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AIMS AND SCOPE

The Journal of Defence and Security is a publication of the Malaysian Institute of Defence and Security, MiDAS. The journal publishes original papers and reviews covering all aspects of defence and security. It is a platform to promote awareness on the capabilities and requirements of modern defence & security technologies and policies, covering topics in the areas of, but not limited to, Evolution of Military Information & Communication Systems, Smart Weapons, Modern Vehicle & Aerospace Engineering Challenges, Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance, Biological & Chemical Terrorism Countermeasures, Personnel Protection & Performance, Military Medicine, Emergent Naval Technology, and Defence & Security Strategic Management.

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HEALTH AND SECURITY: AN ANALYSIS OF VACCINE HESITANCY IN MALAYSIA

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ABSTRACT

Vaccine hesitancy has been declared a global health threat by the World Health Organization (WHO) in early 2019 as it is threatening the third goal of the agenda of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG), good health and wellbeing of people. In Malaysia, vaccine hesitancy is identified as a problem since 2013. Despite viewed as a threat to the human survivability by the global health community, there is still doubt on the threat status towards health and security of Malaysia. Thus, this paper aims to determine the threat status of vaccine hesitancy to the health and security of Malaysia through the application of 'health and security' concept. The objectives of the paper are, to determine the scale of vaccine hesitancy cases; to examine the causes of vaccine hesitancy; to analyse the severity of economic and health consequences caused by vaccine hesitancy behaviour in Malaysia; and to determine the threat status of vaccine hesitancy. Findings of this paper show that the scale of vaccine hesitancy was found to be relatively small compared to the total number of the Malaysian population. The causes for vaccine hesitancy in Malaysia is more of a doubt on the content and safety of the vaccine brought about by independent groups with underlying 'profit-generation' intention. There is no evidence of extremist or terrorist influence behind the anti-vaccine movement. Although the consequences of vaccine-hesitant behaviour at present were noted to be insignificant neither to Human Security nor National Security and Bio-Security of Malaysia, the rising trend of both the scale and consequences of vaccine hesitancy need to be monitored and addressed accordingly. It is suggested that the government needs to revise the policy concerning infectious diseases and other health concern focusing on determining the threshold level for the determination of the health concern as a security threat to Malaysia.

Keywords: Vaccine, Hesitancy, Infectious Diseases, Health and Security, Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases (ERID), Health Facilities,

INTRODUCTION

Vaccine hesitancy is referred to as the act of delaying the acceptance, incomplete vaccination and refusing of vaccination despite the availability of vaccines and vaccination services (MacDonald 2015). Cases of vaccine hesitancy are reported in more than 90 per cent of countries worldwide, including Malaysia. The declaration of vaccine hesitancy as a global health threat by the WHO in early 2019 emphasised health community's concerns over the threat posed by the act of vaccine-hesitant towards the health and survivability of the population. The acts of vaccine-hesitant precipitates the resurgence of infectious diseases that have earlier been eradicated or contained through the global and respective states' immunisation program. It becomes a global health threat as it directly affects the third goal of world's SDG agenda – safeguards people's good health and wellbeing. The foundation of the wariness is due to the nature of vaccine-preventable diseases that are highly contagious, easily spread between individuals, causing severe complications to the affected individuals including fatality and physical disability, and the diseases are not medically treatable but can only be prevented through vaccination. Although viewed by the global health community as a threat to human survivability, there is still doubt on the threat status of vaccine hesitancy towards the health and security of a state.

Literary works reported that the magnitude of vaccine hesitancy worldwide ranges between 1.1 per cent and 46 per cent (Domek et al. 2018; Rey et al. 2018) with higher prevalence in the high- and middle-income states (Lane et al. 2018). Three main reasons why people become hesitant towards vaccination are misinterpretation and non-acceptance of the scientific evidence; religion/culture/gender/socioeconomic reasons; and lack of knowledge and awareness on vaccines and vaccination (Lim et al. 2016; Wan Rohani Wan Taib et al. 2017; Chan et al. 2018; Lane et al. 2018). The act of vaccine hesitancy generated an economic loss to a state from work productivity loss and outbreak containment activities following the resurgence and outbreak of infectious diseases (Ortega-Sanchez et al. 2014; Suijkerbuijk et al. 2015; Pike et al. 2017). However, there are less works of literature on the underlying intention for the spreading of nullifying influence about vaccines, the threat status of vaccine hesitancy to the health and security, and the economic impact of vaccine hesitancy to Southeast Asia region despite the region contributing one-fifth of global measles cases in year 2017 and 2018 (Tobin 2019). Linking health concern and security, works of literature centred the discussion on infectious diseases and biological terrorism as the subject matter (McInnes & Lee 2006; Aldis 2008) with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), Acquired Immunodeficiency Disease Syndrome (AIDS), and Emerging and Re-emerging Infectious Diseases (ERID) as the most common infectious diseases referred to. These diseases were of concern because they threatened the wellbeing of populations, have the potential to cross national borders and undermine the economic and military capabilities of a state (Lee & McInnes 2004). Infectious diseases caused by the act of vaccine-hesitant fall under the category of ERID.

In Malaysia, the rising number of vaccine hesitancy cases and the outbreak of infectious diseases that are vaccine-preventable since the year 2013, implied the government's unyielding quest to control and addressed the health concern. Government's frivolousness in handling the issue of vaccine hesitancy forges ambiguity on the status of threat existence posed by the act of vaccine-hesitant to Malaysia's health and security. Thus, in determining the threat status of vaccine hesitancy within the context of health and security of Malaysia, four objectives have been put in order for an appraisal through the application of 'Health and Security' concept. The first objective is to determine the scale of vaccine hesitancy cases in Malaysia. The second objective focuses on examining the causes of vaccine hesitancy in Malaysia. The third objective analyses the severity of consequences brought forth by the act of vaccine-hesitant to Malaysia's economic and population health status, and the fourth objective ascertains the threat status of vaccine hesitancy to the health and security of Malaysia.

This paper applied the concept of the Health and Security by Stefan Elbe in Collins (2013) looking at the adverse contribution of vaccine hesitancy towards the three nexuses of Health and Security, i.e., Health and Human Security; Health and National Security; and Health and Bio-security. The former nexus is more of people-centric that focuses on the freedom from want and freedom from fear (Sity Daud et al. 2015). The second nexus links health concern to elements of National Security that are inclusive of the population health status, economic status, population demography, military readiness, and inter-state relation in the international system. It analyses the impact of vaccine hesitancy on security at the state level. The latter nexus concentrates on the potential of vaccine hesitancy as a precursor for the act of bioterrorism.

VACCINE HESITANCY AND SECURITY

Chen (2004) argues that the core of security is human survival and good health. As health itself is a source of power to the people and a fundamental for the development and maintenance of all other capacities, therefore, ensuring the good health of the people enables a full range of human function in ensuring the security of the state (Berlinguer 1993). In literary works, health concerns

are not independently considered as a security threat. Instead, securitisation becomes the essential element linking 'Health' and 'Security' concept together (Aldis 2008; Caballero-Anthony 2006; Chen 2004; Rushton 2011). However, before one can securitise the health issue, the status of the threat of the health concern must first be determined.

Traditionally, the focus of infectious disease and security is more on the threat of infectious disease dispersion across the border (Cecchine & Moore 2006). At present, no literature is directly associating vaccine hesitancy to national security. Available literary works, as described in the earlier section of this chapter, focuses on two separate themes. First, the increase in the number of people that are hesitant to be vaccinated increases the incidence of vaccine-preventable disease and frequency of infectious disease outbreak (Kubin 2019; Larson 2018). Second, the disease caused by contraction of infectious germs not only affect human, i.e., direct mortality and morbidity. It also weakens public confidence towards the government, negatively impact the economy, thwarting social order of a country, eroding regional stability, and posing a strategic biosecurity threat (Brower & Peter 2003). Thus, it can be understood that the pathway between vaccine hesitancy and national security is not direct. Instead, the pathway is bridged by the incidence of cases and outbreak of vaccine-preventable diseases. Thus, the decision of the WHO acknowledging vaccine hesitancy as a global health threat is thus valid in this sense.

THE SCALE OF VACCINE HESITANCY IN MALAYSIA

Registered vaccine refusal cases in Malaysia for the period of 2013 to 2018 totalled 7,468 (Figure 1). It represents 0.02 per cent of the total Malaysian population of 31 million. These data, however, is not inclusive of those delaying and not completing vaccination. The data are also confined to government health facilities. More compelling figure that represents the national magnitude of vaccine hesitancy is by the Institute of Public Health (2016) that reported 0.1 per cent of Malaysian children aged 12 years and below did not receive any vaccination, and 4.5 per cent did not complete all scheduled primary vaccination because their parents were hesitant towards vaccination. Through an online survey using Parents Attitude about Childhood Vaccines (PACV) questionnaire (Opel et al. 2011) that was conducted between June 1, 2019, and June 30, 2019, the nationwide percentage of vaccine-hesitant was recorded at 6.6 per cent (respondent with PACV score of 50 and above). 19.6 per cent self reportedly admitted that they delay the vaccination for their children, and 6.1 per cent did not allow their children to be vaccinated for reasons other than illnesses or allergy. Majority of those found to be vaccine-hesitant are Malay, highly educated (having degree and above), earning a monthly household income of above RM5,000, and having children of three and more. The relatively low scale and the declining trend of the cases from the year 2017 onward reflect the insignificant of the threat posed by vaccine hesitancy to the health and security of Malaysia. The issue has also not been reported or discussed at the National Security Council (NSC) at both the state and national level. However, a petition calling for a mandatory vaccination policy for children aged two years and below that gains more than 80,000 signatures over 24 hours expresses the concern of Malaysian towards the act of vaccine-hesitant among the population.

To the health community, the inclining trend of vaccine hesitancy cases in moderate and most densely populace state is worrying as the risk of disease outbreak is relatively higher, "...especially measles as it is transmitted via airborne and droplet mode..." (Faridah Kusnin 2019); "...crowded area with high humidity is the best place for the virus and bacteria to replicate, grow and spread..." (Jamiatul Aida Md Sani 2019); "...the source of infection is from a populated area with a pocket of low vaccination coverage..." (Norhayati Ruslin 2019). Adding worry to the health fraternities, the increase in the number of migrants and refugees entering the country from countries

that are endemic with vaccine-preventable diseases increases the risk of disease outbreak as they become the potential source of primary infection to the Malaysian population. When asked on the threshold level for vaccine hesitancy to be considered a threat to national security, at present, the NSC does not have any figure for reference (Zamri Misnan 2019).




Figure 1. Registered cases of vaccine refusal in Malaysia, 2013-2018

Source: Ministry of Health, 2019

THE CAUSES OF VACCINE HESITANCY IN MALAYSIA

Referring to Figure 2, it can be postulated that the trend of reasons for parents to refuse vaccination for their children reflects the substantive agenda of the anti-vaccine activists. Profit generation drives the motion of the anti-vaccine activists in Malaysia to spread misleading information on vaccines actively. Taking advantage on the importance of halal status to the Malaysian community that are predominantly Muslims, the anti-vaccine activists who are mostly unregistered alternative medicine practitioners generate the doubt on the halal status and the chemical content of the vaccines to distort public understanding to shift to homoeopathy as conventional vaccines' alternative. Using a few influential personalities in the approach, they succeeded in shifting population confidence towards their 'constructed' set of beliefs. Thus, in 2017, favouring homoeopathy and traditional medicine took centre stage of the reasons for vaccination refusal recorded by the Ministry of Health (MoH). This point negates the factor of religious extremism influence for vaccine hesitancy in Malaysia.

Vaccine hesitancy viewed from the five A model of health care provision is more of an issue of appropriateness and acceptability. There was no issue of availability and accessibility, as vaccines are available in both government and private health facilities. Issue of affordability is also not significant because vaccines are given free at government health facilities under the NIP. The willingness of parents to purchase homoeopathy products and other traditional medicines as an alternative for vaccine denies affordability as an issue for vaccine hesitancy in Malaysia. Misguidance on religious belief and wrong information on the content and safety status of the vaccine brought about by the anti-vaccine activist lead to the issue of appropriateness and

acceptability of vaccines by the vaccine-hesitant.




Figure 2. Reasons for vaccination refusal for the year 2013-2017

Source: Department of Family Health Development, Ministry of Health, 2019

Anti-vaccine movement and anti-vaccine activists do exist in Malaysia. The existence of local websites and open and closed social media groups promoting anti-vaccine dogma proved their existence in the country. A book titled “Vaksinasi: Persoalan dan Fakta” (Vaccination: Question and Fact) produced and distributed by Malaysian anti-vaccine activist reflects the active activities of the anti-vaccine movement in Malaysia. The movement is, however, non-organised, unlike in other countries (Tang 2019) and their number is less than one per cent of the total Malaysian population (Azril Annuar 2019). There is no evidence of extremist or terrorist influence behind the activities of anti-vaccine activists for it to be a significant threat to Malaysia.

What is known and considered a challenge, however, is the involvement of doctors and other health personnel in the anti-vaccine movement in Malaysia. The statement by Dr Lee Boon Chye, the Deputy Health Minister on May 15, 2019, warning doctors of stern action if caught prescribing other than the conventional vaccine authorised by the MoH (Tang 2019) reflects the presence of these group of unethical healthcare workers in the movement. All MoH’s interviewed respondents concur with the given statement, “...I do not deny the involvement of health professional in the movement...” (Faridah Kusnin 2019); “...yes, some of them are MoH staff, but it is difficult to trace them...” (Jamiatul Aida Md Sani 2019); “...some of our staff provide data and information to the group...” (Norhayati Ruslin 2019); “...yes, but they do not expose themselves to the public...” (Rozita Ab Rahman 2019). Wistfully, the actual number of health professionals involved in the unethical movement remains undiscovered.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF VACCINE HESITANCY TO POPULATION HEALTH AND NATIONAL ECONOMIC STATUS

Six thousand one hundred and three vaccine refusal cases recorded by the MoH between the year 2013 and 2017 had resulted in 27,619 cases of vaccine-preventable diseases (Figure 3). Out of this number, 266 cases ended with death. For the year 2018 alone, 1,365 cases of vaccine refusal had caused the death of 33 children - six were due to measles, five died from complication of diphtheria, and 22 were the result of pertussis infection. All of these cases and unnecessary deaths can be prevented if only the parents were not hesitance in allowing their children to be vaccinated.

Concerning the outbreak of infectious diseases, 439 measles outbreak cases were recorded between January 2013 and December 2018. None of the states in Malaysia was spared. It indicates that measles virus and individuals that are susceptible to measles exist nationwide. The decline in the number of parents getting their children vaccinated with MMR vaccine has resulted in the progressive rise of measles outbreak cases in Malaysia with the total confirmed measles cases of 6,964. With the present trend and scale of measles outbreak and confirmed measles cases, it signals that Malaysia would endure with a substantial measles epidemic and pandemic in years to come if the situation is not adequately addressed. The insignificant increase in the trend of health expenditure spent by the MoH between the year 2013 and 2018 indicates that the increasing trend of infectious diseases cases and outbreak did not warrant the need for aberrant financial spending. The declining trend of financial allocation for disease control and health promotion activities from the year 2017 by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) denotes that the situation of vaccine hesitancy in Malaysia is within MoH controlled.




Figure 3. Cases of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases by type of disease, 2013-2017

Source: Ministry of Health Malaysia (2019)

With regards to national Gross Domestic Product (GDP) performance, the recent plummet in 2015 was reported to be aggravated by the weakening of the global trade following the fall in the global oil price (below USD60 per barrel), dragging down corporate earnings and performances (Anon 2015a). The introduction and implementation of Goods and Services Tax (GST) on April 1, 2015, that soared the prices at supermarkets, restaurants, and retailers also viewed as an additional factor for the deceleration in domestic consumption and the moderate pace of export performance

in 2015 (Anon 2015b). None of the reported reasons, however, highlighted disease outbreak and rise of vaccine-preventable diseases, as the contributing factor. An extensive literature search also found no reported sequelae of vaccine hesitancy and the inclining incidents of vaccine-preventable diseases on Malaysia's GDP between the year 2013 and 2018.

The sharp decline in the number of tourist arrival in the year 2015 had contributed to the drop in Malaysia's GDP of the same year. According to the President of Malaysian Association of Tour and Travel Agents (MATTA), the drop was influenced by the weakening of both domestic and global economy, the introduction of GST and the uncertain political situation in Malaysia (Suganya 2015). Apart from acknowledging the slowdown of global economy, Malaysia's Ministry of Tourism, Arts and Culture through its Tourism Promotion Board, relates the declined in Malaysia's tourism industry in 2015 to the phenomenon of haze, security issue in eastern Sabah, MH370 and MH17 aviation incidents, and the incidents of earthquake in Sabah and major floods in the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia (Malaysian Tourism Promotion Board 2016). Again, none of the reasons mentioned disease outbreak or inclining cases of vaccine-preventable diseases as the contributing factor. A vigorous online search also found no documented travel restriction or travel alert on health ground associated with the inclining trend of measles and other vaccine-preventable diseases in Malaysia between the year 2013 and 2018. Thus, the act of vaccine-hesitant that resulted in the inclining of vaccine-preventable diseases, especially measles, has an insignificant impact on Malaysia's tourism industry.

ANALYSIS OF VACCINE HESITANCY FROM THE HEALTH AND SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

Human Security as discussed earlier refers to the safety of an individual or population (people-centric) from chronic threats, i.e., hunger, disease and repression, and the protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life whether in homes, in jobs or communities (UNDP 1994). Out of the seven areas or elements of Human Security, the author hypothetically views vaccine hesitancy as a potential threat to the Health Security, Economic Security, Personal Security, Community Security, and Political Security. However, analysis based on the definition of each particular concept by Baylis et al. (2017) found no association between vaccine hesitancy and Human Security for the period of the year 2013 to 2018.

Ensuring minimum protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyle through provision of essential health care services is the definition of Health Security. Concerning vaccine hesitancy in Malaysia, the issue is not because of the availability, accessibility, and affordability to vaccines but more of acceptability of the people on the content and safety of the vaccine itself. As mentioned earlier, through the National Immunisation Programme (NIP), vaccines are available for free at the government health facilities, and it becomes the responsibility of the individual to acquire it. Cases of measles (morbidity and mortality) seen in the government health facilities are also relatively low to cause an increase in the work burden of the healthcare workers although, for few public health personnel, active case detection process was physically and mentally challenging and tiring. The measles outbreak that occurred between the period of 2013 to 2018 was managed well by the MoH without the need of assistance from other government and non-government agencies. Therefore, vaccine hesitancy is not a significant threat to Health Security, at least for the present time.

The objective of Economic Security is to ensure one can live their daily life as an individual by having the essential financial capacity to buy and maintain the basic necessity. Based on the researcher's online survey findings and findings reported in earlier literary works, the majority

of vaccine-hesitant are those not in the low-income category. With vaccines are given free to Malaysian regardless of their socioeconomic status under the NIP, to claim vaccine hesitancy as a threat to Economic Security under the Human Security concept is not well-founded. Besides, the epidemiology of the vaccine-preventable diseases that, at present, focuses on children and of non-chronic in nature does not significantly affect national productivity.

Personal Security refers to the protection of the individual from any form of physical violence that can arise from other individuals, states, or external states. In the issue of vaccine hesitancy in Malaysia, there are no records of physical violence towards both the pro-vaccine and anti-vaccine groups. Dissatisfaction towards those who are against vaccination by a majority of Malaysian do occur, primarily through the discussion in social media, but it has never escalated into a physical act of violence. The government is also not taking any discriminatory action to vaccine-hesitant (Anon 2019) although few suggestions were brought forward by majority Malaysian (Bernama 2019; Nor Ain Mohamed Radhi 2019). Thus, vaccine hesitancy is not as compelling as a significant threat to Personal Security. The same justification applied to Community Security, whereby, the act of vaccine-hesitant does not threaten the safeguarding of the population from loss of traditional relationship and values, sectarian, and ethnic violence.

Ensuring the freedom of people and population to live in a society that honours the fundamental human rights without being controlled by the government is the objective of Political Security. In the case of vaccine hesitancy, those who are vaccine-hesitant has the option to vaccinate or not vaccinating their children despite the availability of the free vaccination services provided by the government. The government has fulfilled its responsibilities and the rights of the individual for essential health care services. However, from the perspective of those taking the vaccination, they questioned their rights to be free from the risk of contracting infectious diseases from the act of vaccine-hesitant by those opposing vaccination. This occasion is evident with the submission of a petition signed by more than 80,000 Malaysian demanding for the enforcement of compulsory vaccination in Malaysia (Nor Ain Mohamed Radhi 2019), which took into consideration the health interest of the whole Malaysian population instead of fulfilling individual interest.

Concerning national security, there was no evidence to signify a significant contribution of vaccine hesitancy to the downturn of national economic status in 2015 and 2016. Malaysia's population demography also showed no significant change following the relatively small number of deaths caused by vaccine-preventable diseases within the period of research. The affected population that are not of an active work-productivity group posed less threat to the security of the country. With reference to the decision tree for a health concern to be classified as a security issue by Feldbaum and Lee (2004), the situation of measles in Malaysia caused by the act of vaccine-hesitant did not fulfil the characteristics of a national security issue. The disease, although it affects the health of the population, the scale of morbidity and mortality brought forth by the disease was relatively low. It becomes another point to offset vaccine hesitancy as a threat to national security for the period of 2013 to 2018. There was also no substantial evidence to support any extremist or terrorist influence behind the anti-vaccine activists and movement in Malaysia. Therefore, the association between vaccine hesitancy and Bio-security is nullified.

The above findings justify that vaccine hesitancy is not a threat to the health and security of Malaysia. Nevertheless, one need to reckon it cautiously as data recorded by the MoH did not represent the actual scale of the situation. The consistent gradual rising trend of recorded cases and outbreak of vaccine-preventable diseases remains a legit indicator of a potential latent threat posed by vaccine hesitancy at least to Human Security. As the paper is limited to the period of January 2013 to December 2018, the problem of vaccine hesitancy that are currently ongoing would be a

significant health concern once the scale of the problem and consequences caused by the adverse behaviour is large enough for the health concern to be considered a threat to the health and security of the country.

The determination of the term 'large scale' unfortunately remains dubious, as none of the available national policies stated the threshold level for an infectious disease to be a significant security threat to the country. It is an oxymoron whereby a condition that has been acknowledged as a threat to national security in the National Security Policy, National Defence Policy and respective military services' strategic policies was only superficially enumerated in the strategic documents. It reflects the triviality of the government towards the importance of health concerns to the security of the nation. The discern threat status by the global health community that focuses on the nature of the disease and its repercussion to the health of the population does not necessarily reflect the concern of the government on the threat posed by vaccine hesitancy to the traditional security spectrum of the state. From this paper, the nature of disease alone is not sufficient in determining the threat status of a health concern to the health and security of a country. Four supplementary determinants that are of government importance are the scale of the causes, the scale of its aftermath to the elements of Human Security and National Security, the affiliation of the health concern to the act of extremist or terrorist, and the age group category of those affected. These four determinants will be sounder if the government identify the threshold for the alert, the warning, and the action level for the relevant agencies to take action on the health concerns duly.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the threat posed by vaccine hesitancy is not yet a threat to the health and security of Malaysia in view of its relatively low scale, no evidence of extremism and terrorism behind the anti-vaccine movement and its insignificant impact to the elements of national security. However, as vaccine hesitancy is currently an ongoing issue in Malaysia, the gradual increase trend of the situation poses a potential latent threat to Human Security of Malaysia. To confidently declared vaccine hesitancy as a threat to the health and security of Malaysia, the threshold level for vaccine hesitancy and its consequences to be considered a significant threat need first to be determined by the government.

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A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE SECURITY DILEMMA CONCEPT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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ABSTRACT

This study analyses the security dilemma concept based on the realist theory and evaluates the applicability of the concept in the Southeast Asian region. This paper employs a quantitative method research design. The research primarily uses secondary data, which were obtained from books, articles, newspapers, periodicals and journals. For the quantitative method, the research uses data available from the World Bank and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) database. These data include military expenditures as a percentage from gross domestic product (GDP), arms imports, government expenditures in education as a percentage of GDP, and research and development spending as a percentage of GDP. The statistical package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) is used to conduct the one-sample t-test (one-tailed), the independent samples t-test and the two-way ANOVA. The study reveals that despite enduring positive economic growth, Southeast Asian countries do not show significantly increased spending in military expenditures. Instead, there is an overall modest, in some declining, pattern of military expenditures among the Southeast Asian countries. Furthermore, there is hardly any evidence of arms race among countries in Southeast Asia given their insignificant arms imports during the last decades, even when Southeast Asia is being compared to the broader Asian region. The research findings also show that Southeast Asia typifies its Asian counterparts in that it prefers developmental spending to deterrence spending. Overall, the research concludes that the security dilemma concept has limited application in the Southeast Asian region and that other underlying factors might better explain foreign policy behaviours in the region.

Keywords: *Gross Domestic Product (GDP), Security Dilemma, geopolitics, traditional and non-traditional threats*

INTRODUCTION

The concept of the 'security dilemma' is a classic term in realist international relations theory coined by John Herz to explain the behaviour of states in an anarchic self-help international system and has since become a standard term in any discourse on international security (Herz 1951). A security dilemma is a circumstance where the actions were taken by a state to increase its security cause reactions from rival states; this chain of reactions leads to a further decline in both states' (or group of states) security. International relations scholars, especially from the realist tradition, found that the concept of security dilemma is the most significant cause of conflicts in international relations. They argue that in an international structure where there exists no supra-national government – anarchy, each state must look after its own security and survival. However, even if states were to benignly focus on maximizing its own security with no intention of threatening others, some of the actions taken by states like developing new military technologies or procuring weapons will still be perceived as potentially decreasing the security of others. Thus, the concept of security dilemma is naturally imbued with threat perception – often taken as real in state-to-state relations.

The security landscape in Southeast Asia has become more complex during the last

decades. Contemporary geopolitics and security concerns in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been fueled by not only traditional threats but also non-traditional threats. Sustainable economic development, for example, has become every ASEAN states' priority. With the importance of ASEAN closely linked to each members' economic prosperities, the strategy for post-crisis economic recovery has been the primary focus for Southeast Asian countries (Funston 1999). Indeed, recent developments have emphasized the fact that economic, political, and security trends remain inseparably interrelated (Shorrock 1998). As seen during the 1997 financial crisis and the global economic crisis in 2008, currencies in most Southeast Asian countries depreciated significantly, causing a further slowdown in economic development.

Southeast Asian countries have been engaging in force modernisation programs to a certain degree. According to Tan (2004), it is also apparent that what Southeast Asian armed forces are doing is not keeping the military status quo, as they are modernising existing capabilities by acquiring new assets. However, the situation does not comply with a strict definition of an arms race. Encyclopedia Britannica defines arms race as "a pattern of competitive acquisition of military capability between two or more countries". The term frequently refers to any military buildup or spending rises by a group of states. This definition requires that there be a competitive landscape to this buildup, frequently reflecting an adversarial relationship. Even though the arms race concept is also used in other fields, in this article, the discussion is limited to military arms races. Many factors account for the phenomenon of military modernisation and arms build-up in the region, in the context of an apparent reduction of the US commitment to the region, new requirements arising from EEZ protection and surveillance, the impact of domestic factors, inter-state tensions and the broadening of regional security concerns (Tan 2004). In that regard, some countries are consciously attempting to modify defence doctrines to keep up with global trends. Some of the states have given priorities on the new procurements to improve their air forces and naval power (Derek, 2000).

This paper seeks to review the applicability of security dilemma concept. It attempts to explain the security landscape in Southeast Asia and the applicability of the concept in the Southeast Asian region. Security dilemma intensifies tensions and rivalry between at least two states. In cases where this involves two powerful states, these tensions are threatening the balance of power and raise the possibility of war between the two states (Huwaitdin 2015). Underlying assumptions behind the concept are being put to statistical tests, whose results then explain to what extent the concept holds in the Southeast Asia region.

SECURITY DILEMMA CONCEPT

Security Dilemma concept has evolved after the Cold War ended in 1990. Since the introduction of the concept formulated by three scholars, John Herz, Herbert Butterfield, and Robert Jervis, the security dilemma concept has been expounded by many scholars. Generally, from the discussion above, the researcher can sum up the security dilemma concept based on anarchy, uncertainty and fear dominate the security dilemma development. As Shiping Tang redefined the security dilemma, it is not run away from the basic concept as formulated by Herbert Butterfield, John Herz and Robert Jervis. He summarized that three characteristics fundamentally govern the security dilemma, which is, out of the eight aspects, anarchy, a lack of malign intentions on both sides and some accumulation of power.

Statism is the focus of realism which involves two claims. First, for the theorist, the state is the main actor, and all other actors in world politics are of lesser significance. Second, state sovereignty indicates the existence of an independent political community, one that has juridical

authority over its territory. The principal objective of all states is survival, and this is the supreme national interest to which all political leaders must adhere. For self-help, no other state or institution can be relied upon to guarantee state survival.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

According to the World Atlas, there are forty-eight countries in the Asia region. Excluding West Bank and Gaza due to unavailability of data, so only forty-seven countries will be considered. According to Collier (2006) analysis stated that the global average for military spending is around 3.5 per cent of GDP. In this paper, the researcher uses 3.09 per cent of GDP which the average of military spending for Asian countries only. Military expenditure by per cent of GDP is calculated based on The World Bank Data from 1990 till 2018. In this paper, a comparison is based on Southeast Asia states and the remaining Asian countries. Using SPSS, the results of the one-sample t-test (one-tailed) for all ten ASEAN countries are displayed below. The researcher used an alpha level of .05 for this statistical test. The null hypothesis (H_o) and the alternative hypothesis (H_a) are posited as follows:

H_o : Southeast Asia countries' military expenditures are greater than or at least equal to the Asian average of 3.09 per cent.

H_a : Southeast Asia countries' military expenditures are less than the Asian average of 3.09 per cent.

The outcome of the one-tailed t-test is shown below:

One-Sample Statistics

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
SEA	11	2.2514	1.10353	.33273

One-Sample Test

	Test Value = 3.09					
	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
					Lower	Upper
SEA	-2.520	10	.030	-.83862	-1.5800	-.0973

Results indicate that Southeast Asia countries' military expenditures (as a percentage of GDP) have a mean of 2.25% ($SD = 1.10$). This is significantly lower than the Asian countries' average, $t(10) = -2.520$, $p < 0.05$. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that states Southeast Asia countries military expenditures are more or at least equal to the Asian average. The arms trade has been a lucrative business in international politics today. The volume of international transfers of major arms in 2014–18 was 7.8% higher than in 2009–13 and 23% higher than in 2004–2008, according to new data on arms transfers published by the SIPRI. According to SIPRI, Asia and Oceania (Figure 3) remain the largest importer region and received 40% of global arms imports in 2014–18, which amount of nearly 60 billion.




Figure 1: The importers of major arms, by region, 2014-2018 and 2009-2013, percent of global share

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, March 2019.

Countries spend on arms and different kinds of weapons in both peace and conflict times. Thus, it is interesting to observe how countries spend over time. The idea is such that one should expect countries which face conflicts such as wars, civil wars and terror attacks, should spend more on arms than countries which do not find themselves in conflicts. Consistently high spending on arms imports should, therefore, reveal a disturbing trend of a country building up its military capability. This situation should then lend support for the security dilemma argument that posits military build-ups (defined in terms of arms imports here) is more of a rule rather than an exception in an international system of anarchy. Southeast Asian spending pattern reflects the Asian region pattern as a whole. This condition should be true, for security dilemma is a shared perception of threat between physically shared and connected sub-regions and within sub-regions. Take China's threat, for instance, not only in Southeast Asia affected, but it equally affects other sub-regions like Northeast Asia, Central Asia and South Asia. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that observing arms imports trend in Asia as a whole can give a good indicator of the trend in Southeast Asia.

Using the independent sample t-test with an alpha value of 0.05, the hypotheses are tested using data on arms imports from SIPRI for all the Asian countries. The data were then split into two groups to represent both the Southeast Asian countries (SEA) and the non-SEA countries (NSEA). The null hypothesis (H_o) and the alternative hypothesis (H_a) of the Independent Samples t -Test are expressed as follows:

H_o : SEA countries' arms imports are greater than or at least equal to the rest of their Asian neighbours.

H_a : SEA countries' arms imports are less than the rest of their Asian neighbours.

The result of one independent sample *t*-test

Group Statistics					
	CountryCode	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Armsimport	NSEA	22	587925898.8883	646900495.28000	137919649.00449
	SEA	9	230028706.9526	184314747.06989	61438249.02330

Independent Samples Test					
		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means	
		F	Sig.	t	df
Armsimport	Equal variances assumed	5.491	.026	1.618	29
	Equal variances not assumed			2.370	27.336

Independent Samples Test					
		t-test for Equality of Means			
		Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	
Armsimport	Equal variances assumed	.116	357897191.93570	221161747.24632	
	Equal variances not assumed	.025	357897191.93570	150985058.94482	

Independent Samples Test					
		t-test for Equality of Means			
		95% Confidence Interval of the Difference			
		Lower		Upper	
Armsimport	Equal variances assumed	-94429369.23830		810223753.10969	
	Equal variances not assumed	48279378.57964		667515005.29176	

Results indicate that the NSEA countries have a mean of US\$588 million (*SD* = 647 million). Contrast this with SEA countries with a mean of arms imports amounting to US\$230 million (*SD* = 184 million). The Levene's test of homogeneity of variance, however, shows significant result indicating the need to adjust for the degrees of freedom from 29 to 27. Using this new adjustment of the degrees of freedom, the research found the SEA countries mean to be significantly lower than that of the NSEA countries', $t(27) = 2.4$, $p < 0.01$. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis that states that SEA countries' arms imports are greater than or at least equal to the rest of their Asian neighbours.

The effects of military spending on a country's economic growth have been the subject of fierce debate over the years (see Benoit, 1973 and Alptekin & Levine, 2012). There is no consensus in the literature. Nonetheless, more recent studies (see d'Agostino & Dunne, 2017) seem to provide more support for the negative effects of military burden on economic growth across different countries regardless of their developmental stage. Sharing this view, this research assumes that countries' preference between developmental and military spending can be observed quantitatively. Countries with a high preference for development should have lower military spending than those countries which prefer deterrence. Under the security dilemma concept, deterrence should drive countries, regardless of their preference, to significantly spend on their military capability. This

is where the researcher conducts a two-way ANOVA test with an alpha value of 0.01. The rather small alpha value is due to the violation of the variance homogeneity assumption for the factorial (two-way) ANOVA. Such a decision will help reduce the probability of the Type I error (Box, 1954). The test design is simply to see the main effects of two factors (independent variables) research and development (R&D) and government education spending on arms import (dependent variable). Also, of interest is to test the interaction effects between different government education and R&D spending and their impacts on military spending. Using data from the World Bank, three sets of hypotheses are posited below:

- 1) Ho: Education spending has no significant effect on arms import.
Ha: Education spending does have a significant effect on arms import.
- 2) Ho: R&D expenditure has no significant effect on arms import.
Ha: R&D expenditure does have a significant effect on arms import.
- 3) Ho: Education and R&D interaction have no significant effect on arms import.
Ha: Education and R&D interaction does have a significant effect on arms import.

Results from the test are given below:

Between-Subjects Factors

	Value Label	N
GovEduPGDP	1.00 Low	11
	2.00 Medium	13
	3.00 High	14
RnDPGDP	.00 Low	29
	1.00 High	9

Descriptive Statistics

Dependent Variable: Arms Import

GovEduPGDP	RnDPGDP	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Low	Low	238744527.9866	195317736.46098	7
	High	1180276315.7895	513019744.56179	4
	Total	581119723.5513	572272819.01586	11
Medium	Low	113864397.2019	103283730.87833	11
	High	1545894736.8421	1388608853.66487	2
	Total	334176757.1466	677332000.02786	13
High	Low	300154188.4810	415702585.00258	11
	High	387929824.5614	123657223.63292	3
	Total	318963253.3554	369701476.62666	14
Total	Low	214669522.0144	284094762.11721	29
	High	997409356.7251	758140337.02325	9
	Total	400055272.3407	546889114.91829	38

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances

Dependent Variable: Arms Import

F	df1	df2	Sig.
8.498	5	32	.000

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groups.^a

a. Design: Intercept + GovEduPGDP + RnDPGDP + GovEduPGDP * RnDPGDP

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Arms Import

Source	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Corrected Model	6254204715798327300.000 ^a	5	1250840943159665410.000	8.318	.000
Intercept	10077540535670198000.000	1	10077540535670198000.000	67.016	.000
GovEduPGDP	1095011776773132030.000	2	547505888386566020.000	3.641	.038
RnDPGDP	4302660748346940400.000	1	4302660748346940400.000	28.613	.000
GovEduPGDP * RnDPGDP	1913295995821189120.000	2	956647997910594560.000	6.362	.005
Error	4812040332797583400.000	32	150376260399924384.000		
Total	17147925443843031000.000	38			
Corrected Total	11066245048595910000.000	37			

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Dependent Variable: Arms Import

Source	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	.565
Intercept	.677
GovEduPGDP	.185
RnDPGDP	.472
GovEduPGDP * RnDPGDP	.284
Error	
Total	
Corrected Total	

Results indicate that there was a significant interaction effect between government education spending and R&D on arms imports among Asian countries which include Southeast Asia, $F(2,32) = 6.36$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .3$. However, the main effects of government education spending and R&D on countries' arms imports are mixed. R&D has the most significant main effects on arms imports, $F(1, 32) = 28.6$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .5$, while government education spending has only marginal significant main effects on arms imports $F(2, 32) = 3.64$, $p = .038$, $\eta^2 = .2$.

Graph (Figure 4) shows that the R&D spending pattern determines the arms imports across all different levels of government's spending on education largely. Arms imports remain on average below US\$500 million under both low R&D and education spending. Nonetheless, spikes are observed under high R&D spending where continuous improvement in education spending by governments in Asia (from low to medium) had caused a significant increase in arms imports from US\$1.2 ($SD = US\513 million) to US\$1.5 billion ($SD = US\1.4 billion). Under high R&D and education spending, arms imports, however, dropped significantly to an average of US\$390 million ($SD = US\123.6 million). Given these results, we reject the null hypotheses for the main effects of the R&D spending and interaction effects. We, however, do not have sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of the main effects of education spending.




Figure 4: Estimated Marginal Means of Arms Import

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfer Database, March 2019.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The study begins by addressing whether Southeast Asia countries' military expenditures compared to the Asian average of 3.09 per cent. From the results in the preceding section, it is clearly shown that Southeast Asian countries are not showing any significant pattern of increasing military expenditures. Should the trend show the reverse where Southeast Asian countries spend above the Asian region's average, we would have concluded for a disturbing trend that can lead to our observing a security dilemma in action within the Southeast Asian region. This finding is relatively robust, given the fact that the data, while still representing a small sample, represent all the Southeast Asian countries at all levels of economic development and political spectrum. The finding also underscores the fact that the South China Sea territorial conflict has not, on average, translated security concerns among Southeast Asian claimant states into concrete upward security and defence spending.

From empirical evidence above which conclude that SEA countries' military expenditures are less than the Asian average of 3.09 per cent, is showing that SEA states do not experience security dilemma. Only Singapore and Brunei have military expenditure (per cent of GDP) greater than the Asian average. It is interesting to note that smaller states are spending more on the military compared to bigger states in the SEA. This phenomenon does not necessarily support the existence of a security dilemma. According to Wu (2018), Southeast Asian countries' historically high defence budgets due to several national considerations such as financial self-sufficiency, expansion of capabilities, territorial control, peacetime missions and the development of the local defence industry. Wu (2018) also explained that several Southeast Asian states such as Cambodia, the Philippines and Vietnam depended heavily on extra-regional powers like the Soviet Union and the United States to build up their arsenals during the Cold War. When the Soviet Union collapsed, and Washington stopped most military aid, these Southeast Asian countries were forced to become financially self-sufficient. This transformation requires a few decades due to upgrading or replacing Cold War-era equipment takes a long time, and increasing a country's financial budget to match these demands together with other adjustments in bureaucratic systems inevitably adds to the delay.

Other Southeast Asian countries, Wu (2018) stated that is less dependent on foreign military aid like Indonesia and Thailand, progressed towards becoming financially self-sufficient as well. In this context, growing military budgets across Southeast Asia are understandable. Another primary reason in the increment of defence expenditure and expand capabilities for Southeast Asian states are maritime and aerial territorial control (Wu 2018). Excluding Singapore, most Southeast Asian countries experience difficulties in controlling their water and air territories. The high cost of building up adequate surveillance and response capabilities to cover two or even three dimensions over vast areas is expensive and such costs are continuous when trying to exert control enduringly. Despite numerous decades of effort, the MH370 case prompts Southeast Asian countries of their limited surveillance capability over their aerial space. Other cases such as piracy, kidnapping and armed robbery on the sea also show the insufficient maritime surveillance and response capability of some countries in the region. In order to properly monitoring and maintaining governance over the air and sea territorial boundary imposes significant expenditures, for example, from purchasing maritime patrol aircraft and vessels and the considerable costs of operating the asset. Increasing defence spending to overcome military vulnerabilities by addressing specific capabilities is realistic for Southeast Asian countries. During the Cold War, most of them focused on land and air capabilities for counter-insurgencies and confrontation in Indochina.

Their limited military budgets prevented the expansion of comprehensive capabilities, especially navies. Consequently, there are some military deficiencies across Southeast Asia, such as a lack of airstrike capability and poor anti-submarine capability. Some countries which economies are better to have introduced new capabilities, such as submarines, anti-submarine helicopters and fighter bombers, to fill the gap. Building up additional capacities and capabilities requires high-cost investment in assets, training and facilities. Pursuing technological progression is an essential goal for several Southeast Asian countries, as labour-intensive industries have catalyzed their economic growth over the last several decades. It is not shocking that these countries list defence industries as a key development priority. Singapore and Indonesia currently have established domestic defence industries, whereas Thailand, Vietnam, Myanmar and Malaysia have launched relevant policies. However, most Southeast Asian defence industries have yet to reach a very competitive level in the market globally, and thus domestic markets for their arms are still their primary source of finance. This situation means that countries' spending in developing their defence industries contributes to a significant sum of regional military expenditure. Southeast Asian militaries are also involved in numerous peacetime operations like human assistance and disaster relief (HADR), and equipment acquired through military spending is used for these purposes as well. For example, landing platform docks are utilized by Indonesia and the Philippines mainly for disaster relief and transportation instead of preparing for war. Wu (2018) reiterated that Southeast Asia's historically high defence expenditure reveals individual countries' corresponding needs that evolve as these countries develop. As the regional economy raises, more enormous amounts of defence expenditure could be expected. Nevertheless, this does not cause an arms race which resulted from a security dilemma. According to Asian correspondent, updated data on international weapons transfers from the SIPRI, Asian shows that the flow of arms to Asia and Oceania increased between the year 2008 to 2012 and 2013 to 2017. Globally, international transfers of primary weapons increased by 10 per cent between the year 2008 and 2012, and 2013 and 2017. SIPRI data clearly show an upward trend that began in the early 2000s. Several factors have often been cited to have driven the growth in the Asian weapons trade because, i.e., territorial conflicts in the South China Sea, the rise of China as a superpower, anxiety in East Asia over North Korea's nuclearisation, and the decades' old tensions between India and Pakistan (Asian Correspondent 2018).

However, the study demonstrates that data on arms trade must be put in a more analytical context. Year-on-year data have indeed shown increases. However, until such data are put

to an analytical comparison within a much larger sample space, both their true statistical and practical significance cannot be satisfactorily determined. In “Racing toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma,” Liff and Ikenberry (2014) claim that “some recent developments suggest that the region is ripe for, or may already be experiencing, severe security dilemma driven dynamics, even arms races”. They portray China’s rise as the leading cause of this dilemma and assert that states must adopt measures to decrease military competition in the region while they still can. Nevertheless, their fundamental claim about the occurrence of severe military competition in the Asia Pacific region does not match with the empirical reality. The finding shows that Southeast Asian countries’ arms imports are much lower than their Asian counterparts. What this means is that propensity for military hostility through the use of arms is expected to be lower in Southeast Asia than in the rest of Asia. Southeast Asian countries obviously display a relatively low inclination toward arms race than the rest of Asian countries, e.g., India and Pakistan. Such a relative absence of arms race in Southeast Asia means that the concept of security dilemma has little if at all, explanatory power to explain mistrust or hostility in the sub-region. It is perhaps military threat but possibly other historical and cultural ones that can better explain insecurity in SEA region (to be proven by future studies)- this study statistically disproves the applicability of the concept in SEA. The research also found that there is an inverse correlation between defence and development spending among Asian countries. Countries with relatively high spending in education and R&D appear to have the smallest arms imports. Interestingly, though, there are further conditions to such an observation. On its own, government education spending does not cause arms imports to decline. In fact, under low and medium education spending, arms imports show an increasing pattern. The findings reveal a more significant impact when R&D spending is brought into the observation. Higher R&D spending appears to consistently drive arms imports regardless of whether or not governments increase their education spending. For Malaysia, at least, these findings can intuitively explain the local scenario of the defence industry. Billions of dollars have been put into the defence R&D over the last decades. Nevertheless, Malaysia continues to rely on imports (arms imports) with minimal (if not none) capability of self-producing her own. Thus, higher R&D provision is being translated into higher purchasing of arms and weapons. Similar observations are also found across the sub-region such as the Philippines, Laos and Cambodia.

Overall, though, the research findings do indeed significantly show that Asian countries do not represent a preference for deterrence more than they do for developmental spending. Many countries in the Asian region, Southeast Asian countries included, seem to care more about spending on their human capital and advancing their scientific development for future growth trajectory. Wars and arm conflicts remain an exception rather than the norm in this part of the world.

CONTEMPORARY SECURITY LANDSCAPE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia security landscape has become more complicated than before. It is clear now that security threats not only traditional but also non-traditional threats. For the Southeast Asia region, the majority of states faces internal threats such as terrorism, transnational crime, information security, disaster relief, climate change, and public health epidemics. Sovereignty issues in the South China Sea among claimant states, transnational crime, ethnic tensions are the key issues addressed in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). “ASEAN way”, as described by Collin (2000) mitigates security dilemma between ASEAN members through dialogue. Even though there are skirmishes between countries in the Southeast region, generally due to sovereignty and the territorial issue had not escalated to a bigger conflict. Absence of war after the post-cold war in the region proved the cooperation among ASEAN is getting better.

CONCLUSION

Even though the evidence of arms procurement is observable, no arms race is currently underway in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asian countries are not openly antagonistic toward one another and have been able to achieve a measure of regional cooperation under the rubric of ASEAN, albeit not without problems. Countries in the region have also not necessarily reacted provocatively to each other's purchases of modern weapon systems. The armed forces of the region are merely enhancing existing capabilities – replacing the obsolete equipment as well as acquiring new capabilities. It is observable that such capability enhancement has been accompanied by the use of confidence-building measures as well as preventive diplomacy. The treaty of Amity and Cooperation and other declaratory measures and arrangements appear to have provided all the countries with political cushions and smart partnership relationships. If at all, the reasons for military modernization in Southeast Asia are economic growth, enhanced self-reliance, protection of individual EEZs, engagement in broader regional security concerns and technology acquisition. From the findings, it is clearly shown that Southeast Asian countries are not showing any disturbing pattern of increasing military expenditures over the last three decades. Should the trend show the reverse where Southeast Asian countries spend above the Asian region's average, we would have concluded for a disturbing trend that can lead to our observing a security dilemma in action within the Southeast Asian region. Overall, though, the research findings do indeed significantly show that Southeast Asia countries do not represent a preference for deterrence more than they do for developmental spending. Many countries in the Asian region, Southeast Asia countries included, seem to care more about spending on their human capital and advancing their scientific development for future growth trajectory. Wars and arm conflicts remain an exception rather than the norm in this part of the world. Overall, the research concludes that the security dilemma concept has limited application in the Southeast Asian region and that other underlying factors might better explain foreign policy behaviours in the region. An interesting puzzle that emerges from this research findings is this; Asian countries, in general, have shown a surprising lack of interest in augmenting their military expenditures despite knowing China's massive increases. Could this signal a pragmatic foreign policy behaviour or merely a more cooperative attitude toward achieving a calmer and peaceful region. Future researches can perhaps delve on these research questions.

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RESHAPING KESBAN CONCEPT AGAINST CRIMINAL INSURGENCY IN EASTERN SABAH

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ABSTRACT


Security and Development or KESBAN is a traditional counterinsurgency concept implemented in Malaya during the Second Malayan Emergency (1969-1989). It was applauded for its two pronged approach strategy to defeat the insurgent movement by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). Drawing from its successful model, this paper aims to reshape KESBAN as a classical counterinsurgency technique in fighting the new form of (criminal) insurgency in Eastern Sabah as a neo-classical counterinsurgency kinetic warfare. Adopting a qualitative approach supported by both secondary and primary data, the paper first attempts to describe and set the security backdrop of Eastern Sabah and the on-going criminality in the area. Second it seeks to examine the nexus between criminality and insurgency by examining the concepts and its key attributes in understanding the new form of insurgency or the “criminal insurgency” in Eastern Sabah. Third, it compares and contract the elements of classical KESBAN concept such as legislation, populace and resource control scheme, food denial operations, hearts and minds programme, social development projects with the current criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah. Finally, it reshapes the key strategies of KESBAN in addressing the new form of insurgency in the region. The paper highlights that in order to eliminate criminal insurgency, it is vital to enhance the intelligence monitoring system, operational command and control, joint operations with Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the use of technology in security operations. These key strategies are expected to sustain and further enhance the KESBAN concept in addressing new insurgencies in the region and especially in curbing the criminality that are conducted by the insurgencies in the Eastern Sabah.

Keywords: *Criminal insurgency, KESBAN, Insurgency, Eastern Sabah, Counter insurgency, Communist, Malaya, Security.*

INTRODUCTION

The concept of Security and Development or KESBAN in the local language was a classical or traditional counterinsurgency concept implemented in Malaya during the Second Malayan Emergency (1969-1989). KESBAN was an acronym coined from two Malay words (*Keselamatan dan Pembangunan*), which means security and development. It was inspired by the Second Prime Minister of Malaysia, the late Tun Abdul Razak Hussien as a mechanism in defeating the communist insurgency hosted by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). He emphasised that security and development must run hand in hand and that security forces (military and the police) need to create a safe environment through the conduct of security operations to pave the way for a development project to take place without hindrance. KESBAN is defined as the sum total of all measures undertaken by the government agencies to protect the society from subversion, lawlessness and insurgency (**NSC Instruction No.11, 1980**). KESBAN was a two pronged approach strategy to defeat the insurgent movement through internal security (IS) program as well as to develop the country socio-economically through internal development (IDEV) program.

The KESBAN Model portrayed below was a successful model, which had compelled the CPM to surrender its struggle to establish a communist republic in Malaya through Hatyai Peace Accord signed on 2nd December 1989. As it is said ‘a picture paints a thousand words’, the model explains comprehensively the nature of the concept in nutshell.



The KESBAN Model

Source: Adapted from NSC Instruction No.11

THE KESBAN MODEL

The model depicts the communist terrorists' (CT) activities in Malaya pervasive throughout Malaya and their aim is to get in contact with the population especially those in the 'new villages' for support in terms of food, money, new recruits and information. The strategic purpose of the model in practice is to isolate the CT from the population. As Mao's famous dictum, '*the communist move within the population like the fish swims in the water*'. Using the same analogy, the government is able to separate the water from the fish, the fish will die naturally. From the outset, the CT in their effort to contact the people has to face a series of obstacles in the form of joint security operations like OPS SELAMAT SAWADEE, OPS DOAYAI MUSNAH and others. This followed by domestic security operations like OPS PAGAR, OPS SETIA, OPS KOTA and so on. As they cross the security operations obstacle, the CT will have to be exposed to many development projects such as East-West Highway, Hydro-Electric Dams, FELDA Schemes and other

large commercial plantations, which further hinders their access to the people. Before the CTs come in-contact with people, they will have to confront the home-guards, local volunteer village armed guards. The CTs will realise by then that the people have been indoctrinated with 'hearts and minds' program to turn their support toward the government cause.

The purpose of this paper is to reshape KESBAN or security and development concept as a classical counterinsurgency technique in fighting the new form of (criminal) insurgency in Eastern Sabah as a neo-classical counterinsurgency kinetic warfare. The paper will attempt to describe and analyse the new form of insurgency (criminal insurgency) in Eastern Sabah and its nexus between criminality and insurgency. The paper will also attempt to feature some options in defeating the 'criminal insurgency' by applying KESBAN concept as the backdrop. The paper adopts a qualitative approach in its methodology supported by secondary and primary data. Most of the primary data are based on personal experience of the author living through the period of implementation of KESBAN in Malaysia during the end of the Second Emergency and in-depth interview, although most of the planned interviews have to be cancelled due the Movement Control Orders (MCO). Secondary data were based from books, articles, internet sources, lecture notes, publications, and News report online.

CRIMINAL INSURGENCY

As the world approach two decades into the twenty first century, transnational criminal organisations and armed groups are challenging state institutions throughout the globe with non-traditional threats in form of drugs and weapons trafficking, sea piracy, kidnapping for ransom and many other petty crimes. These criminal organisations and armed groups are waging criminal insurgencies as their domain against state authority. 'Criminal insurgency' is rampant in the Latin Americas and mainly attributing to drugs wars. The term used extensively by authors like John Sullivan and Fredy Cante which describes "an insurgency movement whose political motivation has been perverted by criminal interests" (**Cante & Quehl, 2015**). Criminal insurgency is varying from the classical insurgency with its political motive to gain autonomous economic control over territory (**Sullivan, 2010**). Since criminal insurgency's political motive is different from the classical insurgency, it is also does not conform either to classical Leninist or Maoist model. Criminal insurgency's fundamental struggle is not take down the existing government nor its intend for regime change, but rather to liberate a specific territory and safeguarding its economic gains within the liberated area.

Criminal insurgency is basically waging a violent encounter against the state authority for legitimacy of their regime survival. This violent non-state actor involved in criminal insurgencies have a web of complex base which are flexible and transnational focus. The increase of activities in their networks means that power is shifting to the them (non-state actors) and these types of actors are capable of organising themselves in large-scale multinational networks with greater facility than the traditional hierarchical state-actors (**Reeds, 2007; 26**). The territorial governance and the authority exercised by the armed groups in the liberated areas are eventually labelled as criminal insurgency. However, they lack ideological motivations for political opposition and, furthermore, they do not pursue the overthrow of the existing state leaders. Despite that, their engagement in illegal activities, control of the population and territories and its violent resistance towards the state turns them into a distinct type of criminals (**Azevedo, 2015**). Their employment of violence in pursuing their intent is their political dimension. Their criminal activities have become too rampant with the support of the population by housing and cater for their hideout within the community settlements.

Criminal insurgencies are rampant in many of the Latin American states like Mexico, Brazil, Ecuador and others involving in transnational drug trafficking menace and had endured to unseen level of violence. Apart from the routine use of violence in intimidating the population, a number of the existing armed groups had infiltrated and weaken the public authority by corruption, blackmailing or coercion of its agents. This is to deny the authority from preventing their illegal business in sustaining the regime's survival. Since the state fails to deliver effective public security, the populace becomes vulnerable to the criminal's violent actions and falls prey to them and the populace are obliging to tolerate their presence and even to collaborate with them. Most of the time, the populace ends up feeling protected by the same criminal organizations they have fallen prey to in the first place. Failing or failed state status is the breeding ground for instability, criminality, insurgency, regional conflict, and terrorism **(Sullivan, 2010)**. Similar failed situation exists in Cape Town, South Africa in which poor governance, lack of political access, ineffective policing, endemic graft and corruption had the city in unstable situation **(Sullivan, 2020)**.

SECURITY BACKDROP OF EASTERN SABAH

The security backdrop in east coast of Sabah is coloured with uncertainty and instability by the number of non-traditional threats happenings especially kidnap-for-ransom (KFR) and sea piracy. The security and safety of the people in Eastern Sabah especially resort workers on islands, tourists enjoying the environment and diving tourism and fishermen were threatened by criminals and pirates by carrying out criminal activities, kidnapping, piracy and other terrorist activities. These are conducted by non-state actors and armed groups emanating from Southern Philippines, which has been experiencing security instability **(Ramli Dollah, 2016)**. The perpetrators have been charging non-traditional security threats as their regime's survivability and sustainability. Most parts of Eastern Sabah have been transformed into havens for pirates and criminals with collaboration from the 'water village' community.

Malaysian Federal government reciprocating to the reported criminal incidences in Sabah waters launched several operational initiatives in its effort of overcoming the persistency of the criminal occurrences. Operation Padanan and Sipadan Island Resort (OP PASIR) was launched in 2000 to deny recurrence of kidnapping after the two kidnapping incidents took place in 2000 at Pulau Sipadan and Pulau Pandanan **(Fuller, New York Times)**. The Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) was given the mandate to manage OP PASIR. The MAF drawn a comprehensive concept of surveillance, detection and protection to observe the security situation in east coast of Sabah. However, despite the drawn concept, crimes and KFR activities were still reported in Sabah waters based on a couple of news reported through Borneo Post news agency.

In 2013, a group of private soldiers known as the Royal Sulu Army (RSA) quietly occupied FELDA Sahabat in Lahad Datu, which resulted in a standoff killing 68 of the RSA soldiers and several others were captured **(Jasmine & Sarriburaja, 2016)**. Following the incident, Prime Minister Najib Razak proclaimed the establishment of Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM) to further strengthen and reinforce the existing security architecture in Eastern Sabah. ESSCOM was a security forces central command integrating main Malaysian security agencies under a unified control to unfold cooperation and maintain integration among the agencies. ESSCOM was given the task to dominate and secure the Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZone) area, which is a 1,700km-long special security area along the east coast of Sabah that borders crime-prone southern Philippines.

Despite of establishing ESSZone and unified command structure to manage the security arrangement, crime and kidnapping incidents were still reported (**Borneo Post Online, May 16, 2015**). This continuing narrative in the east coast of Sabah had irritated the population (**Borneo Post, July 21, 2016**) and demanded the authority to resolve the nightmare. Inter-departmental rivalry is assumed to be the tumbling block especially on sharing of information clinging among the security agencies in ESSCOM that affecting the solidarity in achieving the organisational objectives. Further to add insult to injury, the gang phenomena are exacerbating the civil-military and police-military relation problems and reducing the effective and civil-military ability to control national territory (**Manwaring, 2005**). The same inter-departmental cooperation between the Police (Special Branch) and the military during the Emergency period was not as close as it should be especially in cooperation, sharing information and intelligence. However, General Templer effort to assign army intelligence officers (MIO) since 1952 to provide a channel for the effective transmission of Special Branch operational intelligence to the army, the relation and cooperation between the two service improved tremendously (**Comber, 2008; 7**). A similar relationship enhancement arrangement must be advocated in ESSCOM to optimise the organisational excellence.

Sabah has been prone to criminal activities emanating from armed groups from southern Philippines. The establishment of ESSCOM to dominate ESSZone and the implementation of surveillance, detection and protection (SDP) concept do not guarantee the strategies that have been drawn were attainable in confronting a new form of armed criminality in Sabah. What form of threats that we are facing in Eastern Sabah? Our security community does not give enough attention on our expertise that we were once possess during the emergency period - the knowledge and skill in counterinsurgency warfare. The security forces, especially the military and the police had long forgotten of our master in counterinsurgency warfare, specifically on KESBAN. It also had faded from the curriculum of our professional military education, indeed. The general feeling is that the knowledge and skills in counterinsurgency (KESBAN) against the CPM was a history and it was a classical counterinsurgency skill that is irrelevant today with the demise of the CPM after Hatyai Peace Accord signed on December 2, 1989. Nevertheless, in the present development in Sabah we have to rethink of insurgency – the criminal insurgency and a neo-classical counterinsurgency warfare. We have to restore the old knowledge with few added skills.

ANALYSING CRIMINAL INSURGENCY

Is the on-going criminality in the east coast of Sabah considered as insurgency? Answering this question, this paper shall analyse those crimes committed through an insurgency analysis guide produced and published by US Government in 2012 (**US Government Publication, 2012**). It should be accepted that there is no two insurgencies ever the same, and this analysis guide not designed to give a one-size-fits-all template. Since insurgencies are not unique in all aspects, nevertheless, they share some common characteristics, tactics, and objectives. These commonalities are the emphasis of this analysis according to the guidance notes. So, while examining the criminal insurgency in east coast of Sabah, it will not necessarily demonstrate or reveal the whole bunch of the characteristics given in the guide because some may not relevant or not common to the criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah.

Insurgency is a violent political struggle with the aim to control of people and resources, and in the case of east coast of Sabah, it is assumed that the perpetrator intended to control the territory so that the authority will be a hindrance in pursuing their criminal intentions. Some the common characteristics are:

Attribute 1

Undermining the ability of the government to provide the population with security and it may be contented to portray the government impotence in providing protection for their safety and security. This characteristic has been very clear in east coast of Sabah; the perpetrator create fear among the locals in order to dominate the territory in which they intend to control to supplant government authority.

Attribute 2

Obtain the active or passive support of the population. Although not all support is obtained willingly from their true sympathisers, the thesis is not examining the population support characteristic in terms of the population Sabah but the illegal immigrants and the occupants of the 'water village'. Since the perpetrators were not locals and terrorise the locals, they do not obtain the support the locals. However, there are several evidences that some of the 'water village' inhabitants and illegal immigrants in Sabah were alleged to be the accomplices (Bernama News, 17 May 2015). Certain inhabitants having kinship relations allow the perpetrators to transit in their 'village' boats, provide shelter in the 'water village' and provide information on security forces movements to avoid detection by the security forces before the perpetrators launch their onslaught on their prey.

Attribute 3

Provoke the government into committing abuses that drive the neutral civilians towards the insurgents. This characteristic is neither significant nor relevant in the case in the east coast of Sabah. So far according the daily news record, there is no evidences nor reports have been launched against the security forces on their abuses in the ESSZone. Furthermore, it doesn't involve the civilian population in Sabah, since the perpetrators were originated from southern Philippines.

Attribute 4

Insurgency is a political competition for legitimacy, it is characterised by lack of front lines, sequenced battles, and a protracted strategy. This characteristic is quite obvious in the east coast of Sabah that the perpetrator's attempt to strike on its prey may come from any direction to any specific targets at several resort islands or even on the main land's town or population centres and probably on the fishermen fishing in open sea. It is totally a guerrilla form of tactics

Attribute 5

The distinction between civilian and combatants is blurred in insurgency. This characteristic is coherent in case of Eastern Sabah perpetrators. Linking it to attribute 2, the perpetrator usually takes cover and disguise as sea nomads living in the 'water villages' around east coast of Sabah. It is very difficult to identify them with local inhabitants in the 'water village' once they have taken refuge in the community.

These four out of five characteristics are sufficient enough to categorise the criminalities that are occurring in east coast of Sabah as insurgency – criminal insurgency. A couple other authors had also identified some characteristics related to insurgency. David Galula, a French officer who studied Chinese insurgency while on assignment in China. On characteristics of insurgency, Galula emphasise on the existence of asymmetry between insurgent and counterinsurgent (Galula, 1964; 3). The insurgent usually employs 'Fabian Strategy', avoiding direct confrontation with the counterinsurgents. Chandrasekaran reaffirm in his literature on insurgency the live with support of the masses. Through the masses they constantly update their intelligence on the presence of the security forces, as well as recruiting new cadres (A.V.Chandrasekaran, 2013; 5).

RESHAPING KESBAN CONCEPT AS COUNTERINSURGENCY TOOL

Analysing the criminal insurgency plight in Eastern Sabah, finding a practical approach in addressing the predicament is of urgent requirement since the problem has been perpetual. One practical solution in addressing insurgency issue in the past as indicated earlier was the application of security and development (KESBAN) concept during the 2nd Malayan Emergency (1969-1989) against the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM). It is now time to reshape the same classical counterinsurgency technique into a neo-classical counterinsurgency approach against the criminal insurgency. In reshaping the classical KESBAN concept, firstly, it should identify the various government countermeasures advocated as its concept. The government adopted a couple of civil countermeasures, military security operations and 'hearts and minds' programme as counterinsurgency tool against the communist terrorists. Secondly, transforming and reshaping these classical countermeasures into a fighting doctrine as a neo-classical counterinsurgency approach. Thirdly, applying the reshaped neo-classical counterinsurgency approach against criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah.

Bridging Classical Counterinsurgency Measures to Neo-Classical Measures. This part of the paper will attempt to bridge some of the main government measures taken during the classical counterinsurgency kinetic warfare under the context of KESBAN circumstantiated by the first generation countermeasures to suit to neo-classical countermeasures. The attempt is to identify the various agendas necessitated to curb the widespread of criminal insurgency in Eastern Sabah mirror imaging the countermeasures against the communist during the Second Emergency to destroy the communist's organisational structure and disassociate the citizen from the communist influence.

Legislation. The Emergency Regulation Ordinance (1948) was enacted covering subjects such as possession of firearms, power of arrest, detention, control of food supply and clearing of undergrowth along selected route. Imposition of curfew was also introduced and prohibited and control area was created to limit population movement. Compulsory registration of the population through the identity card system was introduced to segregate between citizen and communist terrorists. The same arrangements are already prevailing in ESSZone area except that the registration of 'water village' occupants have to be conducted to control and rebirth of new members. Once this process is completed, the subsequent move to resettling them can be enforced.

Populace and Resource Control Scheme. Sir Harold Briggs, as the Director of Operations during the First Emergency devise a plan, which was named after his name, 'The Briggs Plan' was initiated in 1952. It was a community resettlement programme to resettle about 42,500 Chinese squatters living on jungle fringes were uprooted into about 400 new villages. The 'new villages' were constructed with the provision of fenced around the village with military and police protection. These were mainly the Chinese community of those who had fled the urban cities and in the wake of Japanese occupation (Nyce, 1973; 192). The implementation of 'new village' scheme had denied the communist terrorists of obtaining food, information, medical and recruits from the squatters' community, which they usually acquire from when they were living at the jungle fringes. The resettling of the 'water village' must be done on the same footing, with organised water village like the one in Brunei or some sort of it. The village must be fenced, secured and protected. There should be single entry and exit gate and all movements must be recorded to avoid criminal insurgents disguising as occupants taking refuge in the village.

Food Denial Operations. General Briggs second master plan after resettlement programme was the launching of '*Operation Starvation*'. This joint military-police-civil components is to deprive the communist of its source of food and other sources required the bandits. Strict food controls were brought in 'food restricted areas' (O' Balance, 1966; 122). It includes centralise cooking in the 'new villages' to ensure that the village occupants do not bring cooked food to their working areas in the rubber plantations and mines, where communist terrorist take the opportunity to contact and obtain the food. Military and police were deployed to monitor and provide protection to the workers in their working areas. This arrangement may not very practical but protection to those occupants working at their work area would be necessary.

Hearts and Minds Programme. When Sir Gerald Templer was appointed as High Commissioner of Malaya, he put emphasis on winning the people support through 'hearts and minds' programme (Stubbs, 1989; 250). The main theme of strategy was to call for a total effort to influence the population in politics, economic, cultural, social as well as military. Templer commented in 1952 that '*the shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us*' (Cloake, 1985; 262). The aim of the programme was to persuade the population to abandon the CPM by threatening to punish those aided the guerrillas and, at the same time, holding out to those who supported the government of greater security (Stubbs, 1989; 155). The 'hearts and minds' programme in Eastern Sabah is very much needed especially concerning the 'water village' occupants. The programme must be designed to ensure the occupants are convinced that the government is committed to provide the basic human needs through security and development.

Social Development Projects. The government also pursued to improve the social standard of the community through social development programme which include introduction of National Education Policy, extending medical services to the rural areas, social developments in rural areas include construction of roads, schools, business infrastructures and other facilities and improving the people's economy by land development projects such as FELDA, FELCRA, RISDA and other schemes. On the lateral developments, the focus of the social developments will be in the 'water village' areas. The occupant's children must be provided with formal education, medical services should be extended to the 'water villages', economy generation schemes such as marine-based economy should be introduced, communication facilities to allow the occupants to market their marine-based products should be promoted, and barter trade which has been a downstream system should be reintroduced with refined, efficient, controlled and secured system. These are part of the 'hearts and minds' programme to get the community behind government's effort to distance the people from the criminal insurgents.

Eliminating Criminal Insurgency. The bridging of the classical counterinsurgency measures to neo-classical countermeasures is to ensure the measures are designed to segregate the people from the criminal insurgents through 'hearts and minds' programme. Once the segregation and getting the people behind the government effort, the elimination process the criminal insurgents should be emphasise and pursued with the following strategies.

ENHANCING THE INTELLIGENCE MONITORING SYSTEM

Intelligence plays are important role in countering insurgency in the context of security and development whether in the classical or neo-classical era. In the classical mode, many argued that 'intelligence drives operations'. So, on a similar platform, any operations against criminal insurgents in the future in Eastern Sabah should be driven by intelligence. In such as case, the counterinsurgents can concentrate and economise its effort at the point of contact. The security architecture must not be reactive to insurgent's action but it must be proactive. The intelligence

system must be predictive with early warning system in-place. The security system must not ever be working blindly, but rather alert at all time.

Although ESSCOM has been designed allowing multi-security agencies to function under a single command in order to unfold cooperation and maintain integration among the agencies (**Jawhar & Sariburaja, 2016;**), thus reinforcing security arrangement, the occurrence of crime and kidnapping incidents were still reported, which prove failure in the intelligence system within the organisation. This lead to the argument that the inter-departmental relation between the Police (Special Branch) and the military during the Emergency period was not as close as it should be especially in cooperation, sharing information and intelligence. The relations turn to better since 1952 onwards, when the British army intelligence officers (MIO) were attached to the Police Special Branch to provide a channel for the effective transmission of Special Branch operational intelligence to the army. The Military Intelligence Officers did not collect intelligence themselves but they worked under the SB unit to which they were attached (**Comber, 2008; 7**).

The Royal Malaysian Police (Special Branch) had infiltrated into the CPM organisation during the Emergency and manage to divide CPM into three different factions and each outmanoeuvre the others (**Chin, 1994; 206-215**). By end of 1980s, before the Hadtyai Peace Accord was signed, there was only one faction out of three remained for surrender. Professor Peter Edwards, the official historian of Australia's role in the Malayan and Vietnam conflicts, commented in his study on Malayan Emergency that *"the most important weapon in counter-insurgency was intelligence."* (**Edwards, 1989; 45**). An insurgent movement in its infancy is necessary small and the attitude of its members have greater influence because there are no generals with no private to command. History is full of cases of infiltration by the counterinsurgents into insurgent's movements and splitting the organisation. Two famous cases of infiltration; the Czarist in Russia, the Okhrana succeeded in infiltrating the Bolshevik Party and the American Communist Party has been infiltrated by the FBI (**Galula; 46-47**). Based on the historical experience, the intelligence architecture must be centrally commanded but decentralised execution. Efforts to infiltrate the perpetrator's organisation must be seriously considered and executed.

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL

The operational command and control of countering criminal insurgency must be managed at the strategic level. The National Security Council (NSC) at the Federal level must command and control the operations in Sabah for effective outcome. Likewise, during the emergency the NSC commands and controls all security and development activities at the federal level. The decision approved at the national level with regards to KESBAN activities were channelled down to the State NSC and further to districts level, which are chaired by the District Officer. This hierarchical chain of command has proven effective, secured and successful in handling the KESBAN programmes in the four northern states that borders Thailand. However, managing KESBAN operations by NSC at Federal level is befitting in monitoring the activities for four states, but in the case of Sabah, it is only state. It is strongly advice that the management of conflict resolution in Sabah should base on the principle of 'centralise control and decentralise execution', which means the planning and decision making should be done at Federal level but the execution of the operations is accomplished at State level.

Doctrinally, unity of effort necessitates for effectiveness and efficiency. Centralized planning is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of all available manoeuvre assets. Decentralized execution is essential to generate the tempo of operations required and to cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat (*US Joint Publication, 2003; v*). Centralized control

is defined as a hierarchy decision-making structure where all decisions and processes are handled strictly at the strategic level. Operational and tactical level in the chain of command are limited in executing the planning and putting in place the activities to ensure the departments below the chain of command follows the direction of the top executives. In simple terms, decentralise execution are to execute assign tasks and maintain a very open communication. In combatting criminal insurgency, which is commonly regarded to be more complex than normal conventional combat operations, the decentralisation in executing the activities that have been translated at strategic level by NSC are needed to generate solutions suited to unique local conditions. This explains the call for decentralized control of assets employed in combating the insurgents.

JOINT OPERATIONS WITH ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES (AFP)

When the CPM was defeated politically and militarily in 1960 during the classical counterinsurgency campaign, they withdrew to southern Thailand to reconsolidate themselves by strengthening its organisation by recruiting young and bold new cadres, conduct retraining and re-establishes its old network. Although Malaysian authorities knew their general whereabouts but not able to hunt them beyond the international border. The virtual absence of coordinated and effective Malaysia-Thailand liaison was a significant barrier to successful counterinsurgency efforts, in spite of having December 1959 accord, which allows the Police Force to the rights to 'hot pursuit' within twenty-five miles of the border (**Wei Chong, 2014; 142**). A similar third agreement was accorded in 1970, which was a significant improvement of the border cooperation, when joint military-police ground operations was approved. Malaysia had obtained many successes in conducting joint operations with its Thai's military during the hard days through several successful joint operations such as Op DAOYAI MUSNAH I and II, Op CAHAYA BENA I and II, Op SELAMAT SAWADEE and Op THAMAL (**MINDEF, 2000**).

On a lateral footing, joint operations with Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) would be necessary in curbing Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) menace. The purpose of joint security operations with the AFP is to create an atmosphere of tranquillity and related peace within AOR so that internal or social economic development can be carried out without hindrance. It embraces the full range of operational measures taken by the police and military through diplomatic channel in seeking the perpetrators in their safe areas. The aim is to keep ASG at bay rather than letting them planning to direct their criminal activities in Malaysian territory.

Option to conduct joint operations with AFP may not be able to put into practice in the near future until such time the MAF acquires its long faded or lost skills in classical counterinsurgency skills and refined the skills and gain mastery in neo-classical counterinsurgency in combatting criminal insurgents. Meanwhile, bilateral diplomatic constructive engagement with the Philippines and AFP should be initiated. The objectives of the joint operations are; first, to deny ASG infiltration into Malaysian sovereignty especially Malaysian territorial waters and resort islands by keeping them at bay rethinking of their own survival on land. Second, to cooperate with AFP in destroying ASG base camps and their safe havens in Southern Philippines especially in Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi (BASULTA) islands.

According to the Malaysian Chief of Defence Forces (CD, General Tan Sri Professor Zulkifli bin Zainal Abidin, any effort to conduct military joint operations with the Philippines against the Abu Sayyaf may not be fruitful because the former always expect to get more benefits from the cooperation rather than the result of the cooperation. US Army has been conducting 'Balik Bayan' joint exercises with the Philippines army in the south for many years, but the outcome of the joint exercises cum security operation has not been very promising. On the other

hand, he stressed that developing the island of Mindanao economically would be more beneficial than security operations (**Interview with CDF, 2019**), at least we may be able to regulate or stop the migration of illegal immigrant into Sabah.

USE OF TECHNOLOGY IN SECURITY OPERATIONS

Neo-classical counterinsurgency techniques must be able to authenticate the technology employed by modern days armed groups and insurgents. Criminals and pirates in the east coast of Sabah are employing modern technologies including lighter speed boats to escape security forces detections and trailing. Security forces common weakness in trailing perpetrators were dormant to the enemy presence, bulky speed boats trailing the perpetrators, and most of the time they were blind and do not realise perpetrators presence in the vicinity. The perpetrators presence is realised after the crime has been committed. Deployment of smart drones equipped with loudspeakers, camera and laser guided weapon would compensate the weakness in countering the criminal insurgents. MQ-9 Reaper, the drone used in the assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani at Bagdad's International Airport on January 3, 2020 (**McCredie, 2020**) was a good example of deadly drone that should be deployed against the perpetrators in east coast of Sabah. Drones should be flown at all time to monitor perpetrators movements, once identified, warning of intrusion through loudspeakers should be voiced and followed by camera recording of the intrusion. If the intruder fails to turn back, the laser guided weapon must be directed against them. Compensating the employment of drones, there should qualified data analysts positioned at control centres to analyse data obtained from these drones.

CONCLUSION

Security and development or KESBAN emerged as the concept advocated to confront the CPM during the Second Malayan Emergency (1969-1989). It was a classical counterinsurgency tool to defeat the communist terrorists by employing two-prongs strategy of internal security and internal development. It is simply, the security forces creating a secure environment through the conduct of security operations to ensure development projects can be carried out and the same time protecting the people from the communists' harassment and intimidation. As Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary-General put it "*there will be no development without security; and no security without development*" (**United Nations, 2005**). This phrase brings a connotation that security and development must complement each other and it works hand-in-hand. At the same time 'hearts and minds' programmes were directed to get the people behind the government cause and to further strengthen the national resilience against communist ideology.

The security situation in Sabah has been threaten by the presence of non-state actors and armed groups leading non-traditional threats in forms of kidnap-for-ransom, sea-piracy and multi-goods smuggling activities. The National Security Council (NSC) has declared east coast of Sabah as Eastern Sabah Security Zone (ESSZone) in order to inhibit security threats and enhance security in the region (**Anuar A.R. and Harun A, 2019**). These non-traditional threats were emanating from the political, social and economic disorder in Southern Philippines that affected the security of Sabah. The non-traditional threats were mainly criminal-base with insurgency approach, categorising it as 'criminal insurgency' based upon the characteristics of insurgency. Unlike traditional insurgency, criminal insurgencies are not intended to overthrow the standing government but to prosecute a violent tussle against the state for legitimacy and freedom of movements (**Sullivan, 2010**) in the area of operations that will guarantee the regime's survival.

Armed groups and gangs' phenomena are exacerbating civil-military and police-military relations problem and reducing the effective and civil-military ability to control the national territory (**Manwaring, 2005**). This phenomenon is reflected in the case of ESSCOM, where crimes are persistent in spite of the security architectures designed to deny them. Based on Malaysia's previous experience fighting insurgency, a practical solution against criminal insurgency is the application of the successful and tested concept of traditional KESBAN in a modernised approach. Reshaping KESBAN to the contemporary environment by applying two dimensions of; firstly, bridging the classical counterinsurgency approach to neo-classical counterinsurgency mechanism. This bridging effort is to segregate insurgents from the people (water village community) and to get the people behind the government cause. This is achieved by legislative measures such as curfew, identity authentication using ID cards, populace control measures by implementing resettlement programme, hearts and minds programme, and social developments through infrastructure and economic developments. Secondly, the elimination of the insurgent's by enhancing the intelligence collection efforts, the command and control of the criminal insurgency operations management by NSC, conducting joint land operations with AFP and employment of technology intensive operations such as deploying drones and computer-aided monitoring system.

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COUNTER NARRATIVE OF ISIS IN MALAYSIA

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ABSTRACT

The research is entitled “Counter Narrative of the ISIS ideology in Malaysia”. The researcher explores both the narrative and counter narrative of the ISIS ideology as it has become a grim regional concern either domestic or international. The counter narrative of the ISIS is crucial to eliminate all forms of propaganda dispersed through social media, especially via Facebook and Twitter as this space is used by the ISIS to recruit and spread their ideology to their target group especially youths in order to gain influence and sympathy. The research aims to identify the counter narrative of the ISIS in Malaysia. It is being worrying trend and there is a paucity of individuals or groups that could create and implement effective evidence-based strategies to deploy counter narratives towards the narrative. The method focuses on an in-depth expert interview that involves two experts and one respondent who was almost recruited by the ISIS and all respondents are aged between 25 to 45 years old. The method includes a deductive thematic analysis using seven identified themes which are moral, theme, ideology, target audience, intention, propaganda and media campaign. The result revealed that media campaign and ideology are two favorite elements that is significant to implemented in the counter narrative in the pursuit of eliminating the ISIS ideology. Therefore, family support, religious awareness programmes, comprehensive cooperation amongst agencies and Islamic countries were needed. Hence, government agencies are recommended to continue exploring the ISIS counter narrative due to the paucity of research pertaining to this topic in Malaysia.

Keywords: *ISIS, Ideology, Jihadist, Propaganda, Morale, Social Media, Extremist, Salafist Jihadi Islamic, Islamic State*

INTRODUCTION

ISIS has been credited of having one of the most successful and sophisticated marketing campaigns in the history of jihadist organisations (Palamar, 2015). ISIS is well known due to their main ideology that purports the Salafist Jihadi Islamic creed in their organisation. It is a part of the Sunni Islamic extremist faction that seeks to restore the early Islam’s days of glory through expediting the jihad, a holy war intended to be directed against internal and external enemies of Islam. The Salafist was derived from the word Salaf in Arabic and is defined semantically as “the first generation” or “ancestors”. The movement perceives that the period during the life of Prophet Muhammad, PBUH was an ideal period and the first four Caliphs who followed his ways as role models.

The Salafist Jihadist have a skewed perspective in terms of Islam where Muslims must always strive to distribute and enforce Islam in all areas of life by eliminating any other religion that is practised and imposing Islam through jihad or the holy war which is deeply understood as the personal responsibility of every Muslim. The ISIS has embedded the concept known as “takfir” or a declaring a Muslim as apostates in its organisation which later makes it turn into a “takfiri” group where members of the group could denounce the faith of a person and claim the person as an infidel thereby enabling his or her execution according to Islamic Law. (The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 2014).

According to the recent Quilliam report on Virtual Caliphate (2015), ISIS have managed to publish more than 30 unique pieces of propaganda each day and its broader narrative can be stratified into six sub-themes which are **Brutality, Mercy, War, Victimhood, Belonging, and Utopianism**. Therefore, that people who are easily influenced by this ideology will give their full support to join and become a jihadist in Syria. In Malaysia, the group has managed to conduct various activities to recruit and disperse propaganda through social media. The propaganda mainly affects certain groups who fought in the name of religion. The group also created fundraising activities. The IS are able to gain funding for their operations and is the wealthiest terrorist group in the history of terrorism.

Currently, the Islamic State scenario was filling the space and a major threat to world security (Zulkarnain Harun & Lailatul Afidzha, 2016). Several literatures are organised and discussed in the following sub-sections to cover the general elements of the IS narrative that includes **ideology, propaganda, media campaign, theme, intention, moral, and target audience**. A **Salafi jihadist ideology** aims to purge Islam away from non-Islamic influences through violence. There is a significant number Shi'ites in the Middle East that would reject the sunni caliph. In relation to that, blaming the west for the problems faced by Islam is seen to have a good response from Muslims. Although there seems to be some dissatisfaction amongst corrupt politicians, there is also a claim towards unwanted vicinities.

COUNTER NARRATIVES

There are efforts expedited in order to counter narrate the propaganda of the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) or also known as Ad Dawla Al Islamiyya Fi Iraq Wa Ash Sham (Daesh). According to Lt. Col. Zulkarnain Haron (2016), the fight against narratives of the ISIS is seen still less effective because there are some Muslims that is generally involved with the activities of the IS, especially in understanding the narratives spread by the IS through their propaganda in the social media. It is important for Malaysians to understand the IS narrative as the lack of understanding is a weakness and becomes a golden opportunity to be directly influenced by the IS leading to the support and sympathy towards the IS. There are confusions among Muslims pertaining to the narrative of the IS and Islamic teachings as they assume that the IS is trying to establish the Khilafah Islamiyah as a religious authority without realizing that Islam is only used as a tool to gain support, recruit followers as well as encouraging Muslims to migrate to the Caliphate of their creation and this requires Muslims to pledge an allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi as the caliph of all Muslims in the world.

IDEOLOGY

According to Dr. Paul Freston (2016), the IS phenomenon promotes or triggers firefighting. He added there are three methods to put out a fire. The first is to use water, which would be an interventionist strategy. The second method would be to fight fire with fire. He explains the idea of setting up counter narratives and propaganda to combat the ideological footing that the ISIS enjoys. The final method is just to have to cut away. Dr. Muhammad Tahir Ul-Qudri (2010) explained there are three different levels of religion which are actions, beliefs and spiritual states and all Islamic teachings revolve around these three levels; Islam, Iman, and Ihsan which are synonymous with peace and security, safety and protection, tolerance and moderation but the perpetrators of terror have clearly justified their actions in the name of jihad which is totally opposite of the true teachings of Islam.

PROPAGANDA

In order to confront this ideology of radical extremism, there are several of steps which is should become the government's upmost priority which is to prevent extremist groups from using violence to achieve their goals. The government needs to elevate public consciousness and it needs to make it very clear that it fears only the distorted version of Islam propagated by radical extremists. The greater alternatives need to be available to young people where the greater freedom they receive entails more credible the voices that will expose young people to voice out and this make them less vulnerable to extremist narratives. Therefore, this diminishes the popular opinion and public support from Muslims on which they are dependent on. The counter narrative must reject the jihadist worldview and storyline while also providing an alternative. The ISIS propaganda should be based on persuasive deployments of an alternative narrative that offers a constructive solution to target audiences, allowing practitioners of countering violent extremism and their civil society partners to pro-actively pre-empt messaging activities of the ISIS, rather than only react to them.

MEDIA CAMPAIGN

Media should play a role in exposing as well as providing aggressive media coverage needed on a large scale showcasing offensive actions undertaken by the military as implemented by the IS previously. In relation to that, the freedom of speech needs to be expanded to counter extremism to target audience by bringing in speakers to counter narrate extremists by safe-guarding the democracy. A Domestic approach suggested by Jenkins (2007) which includes message blocking, removing the inciters, identifying recruiting venues and dissuading potential recruits could be a viable way to defeat this ideology and the best is to destroy the message before indoctrination takes root. The best efforts to win the hearts and minds are clouded by the insidious cultural distrust, capability of speaking against the ideology, the role of Islamic leadership, infiltrating popular blogs and powerful debaters needed. Schmid (2015) proposed that governments impose censorship of the public media in order to end the destructive agenda of the relationship between the ISIS and journalism. he suggested that media in general which includes social media is responsible for self-censorship. He reasoned that the ISIS could only be defeated in the long-term by a Muslim-led counter-narrative that would both invalidate and degrade the ISIS ideology.

THEME

This fact could be emphasized to encourage a more skeptical view among susceptible target audiences towards the ISIS argument that it represents the "pure and unadulterated Islam". The ISIS applies a prophetic methodology by using the word caliphate as well as establishing its own brand symbols in order to give a strong identity to the group. This should be replicated due to its advantages and the ability to embed the identity of Islam as a religion and carries a positive way of life with respect to others rather than the religion with negative values that supports the violent and extremist struggles of the ISIS and this enables followers of the counter narrative to spread the alternative ideology by using the symbol and brand that the counter narrative is associated with.

INTENTION

The war against the IS as suggested by Brachman and McCants (2006) exploits its critical vulnerability and greatest weakness that concerns the *Takfir* belief and justified killings of Muslims. For this purpose, an offensive action must be taken. There is a need to identify the critical capability, critical point of vulnerability as well as the critical requirement of the IS which

has become the Centre of Gravity (COG). In identifying the Centre of Gravity (COG) of ISIS, it is crucial to understand its critical capability. It means that is considered a crucial enabler for a center of gravity to function as such and is essential to the accomplishment of the specified or assumed objective. Second, identifying the critical vulnerability is an aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attacks that will create decisive or significant effects. Third, essential condition, resource and means for a critical capability must fully operate. This element is needed before war begins regardless of either using an offensive or defensive tactic.

MORALE

Doctrine as motivator according to Lorne Dawson (2015), by using the manifesto of religion are more convincing to give people a resolution of purpose and value of life (Friends and family involvement to play important roles in efforts that seek to prevent terrorist plots). It is important to having an open dialogue among family members and friends about the risks of extremism because people are adept at hiding their lives on the Internet from others and many people may not believe that radicalization could happen in their own homes. In the other way, to boost their moral, family or relatives must always talk to them, use the right approach to control and filter, restrict, monitor or report content, set ground rules and boundaries for internet and mobile devices and understand their desire as long as based on true teaching of Islam. In the same on the internet and social media, we need to equipped with the right knowledge, values and critical thinking skills to the youth who potential to lapse into ISIS Ideology. An opinion by Jenkins (2007) regarding to Kinetic 'Kill and Capture Tactics'. He suggested to pre occupied with gathering intelligence to conduct surgical strikes, often by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) and destroy the message before indoctrination takes root.

TARGET AUDIENCE

Disseminate the Message, according to Chris Heffelfinger (2015) and Jonathan Russell and Haras Rafiq (2016), we need the most credible voices capable of speaking against this Ideology and must come from Islamic leadership itself. We must ability to reach and influence Muslim opinion, not just the opinions of individual Muslims in a given constituency but the ability to compete with thought leaders and for thought leadership among Muslims globally. The dissemination of message via proxies in Muslim countries or appointed, local Islamic leaders, through government officials directly has needed. Counter terrorism practitioners and policymakers must develop a greater familiarity with Islam, to wisely choose partners and understand the nuances of intra-Islamic debate. All counter-narratives both online and offline must ideally first conduct robust target audience analysis to ascertain the most appropriate message and the most effective language, messenger, tone, and format to achieve the behavioral change desired.

According to Nur Irfani & Nur Azlin (2015), local messengers is one of the important aspects because of credible voices at the grassroots level needed to counter the everyday messaging of violent extremist organizations. Besides, emphasized face to face interactions are still very important. Social media training against hate speech must have launched consistently and such program aims to teach target audience to build their own counter-messages that are aimed at their peers in their own communities.




Figure 1: The Diagram of ISIS Counter Narrativ

FINDINGS

There are few findings base on objectives that could be discussed with regards of this topic in this study. Findings identified by the researcher can be use by government and other intelligence agencies in Malaysia based on narrative, counter narrative and suggestion plan for counter narrative of ISIS.

First objective is to identify ISIS narrative which has been influenced the ideology of society. ISIS is actively present in cyberspace, on the Internet where its claims too often go unquestioned. With its propaganda in the social media, and with some of its video footage also broadcast in mainstream media, ISIS has caught the imagination of a considerable number of young rebellious Muslims all over the world who are attracted by its violent messages and catchy

slogans. Its apparent success has also led to a number of instant conversions to Islam among mainly marginalized Muslim and non-Muslim people especially new generation around the world including Malaysia. First point of ISIS narrative is an ideology where the researcher highlighted on ideology Salafist-jihadism of the Islamic State which aims to purge Islam of outside influence but through violence. Another point is in *takfir* belief that from the ISIS belief, they have been reject any change or progress to their understanding from claiming religion concerning illustration and calling them (person who deny/reject *takfir*) apostates starting with Islam along these lines never again Muslim. The second element is propaganda whereas ISIS capable presenting advanced propaganda material to a larger audience by social media, especially Twitter and propaganda video produced by them requires a more sophisticated understanding of storytelling that is easy to use in order to penetrate and brainwash their target person. The third is media campaign, which ISIS encourages their member States with maximum effort to use their smartphones to teach, guide and recruit other people on social media accounts, e.g. Twitter, Facebook, Tumblr, Kik, Ask. FM, Skype and blogs. Apart from that, they use their main branding, recruitment campaigns in the Google Play App, Dawn of cheer, ISIS Simulator 2015 and a monthly electronic magazine, Dabiq. They move into community events such as seminars, religious and social activities and including schools such as high school and college through their 'Jihad Mentor'.

The fourth is the theme of the ISIS claims to use "the methodology of the Prophet", 'Caliphate' and migration (Hijrah) to the land of Islam is obligatory. They also have demonstrated outstanding strategic award for 'brand' as a symbol of the narrative and actions. Fifth is the intention by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi in fulfilling its vision of 'Call for jihad' in which he called on Muslims to support the Islamic state through jihad for the sake of Allah. He also promised to Jihadis that happiness awaits them in heaven. His promise was made weak and deluded as used on the basis of the name of Allah and Islam. The sixth is moral which is a major point of influence. ISIS success using these elements is described as often portrays its war as defensive rather than offensive. Apart from that, in Malaysia, people are simply encouraged by partnership sentiment, inspiration and motivation for a struggle. Idea sharing is fostered through relationships in social media and lead to further terrorist acts on the initiative of the individual. The last point is the target audience, ISIS uses the basic narrative on themes familiar to every Muslim and successful approach to Muslim youth. Their attention is to implement a set of techniques that appeal to young children because children and young people easily propagated and misled to join the terrorist group. These people have a burning passion and willingness to use firearms seems to be a soldier. Their weakness has become a golden opportunity for ISIS to directly influence their target group.

Second objective is to identify the elements of ISIS Counter Narrative to prevent the spread of influence in Malaysia. This objective is achieved through a literature review and the diagram was produced for counter narrative of ISIS. When the narrative of ISIS has identified (objective 1) based on seven elements, the important point to counter narrative of ISIS were identified based on seven elements of the narrative of ISIS in Malaysia. The seven elements of counter narrative of ISIS also include seven elements such as ideology, propaganda, media campaign, theme, intention, moral and target audience. The foremost one was ideology and researcher highlighted on ISIS ideology has to be fought at its beginning, from the grassroots. Focus on the Salafi-Jihadi ideological underpinnings of the Islamist narrative which protect it from all criticism and needed in depth understanding of the various pillars of the Islamist narrative and the Salafi-jihadi ideology. The second is propaganda whereas government needs to elevate public consciousness and it needs to make very clear that it fears only the distorted version of Islam propagated by radical extremists, need Community Engagement Programmed and effective counter narrative will also erode the jihadists' religious legitimacy and ideological justifications.

The third is the media campaign in which the media should play a role in exposing and covering the media aggressively for large-scale offensive action. In order to win the hearts and minds of the target group, it must be shrouded in doubt on ISIS, able to speak regarding ideology, the leadership role of Islam, infiltrated popular blog that deviate from Islamic teachings, qualified and experienced debaters needed. The fourth is theme which to make Muhammad's as exemplary way of life and on Islamic law (sharia), uses a prophetic methodology, the word caliphate and establish our own brand symbols and to give a strong identity to the group, just as they have done. The fifth is intention, in order to counter the war of ideas in Malaysia, the current policy can be described as creating powerful and lasting diversion and the use of Internet social networking to discredit "violent extremism," cut off the flow of recruits. The sixth is moral, by using doctrine as motivator in order to convincing to give people a resolution of purpose and value of life. From this, friends and family involvement played an important role for such potential group to be recruited by ISIS. Their concern and awareness towards them is more important. Lastly is target audience, Malaysia need the most credible voices who capable of speaking and knowledge against their ideology and *takfir* belief and must come from Islamic leadership itself to avoid biasness. There must an ability to reach and influence Muslim opinion, not just the opinions of individual Muslims in a given constituency but the ability to compete with thought leaders and for thought leadership among Muslims globally.

Objective three is to suggest the strategic plan for ISIS Counter Narrative in Malaysia. The first point on ideology is suggest Religious awareness program and providing information programs about the true teachings of Islam to non-Muslims from being misinterpreted by some people of Malaysia. Second is propaganda, Government through the National Security Council should devise a joint strategy departments and agencies to provide programs / awareness campaigns, ideology and propaganda continuously made by ISIS, role of Ministry of Higher Education which is topic related ISIS can be made between the discussion in the classroom so that students will indirectly acquire facts and information on ISIS. The third is on media campaign that suggest to take serious note related to the effectiveness of the media campaign based on the acceptance by the people of Malaysia. We need for frequency sharing articles through internet made against the narrative, free speech campaign through the internet and the role of media is very significant in shaping the agenda and spread the message through appropriate medium. Apart from that, the role of Department of Information and the media can assess the medium most frequently used by the public for information.

The fourth is on theme, whereas suggestion the strategy of argument to ISIS and avoid the young people influenced and targeted by ISIS. Young people should be approached and encourage them to leisurely activities, discussions and negotiations so that they can give their views, share ideas as well as their needs and requirements are taken out. From this planning, agencies involved need to devise and created a theme that can affect and be a hoax, the memory of the public not to get stuck with the ISIS. The fifth point is on our intention to curb, fight and destroy ISIS threat in Malaysia. For the responsible agencies as MCMC and cyber security needs to actively carry out preventive measures to fight and destroy ISIS ideology using social media by using all the expertise available from them. Besides, any related link or suspicious sharing info on social sites must be blocked from being read and shared by users of social sites.

The sixth point is moral which highlighted on issued a directive in writing and distributed to all people in Malaysia to read by themselves. The leaflet from the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM) has been produced and distributed through a joint effort with the National Security Council regularly. Most important is encouraging involvement of family members and friends to help give advice, motivation and inspiration to individuals who tend to get stuck.

The last point related to target audience, whereas Malaysia need to identify leaders who really credible and able to make submissions on Malaysians to explain and support the fight ISIS effect. Besides, propaganda products such brochure, leaflets, banners, posters are must be distributed to the local community and the goal that people always see the communities where they live. House to house campaign can be implemented, while the intelligence from the Armed Forces and police have identified the individual characteristics of potential trapped and relationship based on existing information.

RECOMMENDATION

ISIS is a number one threat in the world and in Malaysia. Their technique of recruitment, mislead and use propaganda through the internet and technology have made them one of the most successful militant group in the world and the richest in raising funds from supporters who successfully recruited through social media. Malaysia has now taken steps to prevent the spread of the ideology of ISIS Malaysia. However, prevention techniques are implemented are not exhaustive. The number of ISIS supporters or jihadist were increased time by time although there are many arrests were made by police. There are several suggestions for strategic plan in order to counter ISIS narrative in Malaysia. These strategic plan is based on seven elements identified in previously. The action must be taken by the respective agencies, authority or law enforcement organization. All the suggestion for strategic plan may be considered by the agencies involved so that they can examine the shortcomings and gaps in each program which they have listed earlier to prevent ISIS ideology in Malaysia.

Other than that, emphasis on the individual's influence and has a deep knowledge of ISIS is extremely important in delivering ISIS threat to society. Related to this, most people would be interested to hear lectures given by person they like besides possessing knowledge that can influence their thinking. Therefore, the government should take drastic measures to identify the caliber leaders and free from accusations and slander to their reputation in delivering a lecture, so that there has no bad perception from the audience. Based on the use of technology and research on information disseminated by ISIS through social media, the agencies and ministries of education should be exposed knowledge on how to counter ISIS propaganda through computer forensic methods. This is a good opportunity to Malaysians, especially the young generation because ISIS target is from young people. Restrictions on information on the Internet related brochures and suspicious links should be aggressively pursued by the cyber security so that computer users do not get stuck to click and chose with any website made by ISIS.

Another recommendation is the need for the responsible agencies, police and military intelligence to develop a theme or slogan negatively on ISIS ideology by emphasizing the characteristics that could have an impact on public opinion. Through studies conducted, there is no longer any theme or slogan created to be used for removing ideology in Malaysia. Apart from that, by using media campaign technique in Malaysia has yet to be made. A flurry of information, websites and propaganda materials of ISIS applications other than games that can be uploaded from the play store is not governed by the relevant agencies. Campaign through the print or electronic media should be made regularly at locations become the public focus. The use of billboards, video and advertising on the Internet is more effective. All ministries, agencies and departments should be serious about this threat and have knowledge regarding the way ISIS manipulate and shape the thinking and action of the people. While Muslims must have strong religion beliefs, and not easily influenced by them and the role of society in taking out the problems of the neighbors.

CONCLUSION

Islamic State struggle is very clearly against the teachings of Islam. This has been clarified by the National Fatwa Council which met in 2014. In fact, they are also obsessed as willing to kill Muslims who disagree with the Salafi ideology they profess. Inclination and passion Muslims to wage jihad on behalf of ISIS or ISIL in Syria is the result of confusion in understanding the concept of jihad and martyrdom are real according to Islamic Law. They are also influenced by the traditions of false or weak hadith that the manipulation by the ISIS. IS has been using social media for maximum convenience to affect the sentiments of Muslims all over the world to sympathize and support their cause. Social media is now a medium for presenting information to the user in the most rapid and efficient. The narrative is quite normal that the beliefs and faith of Muslims every day because they use a narrative of jihad, the sentiments of Muslims humiliated and colonized, the Islamic State, the Khalifah Islamiyah and other factors can raise the sentiments of Muslims to be sympathetic to them. If Malaysia does not have any proactive measures are taken to curb and ideology, we are worried that they will re-establish terrorist cells and networks formed by militant groups existing in the country and the region as they probably form a strong network in South East Asia that have made an oath of allegiance to IS. Thus, through threats and modus operandi spreading by IS continuous narrative, Malaysia needs to take drastic measures to counter the narrative elements that have been identified.

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ASSESSING INDIA'S APPROACHES IN NAVIGATING CHINA IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

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ABSTRACT

This research was conducted to analyse India's maritime strategy towards China's presence in the Indian Ocean. China active maritime activity including expansion of facilities amongst the littoral states as well as influencing the trading patterns in the region has impacted India's prominence and its role as a net security provider. In this backdrop, the research seeks to (1) discuss the importance of Indian Ocean to India, (2) to examine China's maritime development in the Indian Ocean and its impact to India and (3) to analyse India's maritime responses towards China's maritime presence in Indian Ocean. This research is a qualitative in nature and uses secondary data consisting of books, journal, magazines and official reports. The study is analysed under the defensive realism umbrella to understanding India's responses and strategies vis-à-vis China. The study is expected to enhance the strategic approaches of India in managing China at its backyard. The study finds that (1) enhancing economic cooperation between littoral states can contribute to mutual economic dependency and sustain India as a major economic contributor in the region, (2) participation in global association will benefit India in building global relation and brand image in Indian Ocean, (3) naval diplomacy within the region as well as globally will contribute to the protection of its interest and stability of IO and (4) strong economic network in the region can contribute to India's naval force modernisation and bolster against its expansion of maritime security and realisation of India as a strong maritime power in the Indian Ocean.

Keywords: *China and Indian Ocean; India and Indian Ocean; China-India relations, maritime diplomacy; defensive realism.*

INTRODUCTION

The growing significance of Indian Ocean (hereafter IO) in terms of financial trade and global security has allure China's interest in being a vigorous player in the vicinity. China is slowly increasing its naval power and continues to maintain its maritime strength in Asia, along with the Indian Ocean, under Xi Ji Ping's management with the support of its strong economy.

One could observe China's naval strength officially growing with its involvement in guarding the Gulf of Aden, west of the Strait of Malacca, patrolling the Sea Line of Communications (SLOCs) trade, including deployment of anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean since 2008, which is fortified with broad shipbuilding and repair conveniences. More recently, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is seen as a fresh means of accelerating its maritime ambition in the IO. China's connections with nations along the Indian Ocean shipping routes, such as Pakistan and Cambodia, construction of new business ports or the renovation of current ports include Bangladesh's Chittagong Port, Myanmar's Sittwe Port and Coco Islands, Sri Lanka's Hambantota Port, Gwadar's Pakistani Port, and Bagamoyo Port of Tanzania are evidences of China's BRI initiatives in the area.

Nevertheless, these developments have direct implication particularly for India. This is because the IO has been India's own backyard for century and having a strong military power like China adjacent to its realm and sphere of influence can threaten its regional supremacy and maritime interest in the area. However, India has adopted an defensive approach in responding to China and has no objective of making its links irreversible and openly hostile. The strategies are created on a case-by-case basis, and not necessary conceived as a response to Chinese initiatives - India's commitment to China does not seem to result from a transparent, proactive approach. In other words, instead of adopting direct confrontation vis-à-vis China, India is pursuing an approach of retaining its influence in the vicinity, increase maritime defence and concentrate in building its economy.

In this backdrop, this paper seeks assess India's approaches in navigating China in the Indian Ocean. The first section will discuss the importance of IO to India and the second section will study China's maritime development and its impact to India. The third section will examine India's maritime policies and capabilities and the final section will assess India's approaches in responding to China's presence in the Indian Ocean.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INDIAN OCEAN FOR INDIA

As the world third largest ocean, the IO provides various political, economic and security advantage for maritime consumer in the world. For India, IO has an enviable strategic position as it lays at the head of the IO, halfway between all the passages that influence access to this important global environment. In terms of geology, the weather in IO connected with the meteorological phenomena of the monsoon and the trade winds has given India a distinctive location in the IO's for economics and trade purposes.

India's placement along the IO ultimately gives New Delhi a distinct perception of the region. India's increasing development and reliance on the international trade setting has led the role of IO to be more relevant to India's foreign policy issues. India Foreign Secretary Rao claims that IO could never be removed from its policy for inevitable reasons. IO position is not just a remark of geography to India but the greater environment as in the aspect of historical, cultural, economic and political relations founded between India. The Ocean, with all of its names, India-link, in its broadest possible, seems to be the single prevalent feature of the Indian Ocean.

India has a long-held aspirations to become IO leading force. Many scholars and policy maker has deliberated exclusively that India as more or less long-term destined to be the region's natural leader. India has also sometimes taken a contractual stance towards South Asia and the full IO, leading to dominant preference over any other major powers in the area. Views of the perceived value of excluding other powers from the IO are partly a defensive response to the historical experience of India. India's strategic aspirations also reflect broader ambitions to be identified as a significant regional power in the IO, where some analysts directly link India's motivations with its targets to be identified as a great power at the top table of the world

Its polices in the 2009 Indian Maritime Doctrine and the 2015 Indian Maritime Security Strategy outlines India's vision and objectives on various naval fields such as defence, safety, deterrence, and IO humanitarian aid in order to protect and secure the IO. These documents similarly display out different regions that are advantageously essential of the IO in order to protect and to secure India's maritime interests and objectives.

IMPACT ON DIPLOMATIC ALLIANCE

India's concerns are not just driven from China's manoeuvres in the IO but also from China's relation with countries in the region through economy and diplomatic alliance. These improved links may be of consideration to India, as China has challenges India's leading role. India wants to gather and maintain loyalties from the same countries that China presently courts. Through global bodies, littoral states have the most power, not independently, but as a group. Both China and India are required to provide as much assistance to their parties as possible. India has shifted to boost its diplomatic connections in China's immediate region. India has pursued enhanced economic ties with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan, and intends to continue to court partners in Central Asia. India has managed to increase its impact in Southeast Asia, exclusively with Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore, as a manner of balancing the Chinese presence in the region. In the broader context, since 2005, India has strengthened its relationship with Australia, Japan and the United States. The pursuit of enhanced diplomatic relations tends to put India and China in close competition. Any state that gives diplomatic support to China or India is a total loss to another unless the subject of contention in the global body is one in which China and India consent. However, it is estimated that a lower regional state supporting China or India could be a global diplomatic "victory" for both India and China. The IO's lower countries, now courted by prosperous China and India, are the advantage of the new interactions.

IMPACT ON SECURITY AND MILITARY

The IO is India's primary national interest. As a result, India seeks to hold the role of a net security provider and at the same safeguard its maritime activities in IO and preserve the resources in the area. The Indian Navy (IN) plays a crucial role as the net security provider and maritime dominance preservation in the IO. Besides promoting security assistance, the Indian naval force also promotes naval diplomacy to display India's role and responsibility in the IO. Coastal safety in regards to particular competitors within the subordinate regions, as evidenced in many sea border conflicts and legal rights has also been India's concern in term of being a mediator. Others are handle the international and non-conventional threats that can be encounter, along with ecological issues, fish trawling encroachments, contraband transfer border and trafficking, piracy, trans border crime and marine facilities protection. With 40 ships and submarines, which include two nuclear submarines and two aircraft carriers, the in is experiencing significant development on schedule. Its ultimate goal is to acquire submarines, 165-ship fleet of surface warships, and three aircraft carrier in the organisations with a total of 400 MiG-29 K planes and helicopters by 2022. With this, it is estimated that India will reach the balance of power in the IO with the establishment of the naval force modernisation.

IMPACT ON ECONOMY

IO plays a significant part for the Indian economy. Its trade environment that interconnects with global economic opportunities makes IO a prime national area of interest. Hence, with China's economic engagement in the IO, the impact for India is considered negative because China could be India's primary competitor. This reality makes India to consider China accountable for India's lost access to essential resources and its decreasing impact in the region, which it has long regarded as its India's backyard. In another aspect, as the IO significantly impact India in the economy sector, India through the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) have established the Blue Economy in order to strengthen the regional maritime economy. Blue Economy's initiative comprises of a lucrative maritime base consisting of fishing, marine biotech, minerals, marine renewable energy, marine production, shipping, port, tourism and marine logistics. By executing the establishment of

Blue Economy, India foresaw that China economic tension is reduced within IO littoral states but it could also increase competition between both states.

IMPACT ON ENERGY SECURITY

Energy security needs resources that are accessible to promote economic growth, uninterrupted energy supplies and affordable prices. By this standard, China and India face comparable hazards to their power supply and infrastructure protection. Reinforcing this economic growth involves enhancing energy consumption, even as both countries face the looming threat of depleting oil and gas internal reserves. China and India have attempted to tackle the intrinsic hazards of energy imports and transport bottlenecks through four interrelated approaches - pursuing equity interests in international upstream energy projects, constructing overland or underground pipelines, investing in outcast countries with oppressive regimes, and identifying Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPR). The pursuit of comparable energy security policies has often brought both countries into intense competition for the same restricted resources, and China has typically gained the upper hand.

CHINA MARITIME DEVELOPMENT AND ITS IMPACT TO INDIA

The significant of IOR to both India and China are the reasons for competition between the two powers. However, the scenario of China's presence in the IO is creating anxiety for India at its own backyard. Amongst the initiative are asset modernisation, to assist China BRI ambition. The expansion on capabilities which involve ships modernisation impacts India, a force that has played an important role in the stability of the IO. China has positioned the development according to BRI planning by certain measures that has direct implication especially as the leading maritime security provider in the region.

China's development in IO correlates with BRI. It has three primary routes starting from China's inland towns - the first route extends through Central Asia and Russia to the Baltic Sea's European regions. The second route is a component of the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea from Central and Western Asia. The third route involves the path to the Indian Ocean from Southeast and South Asia.

China has created and financed a deep-sea port through the collaboration of the Pakistani administration in Gwadar, where China relishes sovereign guarantees ' of its services, making it faster for China to import oil than traditional trade paths and facilitates more straightforward access to maritime routes in Western China, helping to create shipping, power and infrastructure in the area. The Chinese Security Forces (CSF) have performed their first joint naval exercise in China and Pakistan, The CSF conducted their first joint naval exercise with Pakistan, contemplating a Gwadar-Kashi petroleum pipeline that can enable Chinese petroleum imports to bypass the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean. The establishment was in 2015 through the Economic Corridor of China-Pakistan (CPEC). CPEC is a set of projects connecting Kashgar with highway, rail and energy in the far west of China, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region with Gwadar Arab Sea Port in Baluchistan, Pakistan while emergent much-needed energy and transport substructure in Pakistan.

In Sri Lanka, throughout the growth of the Hambantota port and bunker plant, which is six nautical miles from a significant IO shipping route, China has given economic and technical assistance and increase encouraging bilateral trade and military collaboration with Sri Lanka and is exploring oil resources on the island. Investment in China also includes the Colombo Port City

Projects that Sri Lanka owed China \$8 billion. Economic factors have resulted in the Sirisena government to pursue a 99-year payment lease in Hambantota seaport that assists Sri Lanka to compensation off some of its approximately \$65 billion debt to investors.

In Chittagong, Bangladesh, China has built a deep-water port and is looking for enhanced naval and commercial access. In 2002, the Chinese and Bangladeshi signed a defence cooperation agreement that enables the Chinese naval force to use the Chittagongi harbours and provides China entrance to refuelling stations for its aircraft. Bangladesh's growing export economy is dependent on Chittagong and Mongla's two current, comparatively shallow draft ports. China is upgrading the port of Chittagong and connecting Chittagong and Kunming to build road and rail infrastructure. Development is a component of the Economic Corridor Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM EC) contract. But India is not at the BCIM EC, the BRI summit on this segment emphasizes the region between Kunming and Myanmar's Rakhine coast. Aside from that, China is also Bangladesh's leading weapons supplier.

In Myanmar, China helped build several military establishment and commercial facilities, most notably a Great Coco Island naval wharf establishment and a Sittwe business shipping facility. China and Myanmar have scheduled a pipeline from Sittwe to Kunming, which result in a 10% decrease in petroleum destined for China travelling across the Malacca Strait. China's first military base abroad was launched in August 2017 in Djibouti. China's Navy started counter-piracy activities off Somalia in 2008, and Djibouti's Gulf of Aden confirmed a 10-year rental agreement to China for the base in 2016. Under the contract, up to 10,000 soldiers may be stationed in Djibouti by China, and it is reported that China is investing considerably in Djibouti. The islands of Seychelles are south of Madagascari and southwest of the iMaldives. Seychelles has a 1.3 million square kilometres Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Seychelles and China signed the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement in October 2017. China is allegedly offering a \$7.3 million school building grant and \$15 million for the Seychelles Broadcasting Corporation House construction. In Seychelles, China also allegedly funded a \$6 million judicial construction.

CHINA MARITIME ASSET MODERNISATION

China's six presidents asserted that China must provide expandability and also be able to exploit marine resources, such a capacity improvement movement that will decisively protect China's maritime right and interest, while at the same stage develop China's objective to upgrade to major maritime force. In early 2009, China embarked on the Gulf of Aden counter-piracy missions, but most PLA (N) activities stayed close to home. These missions persisted without a pause almost six years later, and China's more extensive fleet began to extend its legs. The PLA (N) has started regular combat training in the Philippine Sea, taking part in multinational exercises as well as for Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) in 2014. Others include services in the Mediterranean, operations on intelligence collection in the Western Pacific and mobilising submarine in the IO for the first time. The development of Chinese naval activities facilitates these increasing mission into the Western Pacific and IO, owing to combat piracy in the Gulf of Eden. Chinese procurement patterns are increasingly emphasizing vessels that are both capable of multi-mission and big enough to support far-ocean activities.

The Platform and Asset	India	China
Strategic Forces	na	100,000
Navy	58,350	235,000
Principal Surface Combatants	28	79
Aircraft Carriers	1	1
Submarines	14	57
Naval Combat Aircraft	803	2,307
Nuclear Warheads	130	270
Defense Budget	\$51 billion	\$145 billion

Figure 1: Comparison of China's and India Naval Assets

The PLA Navy has moved from transporting frontline warships to fielding six latest classes of indigenous destroyers, frigates, and corvettes since 2004. In particular, the Luyang III Type 052D destroyer, the Jiangkai II Type 054A frigate and the Jiangdao Type 056 corvette all went into serial manufacturing, adding mass, equilibrium and punch to the fleet. The transformation of the PLA Navy from a coastal defence force made up of mainly obsolescent Soviet-era techniques into a contemporary naval service. The 2017 annual report of the Pentagon on Chinese military strength noted that the PLA Navy is going to be Asia's biggest navy with more than 300 surface vessels, submarines, amphibious vessels and patrol boats. China will also have the world's biggest navy as well as the world's second most competent' far seas ' navy. In the coming years, the warship developed will be able to these warships and will serve as ticket to guard the carrier, project power alone as the heart of ground action organisations, retain a noticeable presence in controversial waters, protect good order at sea in remote theatres and undertake naval relations around the globe. The reliance of China on the seas requires uninterrupted access to the ocean routes carrying its trade. The Chinese, however, are well conscious of the possible interruptions to such access, mainly due to the worldwide American presence - China has become more interested in constructing its Blue Water Navy to ensure that the International Code of Free Access to the Global Maritime Common remains undisturbed.

The continuing modernisation of the Chinese armed forces is also directed at creating a restricted capacity for force projection to generate a favoured strategic position with greater emphasis on the use of military forces and alternatives. China credited the Navy with a three-stage development plan in which the PLAN would be capable of exercising maritime control over the First Island Chain by 2000, up to the Second Island Chain (Kuriles-Japan-Bonin Islands-Marianas-Palau-Indonesia) by 2020 and operating globally by 2050. It emphasizes the need to create a ' strategic frontier ' extending northeast, south-east and south-west from the shore (of China) along an arc that covers the Western Pacific and North Indian Ocean, known as ' Two Oceans ', which has some strategic benefits. Also stated is the possibility of arranging an Oceanic Theatre Command at an opportune moment. The Chinese Navy's strategic responsibilities include involvement in the initial strategic vision of large-scale activities, containing and resisting maritime military invasion, protecting maritime rights, island territorial sovereignty and interests. They also concentrated on protecting foreign interests and citizens ' concerns, nuclear deterrence and nuclear counterattack supporting land activities and maintaining global maritime security. For China, maritime strength is more than the navy of the PLA. It includes any equipment capable of moulding occurrences at sea, whether it is a navy warship or a stealth fighter/attack aircraft from the PLA Air Force or a PLA Rocket Force capable of fired ballistic missile. It includes Chinese Coast Guard or sister maritime

surveillance, and it includes non-official tools like fishing ships piloted by military personnel or trawlers packed with electronic snooping gear. In short, Beijing is deploying its various and big sticks to prosecute what some Chinese analysts call a “cabbage strategy,” encasing items with thick layers of unarmed or lightly armed hulls while strengthening the exterior layer with military force.

IMPLICATION TO INDIA

For two distinct but linked reasons, the production of the deep-water port in Gwadar, is of interest to India. First, building the pipeline from Pakistan to eastern China enable oil imports to balance the sea control India has at the mouth of the Malacca Strait. Thus, India is losing an essential point of touch with China and its capacity to exert pressure on China concerning shipping routes. The port enables China to access another maritime point, nearer to Indian coastal waters. In the long run, the port at Gwadar provides a convenient land base for Chinese military forces capable to serve as a military base if a war ever breaks out between India and China. Land bases are essential in armed conflict because they do not demand a naval aircraft carrier’s portable supply load, and aircraft that have simple access to fuel at a nearby airbase can fly lighter for sorties with less fuel. Gwadar’s base construction represents a purely antagonistic relationship between India and China, as well as a mutually beneficial relationship between Pakistan and China.

Throughout the remainder of the IO, Chinese military financing and economic development are mutually useful to countries that obtain Chinese attention but loss for India. Hambantota’s Chinese-funded port in Sri Lanka is an obvious loss of security for India as India and Sri Lanka are historically strong allies, and port proximity to the southernmost tip of India is strategically valuable if armed conflict starts out. Sri Lanka and China’s friendly relationship is mutually assisted with each other. Sri Lanka received the advantages from China’s economy and development assistance, while China can maintain a presence in IO using Sri Lanka ports facilities. In the East, China’s achievement in building a deep water port in Chittagong, Bangladesh, and securing a defence cooperation agreement is a win-win in for those two countries and, like Gwadar’s port, a significant loss for India as the port could be used as an airbase. Lastly, China’s close relationship with Myanmar is a win-win for those nations and a loss for India, as China can use Sittwe’s naval jetty as a starting initial in the Far East Indian Ocean. For some semblance of legitimacy and assistance, the Myanmar government, long separated from the international community, depends on its partnership with China. Furthermore, the pipeline from Myanmar to China enables Chinese oil imports to prevent the Malacca Strait and thus undermine Indian control

India is becoming more and more remote from its direct neighbours as China effectively generates these corporations. Development by China makes India vulnerable in term of geographical, naval capabilities, and maritime economy. The strategic plan of BRI already surrounded India from the land and definitely along the littoral states which massively has China influence in the IO. Using the economy approach, China able to control the littoral state to comply with China intention and interest. Even though India’s size enables to maintain their naval presence in the maritime environment nonetheless, China acquired the advantages in the aspect of alliance and economy if tension increases especially in its capable in force cooperation in dominating the IO. Assessing the situation, India is at a disadvantage and China’s influence in IO make India in a dangerous situation if no action is taken to mitigate this situation. If the tension escalates, China is capable of utilising its many ports for pre-emptive military intervention against India.

INDIA'S APPROACHES IN RESPONDING TO CHINA

India has taken appropriate actions to manage China's expansion in the IO. Nevertheless, it seeks to adopt a defensive approach to retain its regional supremacy. This section will assess India's maritime security policy including its capabilities in securing their maritime and national interest. It will then highlight the approaches adopted by India in responding to China.

Maritime Security Policy

In 2015, India established the India Maritime Security Strategy Policy. The policy has outline strategies and objectives to counter issues that challenges its interest in the IO. The Thirteen India President Shri Pranab Mukherjee proposed that the approach is to utilise the sea and create a cooperative framework that supports common intention and enhances security and stability from any shape of threat as well as building the ability to increase the nation's social aspect and economic well-being in the region. In order to become a maritime supplier in the IOR, the policy responds on issues and challenges efficiently towards the geopolitical interest of the country by developing the naval forces capable of ensuring the stability and the safety of IO.

The IN in that sense is the main component that are tasked to protect the maritime interests of the country. The formulation of India maritime security policy is based on India's Navy guiding principles, namely the waypoint that India intent to propagate their development on maritime capability and credibility. It plays the decisive role as the front liner in encountering any threat to IO. India's maritime security policy also have underlined several vital approaches and outlines consisting of maritime security perspective, maritime security imperatives influences, strategy for deterrence, strategy for conflict, strategy for the development of a favourable and beneficial in the marine and naval atmosphere which involves the coastal and offshore maritime area safety strategy and maritime capacity approach.

Maritime Strategies and Capabilities

India's maritime security policy consist of strategies designed to encounter both traditional and non-traditional threat. This strategy aims to execute the establishment of joint structure environment that encourages common knowledge and improves regional safety including stability through appropriate medium in term of communication and execution or legislative. The essential strategies been charted to fulfil India requirement in order to prevent conflict, coercion and achieve stability in the IO. First is nuclear deterrence and conventional deterrence.

ROLE	MILITARY	DIPLOMATIC	CONSTABULARY
OBJECTIVES	Deterrence against Conflict and Coercion Defence of India's Territorial Integrity, Citizens and Offshore Assets from Seaborne Threats Influence Affairs on Land Safeguard India's National Interests and Maritime Security	Strengthen Political Relations and Goodwill Strengthen Defence Relations with Friendly States Portray Credible Defence Posture and Capability Strengthen Maritime Security in IOR Promote Regional and Global Security	Coastal and Offshore Security Security of EEZ Good Order at Sea
MISSIONS	Nuclear Second Strike MDA Sea Control Sea Denial Power Projection Expeditionary Ops SLOC Protection Special Forces Ops Seaward Defence Coastal and Offshore Defence	Constructive Maritime Engagement Maritime Assistance and Support Presence	Counter Terrorism Counter Armed Threats from Non-State Actors
TASKS	Surveillance Patrol Anti-Submarine Ops Anti-Surface Ops Anti-Air Ops Information Ops Electronic Warfare Protection of Offshore Assets Mine Warfare Harbour Defence	Overseas Deployment Flag Showing/ Port Visits Hosting Foreign Warships' Visits Technical and Logistics Support Foreign Training Bilateral/ Multilateral Exercises Coordinated Patrol Activities under the IONS Programme	Counter Infiltration Patrol Anti-Trafficking

Table 4.2: Supporting roles, mission and task in Strategy for Deterrence.

Source: Indian Navy. (2015) Naval Strategic

Second is strategy for conflict which explains the broad manner of naval asset deployed during the conflict - it is based on the appropriate principle of war and focus on strategic effect involving maritime management deployment of maritime security forces.

ROLE	MILITARY	DIPLOMATIC	CONSTABULARY
OBJECTIVES	Decisive Military Victory in Case of War Defence of India's Territorial Integrity, Citizens and Offshore Assets from Seaborne Threats Influence Affairs on Land Safeguard India's Mercantile Marine and Maritime Trade Safeguard India's National Interests and Maritime Security	Strengthen Political Relations and Goodwill Strengthen Defence Relations with Friendly States Portray Credible Defence Posture and Capability	Coastal and Offshore Security
MISSIONS	Nuclear Second Strike MDA Sea Control Sea Denial Blockade Power Projection Force Protection Expeditionary Ops Compellence Destruction SLOC Interdiction SLOC Protection Special Forces Ops Seaward Defence Coastal and Offshore Defence	Constructive Maritime Engagement Presence	Counter Terrorism Counter Armed Threats from Non-State Actors
TASKS	Surveillance Patrol Maritime Strike Anti-Submarine Ops Anti-Surface Ops Anti-Air Ops Amphibious Ops Information Ops Electronic Warfare Protection of Offshore Assets NCAGS & NCS Ops Mine Warfare VBSS Harbour Defence	Technical and Logistics Support Foreign Training Coordinated Patrol	Counter Infiltration Patrol Anti-Trafficking

Table 4.3: Supporting roles, mission and task in Strategy for Conflict.

Source: Indian Navy. (2015) Naval Strategic

Third is shaping a favourable and positive maritime environment strategy. This strategy aims to encourage security and constancy at sea and improve cooperation. It includes common consideration and interoperability with maritime services of friendly nations through maritime relation, maritime engagement and also High-level maritime strategic interactions.

ROLE	MILITARY	DIPLOMATIC	CONSTABULARY	BENIGN
OBJECTIVES	Deterrence against Conflict and Coercion Security of India's Territorial Integrity, Citizens and Offshore Assets from Seaborne Threats Influence Affairs on Land Safeguard India's Mercantile Marine and Maritime Trade Safeguard India's National Interests and Maritime Security	Strengthen Political Relations and Goodwill Strengthen Defence Relations with Friendly States Portray Credible Defence Posture and Capability Strengthen Maritime Security in IOR Promote Regional and Global Security	Coastal and Offshore Security Security of EEZ Good Order at Sea	Promote Civil Safety and Security Project National Soft Power
MISSIONS	MDA Force Protection SLOC Protection Seaward Defence Coastal and Offshore Defence	Constructive Maritime Engagement Maritime Assistance and Support Presence Peace Support Ops	Counter Terrorism Counter Armed Threats from Non-State Actors	HADR Aid to Civil Authorities Hydrography SAR
TASKS	Surveillance Patrol Information Exchange Protection of Offshore Assets VBSS Harbour Defence	Overseas Deployment Flag Showing/ Port Visits Hosting Foreign Warships' Visits Technical and Logistics Support Foreign Training Coordinated Patrol Bilateral/ Multilateral Exercises NEO Peace Enforcement, Peace Making, Peace Keeping and Peace Building Activities under the IONS Programme	Counter Infiltration Patrol Anti-Piracy Anti-Poaching Anti-Trafficking	Provision of Relief Material and Supplies Medical Assistance Diving Assistance Hydrographic Assistance

Figure 4.4: Supporting roles, mission and task in Strategy of Shaping a Favourable and Positive Maritime Environment

Source: Indian Navy (2015) Naval Strategic Publication

Fourth, is the coastal and offshore security strategy - these approaches describe the collaborative structure and coordinating processes for coastline and offshore surveillance against maritime threats and incursion. The strategy expresses the internal and external maritime security context, methods of enforcement by developing coastal MDA with maritime India interagency.

ROLE	MILITARY	DIPLOMATIC	CONSTABULARY	BENIGN
OBJECTIVES	Deterrence against Conflict and Coercion Defence of India's Territorial Integrity, Citizens and Offshore Assets from Seaborne Threats Safeguard India's National Interests and Maritime Security	Strengthen Defence Relations with Friendly States Portray Credible Defence Posture and Capability Strengthen Maritime Security in IOR Promote Regional and Global Security	Coastal and Offshore Security Good Order at Sea	Promote Civil Safety and Security
MISSIONS	MDA Sea Control Force Protection Special Forces Ops Seaward Defence Coastal and Offshore Defence	Constructive Maritime Engagement Maritime Assistance and Support Presence	Counter Terrorism Counter Armed Threats from Non-State Actors	Aid to Civil Authorities
TASKS	Surveillance Patrol Maritime Strike Information Ops Electronic Warfare Protection of Offshore Assets VBSS Harbour Defence	Technical and Logistics Support Coordinated Patrol	Counter Infiltration Patrol Anti-Piracy Anti-Trafficking Anti-Poaching	Medical Assistance Diving Assistance

Figure 4.5: Supporting roles, mission and task in Strategy for Coastal and Offshore Security

Source: Indian Navy. (2015) Naval Strategic Publication

The final strategy is the strategy for maritime force and capability development. The approach is on developing maritime capability to achieve India's maritime security future requirement and including conceptual, and human resource force level factors.



Figure 4.6: Indigenous Projects on India prospect.

Source: Indian Navy. (2015) Naval Strategic Publication

Maritime Diplomacy

India's responses have been reasonable toward China for long now. India has supported balancing actions with intense diplomacy that challenges the validity of China's expansion in both the South China Sea and the IO. India's commitment to balancing on its disputed borders are as determined as they were 57 years ago when the two countries went to war. Moreover, India's unresolved border dispute remains a trigger for a war that only increases with China's continual expansionist behaviour. Ultimately, India has remained committed to pursuing internal and external balancing strategies in encountering with China's expansionist rise. Similarly, India choose to pursue initiatives that are defensive. Preventing maritime confrontation with China is India's implicit strategy according to the approaches and deny the adversary direct connections to the IO. Given the financial strength and strategic outreach capacity of China, India does not prefer to cause or provoke any friction in the IO.

From a military view point, India maritime approach is adequately designed to mitigate any encroachment that will interrupt the national interest in line with the outline of the objective, mission and task of the maritime forces. Indian Navy has established the prioritisation in the security of SLOCs as India is geographically in the central point in the IO. The action includes patrolling and conduct the surveillance initiative in the SLOCs. The measure taken is the ability of India in developing the Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) also on the sea control in the proximity area which covering the chokes point of the Malacca Straits, Straits of Hormuz and the Gulf of Eden.

Within the goals of public protection, India's merchant marine and naval economic path and containment against confrontation and coercion, the IN has stretched out to the coastal nations in cooperation to preserve SLOCs in the region as one of the reasons for India's ideological opposition to multilateral military commitments. The action on IN is considered parallel with New Delhi aspiration to advance broad security measure of the various gate. IN leave its footprints such as a security effort from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el Mandeb, the Cape of Good Hope and the Mozambique Channel

Nevertheless, under present conditions, to embrace synchronised diplomatic commitments. This is parallel with IN's main efforts to protect India's interests in the IO which identifies peacetime efforts. The action taken is to strengthen defence relation with friendly states and at the same time portray credible defence posture, and capability including promoting regional global security. India has involved in foreign training and multilateral exercises in Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) in the maritime environment. Extending to Pacific reach, India participates in Western Pacific Mine Countermeasure Exercise (WPMCMEX). At the regional level, India's engages with the Malacca Straits Escort Operation with United States other than MALABAR exercise. However, MALABAR Exercise has increased its involvement with the participation of Japan, Australia and Singapore, which have contributed to Beijing complaints due to interruption of the China maritime activities in IO. India is also establishing exercise MILAN since 1995, located at Andaman seas as the tip of the Indian Ocean and continuing until the recent time as the initiative from the IONS.

India emphasizes on naval diplomacy due to New Delhi's vision of a regional security construction. The vision is based on principles of globalism that balances India's traditional philosophy and social characteristic known as *Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam* or its mean one family. *Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam's* idea is not really a strategy for foreign policy, but over time it has influenced India's thoughts regarding international relations. The strategy also involves the

present “Neighbourhood First” policy commitment aimed at establishing stable ties with the instant neighbours of India in South Asia. In a broader framework, India’s modern conception is to establish IO as ‘ Open and free Indo-Pacific, ‘ which is based on a multipolar regional order within a globalised foreign policy framework under the attainment of the United States.

India has primarily been reluctant to coordinate any security measures in the IO quoting related to inland concerns. The Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) are displayed on the Indian Navy engagement in which has been a prominent determinant in naval diplomacy. In cooperation with India, Japan, the United States, and Australia as the premier core group, India have promoted public safety and security in conducting disaster relief operations. The effort was valued highly by the countries acquiring such service, where the initiative lead to the recognition of India’s role in HADR and impact China indirectly as China holds the same concept in IO. In this way, IN structure is already changing with a focus on the capacity to regulate threat posed by China diplomatic. This shows that India’s initiative on maritime engagement is an accurate institutionalised process where diplomatic attempts is responded by other participants which involved.

China’s maritime presence in IO illustrates both economy and military unpleasant environment towards India. India has established that IO as its primary maritime and realised the rising Chinese expansion in can jeopardise India position at own backyard. However as outlined in its policy India prioritises strategic maritime responses through maritime relation, maritime engagement and high-level multilateral interaction between coastal states in IO. The execution of this strategy provides benefits and positive occurrence on India in maintaining its dominance in IO without causing unnecessary conflict with China. In short, India intends to pursue on balancing approach towards naval diplomacy and maritime engagement in the IO in order to achieve stability.

CONCLUSION

This paper is directed explicitly at discussing and evaluating India’s responses towards China in IO. As discusses, the IO is composed of strategic communication line for trade, economy and also global security. The geopolitical and geo-economics of the region lured China into the IO and conduct maritime activities for both economic survivability as well as strategic reasons. China’s investment in the realm through expansion of ports, maritime facilities and infrastructure and enhancing financial involvement with coastal nations in the IO as well as traditional sea naval domain, has strongly impacted the India’s regional dominance in IO. Nevertheless, India’s maritime strategy does not portray an offensive strategy against China instead India seeks to establish and sustain connection worldwide as well as with the littoral states in IO to retain the position of a primary resident force of IO.

India’s implementation of defensive approach will gain benefits and positive outcome and create a stable environment for her to continue practise regional leadership and maintain its maritime interest in IO. With this approach, the littoral states will continue to see India as a stable net security provider for regional peace and stability. India its leverage vis-à-vis China and hence an offensive and deliberate approach will only make thing worse and cause friction between India and China. The pursuit of balancing approach towards China and at the same time depends on the international association through naval diplomacy and maritime relation engagement in the IO will remain the ultimate goal. Nevertheless, India continues to pursue in developing its naval forces and structure plans parallel to the growing security outlook of IO and seek to inject maritime requirement for fleet modernisation in order to reduce the gap with other superior conventional influences – such as China.

In conclusion, it is crucial for India to maintain its national interest through naval diplomacy with the regional states in the IO in order to illustrate public good and increase India's reputation as the net security provider in the region. At the same time, India's engagement with big maritime power will benefit India to enhance its influence and aspiration to be an international player, by adhering to good relations. The other part is about developing economic areas in its own backyard to enhance its trading networks both within, regional and at the global level to upraise India's economic development. Its participation with global association will also open up doors of opportunities to be seen as a responsible partner in ensuring global stability which will subsequently improve its global relations. The global association will also be able to portray India's good reputation as India participates intentionally in other global issues. As an impact of this anticipation, India will be able to seek intention and articulate their intention in the global arena, and by doing so that India will be able to develop, modernise, stabilise, and be able to ensure the safety of the region by claiming or announcing India as the maritime domain in the IO.

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MALAYSIA'S HEDGING STRATEGY BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND CHINA

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ABSTRACT

The power competition between the United States and China has been a topical issue in the study of International Relations. In that sense, responses by Southeast Asian countries are gaining more notice because of its geostrategic importance and its impacts against a possible shaping of proxies within the SEA in support of the big powers. Scholars have asserted that whilst the region is adopting “mix responses”, Malaysia has been adopting a “middle position” also known as “hedging” in engaging with the US and China. Since the Post-Cold War era till hitherto, Malaysia has been postulating an equidistance position and opposite behaviours and this character will remain. Therefore, Malaysia’s hedging strategy can be categorised as “mature hedgers”, “pragmatic survivor”, and “risk manager”. However, it is emphasised that Malaysia will face challenges if conflict occurs between both powers. Hedging could send “mix signal”, “increase uncertainty”, “distrust” and test Malaysia’s “credibility” to whom it would support. Hence, Malaysia needs to be vigilant of a possible “risk of entrapment”, “risk of marginalisation” and “risk of alienation”.

Keywords: *Hedging, balancing, bandwagoning, risk of entrapment, risk of marginalisation and risk of alienation.*

INTRODUCTION

After the end of Cold War, the United States (US) was in a fortunate spot of being without a major adversary. It was successful in projecting its superior power both economy and military and this influence was putative in the Southeast Asia (SEA) region. However, China’s has slowly challenged US’s dominance through its military and economic imminent in SEA - the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which faced several hiccups is expected to continue to sway in the region and China’s partnership with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) provided alternatives for the members. Nonetheless, US’s ability to act as a regional security guarantor and a balancer is welcomed in the region. The announcement of the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) is a good reflection of US’s military and security continuity and attachment to the region. In other words, the sign of commitment from the US is still visible. The presence of US and China is tangible in the region but the likelihood of competition between the two powers is also anticipated. As small states, the SEA countries cannot neglect these two powers but needs to respond prudently to avoid proxies shaping or turning the region into a theatre of conflict. At a glimpse, SEA’s position vis-à-vis the US and China is postulating mix behaviours. Some countries show a strong inclination towards either power whilst others are hedging. Singapore has been the most enthusiastic in embracing US rebalancing (Kuik and Rozman, nd) and Philippines, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, Brunei and Thailand are moving towards China. Indonesia and Vietnam is slightly off the fend against China.

Malaysia has strategically adopted hedging – middle but opposite stance towards the two countries. Despite its concern towards China’s dominance, Malaysia has cordially maintained a proactive relationship with China and at the same time ensured a continuity of the US’s presence in the region. This article discusses Malaysia’s hedging strategy and characteristics since the Post-Cold War by analysing the economic and military engagement with both countries.

THEORY OF HEDGING

Malaysia's strategic choice in engaging the US and China can be explained through the theory of hedging. Its evolution can be seen during the Cold War era, when alignment choices were either alliance or neutralism, neutrality and non-alignment (Kuik, 2016). Towards the end of Cold War, the debate was shifted towards balancing or band wagoning (Kuik, 2016). In the Post-Cold War hedging has emerged as a significant approach in understanding small state strategy. Hedging can be defined as an insurance-seeking behavior under high-stakes and uncertainty situations, where an actor pursues a bundle of opposite and deliberately ambiguous policies vis-à-vis competing powers to prepare a fall-back position should circumstances change (Kuik, 2016). Hedging here not particularly means taking middle position where state will avoid taking sides (Goh, 2007) but it is an act of contrary to allow states to optimize benefits from both sides during peace time and to reduce as many risk as possible during a conflict occurrences. According to Kuik (2016), hedging must entail three policy elements. First is an insistence on not taking sides among competing powers - literally means taking a neutral stand. Second is the practice of adopting opposite and counteracting measures - state will not only take a neutral but adopt a contrary position vis-à-vis the other power. This neutral but contrary position is to give the opportunity for state to gain advantages in all aspect when there is no conflict but also to protect the state if conflict occurs. In other words, it adopts two sets of counteracting policies – “returns-maximising” and “risk-contingency” option (Kuik, 2013). The former consists of economic pragmatism, binding engagement and limited band wagoning while the latter consist of economic diversification, dominance-denial and indirect-balancing (refer to Figure 1.1). However, the two behaviours would be pursued concurrently so that their effects would cancel each other out (Kuik, 2008) and subsequently balance against a stronger power. Third is the use of the opposite acts as instruments to pursue the goals of preserving gains while cultivating a “fall-back” position - adopting a backseat policy and watch over improbability while maintaining parallel neutral and contrary behaviour. In short, preparing for the best and the worst is what hedging is all about (Kuik, 2016).




Figure 1.1: Power Rejection / Power Acceptance Spectrum

Source: Adopted from Kuik Cheng Chwee 2016

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EPISODES OF MALAYSIA'S HEDGING STRATEGY

There are several episodes highlight Malaysia's hedging strategy between the US and China. For instance, during the fourth premiership of Malaysia, Mahathir has often voiced China as an opportunity rather than a threat. Mahathir famously described the notion of a "China threat" as nothing more than self-fulfilling prophecy (Kuik, 2016). He said: "Why should we fear China? If you identify a country as your future enemy, it become your present enemy – because then they will identify you as an enemy and there will be tension" (Asia Week, 1997). Similarly, in 2013, after Najib's win in the 13th general election, he tweeted "Had a very productive discussion with @BarackObama. I look forward to growing the Malaysia-US relationship" (Najib, 2013). But, later tweeted and added "Spoke with [Chinese Premier] Li over the phone recently. Looking forward to expanding our relationship with China, a vital link for commerce and growth" (Najib, 2013).

In another occasion, during the Malaysian Student Leaders Summit, at the question and answer session, Najib responded that Malaysia's foreign policy "is based on principle" and the country "did not really need to choose between the US and China" because of "the strength of both countries" (Star Online, 2014). This shows a classic hedging behaviour of Malaysia between the US and China. After the new government takeover in 2019, during an interview with South China Morning Post, in responding to make a choice between the US and China, Mahathir said: "currently the US is very unpredictable and at the moment we have to accept that we are closer to China" (Mahathir, 2019). But the response did begin with a middle position – he said it depends on how they behave. Second, he practised return maximising option and said China is a huge market and Malaysia would want to benefit from it. This is economic pragmatism. But, he took a contradictory position and added that politically Malaysia would not be attracted to authoritarian. This reflects Malaysia's political hedge with the US.

PRACTISE OF MALAYSIA'S RETURNS-MAXIMISING OPTIONS

Relationships between the US and China are the most vital aspects of Malaysia's policies. Hence, Malaysia has postulated an equidistance posture and concomitantly maintain and enhance its relationship between the two countries. Since it's rise, Malaysia has been receptive towards China at both bilateral and regional level especially in economy. At the same time simultaneously maintaining – but not overplaying – its traditional military ties with the US (Kuik, 2016). Several practises in the past illustrate this scenario. In 2013, during Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Malaysia, the two countries agreed to elevate bilateral ties to a "comprehensive strategic relationship" (Kuik, 2016). The BRI initiated in 2013 played a key role to strengthen economic linkages amongst ASEAN (HSBC, 2017). Since then, Malaysia committed to the developments in Malacca-Guangdong, the Malaysia-China Kuantan Industrial Park (MCKIP) and the Qinzhou Industrial Park (QIP) (HSBC, 2017). The relationship between the two countries was described as "being at its best" (Todd and Slattery 2018).

Mahathir also underscored economic pragmatism when he visited the Alibaba HQ and Geely's HQ to expand its businesses (Lye, 2018). During the Malaysian-China joint communique, both stated that would continue to "actively participate" in BRI and "speed up implementation" of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Promoting Mutual Economic Development (Lye, 2018). Similar "comprehensive strategic partnership" was foreseen with the US. During Obama's visit to Kuala Lumpur in 2014, Najib expressed support for US rebalancing in Asia to strengthen regional security and economic development (Ng, 2017). For instance, Malaysia's endorsement of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), enhancing global trade and ensuring peace and prosperity

in the Asia Pacific (White House, 2014). During chairing ASEAN in 2015, Malaysia leveraged its relationships with the US through multilateralism and subsequently Obama labelled Malaysia as “the country coordinator for US-ASEAN relations” (Bernama, 2016). In other words, Malaysia pursue a China policy that tended to “prioritise immediate economic and diplomatic benefits over potential security concerns, while simultaneously attempting to keep its strategic options open for as long as possible” (Chang, 2014) – an option to maximise its returns.

PRACTISE OF MALAYSIA'S RISK-CONTINGENCY OPTIONS

In security, Malaysian elites adopted a pragmatic approach - in order to mitigate China's rise, developing closer military cooperation and a more comprehensive partnership with the proximate giant is more logical, rather than to counter balance it militarily (Kuik, 2016). At the same time, it also concurrently deepens and expand its relationship with the US and safeguard its position from all possible risk (with limitation) to ensure it does not upset China. Adopting different functions, Malaysia has forged defence links with both the US and China. Whilst indirect-balancing is adopted with the US, Malaysia adopted limited bandwagoning with China (Kuik, 2016). For instance, is the aggression of the Chinese navy around James Shoal. The incidents at Beting Serupai and Betting Patinggi Ali would have naturally led Malaysia to hedge heavily to US but it seeks to develop stronger partnership with China and simultaneously cultivate some fall-back measures with an insistence on playing down the urgency of the China challenge and downplaying the US military strategic posture (Kuik, 2016). Malaysia continues to adopt “playing it safe” approach on the SCS issue (Parameswaran, 2015). In this aspect, Malaysia adopted an approach of hedging to balance the rising temperature at the SCS.

Of course, one could notice that since Najib premiership, Malaysia's policy towards Washington has appeared to be more cooperative in gesture and more pragmatic in tone evidenced by a series of decisions that reflect Najib's desire to enhance Malaysia's ties with America (Kuik, 2013). On the other hand, Malaysia's have spoken out against China. For instance, the chief of Malaysian Armed Forces called China's land reclamation activities an “unwarranted provocation” at a security forum in Beijing, but such statements have been less frequent and less strident than those by officials in other claimant states (Blanchard, 2015). As much as Malaysia views US as a balancer and its presences are welcome in the region as a stabiliser, it is unlikely they would support the US in a confrontational stance against China on the SCS issue, as this could dangerously escalate existing tensions in this maritime dispute (Han, 2017). There is some warning that US naval operations in the SCS could spark conflict. Whenever US warships entered waters that China claimed, China has no option but to send warships (Zhang, 2019). Hence, if there is a collision, the root cause is the US (Star Online, 2019). The concern over US's warship at the SCS was observed during the 6th US-ASEAN Summit when Mahathir said that the US led IPS was “welcomed as long as it does not include sending the Seventh Fleet into the SEA waters” (Straits Times, 2018). He added it is important to ensure that the seas around the ASEAN countries remains free of big warship as it could lead to misunderstanding and unwanted tension - an option to minimise risk.

The puzzle would be on how Malaysia's ties with the US and China may play out. Smaller state will reject both pure balancing and pure bandwagoning, and instead adopt a hedging approach. More studies should be carried out to inquire about hedging strategy by small states (Kuik, 2013). Especially with the new government, new areas of inquiries can surface. As noted, Malaysia-US relationship has postulated deterioration whilst drawing closer to China. Hence, are situation different now? The key question is where there will be change amid the continuity?

MALAYSIA'S RESPONSES TOWARDS US-CHINA ECONOMIC COMPETITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Southeast Asia (SEA) is one space that has experienced and developed interactive economic network between regions. Its geographical proximity and centrality bridging the western and eastern world has driven countries as far as the Cape of Good Hope to Straits of Malacca right up to the Far Asia of China to engage the region dynamically. Its highly populated labour demand, culture and civilisation diversity expanded through international trading networks has added to the dynamics of SEA, and abundance of natural resources has subsequently made the region a vibrant business hub.

Whilst all these pull factors have led to a “win-win situation” where economic partnerships are shaped based on common interest for economic prosperity, it has been persuaded the US and China to turn the SEA as a major theatre of economic competition, seeking global dominance and support through Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN). Countries in the region needs to ensure that it does not face the risk of entrapment and marginalisation with these two powers.

In general, majority countries of SEA are balancing between these two major powers. Malaysia is definitely benefiting on economic aspect through ASEAN due to its hedging approach. This is because China is currently the largest trading partner to ASEAN and third largest in terms of FDI contributor. Amongst some of the involvement of China can be observed through the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA), ASEAN-China EXPO (CAEXPO), and ASEAN China Business and Investment Summit (CABIS) as part of China's BRI's initiative.

Others are the Joint Statement between ASEAN and China on Production Capacity Cooperation, agriculture cooperation through courses and technology which is important for a country like Malaysia where agriculture is a main strength. Growth through the China's BRI has benefited Malaysia both in terms of intra-regional trade and investment flows. All the benefits gained is possible because of Malaysia's approach of adopting a neutral stance and at the same time seek to bind the agreement to maximise diplomatic benefits at the multilateral level.

Malaysia has also benefited from the US's economic engagement though ASEAN due to its behaviour of adopting contrary behaviours of embracing US as a close economic partner. Amongst some of the cooperation covers the ASEAN Economic Ministers-US Trade Representative (AEM-USTR) Consultations, ASEAN Senior Economic Official-Assistant USTR (SEOM-AUSTR), ASEAN-US Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) and the Expanded Economic Engagements (E3) Initiatives. All this cooperation reflects strongly Malaysia's hedging responses simultaneously against the US and China.

Knowing the economic prospect of both China and the US, Malaysia has opted to take a middle position but at the same time pursue an opposite behaviour. As a small developing country, this behaviour is to maximise its benefits and opportunities to gain as much as possible advantage and minimise long term risk for survival. In short, Malaysia postulates an equidistance position in responding towards these two major powers by adopting economic pragmatism and economic diversification.

MALAYSIA'S RESPONSES TOWARDS US-CHINA MILITARY COMPETITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Contrast to the rest of the Asia-Pacific neighbourhoods, the Southeast Asia (SEA) is considered to emerge as a significance space due to its dynamic geopolitical orientations. With the current emergence of Indo-Pacific strategy (IPS) – connecting Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean, SEA has strengthened its position as an important sphere of influence in international affairs. On the other hand, the US-China military competition is currently playing out on an increasingly global scale and because SEA has no strong leader, it has turned to be a viscous contested space between these two powers - both countries are seeking to increase its influence and gain world recognition. Subsequently, this global ambition has entered around SEA - the rapid military expansion in SEA indicates the importance of the region in world politics.

The maritime disputes at SCS in particular has caused tension drawing both the US and China to the region. In a nutshell, the US's strategy in the region is to achieve long term maritime security interest in the SEA i.e. freedom of navigation and commercial access. At the moment China is dominant– i.e. its artificial islands across SEA and US is seeking to ensure its North-East interest is safeguarded by balancing against China through engaging SEA. As for China, the SEA lies next door to its vicinity – the SEA is a sphere for China to stretch its economic and military muscle and increase diplomatic influences. Its active strategy in the region is driven by its interest at SCS – its increasing maritime modernisation, spending and dominance explains this scenario.

This lead the member of SEA to carve its own strategic objectives – the ultimate objective of both countries is to counter each other and SEA is the frontline of this strategy. It is argued that Malaysia maintains a middle position but at the same time pursue an opposite behaviour. Malaysia as a small nation shows strong preference to multilateralism platform and thus places ASEAN as its cornerstone of foreign policy relations and the major tool in ensuring regional peace and stability.

This can be noted when Foreign Minister Saifuddin Abdullah recently stressed that Putrajaya will not discuss the SCS issue on a “one-on-one basis” with Beijing – the Chinese government was trying to push Malaysia to discuss the issue bilaterally during Malaysia's three day visit for the BRI Forum (CNA 2019). Mahathir has emphasised that ASEAN centrality will remain primary. The ASEAN centric way will be the only way out for SCS's disputes to be solved. On the other hand, one can observe China continues to engage with ASEAN – the first ASEAN-China maritime exercise which was proposed during the ASEAN-China Defense Ministers' Informal Meeting (ACDMIM) in 2015. This however shows that Malaysia looks up to Chinese leadership but not in the case of SCS.

Similarly, is the Comprehensive Partnership in 2015 with the US when Malaysia hosted the ASEAN chair that year. This is an example of hedging act to also engage the US to ensure its presences is felt in the region. Subsequently in 2016, Malaysia further expand its relations with US through the US-ASEAN summit where President Barack Obama thanked Malaysia as “the country coordinator for U.S.-ASEAN relations” (Bernama, 2016). Others equal dimension can be observed through ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus), ASEAN Maritime Forum framework - China is also active in ARF and ADMM and in addition co-host the ARF Maritime Security Work Plan 2018-2020 with Malaysia.

Being a small state amidst of the US and China, Malaysia is torn between two strategic partners in safeguarding its national interest in SCS. As a result, Malaysia's response thus far has been both cautious and enigmatic (Adam, 2017) – adopting a middle position but at the same time engage both the US and China in securing its interest in SCS. In other words, Malaysia's pragmatic and hedging approaches can be observed through its behaviour in safeguarding its security, economic interest by abiding to international law and holding on close to diplomatic initiatives while simultaneously preserving and managing good relationship with both US and China.

MALAYSIA'S HEDGING BEHAVIOUR IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: A SUMMARY

During the times of Kenneth Waltz's (1979) and later towards the end of 1990s, the major debate on state's alignment behaviour has been either balancing or bandwagoning. However, towards the beginning of Cold War era, hedging emerged and was believed to arise to address the shortcomings of the dichotomous "balance or bandwagon" framework. Subsequently, the concept of hedging began to gain momentum. Evelyn (2005) for instance said that smaller state has used hedging as a strategy in engaging with bigger power to avoid situation where state cannot decide to either balance against a threat that is bigger or bandwagon against a stronger power which could constrain its freedom.

This is true in the case of Malaysia where welcomed the engagement of both the US and China since the end of Cold War. Malaysia seek to ensure that China does not become a hegemon country but it does not perceive China as a trouble maker in the region. At the same time, the US is not sidelined – its traditional partnership continues and is welcomed as a rebalance to Asia. At the ASEAN level, Malaysia welcomes initiatives and expand existing areas of US-China cooperation. This sets the basis of hedging approach vis-à-vis these powers where it sought to balance both countries at an equal stand and postulate contradictory behaviour simultaneously to show that it does not take sides both individually and at institutional level. Hedging is therefore the right "term" to describe Malaysia's international relations with the US and China.

Several observations will strengthen this illustration. At the end of Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union led the US to emerge as a unipolar power. This led to profound political challenges and worry of US dominance. During the premiership of Mahathir (1981-2003), the US was never a formal ally and politically Malaysia was uncomfortable with US's "liberal internationalist" strategy, but was still a crucial economic and military partner. During Badawi, Malaysia's relationship with the US remain stable and was progressive. A more outstanding relationship was seen during Najib as US-Malaysia relationship grow in a positive manner cultivating stronger engagement and cooperation – Obama's visit to Malaysia in 2014 is the turning point to reflect good relationship between two countries. Today, under the new coalition led by Mahathir again, Malaysia continues to maintain a pragmatic and traditional partnership with the US.

However, China's growing power since the end of Cold War also led Malaysia to perceive China as a good balancer against the US. Malaysia's relationship with China can be drawn back through history, geographical proximity and demographic structure (Leong, 1987). Whilst Malaysia-US relationship was always cordial, Malaysia-China relationship shifted from mutual hostility to good friendship in the current trajectory. It began with Razak being the first to establish diplomatic relationship with China during the Cold War - this example itself shows Malaysia's maturity to adopt an equidistance position between the two powers. During Mahathir's tenure, the SCS issues became a hot flashpoint and yet China was not perceived as a threat but rather an opportunity. Similar situation was seen when Badawi and Najib both continued a strong friendship with China.

This description shows that Malaysia is firm in maintaining cordial and productive relationship with both countries and as Najib has postulated, Malaysia's foreign policy "is based on principle" and the country "did not really need to choose" between the US and China because of "the strength of both countries" (Najib, 2014). The development since Post-Cold War reflects "pragmatic judgements" to insure against "all forms of security risks" (Kuik, 2016). Today, Malaysia has developed as a "mature hedger" which has furnished itself with the ability to increase or decrease cooperation with other great powers according to its national interest.

WHY MALAYSIA HEDGE?

As mentioned, Malaysia has been successful in securing its long-term position and wide-range of interest by adopting hedging. It acted as a form of "risk management" approach in an uncertain international environment. The question that remains is why Malaysia chooses to hedge? There are several factors – the size of power, structural conditions (that is the international system), domestic imperatives, geographically position, history and diversification that drives Malaysia to hedge. According to the publication of Rosenau's seminal essay, *Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy* (1966), size is the most potent variable in understanding a state's foreign policy behaviour. In addition, empirical studies have shown size to be an important underlying variation in the international behaviour of nation states (Maurice, 1973). On this front, Malaysia is perceived to be a small power and therefore choose to hedge due to several reasons. A small country is usually weak both in terms of economy and military. Hence because it cannot provide for its own security, small state must rely on the aid of other states (Sweijis, 2010).

Malaysia has limited resources and the resources allocated for them may not be sufficient for the survival of its own people. In the case of military development and security, Malaysia is vulnerable and big powers are often the body of security. As a result, small power will seek big powers for assistances. This is the reason for Malaysia to choose to take a middle position to obtain benefits from both sides. It seems that the concept of hedging is specially tailored for small and weak countries.

Hedging is an attempt to not only seek middle position – meaning not taking sides but also pursuing a bundle of contradictory options simultaneously to prepare for possible worst-case scenario. This sets the first foundation considering it is a small country. But whilst the size of power is crucial in understanding Malaysia's hedging behaviour, an in-depth analysis of the structural conditions and domestic imperatives will unpack the reasons for Malaysia to hedge between the US and China.

In an international system that is anarchy, Malaysia faces uncertainty. Due to ambiguity of the system, weaker states are likely to hedge in order "to avoid taking sides or speculating about the future of Great Power relations" (Kuik, 2008). The uncertainty is not only driven from the fact that the international system is self-help but also the ambiguity of China's growing power and its intention – whether it would dominate Asia under its wings or be a benign regional leader. This insecurity further increases with Chinese behaviour at the SCS. On the other hand, the extra regional power of the US is questioned – US's intention in Asia is a constant debate such as US's IPS which excludes China and its Freedom of Navigation (FoN) that has raised eyebrow reaction to many countries in the region.

Domestically, hedging acts as a defensive mechanism to boost domestic defence capabilities. As a developing country, stability is prerequisite to focus on economic development and improve military readiness. For this, external stability is vital and most importantly Malaysia needs to expand its relationship with all countries to gain from the best option available. Hence it is best to adopt a middle and a non-aligned position vis-à-vis the uncertainties to safeguard domestic vulnerabilities.

In other words, structural conditions and domestic imperatives have led Malaysia to hedge between US and China and adopt mutual counteracting measures to maximise returns and maintaining long-term fall-back positions. Malaysia has sought to engage economically, diplomatically and both unilaterally and multilaterally. In military terms, it has pursued two fall-back measures i.e. dominance-denial and indirect-balancing in a timid manner. It handles each case individually and as much as it engages with both countries, it remains low profile to optimise the risk contingency plan from both sides in case of a crisis. In a way hedging fits well with neoclassical realist theory as hedging is characteristically a recognition of the structural features of power in politics and an attempt to mitigate their impact domestically (Sherwood, 2016) – an observation of foreign policy where it aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the nation (Gibson, 1994).

Besides that, a state's foreign policy is often rationalised on geographical terms. Malaysia is situated in a great but acute position between the east and west – the region is an important crossroads for world-wide trading and other commercial activities. In addition, military presences are also concentrated at this sphere of influence. Therefore, Malaysia cannot avoid from being part of the US and China rivalry and thus need to remain neutral to avoid being dragging into possible risk of conflict or domination. History also plays a part. Majority of the SEA countries comes from post-colonial experiences – the Cold War has influenced the way Malaysia engages with big power today. Due to the ideological and proxy war during Cold War, Malaysia understands the struggle or consequences of aligning to one power for security – the collapse of Soviet Union has led to its allies to suffer. Therefore, Malaysia sought to take a non-aligned position of not siding any one power and instead befriends both the US and China at an equal level.

Diversification is another important driving factor for Malaysia. As a small country, it is vital to ensure that it engages with all major powers without prejudice and not controlled by one particular power in order to benefit the most out of its strategy. As discussed in chapter two and three, Malaysia has benefited from both the US and China because it seeks to diversify its engagement both in economy and military. China's industrial development and US's resources demands has turned countries in the SEA towards a production and export oriented country. Even at a multilateral level, Malaysia through ASEAN have also benefited from the US and China. Malaysia realises the economic benefit and security umbrella through hedging. This is a reflection of pragmatism practise where it seeks to maximise advantages, binding engagement through various institutionalised bilateral and multilateral platforms to create channels of communication and increasing the status quo tendency of both countries (Mustaqim, 2011) and also limited bandwagoning where Malaysia does not surrender to subordinate position. The degree of power acceptance is multifaceted because of hedging.

PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES IN HEDGING FOR MALAYSIA

Hedging means “not putting all eggs” in one basket. It encompasses two different elements – foster positive economic, political, diplomatic and institutional relations through engagement, accommodation, enmeshment and binding and maintain a favourable balance of power and deter destabilising behaviour amid an uncertain environment (Lim and Cooper, 2015). The question is how well can or will Malaysia endure hedging between the US and China. The challenge for governments is to prevent one set of policy responses from undermining the other (Lim and Cooper, 2015). In that sense, there are both prospects and challenges from choosing hedging as the choice of foreign policy. Briefly two categories can be underlined to understand the implication of hedging - during peace times and conflict times. During peace time, the attempt to hedge is beneficial. It gives insurance for small country to acquire as many returns from both the US and China. The security environment is stable during this time and thus Malaysia and even the US and China will seek to optimise returns maximising options for mutual benefits by binding various and diverse engagements.

The question mark however remains during a conflict time. While country seek to simultaneously engage with both countries to seek long term risk contingency plan that might arise in worst case scenario, US and China may not fully trust the credibility of Malaysia to whom it would take sides during a crisis. It could be that Malaysia will stop hedging as soon as either the US and China is identified as the hegemonic power in the world system and when this occurs, Malaysia will lose trustworthiness with not only the US and China but other emerging powers. Big power may instill more trust if pure balancing or bandwagoning is adopted because it postulates clear cut alignment behaviour and subsequently will support and protect countries that is a true ally – for instance US-Japan alliances. As a result, hedgers like Malaysia will be alienated. Trusting relationship has more promising outcome over hedging during crisis occurrences.

Hedging is a middle position – hence it sends mix signal and in fact increases uncertainty as to which side Malaysia chooses in the event of a conflict. Alliance partners are clear cut relationship because it gives a direct and positive signal of either at the supporting or enemy side. Hedgers raising doubts. It is noted that Malaysia has territorial disputes with China over SCS. Hedging could be risking in the sense it gives a mix signal of Malaysia's actual intention – Malaysia is against any form of intrusion to its claimant areas but at the same time forge military relationship to ensure the stability of the area. It is a form of a way to control China to “behave” but it can backfire because it can create a false sense of security from China and as a result, Malaysia need to accommodate to a powerful China at its own cost consistently and might face increased security threat in other forms – for instance, China reducing economic engagement to threaten Malaysia. As power transition take place, when either country becomes dominant, it can create more distrust – as noted in chapter one, Mahathir recently argues that if the country has to be forced to take sides in the high-stake geopolitics rivalry and trade war between the US and China, Kuala Lumpur would prefer the economic largesse of Beijing (Jaipragas, 2019). He stressed that the US under Trump is an unpredictable country. This scenario is a good example of a hedging act that can decrease confidence and trust with the US. Another valid example is Mahathir's visit to the BRI Summit last April when initial acted cold against China. This kind of behaviour can cause trust issue with China. Malaysia needs to be careful in articulating a balance and benign hedging behaviour to avoid risk of alienation, entrapment and marginalisation. All the aspects are possible challenges in the future.

CONCLUSION

Malaysia's relationship with US and China both economy and military can be dated back since the early post-Cold War and has indeed postulated a steady relationship. However, strategically the US-China rivalry has challenged and placed small countries like Malaysia in a difficult position. In an uncertain world system, the absence of anarchy has led Malaysia to play safe between two big powers. This particular strategy is driven both domestically as well as externally where it needs to ensure a stable environment within and out to survive (especially in terms of economy) and the stability at SCS where it involves its territorial and national sovereignty rights.

However, there is a debate of a possible war between the US and China in the future. In addition, the dominance of China is increasing and is perceived to surpass the US. With these two scenarios, hedging can be a risking option where the former will push Malaysia to choose side and the latter will put Malaysia in position where as it aligned more towards China or the US. This will cause trust and confidence issues with Malaysia. As the status quo of the international system changes and power transition occurs, Malaysia's credibility will be put to test. While these are some of the challenges to take note, it is concluded that hedging has thus far been a successful strategy for Malaysia in approaching the US and China and will remain the same for time being.

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MARITIME STRATEGY – A WAY AHEAD FOR MALAYSIAN ARMED FORCES

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ABSTRACT

Military capability development has been an essential issue, as it indicates the readiness of a particular country is facing a future threat. It has been one of a critical instrument for the nation's survival in the time of uncertainty. Malaysia has been one of the countries which currently improving its' military capability in the middle of the complex regional geopolitical scenario, taking into account the character of the nation itself as a maritime nation. This maritime nation has experienced military development since World War II and Malayan Emergencies where the counterinsurgency (COIN). It may struggle to keep the capability and competencies relevance with the current and future threat, but its geographical characteristic required more focused military capability. It is not only preserving the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) history as a legacy and success story but more importantly, to become ideal and balanced forces. The security outlook just adds another dilemma not only with regional countries but other superpowers in the context of the South China Sea. The discussion will paint the critical fact for the strategic think tank to understand Malaysia as a maritime nation in formulation strategy in developing its warfighting capability. Realization of the geopolitical scenario has been another fundamental issue which needs to be monitor carefully as the military capability development not to be view as escalating complex regional security scenario. Maintaining confidence building through existing bilateral and multilateral relations between the United States, China, and regional states has been the reality in mitigating possible future conflict. It is critical as the uncertain security outlook is developing, the MAF needs to keep its capabilities in maintaining presence and deployable if situation warrant. Above all, the maritime strategy not only considering the military capability development, but it must be able to align the national objective and military effort, in short ensuring the security of national interest.

Keywords: *Competency, Maritime Strategy, Insurgent, Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), Whole of Government (WOG), Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Total Defence, National Blue Ocean Strategy (NBOS)*

INTRODUCTION

In every end of the literature which deal with military thought and practice, regardless the Machiavelli time until the contemporary war, we will always come back to the first question raised at the very beginning, the relevance. The future development of armed forces and security forces will have excellent relations on how well or significance the process in bracing for incoming challenges being made during peacetime. The operational experience and ability to reassess the changing environment will gauge the preparedness in which stands to mitigate the impact on the forces. After the Second World War and Cold War, most military organisation faced the dilemma of defining the mission and development to the current and future threat. The relevance of past lessons learnt will dominate most of the discussion to develop more capable forces. Furthermore, the uncertain security outlook, the nation's economic interdependence and survival of power have dominating the debate amongst strategic think tank. Strategic thinker and operational planner will struggle to come out with more ideal and balanced force development to supplement the means which suit the desired capability.

The MAF amongst the military organisation which will continuously redefine its missions, taking into account the lessons and current security climate. However, the current security concerns in the South China Sea, territorial disputes and trans-border criminal activities required the MAF to have balanced capability to instil the competency in delivering conventional warfare and combating the non-traditional threat. The MAF development, throughout its relatively short history, will be shaped by three inextricably connected factors with great emphasise in maritime strategy. The three factors, namely the post-World War II, Cold War experienced including leveraging military bilateral and multilateral cooperation, Malaysia is a maritime nation by default and balance of power shift in South East Asia. Since the evolution of the threat in post-WWII and Cold War identical from known to unknown, the maritime nation like Malaysia need a credible strategy to derive the MAF development. The maritime strategy found to be suitable as it stands as a subset of a nation's grand strategy due to the range of activities and interest at sea. The consistency and ability to bind the nation and military development found to be relevant. It will propel not only the economic growth but military development which will have a parallel impact. The prerequisite of the existing civil-military relation and stable cooperation with regional partners manifest the relevance to a particular confluence of all three factors, representing nexus to consistently adapt the maritime strategy to the MAF development in particular. The discussion will be segregated into four sections. First three sections will elaborate the respective three factors and influence of maritime strategy in the cone of discussion. The final part will look into the relevance of these factors in gearing the development of MAF to undertake future challenges with the great concern of maritime strategy to supplement the way forward.

PAST AND PRESENT

Post-World War II has left the MAF pioneered fighting side by side with British-led operation against Japanese occupation. The continuation of experience in combating the communist insurgents explored another skill which valued till now. The vast experience gathered by MAF in Counter-insurgency (COIN) warfare during the Malayan Emergencies in between 1948-1960 and 1968-1989 have left great lessons to the future military development. Another episode of "Konfrontasi" with Indonesia" in 1960, demonstrate the relevance of maintaining the existing skill but have to be adapted well in the context of different threat or situation. The significance of this experience has always revisited as the country developed. The valuable experienced and skill well preserved as to mature the organisation in anticipating a similar threat but in a different context. The civil and military relationship materialised with close cooperation and improvement made to coordinate action against the insurgents. The intelligence and information sharing play an essential part to combat the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) disposition and to anticipate a possible attack. The implementation of 'Briggs Plan' identified as the comprehensive mechanism to combat the counter-insurgency. The key success is the population control which enables close monitoring of their activities. It is also to mitigate the support or supply from sympathisers and resist the CPM insurgent to reach the food to sustain their operation. The implementation of a suitable strategy in the first place found to be the driving factor to success.

Understanding the demographic and reassess the threat require the military not only embarking the equipment as a sole solution to reduce the threat. Synergising the effort by understanding the importance of insurgent activities to be contained within the land, the naval forces have played significant effort to the whole operation. The long coastal and sea approaches deemed necessary for the maritime patrol to be conducted. It is to prevent the arms and supplies from reaching the insurgents. Concurrently, the naval gunfire support and sealift play a vital role to disrupt insurgent's disposition. Interestingly, during "Konfrontasi", these existing skill and strategy apply to curb Indonesian intrusion. The strategic and military culture in Malaysian context

admits and value the COIN has been valuable as the key strategic experience. It has a significant impact on the military and civil institution where the security benefit cannot be defined without physical development. This is due to development promotes internal political and social stability, perceived to be more important than military defence. Significantly, the impact of CPM insurgency has greatly enhanced the relationship between the military and the police. It brings towards the 'socialisation' framework of operations alongside government organisations and the police.

The military cooperation builds up during World War II and the Cold War has a significant influence on how MAF is taking leverage to its contemporary military cooperation. Undoubtedly, the existing multilateral cooperation, such as the Five Power Defence Arrangement (FPDA) becomes more relevant and essential in the current security context. In an uncertain international climate, Malaysia recognises its limited capabilities. Continued engagement within the regional partners has given MAF leverage as it promotes better understanding in dealing with any crisis or issues. Alliances are derivative of a balance of threat strategy, which in turn acknowledges the importance of countervailing power. The existing cooperation with neighbouring countries and partners found vital as it can promote stability and endure a healthy environment for economic activities. This situation is conducive to boost economic development as part of the maritime strategy for a maritime nation.

Within the context of non-alignment, Malaysia also began to take an active interest in regionalism as a means of enhancing its external security. It became more committed to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that was established in 1967. Such an approach greatly reduced the potential threat to Malaysia from its immediate neighbours. It also facilitated a lower defence expenditure thereby releasing valuable resources for economic development.

The post-Cold War period leaves the MAF with a question mark on how it will be dealing with the future threat. The challenges not only leave the capacity to deal with internal threat but the territorial disputes which will always undermine the relationship with neighbouring countries. The need to have a better mechanism to avoid clashes between regional military forces in dealing with the complexity of territorial disputes arises. The cooperative and peaceful solution was put in place amongst the countries as it can mitigate the issues of the dispute to crisis or conflict. Despite the 'peaceful' solution in place, the MAF continuously developed realising the need to safeguard the maritime interest as most of the economic growth heavily depended on maritime trade, oil, hydrocarbon and fisheries. Synchronising the capabilities MAF respectively the Army, Navy and Air Force, the concern to maintain presence, patrol and guarding the maritime sovereignty remain vital. Balance approaches in developing the desired capability to safeguard the maritime interest and military cooperation coexist as two-prong strategies to maintain security and stability. Careful development of military might as not to inflict 'prejudice' or implication in the existing military relationship deem vital as it will not to demonstrate the 'arms race' in the region overtly. At large, the maritime strategy valued the importance of cooperation as the instrument has a more significant impact towards diplomacy parallel with the defence development.

The first section has elaborate the synergy between the political master and military leaders in understanding the importance of maritime strategy. The strategic and military culture valued the experience collected post-WWII and Cold War as it measures the desired capability for future challenges. MAF must be holistically developing with greater awareness that Malaysia as a maritime nation and the importance of maritime strategy as a backbone to derive the effort. The existing cooperation seems vital, but it has to be coherent with balanced development to ensure it is capable of safeguarding Malaysia maritime interest. The evolution of the known to unknown threat surface other challenges in shaping the MAF to adhere and respond. The wide variety of skill will

emulate either the non-traditional threat will justify the improvement or redevelopment of doctrine. It has some weightage, either the concern with constabulary duties to guard the land borders, sea approaches and maritime territories against the 'unknown' threat will degrade the conventional warfare capabilities. As the capability costumed to strike a balance between the uncertain environments, the procurement of military equipment to conventional warfare remain relevant. Catalysing the cooperation among the neighbouring countries and coordinated action among the military has played a crucial dual role as it can soften the tension and promote information sharing. The exchange of information in combating issues such as trans-boundaries crimes, terrorism and sea robbery is vital as the actors will capitalising the loophole between countries. The following section will discuss the importance of realising the fact that Malaysia as a maritime nation and how defence development has to be tailored to the geographical criteria.

MALAYSIA A MARITIME NATION

Malaysia is a maritime nation by default. To understand the formulation and application of maritime strategy towards MAF development, we have to look at the factors governing the formulation. Factors such as geographical environment, national maritime interests, maritime security concerns, and organisational challenges, must be critically analysed. About 98% of Malaysia's international trade is currently transported by sea and depends upon offshore economic activities, fisheries and tourism. The oil and gas industry is the main offshore activity. Since the first exploration in the early 1970s, this sector has become the main contributor to the national revenue, which accounts from 30 to 40 % of the national revenue.



Figure 1: Political and Administrative Map of Malaysia

Source: Nations Online Project

Malaysia has a total of 323,186 square nm (598,540 square km) of the maritime area compared to only 329,750 square km of land area, which is nearly double the size of its land area. (Figure 1) A significant portion of the land area is adjacent to the sea, and the coastline is 2425 nm (4492 km) long compared to the land boundary of 2669 km. Malaysia shared maritime borders with

six countries, namely, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Brunei, Vietnam and the Philippines as compared to only three land borders. The Peninsular of Malaysia and East Malaysia are separated by the South China Sea where the shortest distance between the two is 334.6 nm (602.3 km) whereas the longest distance is 875.7 nm (1576.3 km) apart. Reasons are non-exhaustive but what has been mentioned are among the salient maritime attributes of Malaysia. The geographical fact manifested the importance of MAF development in appreciating the significant effort to safeguard its maritime interest. The maritime interests of the country fundamentally relate to its economic contribution to the nation as a whole. Significant development on this interest among others has been the ratification of the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS) by Malaysia in 1996. It is all about safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation in accordance with its International obligations. This is through the expansion of maritime jurisdiction for enforcement, resource exploration and exploitation. For instance, the status of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by its very nature is clearly to give more powers for coastal states to manage its economic activities seaward up to 200 nm. (Table 1) Such rights to explore and exploit the area would also necessitate better enforcement measures to protect the area from possible threats, which may include among other illegal activities.

Regulation Area	Description
Territorial Waters	12 Nautical Miles from low-water line – can use all resources and set all regulations
Contiguous Waters	12 Nautical Miles beyond Territorial Water Boundary – can enforce only taxation, immigration, customs, and pollution regulation
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)	200 nautical miles from low-water line – has exploitative rights to all natural resources. Can regulate but must maintain freedom of maritime navigation and overflight

Table 1: UNCLOS Provisions and Regulation Areas

Source: UNCLOS, 2013

Recognising the geographical factor of Malaysia, the posture of the MAF has to be adhering to the fact that it stands as the guardian of national and maritime interest. MAF will become the first option for the government to undertake any possibilities. The requirement to have suitable assets and capability to operate within the domestic area remains a challenge. Any need to operate beyond the local envelope operating area will pursue the MAF to deploy more capable assets. Domestically, MAF carried out a routine operation such as monitoring the activities and keep guard the national interest. However, when a situation warrants, it has the agility to be assigned as a unit to undertake the given task. A great example was the deployment of the MAF personnel and assets under the operation called ‘OP FAJAR’. This operation demonstrates the Whole of Government (WOG), and MAF symbiotically serves each other. ‘This operation symbolises the unique Civil-Military Cooperation in preserving Malaysian’s national interests. It also supports the WOG effort under the pretext of Concerning the MAF capability development, the great concern looked at the need to have longer endurance surface ship to sustain the MAF operation if being tasked beyond the area of responsibility. As the previous Chief of Navy said that:

Op FAJAR was, initially, a full-fledged military operation whereby the RMN was called in to rescue the hijacked MISC ships, BUNGA MELATI DUA and BUNGA MELATI 5. The operation

developed into an escort mission as the route was no longer a safe passage for ships. One of the MISC ships, BUNGA MAS LIMA was later refurbished and commissioned as the first RMN auxiliary ship in June 2009. MISC crews were then recruited as RMN Reservists. Since then, the escort duty increased; another MISC ship, BUNGA MAS ENAM was commissioned as the second RMN auxiliary vessel in August 2011

The concern in safeguarding Malaysia's maritime interest has become the key which has to be translated by the capability of MAF. The deployable force to undertake the liability covering the vast maritime area dominating the air and land required MAF to be swiftly deployed to the concentrated area. Challenging task ranging from keeping the safety of major trade routes from Malacca Straits to the South China Sea (Figure 2), vulnerable coastal area to non- traditional threat and illegal activities have burdened the MAF to carry out its task. More comprehensive cooperation with other government agency will promote more coordinated and will to innovate the best option to 'ease' the burden.



Figure 2: Major Crude Oil Trade Flows in Malacca Straits and South China Sea in 2016

Source: The Maritime Executive, 2020.

The first paragraph in the second section has defined and elaborates in length the fact which explains the Malaysian maritime attribute, including the complexities. The following paragraph has reflected the contemporary role carried out by the MAF in safeguarding the national interest. The example and the description of the MAF able to deploy as a single entity to carry out its mission manifested the fundamental strategy of maritime as the backbone which marry the capabilities. This is another result in churning the mind-set of the civil and military communities towards the adoption of Total Defence. The overarching maritime strategy towards the implementation looks the understanding of the operational planning in support of the political objective. The effort may not be a success if MAF the only actor which pursue the implementation of the strategy, but it has been made understood; it requires broader participation and effort from the nation itself. This bit piece of success story has significant value on how the future development for MAF should be. Coordinated effort within the MAF and another relevant agency become more critical. The other appropriate agency will fill the capability gap within the MAF, respectively, the professionals or material. This partnership under the National Blue Ocean Strategy (NBOS) has to be enlarged due to the reasons as it can deliver the desired effect by optimising the assets at an effective cost. The

mean of using the auxiliary ship under the smart partnership of maritime strategy has envisaged the extension of MAF capability beyond its enveloped. It is demonstrated as what Mahan sees the maritime operation as follows:

Mahan's view, also, navies were better instruments of national policy than were armies. Less blunt, less symbolic of aggressive intent, more mobile and therefore more responsive to political direction, the influence of a navy could "be felt where the national armies cannot go".

Overall, the MAF role in context safeguarding the maritime attributes have been necessary as it required the MAF as the main actor leveraging the existing partnership. The broader implementation of maritime strategy in term of sustaining and resourcing for war has to be measured. The symptom and need to adopt a better strategy has emerged, and it should consistently guide the development of MAF in having a greater capability.

BALANCE OF POWER

An interesting trend in the military development in South East Asia has an origin from the historical event of the Cold War. The importance to understand the military modernisation in South East Asia as it has a direct challenge to the regional stability. While territorial disputes between countries within the region have long existed, in some cases for generations, the current military balance of power in Southeast Asia has its roots in the Cold War. The stability remains a concern, and evaluating the impact or consequences will be complicated and difficult. Significantly the robust expenditure and military modernisation will result in the qualitative improvement in national capabilities. These will distinct the capabilities amongst the neighbouring countries, and it remains a concern on how the military modernisation will have an impact on existing disputes among the countries. The Five Power Defence Arrangements were also agreed in 1971 after the withdrawal of British forces from Malaysia and Singapore, and provide for the participating Member States (UK, Australia, Malaysia, Singapore and New Zealand) to consult in the event of an external threat to, or an attack on, either Malaysia or Singapore. The presence FPDA in remains relevant in the contemporary environment. The mechanism can stabilise and mitigating the 'arms race' and imbalanced. MAF has continuously developed and modernised its capability. The existing FPDA exercise has been the platform which necessary for MAF to demonstrate the capabilities. It is also used to be the medium for sharing experience and knowledge. MAF development will carefully respond to the regional military development programme and at the same time leveraging FPDA as the field to keep abreast with another developed military. The territorial disputes and ability for the territorial states to pose significant 'deterrence' remain a great concern in developing military capability. The trend development will not only influence the perception the parties involved but other external parties which have great interest if the uncertainty will go to awry. The Spratly dispute deserves its standing as one of the maritime security concerns and challenges due to its complexity and multilateral nature. It remains a source of regional concern, and will stay as it is, due to two reasons. Firstly, it is because of its strategic location situated across the major maritime routes. Secondly, because it is believed that it has large deposits of marine resources. Therefore, any conflict in the area will have adverse effects on the broader aspects of global security and may attract the involvement of major world powers. Regardless of other great power concern; the involved countries will develop the military capability in accordance with the 'known' threat.

As the narrative goes, while continued American engagement provides *reassurance* and *stability*, the current and future relationship with China brings *opportunity* and *prosperity*. The diplomatic ties between these two countries remain important at presence. The rise of China and active presence in the disputed area has been seen as another agenda in safeguarding her resources.

The MAF development must take into account and realises the presence of major superpowers such as the US and China will have a significant impact on stability. The activities of China in the South China Sea, including some in the area of the dispute, has gain attention of US in the region. The US acknowledges the China capacity as the dominant player in the region, but at the same time, the US did not want it to lose its influence over the states in this region. The interdependence of economy and vulnerability of chokepoint surrounding the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea has increased the concern over the stability in the region. In facing the current and future challenges, Malaysia is carefully navigating the relationship to maintain balance relationship between the two countries. This has resulted in the bargaining position of smaller maritime powers such as Malaysia is likely to remain strong. The presence of two major power and how each country significantly influences the Malaysian defence cooperation will significantly shape the development in term of the military professional. This is the situation where MAF has to admit operating within the context and complexity of the dominant power of the US and China. The great understanding of geographical and operational environment will give impact towards the MAF modernisation and development as it remains the instrument of the policy.

The deliberate approached by MAF has to take into account the contemporary development happened within the region. The third section has covered the current military modernisation have an implication on stability within the region. It may be seen as another 'arms race', but the importance of MAF to revisit its capabilities remain relevant. The bargaining power and diplomatic relation remain important. The MAF stands as the instrument of the government in achieving the desired effect. The political objective of participating in the exercise and working together amongst military professional has offered another spectrum to maintain stability. The realisation of maritime strategy as a whole will give MAF leverage in term of understanding the complexity of the modernisation against the stability. The capacity to modernise is crucial as it will gauge the level of 'deterrence'. The uncertainty has left the regional military with a wide range of capability to be developed with. The capabilities not to be compromised in narrowing specific spectrum but it will keep the option open. The understanding of political influence against the military and the contribution towards stability demonstrated by the US and China presence in the region. The situation will be seen by MAF strategic and operational planner in having more deliberate planning in a complex situation. Operational planning will measure the implication due to some mistake at the operational/tactical level will have an unfavourable impact strategically.

GEARING UP FOR THE FUTURE

The military effectiveness to undertake the external or internal threat in the complex environment has distinctive by the different thresholds of technology and integrative capacity. Prudent appraisal of military effectiveness will discuss the effort made by the military organisation preparedness in term of the infrastructure, training and intelligence. However, the results will vary due to the variety of context and factors. While it is impossible to predict precisely how these and other technologies will mature in the coming decades, continuing rapid technological development appears certain. MAF development to become effective military organisation have to answered the appraisal and how much the existing factors and maritime strategy able to elevate the current status to adopt MAF in giving the desired 'answer'. As in the past, one may expect that powers capable of effectively harnessing one or more key technologies will enjoy critical advantages over less-adaptable rivals. The concept of technology as it stands as leverage against the enemies and at the same time, the deliverables to the specific doctrine have an inconsistent result. The fundamental development of MAF again will look not only the technology as the main thrust, but the other factors and appraisal of the ability to operate under the complex environment will be much a concern. This is not a single solution, but it has to be in place to beef the development for the next decade.

The MAF development should overcome the existing weakness in propelling the WOG approach in elevating the defence capabilities as a whole. The relevant to have a broader strategy will catalyse the in-house development to sustain MAF capability development. 'This broader form of strategy should animate and guide the narrower strategy of war planning and warfighting, and Clausewitz implied as much in the famous statement cited at the outset of these observations. Recognise defence industrial base as the major player; existing industrial base have to be more adaptive in sustaining the MAF. Inhouse development will cherish the initiative to innovate and diversify the production. At present, the industrial defence base has limited capacity in serving the need of the MAF. Malaysia has developed a fledgling defence industrial base with specific capability in maintenance, repair and overhaul, electronics, simulation and advanced composites. However, the defence industrial base is still considered relatively low-technology. Procurement of assets with strategic value has given the MAF leverage in elevating the strategic capabilities. The geographical nature of Malaysia required the MAF can mobilise the equipment between the Peninsular, Sabah and Sarawak. Procurement of Airbus A400M transport aircraft by Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) has elevated the capability of strategic airlift including the Eurocopter EC-725 multi-role helicopters to replace the ageing fleet of S-61 Sikorsky. Existing two Scorpene submarine operated by Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) has enhanced the strategic maritime capability, and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Littoral Mission Ship (LMS), New Generation Patrol Vessel (NGPV) and Multi-Role Support Ship (MRSS) under the RMN 15 to 5 Transformation Programme is in the pipeline. The Army has operated the PT-91 Main Battle Tank (MBT), and the indigenous AV-8 AFV is operational and currently being built locally. The consistence procurement of high technology equipment required more reliable industrial base to support and sustain the operational wise of the assets. The MAF development will require detail planning of future procurement and value-added to the domestic defence industry. It is important for long term benefit of technological transfer and the MAF sustainment.

The last section has furnished the fundamental issue which has to be adhered to in gearing the MAF development. The military effectiveness and technologies have an essential part to gauge the MAF present for the future, but the important is the contexts in which it will be applied remain a significant concern. In this discussion, the South East Asia context and the current security climate will be the varying factors which MAF has to consider. The relevance and broader implementation of the strategy will be the backbone to derive the development. The engaging or more comprehensive impact of the maritime strategy aligning MAF and national economic growth should have been the catapult to propelled better development. The initiative to recognise and improve current defence industrial base is vital towards MAF sustainment and technological transfer. The rationality lies with the formulation of the development, taking into account the fact and realistic appraisal of the organisation towards the implementation. This has to be made comparable to the current environment and how it is at the end able to attain the political objective. The pursuit of MAF development marries with the maritime strategy has to be in the right path to champion the holistic development not only the military but the whole nation.

CONCLUSION

Overall, MAF development has to be holistically taken into account the realisation and awareness of Malaysia as a maritime nation. The MAF has to stand as a shield and sword in ensuring the security of national interest. The great experience and vast skill ranging from counter-insurgency, jungle and conventional warfare remain relevant as the fundamental competency for the MAF to operate within its area of responsibility. Multilateral and bilateral engagement remains essential as a means to enhance diplomatic relation and revisit current development. Capable of maintaining presence and deployable as situation warrant is vital in the situation where the security

and stability take centred in South East Asia. As the initiative to build up ideal MAF to respond to the future threat, the maritime strategy as the key elements is vital. The strategy which enables to align the political objective and military effort made this strategy premier and exclusive by its own. The holistic approach by recognising the importance of coherent development for MAF in support of national agenda is more critical. The development will not only take into account the purchasing piece of modern or state to the art equipment, but what leverage it has to support the strategy in place. This is to ensure the development of MAF in the next 10 to 15 years will be in the right footing and relevance by recognising the influence factors along with a more coherent strategy.

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COVID 19: THE IMPACT AND CHALLENGES TOWARDS NATIONAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY

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ABSTRACT

Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), a novel pneumonia disease originating in Wuhan, was confirmed by the World Health Organization on January 12, 2020 before becoming an outbreak in all countries. The Government of Malaysia enforced a Movement Control Order starting on March 18, 2020 to break the chain of COVID-19. This pandemic contributes not only on health problems to the country but also do give an impact to our defence and security matters. Before the cold war, a national security consideration usually takes into account the security of a nation or ruler. The government played a crucial role in safeguarding the security of a nation. This implies that if the government is secured the people's lives are also secured and safe. His excellency, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yasin, on the 25th March 2020 had announced the implementation of Movement Control Order (MCO), for the whole of Malaysia for 4 weeks from 18th March 2020 to 14th April 2020 and while this article is written, the COVID-19 outbreak in Malaysia is currently still ongoing, with high numbers of cases reported each day to date. Hence, this paper discusses the challenges and actions taken by the government with regards of defence and security during these pandemics.

Keywords: *Movement Control Order (MCO), COVID 19, Corona Virus, Disease, Security, Defence, Cyber Security, Immigrants, NGO*

INTRODUCTION

The world underestimated COVID-19, the disease caused by a novel strain of coronavirus that emerged late 2019, in terms of both its propensity to spread and cause harm and its ability to bring businesses and whole economies to a halt. Many countries are in the midst of executing either mitigation or all-out suppression strategies that are taking its toll on both the populace and the industry. The defence and security segment is not excluded too. Even though it appears to be a health issue for any country in the world, this pandemic does leave a huge impact and pose great challenges towards our defence and security and Malaysia is not excluded too. As at 14th April 2020 2, 477 cases are reported.

Malaysia reported its first fatal case on March 17, 2020, a case related to the religious gathering in Seri Petaling. Another death was also reported on the same date from a case in Sarawak). Figure 1 shows the numbers of cases from March 10 to March 31, 2020, which involved the biggest cluster for the COVID-19 outbreak in Malaysia.




Figure 1. Total new cases, recovered cases, and deaths reported daily from March 10 to March 31, 2020

Source: Ministry of Health.

CHALLENGES

Security issues such as Migration/ Border Security/ Illegal Influx

Malaysia is relatively a maritime country with a total coastline spanning 4,675 km and land border 2,669 km. Therefore, undoubtedly the most challenging part during this COVID 19 is the security of our border and the movement and migration of foreigners from the neighbouring countries. Some of them would take this opportunity as they think that our border security is lenient. Thus, they try to trespass it via our land and maritime border. It has been reported that there are a few attempts made by a group of Rohingya refugees to enter the country illegally through a boat in Langkawi but successfully it has been detected by a Royal Malaysian Air Force's C-130H aircraft at 60 nautical miles west of Langkawi and the Royal Malaysian Navy has been notified for action. On the other hand, we are reminded by the current scenario in The Philippines where the clash between the Philippine troops with dozens of Abu Sayyaf armed fighters allied with the ISIL (ISIS) group in the country's southern island of Mindanao, leaving 11 soldiers dead and 14 others wounded recently also worried and challenged our security. The possibility of some of the members of Abu Sayyaf group fleeing to Malaysia via the sea to Sabah territories is very high. On the other hand, there is a reason to worry that the diseases could be transmitted due to the massive influx of Indonesians to our country through land - the Coronavirus might serve to be the reason for their migration to our country.

Other Crimes

Terrorism, piracy, smuggling, narcotics trade, human trafficking, and illegal immigrants are also major problems that need to be tackled during this crisis situation. Although data shows that during the Movement Control Order (MCO) crime rates have decreased it is reported that there are still active cases related to drug smuggling in the country. Nowadays, drug cartels use courier and delivery services as their modus operandi to sustain the activity. For example, during the MCO

period the drug syndicates employ the service of delivery riders to send out their “packages”. While most people use delivery services to buy necessities, some parties are taking advantage of the MCO by using the riders to deliver drugs. According to Bukit Aman a total of 3,085 cases were recorded, including five big-scale drug trafficking cases between April 10 and April 13 and a total of 3,923 people were detained for drug-related offences nationwide between March 18 and April 16. From those detained, 208 of them were arrested for drug trafficking under Section 39B of the Dangerous Drug Act 1952. We also seized RM7.5mil worth of drugs during the same period.

Cyber Crime

Another issue that prevails during this COVID outbreak is Cyber Crime or Cyber Threats. This crime is constantly evolving as some irresponsible people tend to take advantage of the online behaviour and trends as they tend to conduct more of their daily tasks online, including shopping. Cyber criminals are attacking the computer networks and systems of individuals, businesses and even global organizations at a time when cyber defences might be lowered due to the shift of focus to the health crisis. The already-strong presence of crime in the electronic space will likely be on the rise. Beyond typical efforts to hack bank accounts and online sites storing credit card information, as well as advance-fee scams, online loan sharking has a high chance of increasing as COVID-related unemployment and global economic downturn leave many in an accumulation of debts and in a state of poverty.

Countries that provide economic relief to those unemployed as a result of coronavirus can expect a rise in scams, with online thieves pretending to represent social security agencies and seeking to obtain confidential information. While some are legitimate websites, cybercriminals are creating thousands of new sites every day to carry out spam campaigns, engage in phishing, and spread malware or to compromise Command and Control servers. Malaysia is not spared from it—since the MCO came into force, police have opened 393 investigation papers (IPs) with total losses incurred reaching RM3 million as of March 25. It involved online sales of face masks as well as fraudulent withdrawals of Employees Provident Fund (EPF) savings. The scammers tricked victims into surrendering their identification cards and bank account details on the pretext of assisting them to withdraw their EPF savings. Figure 2 shows the Malaysia Cyber Threat Landscape.




Figure 2: Malaysia Cyber Threat Landscape

Source: New Straits Times.

Defence Industry

Broadly speaking, the effects on the defence industry because of the spread of COVID-19 and related actions to curtail the contagion can be condensed into five major impact points which are Production/manufacturing facilities and supply chains, Business development efforts– some will lose, some may win, the demand for defence equipment and related services could drop, Companies may have to make tough choices that could impact finances and competencies, and Stock price declines and would spawn secondary effects. In another perspective, this pandemic also leaves an impact and challenge towards the defence industry and the supply chain process for military goods and needs. Countries around the world are now prioritising matters concerning the acts of combating COVID and halting other businesses including defence. For example, in Western Europe, operations of many other defence firms in Europe, such as Navantia and Indra in Spain, may be affected by partial or complete shutdowns or regulated functioning, thus affecting production queues and deliveries. Even though there is no statement released by the defence industry players in Malaysia, it is predicted that there will be Supply Chain disruptions in which production and manufacturing facilities will be affected and Demand for defence equipment and related services would be remarkably reduced. Maintaining all assembly lines and an active workforce in the face of reduced sales is a challenging condition for defence companies. The disruption of the Supply Chain can also cause a “Bullwhip Effect” in the Defence Supply Chain, thus it could cause lead-time issues such as manufacturing delays, cost changes and other price variations that disrupt regular buying patterns and also Inaccurate forecasts from the over-reliance on the historical demands to predict future demands. All these will leave an impact on the military in terms of training and exercise when the supply could not meet the demand of the main users.

Military Readiness

Maintaining readiness during the pandemic has been a challenge for the military. It is well known that military training and exercises involves close contact of one and another action related to it. By imposing social distances, it does give a challenge to the military side because the nature of its work requires that a lot of people work together, often in tight spaces, under physical stress, and without a lot of personal distance. More over during this condition, military personnel have to assist other government agencies to fight the disease and this affects the manpower requirement because at the same time they have to ensure that the country in general, and our borders in particular, are well protected.



Figure 3: Military Readiness During Covid 19

Source: The Star.

ACTION AND MEASURES TAKEN

In spite of all the challenges, the government and the respective ministry have taken proactive actions to curb and all the problems. As for border security, certainly the security of our land maritime and air has been tightened by the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) and more stringent control would be implemented with the cooperation from other security and enforcement agencies as stated by the Chief of Defence Force, General Tan Sri Affendi Buang. It includes a new strategic plan to tighten the country's security, including in areas that are at risk of "*lorong tikus*" (illegal routes). Patrols along Malaysian waters would also be coordinated with Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency and the navy to prevent the smuggling of illegal immigrants. Other than that, The Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) and Royal Malaysian Police (RMP) have deployed micro and small-class unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) to support the enforcement of the government-mandated Movement Control Order (MCO). The UAS types - comprising vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) systems of various models - have been used in this effort.

In order to retrain the number of criminals cases especially the smuggling of drugs and illegal items, police have deployed a number of personnel from the Narcotics Investigation Criminal Department (NCID) at over 800 roadblocks nationwide to detect drug trafficking trends since the Movement Control Order began (MCO). The number of personnel at border checkpoints is also increased with a total of 2,197 General Operations Force (GOF) personnel stationed at various borders nationwide, which is 50% higher than before. As a result, the police have crippled several large-scale drug trafficking cases in separate operations conducted from April 10 to 13 involving two cases in Penang and one case each in Selangor, Perak and Kuala Lumpur. During a four-day operation, police arrested 15 individuals and seized 165kg and 61,566 pills of various drugs worth RM5.7 million. The drug dealers who use food delivery services (also some food delivery riders) were arrested- even if they did not take drugs, they were still arrested for taking the opportunity to ask for extra payment.



Figure 4: Enforcement Agencies Defending Our Nation During COVID 19

Source: New Straits Times.

As for the military, an action that will continue to be taken is the reduction in big exercise and training. So far, the military around the world has cancelled or scaled down exercises such as in Korea, Japan, Morocco and even the United States of America. In our homeland, some advanced precautions have also been taken which is scaling back training and postponing few exercises to help limit the potential spread of the virus. Some ceremonial events are also deferred such as the graduation of officers from the National University of Defence Malaysia and also the recruitment activities. In the training line, most of the students have been asked to continue their work and do all the necessary requirements through online and video conferencing. The Armed Forces has secured its command arrangements, restricted duty travel and increased teleworking throughout the organisation. Work attendance rotation for those who served in headquarters is also implemented. Physical training may be carried out while keeping in mind the one-meter distance that should be observed.

While it is too early to accurately predict whether the industry will be flat, take a major or minor dip, or grow unaffected by the global pandemic, it is of utmost importance that defence companies identify what the major impact points are and assess their potential to affect business development plans and the supply chains. While larger defence companies may have some contingency planning in place to wait out the worst-case scenario, local small and medium enterprises that run the liquidity risks and have high levels of debt on their balance sheets may not fare too well. These companies will need bail outs or some form of monetary support to continue. Therefore, they need to relook into their business model deployment. Irrespective of how the COVID-19 scenario may turn out, there are some common lessons for the defence industry. The uncertainty in today's world must be accepted as a norm and the defence industry must explore into multiple facets of risk planning. Defence industry players should consider getting more prudent support from the government and issue a few suggestions such as the exemption of payment, issuing additional funds or readjusting the terms and clauses of the contract and many others. The Business in defence is fairly different from that of many other industries, characterized by long negotiation periods, protracted engagements, high stakes, government-to government (G2G) linkages, extensive testing and evaluation, and face-to-face meetings. The current scenario does not bode well for the business development in this industry

With an increasing number of countries encouraging citizens to stay, learn or work from home, now is the moment to focus on cyber-security, whether it is for individuals or organisations and the workplace. The *ransomware* can enter their systems through emails containing infected links or attachments, compromised employee credentials, or by exploiting vulnerability in the system. Some recommendations and prevention tips that could be implemented are to keep all information especially the sensitive information, safe, back up all your important files, and store them independently from the current system (e.g. in the cloud, in an external drive), make sure that you have the latest anti-virus software installed on your computers and mobile devices, secure email gateways to thwart threats via spam, disable third-parties or out-dated components that could be used as entry points, do not click on links or open attachments in emails which you do not expect to receive, or which come from an unknown sender, always update passwords and ensure that they are strong passwords (a mix of uppercase, lowercase, numbers and special characters), regularly check and update the privacy settings on your social media accounts, and as always, if you believe you are the victim of a crime, alert your local police and be vigilant.

CONCLUSION

Apart from mobilising relevant agencies, it is suggested that the Malaysian government can also look into enhancing cross-border intelligence sharing and surveillance to identify and close the

illegal routes (*lorong tikus*). Advanced technologies such as drones, state-of-the-art scanners and CCTVs can also be deployed at suspected entry points, also goods coming through ports and expressways must also be checked thoroughly. For those who are involved in criminal activities, the government should impose harsh punishment without hesitation such as revoking the company's license (good delivery company) and the individual license. Irrespective of how the COVID-19 scenario may turn out, there are some common lessons for the defence industry. The uncertainty in today's world must be accepted as a norm and the defence industry must probe into the multiple facets of risk planning. Strategy should not just be focusing on growth but must also include scenario-based resource planning and material substitution. The defence players have to set their priorities and revisit their business development plans. Despite the actions and precautions taken by the government, it is important to put an emphasis on self-awareness and self-discipline in every citizen. All actions set to be implemented can easily fail if each and every one of us takes for granted all the efforts exerted by the government. *Netizens* should be cooperative and supportive of the government's action during this crisis and they should not breach any rule and law. As Malaysians, we should be proud that we have been recognised as among the countries in the world who have successfully handled the pandemic crisis with our effective and efficient front-liners, foresight stakeholders and a very caring and proactive government, thus as responsible citizens who love the country and our homeland, the responsibility to protect our national defence and security rests in our hands.

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Henderson, D.A., The looming threat of bioterrorism, *Sci.*, 283: 1279-1283, 1999.

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Hurlbert, R.E., Chapter XV, Addendum: Biological Weapons, Malignant Biology, Available from <http://www.wsu.edu/~hurlbert/pages/101biologicalweapons.html>. (Accessed on 30 January 2010).

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