, reunification and the rise of Korean nationalism dealing with the Japanese, which compounded in a hegemonic conflict. These development created a new strategic outlook in the region, i.e. how will a more powerful and an independent ROK, or perhaps even a unified non-communist Korean peninsula be incorporated into a stable regional order? Moreover, an autonomous ROK promises to be an important economic partner of China and Russia, and perhaps even a security co-operation partner as well. A more secure and autonomous ROK security posture also coincides with the American interest in reducing its military forces in the region. With lower costs and risks in the Korean peninsula, the U.S.-ROK bilateral mutual security treaty is of a greater net value to the U.S. side. But the main threat to the security of the ROK after the Cold War period still emanates from the DPRK, which strategically, paying interests accentuate Seoul's feelings of vulnerabilities and fears. In the meantime, the U.S. is co-operating with ROK wishes for greater autonomy by reducing its military presence and turning over military command functions to the South Korean.

1. DPRK - ROK – Japan on Political and Military Issues. The most outstanding structural development affecting Japan is the emergence of the ROK as a regional actor. The old Cold War confrontation left the ROK been opposed by China, Soviet Union and DPRK, and postulated a highly dependency on the U.S. patronage. In the post-Cold War order, however, the ROK is winning the co-operation of the Russians and Chinese in many important areas, while the political and military threats of the DPRK could be obsolete if nuclear weapons are taken out of the picture.

On the other hand, the ROK's security concerns in relations to Japan, rest on a deep mistrust originated since the colonial era. One specific area of concern for Seoul is the territorial disputes between the two countries, involving the ownership of Dokdo or Takeshima islets [28]. The emergence of an elevated mistrust for the ROK towards Japan is Tokyo's new defence posture. Since 1995, Japan has been restructuring its Self Defence Forces (SDF), and in April 1996 Japan has signed the US-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, which referred to Japan's pledge to take on a more active security role in any future Asian conflict provoked concern in Seoul. A further ROK concern is the possibility that Japan might develop its own nuclear weapons, particularly in response the DPRK nuclear programme [28]. Tokyo accused the ROK of occupying the islets illegally since they are Japan's inherent territory in light of historical fact and international law [5], and claims:

Japan began to use the islets in the 17th century as a stopover en route to nearby islands and as fishing grounds, establishing sovereignty by the mid-17th century

and reaffirming sovereignty with the incorporation of the islets into Shimane Prefecture in 1905' [5].

As mentioned earlier, in the year 2005 after the electoral, Japan strengthening the U.S.-Japan defence cooperation and produce the NDPG, which caused a responsive furore between Japan and ROK. In the mind of the Japanese, local instability in the Korean peninsula could still easily affect Japan's security. While in ROK, talks and perceptions focused on Japan's overhaul of its defence guidelines to play a more expanded global role and the DPRK nuclear standoff [18]. According to Prime Minister Koizumi in 2005, he supported revising the Constitution to include a "clear reference to Japan's commitment to pacifism and dedication to international cooperation as well as the possession of a military for self-defence" [18].

In short, the expansion of Japan's international role in Northeast Asia was affected by the structure changes brought on by the end of the Cold War as well as by new domestic factors peculiar to Japan that were shaping its response to the rapidly changing external environment. New factors have produced changes in Japan's foreign policy, most notably in the case of Japan's new activism towards the two Koreas and the debate over the overseas despatch of Japan's Self Defence Forces (SDF). The positive improvement was in economic ties, but not in political and military side.

In view of the remaining threat from the DPRK, prudence would dictate that the ROK did not do anything to provoke Japan into rearmament, but bilateral economic frictions are chronic and serious, and anti-Japanese sentiment in Korea cannot be easily dismissed since both the North and South Korea and Japan relationship are still characterized by a long history of mutual antipathy [29]. What was expected was the DPRK request for official normalization talks and a sizable reparations and compensation agreement to cover the post-Cold War as well as wartime years. This desire to open official talks on normalisation marked a turnaround in a long-standing DPRK policy not to seek official ties with countries having official relations with the ROK. This action shows how Japan's economic power gives it a greater ability to penetrate areas of high politics. There were several reasons why the DPRK change its long-standing policy of refusing to talk to Japan about normalisation. Among the most important, was her failing economy and its lacking of any other likely source of external economic assistance caused the DPRK wanted normalization talks changed its stand and was because the Japanese would not grant economic assistance without first having official relations.

On Chinese side, there are two folds dealing with ROK and DPRK, which showed a different attitude and perception. Dealing with ROK, in 2009 China was proposed a four points of diplomatic contact:

`expanding high-level contact and political trust, expanding trade and economic cooperation, increasing personnel exchanges, and strengthening coordination

in multilateral frameworks including a China-ROK-Japan dialogue..... pursuing respective advantages for a “win-win outcome” [30]’.

On the other hand, China entertains the DPRK in a different attitude that focused on issues of North Korean nuclear proliferation, economic sanction by the UN Security Council (UNSC) and military cooperation facing the U.S.-Korea alliance. During Prime Minister Wen visit to North Korea in October 2009, there was a secret agreement between both countries to restore intelligence ties and strengthen defence cooperation against South Korea, U.S., and Japan through cooperation between traditional intelligence agencies including the DPRK External Liaison Department and Operational Department [30]. In short, China establishes special relations with the DPRK rather than ROK.

2. Issues on Korean Reunification and Nuclear Proliferation. These two issues are not independent the issues by themselves. The issues related closely to traditional and historical background before WW II. It is the issue of the U.S. forces presence in ROK, issue of anti-Japanese spirits, and issue of hegemonic inter-play among DPRK, ROK, China, Japan, the U.S. and Russia. The nuclear proliferation and Korean reunification issues are interpretations on how serious the DPRK government responses to other nations involved. Certainly, the nuclearisation issue presently is more prominent, and become a major resistance towards the progress of peace and prosperity in the Korean Peninsula.

Since the 1990s, threats and fears of this World Mass Destruction (WMD) weapon are a menace to the ROK, U.S. and Japan on one side of the alliance. Hence, the first round of meeting in September and December 1990, the Six-Party Talks, discussed the issues such as; reduction of armaments, nuclear weapons, the withdrawal of the U.S. troops from South Korea and economic problems. It is followed by the second round of meeting in February 1992 which discussed on the formation of three sub-committees i.e. North-South Political Committee, Military Committee and Exchange and Cooperation Committee. Somehow or rather the above matters failed to be realised since the North regime afraid that the ROK achievement on economic and political would absorbed the whole Korean Peninsula when deal with unification issue. Pyongyang feels unachievable to emerge together due to its acute domestic problems, robust military forces, with biological, chemical and, most probably, nuclear, as well as conventional capabilities [28].

The first nuclear test initiated by the DPRK took place in 1998 with a missile test over Japanese territory prompted Tokyo to sign up for the U.S. missile defence programme [31]. The second tests in 2006 and in 2009 were giving different scenarios to the sub-region. It did not involve only with the development of nuclear weapons but also missile capability. According to Young-Sup Han:

‘Since the mid-1970s, North Korea has been developing its missile capabilities. Starting from reverse engineering of SCUD-B and SCUD-C missiles, North

Korea's missile variety and range has grown exponentially. So far, North Korea produced and deployed 600 SCUD-B/C, 150 Nodong, tens of Taepo-dong-I, and is arduously developing long-range ICBMs, which have the potential to threaten the North American continent effectively with a nuclear sized payload. [4]

Japanese leaders were the most worried that the hostile relationship between the two Koreans could be affected not only by nuclear weapon but also by refugee crisis and guerrilla incursion. The North Korean threat according to conflict analysts has certainly made it easier for the Japanese government not only to go for missile defence programme in collaboration with U.S., but also preparing public opinion for amending the Constitution 1951 [25]. Meanwhile, ROK also expected the credibility of its American ally's commitments continuously in terms of the peninsular security. The U.S. has always viewed the Korea issue through the prism of its larger regional or global strategies in Northeast Asian region [13]. In this condition, the ROK remained as détente-partner or mediator diplomacy [32] to contain, deter and engage the DPRK on nuclear issue as what happened during the Cold War. Presently, the North Korea nuclearisation issue has been in the Northeast Asia security agenda for almost two decades. It caused several series of negotiation within or out of Six-Party Talks such as; the first Six-Party Talks was in 1992, second talks in 1994, and third one in 2005 [4].

CONCLUSIONS

Issues in the Taiwan Strait and Korean Peninsula are creating condition of uncertainties even though the Cold War era has ended in Northeast Asia region. Issues in the Taiwan Strait directly involves with PRC sovereignty and hegemonic. Even though there is uncertainty to predict the conflict, arguably the PRC might be using its forces if Taiwan declared itself an independent nation [21] and separate sovereignty political identity. Nevertheless it also depends strongly on the credibility of the KMT government to exercise its political agenda over Taiwanese affairs as an integral part of PRC even though their ideologies differ. Economically, PRC and Taiwan are increasingly interdependent with the support from Japan. Beijing has encouraged economic integration with Taiwan believing it will encourage political integration, and considered it as One China with two Systems. What is worrying is the issue of the preponderance of the Japanese SDF in the straits through its new defence guideline 2005 which strongly supported by the U.S. as part of burden sharing partnership.

Issues in Korean Peninsula on the other hand are more focus on to prevent DPRK from exercising its nuclear weapons and publicly back the South's proposal for the separate entry of the two Koreas into the United Nations (UN) something the North vigorously opposed. The DPRK's isolation is due to the fact that although its economy requires outside help, domestic political considerations give its hard-core regime leadership an interest in maintaining the Cold War and this intransigence has led to isolation. Nuclear weapon in the minds of DPRK leaders is quite significance as part of

deterrence factors when dealing with the issue reunification, the presence of U.S. forces in South Korea, and Japanese factors. In other words, currently, DPRK is very convenient by having this nuclear weapon to strengthen its hard line defence diplomacy to create a situation of 'balance of power' in the Korean Peninsula. It is also sceptical either the situation could be changed or remained as a status quo.

In both cases of the Taiwan Strait's and the Korean Peninsula, Japan's potential to extend economic co-operation is acting as a powerful inducement. This illustrates a major new theme in Japan's post-Cold War strategy; the explicit use of economic co-operation to improve Japan's security environment. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the balance between Japan's reliance on economic and military instruments will continue to tip in favour of economy as long as the U.S. maintains commitment in the region, and the Japanese conservatives are unable to revise the laws governing the SDF's role. China as an emerging power and both North and South Korea are also very sceptical about Japan's play-role in future. Thus the situation in both theatres and the Japanese commitments are still very much influenced by the Cold War shadow and a long experienced of historical background. The scenario in both theatres may become more uncertain compared to the Cold War era, and has a potential to provide a continuous challenge.

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THE RISK MANAGEMENT AND ITS KEY ELEMENTS: RISK ASSESSMENT AND CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY PLANNING

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ABSTRACT

Worldwide the territorial risk consists by natural and anthropogenic risk; modern societies are made up of very complex systems and networks and so they always depend on a more efficient supply of essential services such as: communications, electricity, public welfare, banking and financial services, etc. This complexity has a strong influence on citizens' welfare, social organization, economy and territorial security as a partial or total detriment of the networks and systems capacity can have a debilitating impact on the society (domino effect).

To mitigate, prevent and deal with the consequences of a crisis, we have some key elements: monitoring and control of critical infrastructures, adopting appropriate emergency and contingency plans, resilience increasing, consider a security policy shared between public and private sectors, proper management of information. In emergency or crisis, we have to achieve a holist, integrated, comprehensive and multidimensional approach namely risk mitigation has a key element: the risk management. Then the emergency respond system must be rational, coherent and interoperable; for this reason, every Country must undertake an intensive risk management that is holistic and integrated because it must consider a variety of aspects such as social, economic, political and cultural. To get ready for a emergency is important to know what to do and how to do it, have monitored the territory, able to face the recovery activities and have a necessary human, instrumental and economic resources.

Each activity must be planned, provided for and continuously updated and then all countries should undertake a policy of risk management that includes everything about the management of a crisis or emergency

Key words: risk management, systemic vulnerability, contingency planning, and emergency planning.

INTRODUCTION

The National Service for Civil Protection is on charge of territory's defense, civil population's protection and defense and of the infrastructure both public and private. The

National Service for Civil Protection is part of the Italian Civil Defense which consists in measures to set and activities to perform in order to cope with emergencies caused by:

- Natural occurrences, involuntary and/or hazardous accidents
- Natural disasters or deliberate disasters provoked by men
- National or international crises

The organization and consequently the planning of territory's defense have to be structured on precise "levels of efficiency":

- The preparedness in applying provided measures
- The quantity and quality of employed personnel and means
- The duration of recovery operations

The common denominator of all the activities connected with this planning is the total absence of any forms of improvisation and the full respect of provisions established in the Management Plans. In fact, these provisions comes from cautious and tested planning because, by this way, emergencies can be faced with promptness and determination as to avoid chaos and then it is possible to get less waste of energies and more efficient use of the available structures.

The main objectives in planning the emergencies management step by step are:

- Continuity in Government action
- Telecommunication and early warning system: functionality of telecommunication as a whole of systems, forming the national network and their connection with the international hubs, the branch of steps and conditions of warning as well
- Safeguard of the economic and logistic framework: this framework is formed by the safeguard of services of vital interest such as transport, food supply chain (finding, supplying, conservation and transport), essential services (energy, water, gas, fuel) and, finally, the works of infrastructures recovery
- Safeguard of public health: establishment of field hospitals and centers of health check, first aid, patient's recovery and treatment and those patients affected by non conventional weapons attacks or NBCR's attacks as well; safeguard and health check of animals, food, waters and environment and, finally, decontamination and recovery of infected areas
- Civil Protection: prevention and detection of natural dangers and radioactivity biological and chemical dangers, protection of population, protection of cultural heritage and productive activities and, finally, maintenance and recovery of environment.
- Public information, training to protection and safeguard of cultural heritage: focus on dangers and its steps of emergency and warning, how to protect and train a single person or collectivity, organization of volunteers and collaborators which are part of the Civil Protection and protection of private and public goods.

The political and economic assets which has been outlining during these years, determined a progressive change in the concept of safety and safeguard of the country. Now, the focus of attention is on the protection of people and on protection of civil State's infrastructures and on the goods of national collectivity, which are the main objectives and more vulnerable in case of emergency.

This view of the National territory safety implies an increase of the Civil Protection National Service's tasks in comparison with the past and a possible diversification of competences and bodies in charge and a more complex planning as well. This approach needs a strong synergy between the Civil Protection and the law enforcement agencies interested in this area and, moreover, there is a strong need of flexibility of tasks and dependences.

In order to develop a Urban Crisis Management Plan, it is necessary to take into account all those assets which take part into citizens' life, to analyze not only the natural risks, but also the anthropic ones, the risks of bad working or end of essential services supply and of every other fact which can invalidate the usability of the City System or which can be a danger for the life of any member, even if virtual, of the very same metropolis.

Modern societies are more and more a complex system of systems and, then, the emergencies or crisis occurrence management plans are necessarily more and more complex. This framework implies a big management effort which cannot be finalized only to the disaster occurrence's management, but it has to be extended over the emergency, both before its occurrence and after it happens until the phase of normality recovery.

The concept of safeguard and safety of the Country extended its horizons both in terms of administrations, bodies and structures involved and in terms of analysis' activities, monitoring, management and efficiency in order to guarantee a best capability as response to the new menaces and to the new risks profiles.

In fact, the environment is continuously evolving and consequently the risk scenarios too which are becoming more and more dynamics and changeable; the menaces modern societies are exposed to every day are complex, variable, asymmetric and, so, cooperation, coordination of institutions, organizations and experts are the best way to face them. Every player becomes a fundamental element for the safety of collectivity.

The organization and management of human resources, technologies and tools are the focus points of an efficient response in the protection of population, of critical infrastructures and of any other element which constitutes the modern society.

THE RISK MANAGEMENT

The **risk management** can be defined as all those activities, procedures, methods and tools, which are necessary to estimate and evaluate the risk and to identify the management strategy more suitable to prevent and limit the effect of the very same risk and its effects on society as well.

Among the tasks of a good risk management's activity there is the protection and increase the security level of a country by supporting the objectives stated through the setting of a methodological and resources framework which allows to maintain always unchanged, coherent and controlled the future activities in order to ensure the country and to its population.

The risk management is a continuously process and it is gradual and pro active. It provides the introduction of a logic and systemic methodology which is able, step by step, to identify, evaluate, communicate, eliminate and/or contain and monitor the natural risks or those risks which are associated to men's activities. For this reason, it is important to promote a "risk's culture" which has to involve in a transversal way every society, from the government's structures to the private enterprises, from the public and private centers of research to the law and military enforcement until all the citizens; the risk management cannot be and must not be considered a process of exclusively competence of this sector's technicians, but, at different levels, it must involve every part which can be directly or indirectly affected by events which can degenerate first of all in a crisis and then, if not adequately and immediately faced, in an emergency.

The global approach to the risk management allows considering the potential impact of every type of risk on the territory.

The management of the risk, as being a main part of the planning, programming and controlling process, has to be finalized to the achievement of the strategic and effective objectives which have to be well identified because otherwise the process completely loses its utility.

The main benefits deriving from an adequate risk management policy are:

1. The improvement of efficacy and efficiency: through the alignment of the acceptable risk strategy it is possible to identify and develop the activities which are necessary to cope with an event before it degenerates;
2. Strengthening the capabilities of response: by applying a "rigorous" methodology in the assessment of risks it is possible to identify and to select among a set of different responses the one that is more adequate to the analyzed risk (avoidance, reduction, sharing, retention of the risk), by taking into account the correlated and multiple risks too; in fact, during emergencies we are often involved in a set of

correlated impacts, as well multiple risks which have to be managed by giving an efficient and univocal response;

3. The reduction of economic, social and physical losses: by identifying the risks and the associated prevention and protection actions, in the same time, it is possible to reduce the event's frequency and magnitude;
4. Better allocation and employment of instrumental and human resources: the analysis of the risks and of the vulnerabilities of a territory allows to identify the weaknesses of the "chain" and, consequently, to rationally organize the necessary resources to protect and to defend the safety of all the system;
5. Raising, disseminating and developing a transversal knowledge and awareness of the risk within the society intended as a complex of systems, bodies and individuals in order to take and to exploit in a proactive way the emergent opportunities and the lessons learned during the process and above all in the emergencies previously occurred.
6. Strengthening of local/national identity: the emergencies affect in a transversal way all the society and for this reason it is import to set, in time of peace, a process of making responsible and actively involved the community in every step of the emergency life-cycle through communication, information and training campaign and through spreading the culture of risk. By this way anyone can learn how to be an integrated part of the Country system.

The risk management allows to fill the existing gap between an individual and tacit knowledge as shown in Figure 1 which is typical of the traditional very often little efficient approach to the emergencies planning, and a social and explicit knowledge, which is typical of an integrated and holistic approach.




Figure. 1 - The individual and social knowledge

Obviously, in order to move from one approach to the other, it is necessary to undertake a codification of knowledge, it means it is fundamental to undertake a process of adequate rationalization and structuring of information (risk and territory mapping,

detection grids, standardization of rescue procedure and emergency management, etc.). In the meantime, it is necessary to activate the socialization of this process through social interaction (training, informing, focus group, education, practices, etc) and this is the requirement for a real communication between the parts. By this way only, in fact, it is possible to reach the development of the social and explicit knowledge in every member of the community.

Within the process of risk management it is possible to identify some steps, as showed in the image at Figure 2:



Figure. 2 – The stages of the process of risk management

Therefore, it is possible to identify eight elements:

1. **Environment:** in order to apply a real activity of prevention and forecasting is necessary to deeply know the environment, intended as not only territory, but also, and above all, as social framework. Being aware of the environment helps to build the essential identity of the territory, to identify the levels of acceptable risks and the mission which the Country is persecuting;
2. **Definition of the objectives:** the objectives must be fixed before proceeding to the risks' identification and must be coherent and in line with the *mission* and with the level of the acceptable risks. The objectives can be divided into four categories:
 - a. **Strategic:** they are of general nature and they are defined on the highest levels of the organization's structure, aligned and supporting the general *mission*.

- b. **Operative:** these objectives concerns the employment efficient and effective of resources;
 - c. **Communication:** available and/or provided information must e reliable and consistent;
 - d. **Conformity:** every activity performed within the management process must respect rules and laws in force.
3. **Risk assessment:** the analysis of occurrence probability of risks and their impact on territory is intended to establish ways of management of the very same risks; infact, the risk must be assessed both in terms of relevant risk, it means an evaluation in lack of any intervention, and in terms of *residual risk* and, so, after having performed the mitigation interventions.
 4. **Identification of the events:** once the risks' profile has been determined, it is necessary the events which are more prevalent or which has a strong magnitude, as well as the external and internal factors which can affect the ongoing emergency strategy management.
 5. **Response to the risk:** among the possible opportunities of response it is necessary to identify the responses which are more efficient and effective in order to avoid, accept and fully understand the risk and/or every factor of risk weighing on the territory in exam. These procedures and activities must be rationalized, standardized and finally organized within a suitable contingency and emergency plan.
 6. **Activity of control:** definition and realization of policies and procedures finalized to ensure that the responses to the risk are efficiently performed.
 7. **Information and communication:** information concerning risks and their management must be identified, collected and disseminated in the form and time which allow the management and first aid personnel to fulfill their tasks and responsibilities. The communication flow then must be efficient and suitable to flow through all the organizational structure: towards the low level and towards the high level and through the transverse level.
 8. **Monitoring:** the whole process must be monitored and modified if necessary. The monitoring of the environment is put into effect not only in the control's activity of levels/limits of environment indicators which has been defined for each risk, but also and above all in the continuous and integrated interventions during the normal operative activity of the territory and/or in the continuous assessment of the ongoing situation.

Obviously, among the aimed objectives and the eight elements of risk management previously listed above there is a strict synergic relationship and their joint ring is represented by the four operative units listed in the vertical columns of the tridimensional

matrix showed here-after. This matrix summarize the strong bound among all the elements of this management system (Figure 3).




Figure 3 - The three-dimensional structure of the risk management

The modular structure of this approach gives to the risk management the necessary flexibility to face every kind of event and of risk, and all the possible connections and interconnections between the different elements of the tridimensional matrix as well.

The eight elements of the scheme are a valid support not only because they show step by step the actions to perform to cope with emergencies, but also because the bad working or application even of only one of them affects all the system and for this reason these elements can be used as indicators of the management system's goodness which we have realized.

This methodology of approach to the emergencies management can be applied to every level: National, regional, provincial and local. The defense of the territory, though it is a responsibility of the State, cannot be its exclusive prerogative. In every natural or anthropic occurrence which affects a community, the first element to intervene and to warn rescues staff are not the central bodies of the state but the citizens hit by the event. This fact underlines how the risk management process important is and how much it involves in a transversal way all the society, and every citizen with his tools, capabilities and responsibilities.

CONTINGENCY AND EMERGENCY PLANNING

Among the basic steps of risk management there are contingency and emergency planning.

The contingency planning is a document that contains all the unfavorable conditions of an event and the guidelines that each public or private actor should put in place if necessary. It identifies and describes all the procedures that must be taken to ensure

- the coordinated use of the required resources to deal with a calamitous events
- overcome the emergency
- restoring the precious situation

Emergency plans contain procedures that rescue personnel must put in place to deal with a disaster or an alarm situation; meaning they include all the rescue actions to be activated during a full-blown event and it ends when the state of emergency is exceeded. If the emergency plan has a beginning and an end at the same time the emergency or crisis, the contingency plan is active during all the phases of the emergency cycle.

The emergency cycle has four distinct phases:

1. Forecast: risk assessment, vulnerability and criticality analysis.
2. Prevention: planning, information, training and organization of resources.
3. Response: alarm, technical and medical support, public order and essential services.
4. Recovery: assistance to the population, reconstruction, funding and grants.

First two stages are active before the event happens while the stage three and four must be activated after the occurrence of disasters.

In fact, the forecast and prevention are the moment of recognition and knowledge of the region about risk assessment; they have the following objectives:

- To identify vulnerable areas
- To evaluate the technical characteristics of existing items of defense
- To identify the critical elements
- To draw up the necessary monitoring activities
- To assess the probability of occurrence, magnitude, territorial extent and indicators of each risk

During the forecast, we must take care of the study, analysis and characterization of the causes of hazardous events and the definition of vulnerability and the consequences of each occurrence. Instead the prevention is a “*non-structural phase*”, i.e. it is not related to public work or concrete actions on the territory but it aims to mitigate the effects of risk and so it is made up by theoretical and practical training, information and planning.

Among the topics of contingency plan, there is also the drafting of emergency plan that aims to prepare rescuers to deal with the disasters.

The civil protection emergency plan must identify actions, coordinate activities, resources and instrumental and human resources to address, face and overcome a disaster.

The fundamental objectives of an emergency plan are:

- To keep away as much as possible the risk
- To reduce the risks for the citizens
- To provide first aid measures
- To limit and contain the event

Therefore a good emergency plan must have the following characteristics:

- Precision
- Clarity and conciseness
- Flexibility
- Concreteness
- Opportunity to review and update

To a first analysis, the two plans may seem equivalent, but in reality they are two distinct and separate entities but they will need each other in order to ensure maximum security and defense.

The Emergency plan is included in the contingency plan because to implement rescue activities, we must know deeply the territory: the existing monitoring networks, vulnerabilities, strengths and magnitude of all possible risk scenarios identified in the contingency plan.

These are essential elements in order to define an adequate response and to assign each level of command and control chain appropriate responsibilities and skills and also they are the co-ordination between all operational centers and control rooms.

When the alarm and emergency stop, the emergency plan shall conclude its activity, but the territory is affected by the consequences of the event and thus begins the recovery phase. In this stage the lives of citizens is no longer in danger, but restore normalcy is never a simple and linear process.

Recovery activities involve a lot of effort in terms of personnel, financial, economic and healthcare resources that require commitment from the whole Country and not just the affected area. For this reason, every government must learn to consider this final phase of the emergency cycle with the same importance and attention placed in overcoming the emergency.

Defend and preserve the life of a country are complex activities that must be considered as a *unicuum* and so it is vital that every community should have both a contingency plan and an emergency plan.

CONCLUSION

The security and safety of a County and its citizens depend on a large number of factors. To deal with emergencies and crisis events require the intervention and the involvement of many actors, each with its own characteristics, responsibilities and tasks. The disasters, that strike on a territory, impacting not only on the territory directly affected but also the surrounding areas, on the local, national and international economy.

The complexity of modern societies is reflected both in the risk scenarios and the concept of vulnerability that loses its linear nature becoming systemic, i.e. the society is continuously evolving and then have to change the assets and our approach to risk management.

The activities related to the security of the country must be planned and organized in detail, they need timely and meticulous organization that is able to line up with the needs of the country and their changes, must be able to compete with the new and emerging threats, and must take into account all the boundary elements of emergency situations.

A *totalitarian* approach to security needs the support, collaboration and synergistic cooperation of all structures of the country. Managing such a complex network requires careful planning that aims to be as comprehensive as possible, able to dictate precise and concrete guidelines to avoid any unnecessary duplication of tasks and responsibilities, but that is both flexible and dynamic.

In fact the risk management is a cyclic process always subject to improvements. Through ongoing monitoring and analysis we can identify possible weaknesses in the supply chain management and so we can put in place the necessary measures to contain these vulnerabilities. The risk management activities is effective if we are able to predict and plan each risk profile, and if our monitoring network allows us to trigger timely rescue activities to mitigate the impact on the area.

Obviously, the complexity of the society is reflected in the risk management but today cities are systems of systems, and have a network structure. So we cannot have a more traditional approach, which is linear and probabilistic. In fact, to ensure an effective, practical and strategic security, we must consider the Country as a system and we perpetrate activities of risk management in time and space.

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MOTIVATING NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS IN THE MALAYSIAN INFANTRY

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ABSTRACT

Motivation in the military organization is pertinent to sustain soldiers' desire, commitment and willingness to perform their military missions effectively in the interest of the nation. As motivation is an essential factor and empirical studies in motivation are limited in the Malaysian Infantry, the need to identify motivation factors that would enable military commanders to motivate their soldiers becomes a necessity for study. This paper aims to identify the motivation factors that are important to non-commissioned officers in the Malaysian Infantry. A quantitative approach was taken to determine empirically the priority of motivation factors important and how does it implicate in the career progression of non-commissioned officers in the Malaysian Infantry. The findings indicate that loyalty, esprit de corp and role clarity were the three most important motivation factors while interesting work was the least important. The priority of motivation factors were also examined across the demographic profile of the non-commissioned officers where a change in the motivation factors among the non-commissioned officers was observed as they progress in their military career. The findings will be able to contribute an understanding for military commanders to effectively motivate their non-commissioned officers and for the organization to efficiently allocate funds for leadership programs relating to motivation.

Keywords: motivation, military commanders, non-commissioned officers, military organization, job commitment, esprit de corps.

INTRODUCTION

Motivation is a pertinent factor in any organization as it relates to organization and their leader's ability to create an attractive environment and sustain their employee's desire to continue providing their best for the organization. According to Landy and Becker [1], the features that commonly describe motivation includes initiation, direction, persistence, intensity or termination of a particular action. In this perspective, organizational leaders have to view motivation as an integral part of their responsibility to sustain organization competitiveness. In the era of competitiveness, it is pertinent for organizations to motivate their human resources to achieve organizational excellence. The manner to influence employees to work towards organizational goals is the common

challenge faced by all organizations [2]. Pfeffer [3] also argues that the key factor for organizations long-term success is much dependent on how organization's motivate their employees to foster meaningful work relationships and keeping employees happy with the aim to achieve organizational goals. As influencing employees towards organizational goals is the leading function of management, motivation becomes a pertinent element of that function [4]. The importance of motivation is also supported by Stewart [5] as he cites John Harvey-Jones, the Chief Executive of ICI who said, "The real purpose of management is motivation of a group to use its energy to achieve objectives". Dessler [6] portrays that in the era of business competitiveness; it is important to have committed employees as they are the source of competitive advantage and further explains that employees will not remain committed if they are not motivated.

The term "Motivation" is a Latin word which means movement (*movere*) and based on this concept, Atkinson [7] defines motivation as an influence on "*direction, vigor and persistence*". Vroom [8] adds value to motivation by stating that motivation is a choice made among other alternatives by a person voluntarily. However, Campell and Pritchard [9] illustrate that motivation is not a single element but encompasses a set of independent and dependent variables that explains the direction, and persistence of an individual behavior, while skill and knowledge of the task is constant and environment being the constraint. In addition, Bartol and Martin, [10] define motivation as "*a force that energizes behavior, gives direction to behavior and underlies the tendency to persist*". These definitions illustrate that to achieve goals; individuals must be stimulated to be energetic and must be given a clear objective of achievement, and be committed to achieve that objective. Bass [11] also explains that motivation could be achieved by raising the level of awareness about the importance of outcomes and ways to achieve them. A closer examination of these definitions draws out the fact that there are three common elements in motivation, which are; activities that energizes, effective channel and sustained human behavior. Based on Campell and Pritchard [9] perspective, this study aims to examine the variables in the military that are able to energize, channel and motivate NCOs. The essence of motivation is to influence employees' behavior to enable performance and meeting organizational goals. According to Cole [12], motivation describes processes by which people seek to obtain their needs, goals and desires. In organization and human resource theories, motivation is considered a key element that harnesses human potential to maintain organization's competitive advantage [13]. Wright and McMahan [14] also advocate that motivated employees are regarded as a critical resource in an organization. Since management is the prime mover for motivation, it is important for organizational leaders to continuously review means and approaches to motivate their employees' [15]. In this perspective, Adeyemo and Aremu [16] assert that there are four basic assumptions that organizational leaders must address in motivation practices, namely; 1) that it influences the desire to work, 2) that factors such as working environment, ergonomics and conditions in which one performs are important, 3) that motivation is on-going process that must be addressed continuously and 4) that motivation is a tool to establish what drives their employees' to sustain their performance and giving their best.

Likewise, in the military, motivation has been a concern in most military forces around the world. However, most studies relate motivation in the context of conflicts and war where the need for highly motivated force is pertinent to succeed in military missions [17,18,19,20]. In various occasions, quantitatively inferior armies have been able to win battles and conflicts because of their fighting spirit, aggressiveness and high morale that were brought about by motivation [18]. The US, Canadian, Australian, Russian and other military forces have examined motivation as an important factor in managing human resource in the military [21,22,23,20]. This is because motivation relates to what people do in performing their task that determines the productivity and commitment to a job and eventually brings organizational success. In the context of the Malaysian Infantry, the ultimate aim of human resource management is to ensure that the Malaysian Infantry is able to perform its roles, functions and tasks through its personnel. The Malaysian Infantry fought the communist terrorist for more than two decades spending long durations in the jungle, leaving their families at home. The factor that kept them fighting was the high spirit and motivation shown by the troops [24,25]. However, not much study has been conducted to identify the motivation factors or how soldiers were motivated during the communist era [24]. Hence, this paper intends to provide the Malaysian Infantry some knowledge on motivation factors that are important to NCOs, first; by ranking the importance of motivation factors among the Royal Malay Regiment, the Royal Ranger Regiment and the Border Regiment, second; among the NCOs group (Senior NCO and Junior NCO), third; the effect of demographic profile; age, tenure in military service and in the regiment and marital status of the respondents on the choice of motivation factors important to NCO in the Malaysian Infantry.

LITERATURE REVIEW

As the objective of the study is to determine the motivation factors important to NCOs, it examines other studies on employees' motivation. Lord [26] establishes that in his study among a group of engineers, motivation has an influence on retention and productivity of workers. The main motivating factors in Lord's [26] study were accomplishment, job responsibility and recognition. He concludes that effective application of motivating factors results job satisfaction and increase productivity. Wright [27] study compares employees' motivation in public and private sectors. He concludes that employees' motivation in the public sector is affected by the weak relationship between reward and performance, procedural constraints and goal ambiguity. In other words, motivating factors among the employees' in the public sector is influenced by the perception of fair reward according to performance (Equity theory), work flexibility and goal focus (goal-setting theory), while Mani [28] study at East Carolina University involving library clerks, patient relation representatives, medical record assistants and ground workers identifies that good pay and recognition are the most effective motivating factors. Milliken [29] describes that the means to motivate and retain employees taken by Eastman Chemical Company was by adopting programs relating to job-security, performance-based appraisal system, extrinsic recognition and performance feedback systems and Ross [30] study on the motivation of Chefs in seven New South Wales

(Australia) hospitals indicates that chefs in smaller private sector hospital kitchen are more satisfied with their work compared to those working for public sector hospitals because of better working environment. In the Japanese financial sector, Kubo and Saka [31] identifies monetary incentives, human resource development and job autonomy are important motivating factors and Larsson [32] study on motivation among the academicians and employees in the airlines, automobile, banking, construction, insurance and government agencies observes that six most effective motivating factors are high wages, good working conditions, promotion, job security, interesting work and work recognition.

In addition, Allen and Meyer [33] explains that work motivation is a multidimensional concept that links to how employees interact and view their organization which depends on the employees' level of obligation, sense of belonging and expectation of reward working for the organization. Conceptually, Locke and Latham [34] refer work motivation as "the concept of motivation that refers to internal factors which impel action and to external factors that can act as inducements to action". The concept of work motivation is based on four essential elements; 1) job satisfaction which is defined as "pleasurable or positive emotion state resulting from the appraisal of one's job or job experience" [35]; 2) employees commitment that indicates the sense of loyalty and obligation of employees towards their organization [33]; 3) organizational commitment that encourages individuals to pursue collective goals instead of individual ones [36] and 4) job involvement that indicate the degree to which the organization contributes to one's self-image [37] and satisfies important needs [38]. Harrison et al [39] also supports job satisfaction and organizational commitment to be considered when examining employees' behavior in the context of motivating them towards organizational objectives. Some insights by Moynihan and Pandey [40] in fostering work motivation among employees includes; 1) that motivation tend to erode if employees stay too long in the same organization and suggest for organizations to find ways to rejuvenate the employees interest from time to time, 2) that employees in highly routine jobs are likely to have low work motivation and proposes to foster positive motivation such as promotion opportunities, 3) to ensure employees role in the organization is clear and communicate the importance of the respective role. Motivation and work motivation seems to be similar in nature, however, the study views motivation as individual attributes that relates to individual beliefs about what is important in life and in his or her job attributes that needs to be satisfied [41], while work motivation is referred to ways in which managers seek to shape the employee-held views of the organization [42].

In the military environment, morale and motivation are frequently used interchangeably. However, to be clear in the course of the study, morale highlights the condition of the group or a military unit, whilst motivation describes principally the attributes of an individual [43]. This study intends to explore the motivation aspects among the human resource, the NCOs in the military. Although it can be argued that the military organization is 1) a non-profit organization, 2) pay scale is fixed according to rank structure, 3) leadership is hierarchical, 4) decisions are based on hierarchy structure, the military organization is still required it still requires to be competent professionally

and ready for military missions. In this aspect, keeping soldiers (human resource) motivated requires an in-depth understanding of not how soldiers are motivated but rather how can the attributes of an individual be directed towards achieving the organizational goals. To attain the answer, it relies on the military commander's ability to motivate his human resource in achieving the organizational objective. The motivation process is largely dependent on the relationship between the military commander and his soldiers (human resource). Since command is a function of leading and managing, it is of interest to establish the leadership styles and behavior of military commanders that can motivate the human resource in the military organization. Apart from the motivation factors described, equally important in the context of the military are cohesion and patriotism that relates to motivation [44,18]. The contemporary meaning of cohesion in English derives from two Latin word, *cohaerere* that means to stick together and *cohor*, an enclosure derived from the term cohort. The term has been widely accepted among military researchers and planners [45]. Cohesion has also been accepted as the key to realizing optimum unit performance, especially among the military combat units [46]. According to MacCoun et al [19], cohesion can be distinguished from two perspectives; social cohesion and task cohesion. MacCoun and his colleagues refer social cohesion to the nature and quality of the emotional bonds of friendship, liking, caring and closeness among group members. On the other hand, they [47] refer task cohesion as the shared commitment among members to achieving a goal that requires collective efforts of the group. A group with high task cohesion is composed of members who share a common goal and who are motivated to coordinate their efforts as a team to achieve that goal [47]. This could mean that cohesion results from members who are highly motivated to engage their efforts towards a common organizational goal. Hence, the study intends to view task cohesion as part of the motivating factor in motivating human resource in the military.

Patriotism by definition concerns for the love for one's country and the readiness to defend it. The readiness for action to defend the country is the most significant quality for military personnel to have. Patriotism is referred to as an obsessive commitment, devotion without boundaries [48]. It gives one the sense of belonging and the manner one express his or her care for the country in doing more than is usually expected [17]. Patriotic activity, even when it involves personal sacrifice, cannot be regarded as patriotism unless it is motivated by anxiety for a shared public good [49]. According to Lewin [49], researchers tend to characterize patriotism using various criteria such as the object of loyalty, the deep love for the country and fellow countrymen and the sense of belonging. Patriotism is an essential element in an organization that relates to criteria such as loyalty, love for the organization and colleagues and sense of belonging to an organization which plays a vital role for performance. The drive to have patriotism is also linked to motivation of which leads towards achieving organizational goals. Therefore, patriotism will be another factor to be examined in the study of motivating human resource in the military. As the study was conducted in a military setting, motivation factors such as pay, monetary incentives, work flexibility, job autonomy, and promotion are not within the control of the military commanders as they are dictated by procedures and systems in the military hierarchy. Therefore, these motivation factors will not be considered in this study for the stated reason.

The motivation factors discussed above were characterized into three perspectives; first, as *job-related* motivation factors that contribute to an individual's degree of commitment and influence behavior in a purposive manner towards the achievement of organizational task or mission [50], second; *task-cohesion* motivation factors that contribute to the social integration and bonding among members of a unit or organization to achieve organizational goal or performance [51,21,52] and third; *patriotism* motivation factors that portrays obsessive commitment and love to the country or organization one belongs to and the willingness to strive for it [49,17]. These motivation factors, indicated in Table 1 are within the control of military commanders to address in motivating his human resource. Hence, the first part of the study intends to examine the preference of importance in motivation factors established among the NCOs in the Malaysian Infantry.

Based on literature review, a summary of motivation factors derived in the modern era is elaborated in **Annex A**.

Table 1: Category of Motivational Factors

<i>Job-related</i>	<i>Task cohesion</i>	<i>Patriotism</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Job satisfaction • Job involvement • Job commitment • Recognition • Leaders' loyalty to employees. • Interesting work • Role clarity 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shared commitment • Bonding of friendship 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sense of belonging • Sense of loyalty • Espirit de Corp

For the purpose of this study, the motivation factors examined are defined as; *Job satisfaction* that reflects as the employee's reaction to what they receive [27]. It relates to work conditions and the working environment of the organization that provides a harmonious state of job experience. *Job involvement* reflects the extent to which work is of interest to an individual. It is the degree to which the total job situation is perceived to be a major source of satisfaction of important need [38]. *Job commitment* illustrates the sense of responsibility and obligation an individual show to his or her organization [33]. It is the degree of responsibility and initiative portrayed in the conduct of the job. *Recognition* was viewed as an individual perception of an appraisal or reward according to performance [27]. It is the expected acknowledgement from an individual's leader that could be in a form of praise, compliment or other non-monetary incentives. *Leader's loyalty to employees* reflects the responsibility taken by the leader to satisfy the needs of his employees or subordinates [53]. It relates to the well-being of an individual or group by ensuring the basic needs to work and providing opportunities to self-develop. *Interesting work* reflects as job with a variety of activities in the day-to-day work routine is less likely to show lack of interest in an individual's job and being bored [54]. A working environment where job rotation within the department or organization would

enable one to be enthusiastic and eager to learn in a new environment and this is likely to be more satisfying [55]. *Role clarity* reflects as the sense of purpose and enhances the individual's belief that the organizational goal set is achievable [41]. It is believed that the more clearer the role of an individual in an organization, the greater the chances for his or her satisfaction and commitment to the job. *Shared commitment* reflects the collective effort among the members to achieve the same professional goal [19]. It is the degree the members of the organization are willing to cooperate and combine their strength to accomplish a given task successfully. *Bonding of friendship* reflects the trust among the group to watch each other's back with the capacity for teamwork to get the task or job done [51]. It is the caring and close interaction among the group that develops the sense of team unity and spirit. *Sense of belonging* reflects a strong identity between individuals and the organization they belong. They commit to the interest of the organization and engage in the activities that promotes the identity of the organization to a higher level [56,57,58]. *Sense of loyalty* reflects to one's love for the country, organization and the fellowmen [17]. It is the affection towards the belief in the country or organization's vision or goals that ties with a strong feeling. *Espirit de corp* is the common spirit reflected by all members of the organization and provides solidarity [44]. It implies to the organization's tradition, history and honor which expresses the organization's will to fight and win in difficult situations. For the purpose of the study, the identification criteria used as reference for motivation factors is shown in Appendix B. The motivation factors derived for the study from relevant literatures combines for the need to work in an organization and meeting military demands.

Generally demographic attributes is a composition of a social entity relating to factors such as gender, age, ethnicity, tenure, marital status and income level that are assumed to have explanatory value in a research [59]. Bowen and Ostroff [60] also argue that demography is an important factor and should not be assumed that respondents are a homogeneous group with similar attributes. It is necessary to be sensitive to demographic attributes such as age, tenure, marital or organizational service as it would provide a better understanding to the outcome of a study. Pfeffer [61] further explains that some demographics such as age, gender, tenure or education also have influence on organizational outcomes. Kakabadse et al [62] substantiates that demography attributes; age, tenure, gender, occupation, ethnicity and education influences interpersonal or group dynamics which in turn influences organizational performance. Goll and Rasheed [63] support Pfeffer [61] arguments to say that demographic characteristics do have an impact on organizational outcomes. Wiersema and Bantel [64] argues that age has an influence on the choices or decisions taken by individuals and found related to the quality of the decision made [65], on any organizational perspective. Studies by Wehrmeyer and McNeil [66] and Konrad and Hartmann [67] also associates that age is significantly related to attitudinal and behavior difference which influence organizational decisions. In extension, Wagner et al [68] relate age to individual experiences and accumulated knowledge and that it influences individual's beliefs, values or attitudes in conducting their job responsibilities. Tenure is viewed as length of military service in the organization and length of military service in the military regiment is also expected to have influence on individual's choice in motivation factors relating to working

relationship in the organization. In the context of this study, the preference of motivation factors by NCOs will be viewed in cognizance with their demographic attributes; age, tenure in military service and regimental service, and marital status including comparison among the NCOs group.

ORGANIZATIONAL SETTING

The Malaysian Infantry constitutes of three infantry regiments; the Royal Malay Regiment (RMR), Royal Ranger Regiment (RRR) and the Border Regiment (BR). The Malaysian infantry is the backbone of the Malaysian Army where the prime role is to deny any form of threat or intrusion by land or from the sea. The infantry corp consists of thirty-nine regiments.

The history of the Royal Malay Regiment began with the foundation of the 1st Experimental Company in 1933, where a group of native Malays was established as the initial Malayan military force in the British colony. The company consisted of twenty-five young Malay locals who were recruited to form the new regiment on 1st March 1933 in Haig Lines, Port Dickson, Negeri Sembilan. This native Malay military force has expanded to the current twenty-five regiments located within the Peninsula Malaysia, Sarawak and Sabah.

The Royal Ranger Regiment began in the mid nineteen century with the establishment of the Sarawak Rangers, a peacekeeping force in the Sarawak region. This force was later absorbed by the Sarawak Constabulary in 1932 as part of the British colonial unit. During the Malayan emergency, a group of Iban (natives of Sarawak) was recruited as jungle trackers in fighting against the Communist party of Malaya. These trackers were later organized into a Sarawak Ranger regiment in 1953. However, after the formation of Malaysia, these units were transferred from the British colonial forces to the Malaysian Army, which expanded into a multi-ethnic regiment as the Malaysian Rangers.

The Border Regiment was formed with the absorption of the regular reserve force as the third regiment of the infantry corp. Its current force consists of five border regiments with the main role of guarding the national border against any form of incursion, infiltration, smuggling and criminal activities.

METHOD

To determine the motivation factors important to NCOs in the Malaysian Infantry, a survey was conducted in which 379 NCOs participated, the number of respondents was based on Krejcie and Morgan [69] table for determining the sample size where 190 were JNCOs and 189 were SNCOs. The NCO sample population constitutes of 240 from RMR, 87 from RRR and 52 from BR. Twelve motivation factors established as essential in the military [51,21,52,49,40,48] was used to obtain the ranking of importance from the

NCO at the organizational level, sub-group level and among NCOs group. In addition, respondents were also given the opportunity to list any other motivation factor that they felt important. However, there was no response to this question. An informal interview revealed that most respondents were satisfied with their basic needs to which the researcher believes that the organization's measures to address the shortcomings in pay, housing and facilities have recognized a general satisfaction among the NCOs. Therefore, the twelve motivation factors established from literature were used in the survey. The questionnaire had two parts; the first furnishes the respondent's demographic details such as rank, age, tenure in military service and in the regiment, marital status and race. In the second part, the respondents were requested to rank the twelve motivation factors in terms of their importance. The NCOs were asked to rank that best describes the degree of importance of each motivation factor that was established as essential in the military. Not important at all ranked as 1, not important as 2, moderately important as 3, important as 4 and very important as 5. Preliminary analysis was conducted to determine no violation of the assumptions of normality, linearity and homoscedasticity.

DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The ranking of motivation factors at the organizational level is shown in Table 2; it illustrates the mean, standard deviation and variance for the means. Ranking was determined based on the mean statistics value of the motivation factors. The higher the mean, the higher is the rank. The highest and lowest mean values are 4.60 (sense of loyalty) and 3.97 (interesting work) respectively. As the scale of measure is interval, the mean measure of central tendency is used to determine the degree of importance using Likert scale of 1 as least important and 5 as most important for motivation factors among the NCO in the organizational level (Malaysian Infantry). From Table 2, the importance of motivation factors from the most to the least is observed. It also indicates the importance of motivation factors among the NCO at the organizational level, the Malaysian Infantry.

Table 2: Ranking Importance of Motivation Factors at Organizational Level (n= 379)

Motivation Factor	Mean	Std. Deviation	Ranking
Sense of loyalty	4.60	0.64	1
Espirit de Corp	4.50	0.70	2
Role Clarity	4.44	0.61	3
Job Commitment	4.25	0.63	4
Leader's loyalty to Subordinates	4.23	0.79	5
Bonding of Friendship	4.22	0.71	6
Shared Commitment	4.08	0.64	7
Job Satisfaction	4.07	0.75	8
Job Involvement	4.05	0.68	9
Sense of Belonging	4.05	0.76	10
Recognition	4.01	0.79	11
Interesting Work	3.97	0.75	12

At the sub-group level, between the regiments in the corp, the mean, standard deviation, and ranking of motivation factors important to NCOs in RMR is shown at Table 3, the RRR is shown at Table 4, while for the BR is shown in Table 5. Ranking importance of motivation factors has been determined based on the mean statistics value of the motivation factors, where the higher the mean, the higher is the rank.

Table 3: Ranking Importance of Motivation Factors in the Royal Malay Regiment (RMR) (n= 240)

Motivational Factor	Mean	Standard Deviation	Ranking
Sense of loyalty	4.68	0.58	1
Espirit de Corp	4.59	0.63	2
Role Clarity	4.50	0.59	3
Job Commitment	4.28	0.57	4
Bonding of Friendship	4.24	0.71	5
Leader's loyalty to Subordinates	4.19	0.78	6
Job Involvement	4.10	0.64	7
Job Satisfaction	4.09	0.75	8
Recognition	4.07	0.75	9
Shared Commitment	4.07	0.64	10
Sense of Belonging	4.06	0.76	11
Interesting Work	4.02	0.75	12

Table 4: Ranking Importance of Motivation Factors in the Royal Ranger Regiment (RRR) (n=87)

Motivational Factor	Mean	Standard Deviation	Ranking
Sense of loyalty	4.40	0.84	1
Espirit de Corp	4.37	0.87	2
Role Clarity	4.26	0.67	3
Bonding of Friendship	4.18	0.75	4
Leader's loyalty to Subordinates	4.17	0.85	5
Shared Commitment	4.13	0.69	6
Sense of Belonging	4.11	0.84	7
Job Commitment	4.11	0.81	8
Job Satisfaction	4.09	0.80	9
Recognition	4.02	0.91	10
Job Involvement	3.95	0.86	11
Interesting Work	3.89	0.84	12

Table 5: Ranking Importance of Motivation Factors in the Border Regiment (BR) (n=52)

Motivational Factor	Mean	Standard Deviation	Ranking
Sense of loyalty	4.73	0.49	1
Espirit de Corp	4.67	0.47	2
Role Clarity	4.45	0.54	3
Job Commitment	4.33	0.51	4
Leader’s loyalty to Subordinates	4.20	0.74	5
Bonding of Friendship	4.18	0.65	6
Shared Commitment	4.10	0.60	7
Job Involvement	3.98	0.54	8
Job Satisfaction	3.94	0.70	9
Recognition	3.92	0.59	10
Sense of Belonging	3.90	0.64	11
Interesting Work	3.75	0.77	12

In examining motivation factors important and rank their level of importance among the NCO group (SNCO and JNCO), a descriptive analysis was conducted where the results indicate that the data is reasonably normally distributed for all motivation factors among SNCO and JNCO. Table 6 and 7 also show the mean, standard deviation and ranking of importance of motivation factors among SNCO and JNCO respectively. Ranking has been determined based on the mean statistic value of the motivation factor, where the higher the mean, the higher is the rank.

Table 6: Ranking Importance of Motivation Factors among Senior Non Commissioned Officers (SNCO)

Motivational Factor	Mean	Standard Deviation	Ranking
Sense of loyalty	4.65	0.59	1
Espirit de Corp	4.56	0.61	2
Role Clarity	4.53	0.61	3
Job Commitment	4.31	0.56	4
Bonding of Friendship	4.27	0.71	5
Leader’s loyalty to subordinates	4.24	0.78	6
Sense of belonging	4.16	0.73	7
Job Involvement	4.11	0.69	8
Job Satisfaction	4.09	0.75	9
Shared Commitment	4.06	0.63	10
Recognition	3.97	0.73	11
Interesting Work	3.93	0.72	12

Table 7: Ranking Importance of Motivation Factors among Junior Non Commissioned Officers (JNCO)

Motivational Factor	Mean	Standard Deviation	Ranking
Sense of loyalty	4.54	0.69	1
Espirit de Corp	4.42	0.77	2
Role Clarity	4.35	0.59	3
Leader's loyalty to Subordinates	4.23	0.78	4
Job Commitment	4.20	0.69	5
Bonding of Friendship	4.16	0.71	6
Shared Commitment	4.11	0.66	7
Recognition	4.05	0.85	8
Job Satisfaction	4.05	0.76	9
Sense of Belonging	4.02	0.79	10
Job Involvement	4.00	0.67	11
Interesting Work	3.94	0.78	12

A comparison of the ranking of importance of motivation factors among SNCO and JNCO is illustrated in Table 8. It is observed that the three most important motivation factors among the SNCO and JNCO also indicate sense of loyalty, esprit de corp and role clarity while the least important motivation factor is interesting work.

Table 8: Comparison in Ranking Importance of Motivation Factors among Senior Non-Commissioned Officers and Junior Non-Commissioned Officers

Motivational Factor	SNCO	JNCO
Sense of loyalty	1	1
Espirit de Corp	2	2
Role Clarity	3	3
Job Commitment	4	5
Bonding of Friendship	5	6
Recognition	11	8
Job Involvement	8	11
Sense of Belonging	7	10
Leader's loyalty to Subordinates	6	4
Job Satisfaction	9	9
Shared Commitment	10	7
Interesting Work	12	12

Note: **SNCO**: Senior Non Commissioned Officers

JNCO: Junior Non Commissioned Officers

Various studies have illustrated that esprit de corp and sense of loyalty as part of cohesion is pertinent and that it does not only strengthens a regiment’s level of morale but also acts as a catalyst to heroic behavior among members in an organization [18,70,71,52]. In contrast to Ben-Dor et al [52] study of motivation factors among soldiers in the Israeli forces, where income, well-being, work conditions and military commander’s concern for unit members have higher rank of importance, the NCO in the Malaysian infantry value sense of loyalty, esprit de corp and role clarity as most important motivation factors. It also contradicts to the motivation factors such as high wages, good working conditions which are part of interesting work that are regarded as effective motivation factors in the corporate world [41,4]. The finding of the most important motivation factor in the Malaysian infantry indicate a need for a sense of patriotism (sense of loyalty and esprit de corp) and sense of purpose, and belief in organizational goal are essential to be addressed among NCO in the Malaysian infantry. Job commitment ranked as fourth important motivation factor among the NCO in the RMRs and the BRs, while bonding of friendship is fourth important motivation factors in the RRR. Recognition is ranked as the tenth important motivation factor the RRR and BR, while it is the ninth for the RMR. However, the three regiments share interesting work as the least important motivation factor which is reflected as job with a variety of activities in the daily work routine. If the motivation factors among the regiments are reflected into four quadrants where the first three important motivation factors are in quadrant 1 and the next three in quadrant 2 while the seventh, eighth and ninth important motivation factors in quadrant 3 and the remaining in quadrant 4, it illustrates that there are seven common motivation factors among the three regiments, as shown in Figure 1.

Quadrant 1 <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Sense of loyalty• Esprit de corp• Role clarity	Quadrant 2 <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Bonding of Friendship• Leader’s loyalty to subordinates• Job Commitment
Quadrant 4 <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Interesting work	Quadrant 3 <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Job satisfaction

Figure 1: Common Important Motivation Factors among the Three Regiments

Demographic attributes of the respondents may effect on the choice of motivation factors that are important to the NCO in the Malaysian Infantry as it would provide a better understanding to behavior and characteristics of respondents [59,60]. The term choice has been used to illustrate that among the twelve motivation factors established as essential in the military, individual respondent can rank the motivation factors in terms of importance that motivates them. Hence, the demographic attributes examined were age, tenure in military service, tenure in the regiment and marital status. The researcher has computed the ranks of the twelve motivation factors previously mentioned separately based on the age tenure in military service, tenure in the regiment and marital status. Ranking was determined based on the mean statistical value of the motivation factors. The overall ranking of the twelve motivation factors on the demographic profile of the

NCOs in Table 9 revealed a uniform pattern, where the first three important motivation factors for age, tenure in military service, tenure in the regiment and marital status are sense of loyalty, esprit de corp and role clarity. These motivation factors are consistent to the overall ranking of importance in the Malaysian infantry and among the SNCO and JNCO. Despite the overall motivation factors ranking that shows role clarity, esprit de corp and sense of loyalty having a higher rank of importance among the respondents, it does not mean that respondents with respect to the motivation factor concur on the same rank for all twelve motivation factors. A closer analysis of the motivation factors ranking in Table 9 illustrate that in the early stages of respondent's military career, role clarity, leader's loyalty to subordinates and sense of loyalty are prominent motivation factors. These motivation factors are observed for demographic attributes; age, tenure in military service and tenure in regimental service. The motivation factors ranking in Table 9 also reveal that a change of motivation factors important to respondents as they mature in their military career where job commitment, sense of belonging and sense of loyalty become more prominent. However, interesting work remains consistent as one of the least important motivation factor as it was ranked between ninth and twelfth throughout the respondents' military career for age, tenure in military service, tenure in regimental service and marital status. Further observation also indicate that role clarity ranked as second important in the early stage of respondents' military career drops one notch to third in their mid military career and finally between fourth and fifth as they mature towards retirement. While job commitment ranked as fifth and seventh in the early stages of military career rise up to between second and third important motivation factor as they approach maturity in military career, and leader's loyalty to subordinates ranked as third important in the early stages of military career drop to between seventh and tenth important during the final stages of respondents' military career. It was also observed that sense of belonging ranked as least important motivation factor in the early stage of military career becomes as one of the most important motivation factor (ranked first and second) in the final stages of the respondents' military career. However, sense of loyalty remains as the top most important motivation factor throughout the respondents' military career.

Table 9: Ranking of Motivation Factors based on Non-Commissioned Officers’ Demographic Profile

	Age						Tenure in Military Service					Tenure in Regimental Service								Marital Status	
	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8	MS1	MS2
Role Clarity	2	3	3	3	3	4	2	3	3	3	4	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	3	3
Job Commitment	7	5	5	5	4	3	7	5	5	5	3	5	4	6	8	5	6	4	2	5	5
Bonding of Friendship	12	10	4	4	6	6	11	8	4	4	6	7	10	4	6	4	4	7	4	7	4
Espirit de Corp	4	2	2	2	2	7	4	2	2	2	5	4	2	2	2	2	2	2	7	2	2
Recognition	8	7	6	9	12	11	10	6	8	12	12	11	6	7	5	10	11	12	8	8	11
Job Involvement	5	11	9	11	7	10	5	12	9	9	9	6	9	11	9	9	9	8	12	9	10
Sense of Belonging	11	12	7	7	10	2	12	9	7	10	2	12	11	9	7	6	8	9	1	12	9
Leader's loyalty to subordinates	3	4	8	6	5	8	3	4	6	6	8	3	7	5	4	8	5	5	10	4	6
Job Satisfaction	10	6	10	10	8	12	9	7	11	8	10	9	5	8	10	12	10	6	11	10	7
Shared Commitment	6	8	11	8	9	5	6	10	10	7	7	8	8	10	12	7	7	11	6	6	8
Interesting Work	9	9	12	12	11	9	8	11	12	11	11	10	12	12	11	11	12	10	9	11	12
Sense of Loyalty	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	3	1	1

Note:

Age	A1	A2	A3	A4	A5	A6
Years	19-23	24-28	29-33	34-38	39-43	44-48

Tenure in military service	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
Years	Less than 5	6-10	11-15	16-20	More than 21

Tenure in the regiment	R1	R2	R3	R4	R5	R6	R7	R8
Years	Below 3	4-6	7-9	10-12	13-15	16-18	19-21	22 and above

Marital status	MS1	MS2
	Single	Married

The difference in the emphasis of motivation factors during the military career of NCOs is illustrated in Table 10.

Table 10: Difference in the Emphasis of Motivation Factors during Non-Commissioned Officers Military Career

Military Career		
<i>Early</i> (<i>Below 5 years</i>)	<i>Mid</i> (<i>Between 6 -20 years</i>)	<i>Matured</i> (<i>More than 20 years</i>)
Role Clarity	Role Clarity	Job Commitment
Leader’s Loyalty to Subordinates	Espirit de Corp	Sense of Belonging
Sense of Loyalty	Sense of Loyalty	Sense of Loyalty

Generally, the three top most important motivation factors were sense of loyalty, esprit de corp and role clarity while the least important motivation factors was interesting work. These motivation factors were significant at all three levels and among the demographic profile of the respondents (NCOs). Sense of loyalty and esprit de corp indicates that among the three broad categories (job-related, task cohesion and patriotism) in this study, patriotism was apparently the most important motivation factor to the NCOs in the Malaysian Infantry. Subsequently, with the change that is taking place in the organizational structure of infantry regiments, the need for role clarity on the new organizational structures is assumed to have gained importance among the NCOs [53]. An assumption is that NCOs want to be clear in their function, responsibilities and role in the new infantry organizational structure.

A close examination of the motivation factors matrix in **Annex B** illustrates that job commitment, leader’s loyalty to subordinates and bonding of friendship are the next cluster of important motivation factors to the NCOs in the three levels. Among the regiments in the sub-group level, it was observed that bonding of friendship and leader’s loyalty to subordinates were ranked 4th and 6th most important motivation factor which are probably due to the roles of these three regiments undertaken in the Malaysian Infantry. Being infantry regiments, bonding of friendship among members of a unit and, between leaders and subordinates play a pertinent role in undertaking military missions or tasks [18,70,52]. It was interesting to note that the motivation factor, sense of belonging was ranked 7th among the NCOs in RRR while it was ranked 11th by RMR and BR. Based on the background of the three regiments, an assumption by the study was that sense of belonging was of higher importance in RRR as the NCOs in these regiments had multi-racial, multi-cultural and multi-religious population consisting of various race and ethnic groups from Sarawak, Sabah and West Malaysia. With this perspective, military commanders in RRR must take additional initiatives to inculcate the sense of belonging among their subordinates to form a strong bond for military tasks. On the other hand, the NCOs in RMR are of the same Malay race and Muslim religion. This factor enables military commanders in RMR to address the sense of belonging much easier as compared to RRR. Likewise in BR, most, if not all NCOs are from the same state of northern Perak

or Kelantan depending on the location of BR regiments. A common cultural background and speaking the same dialect probably make sense of belonging easier in BR. Therefore, having a common race, religion, background culture and dialect could be the reasons for NCOs in RMR and BR to rank sense of belonging as one of the least important motivation factor while it is the reverse for RRR.

Interesting work was ranked as the least important motivation factor by NCOs at all levels of examination. An assumption is that soldiers in the infantry regiments are multi-skilled and ready for multi-tasking and multi-functioning as it is part and parcel of infantry training. Apart from these, job rotation in the infantry regiments is conducted as NCOs progress in the military career. The job or task rotation is frequent in NCOs to keep their job interesting and hence interesting work is ranked the least important motivation factor. Two models were developed in ranking the motivation factors in this study. The model shown in Figure 2 was based on the ranked importance of motivation factors among NCOs at the organizational, sub-group and NCOs group. This model is termed as “Ranked Motivation Factors among NCO” for military commanders, specifically in the Malaysian Infantry.




Figure 2: Ranked Motivation Factors among Non-Commissioned Officers

The next model shown in Figure 3 was examined in relation to their military career where a generalized model was developed to show the difference in choice of motivation factors during the NCOs early, mid and matured military career progression.




Figure 3: Motivation Factors among Non-Commissioned Officers in Military Career

The models developed provide a general awareness of the motivation factors important to NCOs for military commanders, specifically in the Malaysian Infantry and in their military career progression. Military commanders can also be aware that sense of loyalty remains consistent as the most important motivation factor for age, tenure in military service and regiment service, and marital status and during their military career progression while changes are seen from role clarity to job commitment. In addition, the model in Figure 3 illustrates that NCOs' view leader's loyalty to subordinates as an important motivation factor in their early military career as they are young and tend to look for guidance from their superiors and as they progress in the military career, esprit de corp tends to become a more important motivation factor because the need for cohesion and comradeship for military tasks takes a higher priority. As the NCOs mature in their military career, sense of belonging takes precedence as being part of an organization becomes a pertinent factor. In addition, there is a general support for motivation theories; Maslow hierarchy needs and Alderfer's theory of needs. A comparison of the ranked motivation factors to Maslow hierarchy and Alderfer's theory of needs supports the fact that motivation needs changes as NCOs progress in their military career. This finding also denotes that the NCOs in the Malaysian Infantry are currently at a higher level of needs, specifically the social and esteem needs (Maslow and

Alderfer's needs theory). This is another important contribution to military commanders in the Malaysian Infantry as they will be aware of the level of needs; social and esteem needs to be addressed among NCOs in the context of motivation. In relation to Herzberg Motivator-Hygiene theory, the top five ranked motivation factors are hygiene factors which imply that military commanders have to address to prevent dissatisfaction among NCOs in the Malaysian Infantry.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the findings empirically illustrate several implications for human resource management in the organization. The models directly propose that in order for military commanders to effectively motivate NCOs; the organization must develop programs to make military commanders aware of the motivation factors important to NCOs. This would decrease time and effort knowing the general motivation needs among the NCOs in the Malaysian Infantry. Next, in terms of financial allocation in training, the organization can specifically provide allocation for leadership programs relating to motivation that would benefit the current and potential military commanders in their role of human resource management.

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ANNEX A

SUMMARY OF MOTIVATION FACTORS

Research	Respondents	Motivational Factors Identified
Milliken, 1996	• Employees in Eastman Chemical Company	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Job security • Performance Appraisal • Extrinsic recognition
Wright, 2001	• Employees in the Public and Private sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reward according to performance • Work flexibility • Goal-focus
Lord, 2002	• Engineers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Accomplishment • Job responsibility • Recognition
Mani, 2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ground Workers • Library Clerks • Patient Relation Representatives • Medical Record Assistance (East Carolina University) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Good Pay • Recognition
Ross, 2002	• Chefs (New South Wales, Australia Hospitals)	• Job satisfaction
Kubo and Saka, 2002	• Japanese Financial sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monetary Incentive • Human Resource Development • Job autonomy
Rafikal and Ahmad, 2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Malaysian Employees <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Academicians ○ Airlines ○ Automobile ○ Banking ○ Construction ○ Government agencies ○ Insurance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High wages • Good working conditions • Promotion • Job security • Interesting work • Appreciation of work
Furnham and Eracleous , 2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retail • Manufacturing • Healthcare 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Job Satisfaction • Personality

Allen and Meyer, 1990	Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of obligation • Sense of belonging • Reward recognition
Locke and Latham, 2004	Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Job satisfaction • Employees commitment • Organizational commitment • Job involvement
Harrison et al, 2006	Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Job satisfaction • Organization commitment
Moynihan and Pandey, 2007	Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Employees interest • Promotion opportunity • Clear task role
Larsoon, Brousseau, Kling and Sweet, 2007	Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Culture • People • Strategy
Bendoly and Prietula, 2008	Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performance in operational task • Experience
Martin and Dowson, 2009	Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interpersonal relationship • Achievement
Antwi, 2009	Public Sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Performance base
Shils and Janowitz, 1948. (Cohesion)	Combat Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unit performance • Team effort
MacCoun et al, 2005 (Cohesion).	Combat Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bonds of friendship Caring • Closeness among group members • Shared commitment • Collective effort
Tamir and Yael, 1997. (Patriotism)	Combat Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obsessive commitment • Devotion without boundaries
Primoratz, 2002 (Patriotism)	Combat Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sense of belonging • Care for the country

Lewin, 2006 (Patriotism)	Combat Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Object of loyalty• Deep love for the country and fellowmen• Sense of belonging
Blocq, 2010 (Combat Motivation)	Combat Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Loyalty• Comradeship• Survival
Jans and Jans, 2009 (Military Professionalism)	Combat Organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Good pay• Welfare• Loyalty• Commitment

ANNEX B

MOTIVATION FACTORS MATRIX

Rank of Importance	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Organization	SL											
		EC										
Sub-Group			RC									
RMR	SL			JC								
		EC			LLS							
RRR	SL		RC			BF						
		EC		JC			SC					
BR	SL		RC		BF			JS				
		EC		BF		LLS			JI			
Individual			RC		LLS		JI			SB		
SNCO	SL			JC		SC		JS			RG	
		EC			LLS		SB		RG			IW
JNCO	SL		RC			BF		JC		SC		
		EC		JC			SC		JS		SB	
			RC		BF			JI		RG		IW
				LLS		LLS			JS		JI	
					JC		SB			RG		IW
						BF		JI			SB	
							SC		JS			IW
								RG		SC		
									JS		RG	
										SB		IW
											JI	
												IW

Note:

- SL** Sense of loyalty
- EC** Esprit de corp
- RC** Role clarity
- JC** Job commitment
- LLS** Leader's loyalty to subordinates
- BF** Bonding of friendship
- SC** Shared commitment
- JS** Job satisfaction
- JI** Job involvement
- SB** Sense of belonging
- RG** Recognition
- IW** Interesting work


BOOK REVIEW - THE DARK SIDES OF THE INTERNET: ON CYBER THREATS AND INFORMATION WARFARE

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By Roland Heickerö
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With the rapid development of information & communications technologies (ICT), cybersecurity is a major challenge for organisations, with new and increasingly complex cyber threats emerging on an almost daily basis. In this regards, the publishing of the book entitled *The Dark Sides of the Internet: On Cyber Threats and Information Warfare*, consisting of 11 chapters in 170 pages, is timely. The book reviews the elements of information warfare and various forms of cyber threats, and their effects on society, economy and security, as well as military and law enforcement.

Following an introduction chapter, the first chapter defines the players, means and methods of information warfare and cyber threats. The players and antagonists are categorised based on threat level. This is followed by a discussion on the methods of cyber threats, via exploitation and attacks.

The second chapter deals with the development of information warfare policies and doctrines in the superpowers; US, Russia and China. The chapter is aimed that highlighting that while there are significant similarities on how information warfare is defined and used by the three countries, their different historical backgrounds, in terms of evolution of network centric warfare and information operations, have resulted in differences in theories and concepts on how varying resources should be used.

In the third chapter, the threat of cyber terrorism is discussed, in terms of usage of the internet for information collection on sensitive targets, co-ordination and recruitment, and cyber attacks on critical infrastructure, in particular civilian targets which are more vulnerable. A case study is provided on al-Qaeda's use of cyber terrorism via its electronic Jihad.

The fourth chapter concerns industrial espionage and theft of information, with a number of examples of such incidents provided. A brief discussion is given on the vulnerabilities of cloud computing. My opinion is that this discussion should be more extensive given the security concerns that arise from the increasing reliance of companies on cloud computing due to its low costs. The chapter concludes with a case study on GhostNet, a global espionage network suspected to have emanated from China. By 2009, GhostNet had infiltrated computer systems in government offices, specifically in diplomacy and finance, in a total of 103 countries.

The fifth chapter explains that cyber crime is one of the most profitable and fastest growing criminal fields. Among the examples of incidents given include theft of credit card and financial information via hacking, with recent incidents involving banking systems and online games being cited. The author also warns on the dangers of common cyber criminal activities such as phishing, spam and skimming. While cracking (circumvention of copyright protected software) is briefly mentioned, the author feels that this topic is worthy of a more detailed discussion given that it is a serious problem causing major losses for software companies, with many websites openly providing such cracks. The chapter concludes that cyber crime is a cross-border, global problem that requires international coordination and cooperation between law enforcement agencies in the countries involved, while laws and regulations need to be kept up-to-date.

The sixth chapter focuses on hacktivism, which is politically, religiously, ethnically and ideologically motivated hacking. In many cases, hacktivism has led to aggression between hackers of different origins and groups. These aggressions usually originate from the real world, such as confrontations between Palestinian and Israeli groups, conflicts between Islamist and Western hackers, national chauvinist manifestation between Pakistan and India, and Chinese and Russian hacktivism. The author warns that these confrontations could escalate from website defacement and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) to large-scale and coordinated cyber operations against sensitive targets. Preventing malicious hacktivism requires improved information security and international cooperation, and cyber rules of engagement for how to behave on the internet.

The seventh chapter provides case studies on cyber war occurrences in Estonia (2007) and Georgia (2008). The two incidents marked a new *modus operandi* in cyber warfare; attacks against a country using large-scale botnets and DDOS by nationalist civilians. They also highlight the consequences of well-coordinated cyber operations against critical systems and networks.

The eight chapter discusses the need for a treaty in cyberspace. Regulations and operating procedures should be agreed upon by major nations on how to behave in cyberspace and the level of response for attacks. However, this is difficult due to fundamental differences between the US, Russia and China on how to regulate hostile activities on the internet. An agreement on cyberspace will need to deal with a number of issues, including censorship of the internet, sovereignty and how to handle rogue players.

In the ninth chapter, the author looks ahead and predicts future cyber threats based on the expected growth of ICT. The book closes by iterating the importance of secure information systems, with adaptive strategies and attitudes, in protecting against cyber crimes.

The book is very informative and is a pleasure to read. It communicates well to its readers on the various aspects of information warfare and cyber threats, and their consequences. The discussions in the book are followed up by various examples and case studies, helping improve understanding on the issue highlighted. Given the dangers of cyber threats, the author recommends this book as a must-read for any internet user, irrespective of background.

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